AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS- GENERAL COUNSEL: MASLOW, WILL

HEZBOLLAH, 1993-1996

Factions Scramble to Contain Fighting on Israel-Lebanon Border

Hizbollah

By CLYDE HABERMAN

JERUSALEM, April 1 — Israel, Lebanon and their allies struggled today to keep new border fighting from spinning out of control, even as they warned that they were ready to launch fresh military attacks if provoked.

The Israeli-Lebanese border was quiet today, a day after Israel and fighters of the pro-Iranian Party of God in Lebanon traded some of their heaviest blows in many months.

Israeli forces shelled villages across southern Lebanon Friday, and the Party of God fired more than a dozen portable Katyusha rockets at towns in northern Israel, where residents spent the night in air-raid shelters. At least five people were killed in the fighting. They included a Party of God leader, Ruda Yassin, whom Israel said it had targeted for assassination, and an Israeli teenager who was struck by a rocket while jogging near the northern coastal town of Nahariya.

Each side blamed the other and warned that it was prepared to attack again if civilian areas were shelled. Specifically, each accused the other of violating an agreement, brokered by the United States in 1993. Under the accord, the Party of God promised not to fire rockets into Israel and the Israelis said they would not strike north of the narrow strip across southern Lebanon that they have controlled for the last decade as their so-called "security zone."

Refusing even to refer to Israel by name, a senior official of the Party of God, Sheik Nabil Qawooq, said, "The Islamic Resistance's announcement to shell settlements in northern Palestine indicates our deep commitment to the principle of replying in kind and not to sit silent when villages are targeted."

The Islamic Resistance Movement, also known as Hamas, is the military wing of the Party of God.

In Israel, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin visited the northern Galilee town of Qiryat Shimona, and similarly warned that Israel would attack if Katyushas started coming down again. Mr. Rabin put the responsibility for the fighting on Syria since it is the main power in Lebanon, which still does not entirely control its own fate after the long and costly civil war there. Syria also joined the 1993 agreement, and the Israelis insist that it could rein in the Party of God if it wished.

"We want to clarify this to the Syrians via the Americans, our partners in the understandings, and we cannot stand by if these violations continue," the Prime Minister said. "How we will act and when — I will of course not talk about it."

For its part, Syria affirmed its support for the Party of God, saying through an official newspaper, Tishrin, that "the Lebanese people have full right to resort to any method they find suitable to liberate their lands from the occupiers and their agents."

Despite the tough talk, it seemed that the major parties wanted to keep the situation under control.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher reportedly expressed concern about the border tensions, and the United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, urged that hostilities be suspended.

One obvious concern is that the fighting, which follows months of unease along the border, may impede reported progress in Israel's peace negotiations with Syria.

On Friday, Israeli officials said that Syria had told Mr. Christopher in mid-March that it was ready to give Israel a "low-level diplomatic representation" in Syria even before Israel fully withdraws from the Golan Heights, which was captured from the Syrians in the 1967 Middle East war. This was a departure from Syria's previous insistence that the Israelis must first leave the Golan.

Lebanon

The Southern Lebanon Quagmire

With Israel-Syria talks stalled, tensions grow in the security zone; Rabin warns of retaliatory strikes after deaths of nine Israeli soldiers.

DAVID LANDAU
SPECIAL TO THE JEWISH WEEK

Jerusalem — Just as it was becoming clear that the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations were sinking deeper into deadlock, fighting intensified in the southern Lebanon security zone, where nine Israeli soldiers were killed in two separate attacks.

The developments are far from unconnected.

Syria, with some 30,000 troops stationed in the Bekaa Valley, is the leading power broker in Lebanon. The on-again, off-again Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations have often been cited by both sides as the key to ending two decades of incessant strife in southern Lebanon. Israel has long maintained that Syria could rein in the Shi'ite Hezbollah movement in Lebanon if it chose to.

news analysis

Damascus, in turn, has flatly stated that the fighting along Israel's northern border will cease as soon as the Jewish state withdraws its troops from the security zone and concludes peace agreements with Syria and Lebanon.

And the price of that peace, says Syrian President Hafez Assad, is Israel's willingness to hand over the Golan Heights completely as a precondition to engaging in peace talks.

Israeli leaders have expressed their willingness to turn over the area — but they emphasize that Israel would withdraw only in phases, and only in return for normalized relations with Damascus that would include open borders, free trade and an exchange of diplomatic representatives.



Shalom Barashi and his daughter, Sarit, at the grave of their son and brother Dror, a 22-year-old Israeli army officer. Dror and two other soldiers were killed by Muslim Hezbollah guerrillas in an attack in south Lebanon Oct. 12. The lieutenant's unit was the same one his father had served in 20 years earlier.

Photo by RNS-Reuters

As the two sides show little signs of moving from these positions, southern Lebanon has once again become the site of bloody confrontations.

Six Israeli soldiers were killed and two wounded Sunday in the central sector of the southern Lebanon security zone after Hezbollah forces detonated a roadside bomb as an Israeli patrol was passing.

The latest Israeli fatalities came in the wake of another Hezbollah ambush that killed three Israeli soldiers on Oct. 12.

According to the Israel Defense Force, the latest attacks brought the total number of Israeli soldiers killed this year in Lebanon to 22 — more than in all of 1994, when 21 Israeli soldiers died.

In a special cabinet meeting Tuesday, Rabin warned Hezbollah guerrillas that Israeli troops will "strike in every place in Lebanon" if necessary to retaliate for the deaths of nine Israeli soldiers. Rabin said that Hezbollah was transferring money, men and arms through Syrian-controlled territory.

"Syria is making a terrible mistake," Rabin said. "The fact that Syria is behaving as it is only makes the negotiations more difficult."

As a result of the latest fighting, Israeli commando units have reportedly been placed on high alert, and Israeli gunships have intensified their strafing of suspected Hezbollah hideouts. The escalating fighting comes as Assad has once again blamed Israel for the lack of progress in the negotiations.

Meeting last week with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the Syrian leader reportedly asserted that Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin was politically unable to hand over the Golan Heights in return for peace. Surprisingly, Assad found support for this contention from one of the Labor Party's leading doves.

Knesset member Haggai Merom, chairman of the legislature's important House Committee, which regulates the body's internal affairs, declared over the weekend that there were some in the Israeli government who sought to defer, for political reasons, any progress on the Israeli-Syrian front. Citing what he termed "impeccable sources," Merom said these unnamed government figures had apparently concluded that the latest accord with the Palestinians, signed in Washington on Sept. 28, was sufficiently controversial and complex in its implementation. The Labor-led government, Merom added, now wanted no additional controversy or complexity, in the form of an accord with Syria, during the 13 months remaining until Israel's general elections.

Whether Merom was correct or not, there was ample evidence coming from Washington to support the view that the Israeli-Syrian negotiations were in effect suspended.

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said last week after a round of separate sessions in Washington with Israeli and Syrian ministers that he would not schedule another round of shuttle diplomacy between Jerusalem and Damascus later this month.

He is scheduled to be in the region at that time to attend a Middle East Economic Conference in Amman, Jordan — but instead of attempting to nudge the two sides closer to the bargaining table, Christopher said he will return straight home from the conference to handle negotiations related to the latest cease-fire in Bosnia.

Observers in Jerusalem see this as a signal by the Clinton ad-

Continued on page 57

Hizbollah

Israel Denounces Iran and Syria Over Attack in Lebanon

By SERGE SCHMEMANN

JERUSALEM, Oct. 17 — The Israeli Government blasted Syria and Iran today for their support of the Party of God guerrillas in southern Lebanon who killed nine Israeli soldiers in the last week, but it appeared that Israel did not intend to launch a major retaliatory attack.

And even as Israel buried the six soldiers killed in the attack Sunday in emotional funerals around the country, there were questions whether the Israeli Army still needed to maintain the buffer zone inside Lebanon that it established 10 years ago against Palestinian attacks.

"The Cabinet condemns the Government of Iran which directly aids the Hezbollah terrorists and denounces the Government of Syria which, althouth it is capable of doing so, does not prevent but rather gives backing to the terrorist activity of this organization," the Government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said in a statement issued after a special session. Hezbollah is the Arabic name for the Party of God.

The statement reflected the belief that Iran is the main backer of the Party of God, a militant Shiite movement, in Lebanon, and the Israeli conviction that Syria could rein in the guerrillas if it was so minded. Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war in 1976, and still maintains a force of 35,000.

Syria and Lebanon are also the last of Israel's neighbors not to have made peace with the Jewish state, and efforts by the United States to set up negotiations over the last year have stalled.

"Syria apparently thinks that by encouraging terror attacks, we'll be pressured in all that relates to peace negotiations with it," Mr. Rabin said over Israel Radio. "It makes a grave mistake."

The Cabinet statement also said the Israeli Army and the Arab militia it maintains in southern Lebanon, the South Lebanon Army, had the "freedom of action necessary for the struggle against Hezbollah."

Lebanon put its army on full alert against the possibility of an Israeli retaliatory attack, and Israel canceled all leaves in the buffer zone. But the Government statement made no threat of retaliation, and Israeli Cabinet ministers played down the chance of such an attack, especially since it would probably provoke the Party of God to fire Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, as it has done before in response to Israeli offensives.

"In a war there will always be victims," said Shulamit Aloni, the Minister of Communication, Science and the Arts. "There is no justification for a big army like ours to engage in a war or in operations that will later lead to Katyusha rockets launched.

"There are those who get all excited and think that we have to react. When we were small and persecuted, this might have been true, but today we are very strong, our army is very strong."

The measured response also reflected a recognition in the army and the Government that the deaths did not necessarily reflect an increase in activity by the Party of God, but rather a nasty turn of fate that led two Israeli vehicles to hit land mines within three days.

"This is a war," said the Israeli chief of the general staff, Lieut. Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak. After Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 1985, the Israeli Army set up a nine-mile wide "security zone" inside Lebanon to protect northern Israeli.

Party of God guerrillas have maintained a constant pressure on the buffer zone, insisting all along that their only goal is to drive the Israeli soldiers out of Lebanon.

During the last year, the Israeli command shifted its tactics in the zone from an emphasis on static observation posts, which were vulnerable to guerrilla strikes, to more small-scale patrols and strikes. But that made the Israelis vulnerable to the sort of land mines and remotely detonated explosives that blew up two patrols during the last week.

Last Thursday's patrol was in an ordinary sedan with Lebanese license plates, a tactic the Israelis have used to conceal their movements. On Sunday, an Israeli armored personnel carrier detonated a land mine when it entered onto a dirt road. The deaths brought to 22 the number of casualties so far this year, compared with 21 in all of last year.

One of the questions in the aftermath of the attacks was whether the buffer zone was still necessary, if there was peace with the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Party of God really had no intention of attacking northern Israel.

Writing in Yediot Ahronot, Nahum Barnea said Israel had three options. One was to conclude that the security zone had changed from an asset into a burden and to withdraw. The question was whether the Islamic militants would halt at the border, and what would become of the Arab mercenaries of the South Lebanese Army. The second option was a large military operation, with an inevitably heavy price.

"The third option is to continue the current situation, to attack in measured doses, to absorb attacks, and to wait for an agreement with Syria," wrote Mr. Barnea.

Lebanon

tion. He, like Mr Bouchard, has aimed at the women voters who make up most of the "undecideds", and he made hay when the BQ leader, lamenting Quebec's low birth-rate, complained last week that "we are one of the white races that have the fewest children". Mr Chrétien too leapt on this gaffe, asking in Parliament, "Are all Quebeckers white? And the choice of having children, is that the responsibility of the state?"

The federalists have not offered concessions such as a redrafting of the constitution in Quebec's favour. Mr Johnson did hint at this, and was told by his friends in Ottawa to backtrack. And when the premiers of New Brunswick and Ontario offered to work with Mr Bouchard on a more decentralised confederation, the BQ leader called them "idiots". The federalists' best hope of regaining a clear lead may indeed depend on Mr Bouchard's overreaching himself with intemperate language like that. Which seems a rum way of deciding the destiny of a country of 29m people.

Mexico

PRIsed apart

MEXICO CITY

THE death of Mexico's ever-ruling PRI has repeatedly been predicted—and the prophets have repeatedly been proved wrong. Yet one day things must change. Could that be soon? There were straws in the wind this week.

In Chiapas, the south-eastern state which the armed Zapatist rebels have made famous, local elections brought signs of a peaceful change to a multi-party future. Many people had predicted violence. It did not happen. Instead, a deeply divided electorate gave control of some municipalities to the PRI, some to the leftist PRD, and the state capital to the conservative PAN.

Back in the capital, Agustin Basave, a reform-minded PRI man, was installed as head of the party's main think-tank. Some saw this merely as one of a recent series of moves by President Ernesto Zedillo to shore up his weakening control over his party by putting in like-minded associates. But no: Mr Basave, in his inaugural address, called for loyalty not to Mr Zedillo but to the PRI's "nationalistic and popular" roots; not to the neo-liberalism embraced by Mr Zedillo and his predecessor, Carlos Salinas, but to "pragmatism" in economic policy. Free-marketeers may disapprove, yet politically this was good news: the PRI is beginning to distance itself from government, if only because the present government's policies seem a formula for electoral disaster.

Maybe more important was the news that Manuel Camacho was leaving the PRI to form a broad "pro-democracy" coalition. In the days of President Salinas, Mr Camacho, a former mayor of Mexico city—and in early 1994 appointed Mr Salinas's (unsuccessful) negotiator in Chiapas—was seen by many as his likeliest successor. Instead, Mr Salinas, though a close friend of many years, picked another man as the PRI candidate, and then, when his first choice was murdered, Mr Zedillo. Since then, Mr Camacho has acted as a lover spurned, by turns stomping off in silence, pouting on about his unappreciated talents and wooing the press with grand visions of Mexico's future.

It is easy to dismiss Mr Camacho as a washed-up politician with a bright future behind him. He has no party, and no national base of support. He talks of multi-party democracy, having lived happily with the PRI while he thought it a ticket to the presidency. He quit only because he was shoved out: having taken no part in PRI activities for years, said Santiago Onate, the party's new chairman, he could no longer be considered a member.

Yet this unceremonious rejection suggests that he may yet be a force to be reckoned with. Mr Camacho had taken himself out of the public spotlight for a year following the August 1994 presidential election; to promote political stability, he said. When he re-emerged a few weeks ago, he announced that he would give President Zedillo one more year to fulfil his electoral pledges of democratic reform. If not, he would re-enter politics himself.

It was this that pushed the party's chairman to say he wasn't really a member anyway. Other PRI reactions had been still more vigorous: the interior minister dropped veiled hints that Mr Camacho's life was in danger. All, says Mr Camacho, because PRI leaders feared his message of democratic change ~~would let~~ loose uncontrollable pressures within the party. In fact his real appeal is different: not his love of democracy but his centre-left economics, whose charm will only grow as Mr Zedillo's policies bring further electoral defeats.

Camacho has discovered democracy

Mr Camacho has his eyes set on mid-term elections in 1997, when the entire lower house of Congress is up for grabs. He talks of building a "broad opposition coalition for democracy" that would field a unified slate of candidates. Even Mr Onate concedes privately that unless the PRI revitalises itself with steps toward intra-party democracy—as he claims it will by April—it may lose control of Congress.

Lebanon

Their master's voice

BEIRUT

SYRIA has decided that Lebanon should not have the presidential election it was supposed to hold in November. Instead, it is to extend the six-year term of President Elias Hrawi by a further three years. But does not the constitution ban successive presidential terms? No matter, Lebanon's parliament amended it this week, making the extension legitimate. The prime minister, Rafik Hariri, was all in favour. So, you guessed it, was Mr Hrawi.

Change at the top is hardly a Syrian habit: President Hafez Assad has been in power there since 1971. And the Syrians feared that a new man at the top in Beirut might lead to a more independent Lebanese attitude in the complex tripartite relationship that links Syria, Lebanon and its other occupier, Israel. Moreover, in domestic affairs Mr Hrawi had proved himself a reliably pliable ally.

Recent developments in the region also influenced the Syrians. With their own negotiations with Israel stalled, the new Israeli-Palestinian deal increased their fears of isolation, making them the more determined to ensure firm ground in Lebanon. The Hizbullah landmine that killed six Israeli soldiers in Israeli-occupied south Lebanon on October 15th, and the fear of some fierce Israeli retaliation, can only have confirmed Syria's belief in keeping itself securely in overall charge.

Most of Lebanon's presidents have tried to extend or renew their terms. But only Beshara Khoury, Lebanon's first president after independence in the 1940s, succeeded, and even he was forced to resign halfway though his second term. The new constitution, adopted in 1990 at the end of the civil war, curtailed the president's powers, transferring many of them to the Council of Min-

GUERRILLAS KILL 6 ISRAELI SOLDIERS IN SOUTH LEBANON

HIGHEST ARMY TOLL OF '95

Strife Rises in North as Israel and Palestinians Agree on West Bank Withdrawal

10/16/5

By SERGE SCHMEMANN

JERUSALEM, Oct. 15 — Six Israeli soldiers were killed and a seventh was wounded today in the deadliest attack by Muslim guerrillas in southern Lebanon this year.

The killings followed a similar attack on Thursday by Party of God guerrillas in which three soldiers died, and they reminded a stunned Israel that while the country has come to terms with Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians, it has yet to make peace in the north with Syria or Lebanon.

Today's attack brought the Israeli military toll in Lebanon so far this year to 22 dead, compared with 21 for all of 1994.

The heating up of the war on Israel's northern front came as Israel and the Palestinians reached an agreement today on withdrawing Israeli troops from the West Bank by year's end. The Palestinians said that could enable them to hold elections in January.

The Iranian-backed Party of God has waged a guerrilla war against Israeli forces and an Israeli-financed Arab militia known as the South Lebanese Army ever since Israel set up what it calls a security zone inside Lebanon along the Israeli border after pulling out of Lebanon in 1985.

The Party of God has declared that its only goal is to drive the Israelis out of Lebanon. Although Syria has no formal connection with the movement, Israeli officials are convinced that Syria could rein it in, as it did other Lebanese militias when it intervened in the Lebanese civil war in 1976.

Speaking on the Israeli radio, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said the stepped-up fighting in southern Lebanon was dangerous for all sides. "There is no doubt that Syria must participate in preventing the flare-up," he said. "The Lebanese Government must participate."

American-brokered efforts in the last year to start Israeli-Syrian peace talks have foundered, and Israeli officials no longer expect any

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Hizbollah

Guerrillas Kill 6 Israeli Soldiers in Lebanon

Continued From Page A1

progress until after Israeli elections in November 1996.

Syrian television reports monitored in Israel denied any Syrian role in the attacks.

The attacks sent the Israeli Army into high alert. The Israeli television said ships had shelled strongholds of the Party of God from the sea while planes and helicopters shelled them from the air. Reinforcements were reported headed for the buffer zone, although commanders denied that a major retaliation was planned.

The buildup raised fears that Israel would retaliate by shelling Lebanese villages where the Party of God has its bases, and that the guerrillas would respond by shelling northern Israeli settlements.

Reports from southern Lebanon said today's attack had occurred in the eastern sector, where Party of God guerrillas detonated an explosive as an Israeli armored personnel carrier was passing by. The guerrillas followed up with heavy automatic fire until they were dispersed by Israeli artillery.

Thursday's attack was on a nearby stretch of road, between Merj 'Uyun and the Aishiye region.

The Israeli-Palestinian agreement on withdrawing Israeli troops from West Bank cities by the end of the year was reached at a meeting at the northern crossing to Gaza between Foreign Minister Peres and Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader.

After the meeting, Mr. Peres said Israel had agreed to start withdrawing from the West Bank town of Jenin on Oct. 25, and to withdraw from other West Bank cities at one-week intervals, completing the pullout everywhere except in Hebron by year's end.

The announcement advanced by several months the timetable set out in the agreement on disengagement in the West Bank signed by the Israelis and Palestinians in Washington last month, and it appeared to meet Mr. Arafat's intention of holding elections before the start of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which begins on Jan. 22. Pious Muslims spend the month fasting and praying in mosques, where Hamas, the militant Islamic opposition movement, could expand its following.

Although Mr. Arafat has said before that he hoped to hold elections before Ramadan, it was not clear why he agreed to hold them before the Israelis completed their withdrawal from Hebron. Hebron was a major hurdle in the negotiations on the West Bank disengagement, and Mr. Arafat insisted then that Israeli troops must withdraw from Hebron before the elections.

The problem in Hebron was small enclaves of Israeli settlers in the middle of the city, and the agreement was that the bulk of Israeli troops would not withdraw until a new access road was built. That road will not be ready until March.

With the agreement today, Israel announced that it would partly lift the closure on the West Bank and Gaza. The army sealed off Gaza on Sept. 20 and the West Bank a week later, reportedly to prevent any terrorist attacks in connection with the signing of the West Bank agreement.

The New York Times

The war in Israel's so-called 'security zone' is heating up again.

Hizbollah

World News Briefs

Muslims in Lebanon Kill 2 in Israeli-Backed Army

MERJ 'UYUN, Lebanon, Nov. 1 (Reuters) — Muslim guerrillas killed two Israeli-backed militiamen and wounded five Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon today, and said the attacks were to avenge the shooting of Fathi Shiqaqi, a leader of the Islamic Holy War.

Palestinian gunmen also seriously wounded an Israeli settler in the West Bank. There was no claim of responsibility for that shooting, but Mr. Shiqaqi's followers blame Israeli agents and have vowed vengeance.

Tens of thousands of mourners chanting anti-Israeli slogans accompanied Mr. Shiqaqi's coffin to a cemetery near the Syrian capital of Damascus today, and thousands more demonstrated in the Iranian capital, Teheran.

The guerrilla chief was shot dead on Thursday on Malta, and the Maltese police stepped up security to head off attacks by Libyan militants demanding that his killers be brought to justice. Mr. Shiqaqi, a hard-line opponent of the peace effort between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, traveled on a Libyan passport.

Hizbolla

October 20, 1995

Nine Israeli Soldiers Killed in Occupied Lebanon

At least nine Israeli occupation troops were killed in two operations in South Lebanon in four days in mid-October.

On Oct. 15 at least six Israeli soldiers were killed in a bomb attack and ambush in the deadliest attack against the occupation troops this year. On Oct. 12, at least three soldiers had been killed and six wounded in a similar blast. Both operations were carried out by Hizbullah, an Islamist group which in addition to having a number of members in the Lebanese Parliament, has spearheaded the resistance to Israel's continued occupation of south Lebanon.

The occupation forces responded to the operations by shelling a number of Lebanese civilian villages from gunships off the Lebanese coast and from planes and helicopters. Israeli officials held an emergency cabinet meeting on Oct. 17 to discuss a further response with some calling for an invasion of Lebanon similar to one carried out in 1993.

In 1993 an Israeli intrusion into Lebanon led to the deaths of 130 civilians but hardly scratched Hizbollah which emerged from the campaign with more support.

The United States brokered an accord which ended the 1993 campaign. An unwritten agreement between Israel and Hizbollah called for Hizbollah to limit its resistance to south Lebanon and end shelling of Israeli military positions across the border in occupied northern Palestine. In return, Israel agreed to end its shelling of civilian targets.

However Israel never ended its shelhng of Lebanese civilian villages. Hizbollah meanwhile stepped up its resistance against the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon.

The United States has responded to the Hizbollah resistance by pressuring Syria to use its influence to stop Hizbollah.

"Syria clearly has the capability to influence the behavior of Hizbollah, and we would urge Syria to use its influence to control the violence, to end the violence, and to stabilize the situation in order to increase or enhance the prospects for peace in Lebanon as well as throughout the Middle East," State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said. "This message will be transmitted privately, as it is now being done publicly, to the Syrian government."

Both the Syrian and Lebanese governments have however maintained the position that as long as the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon continues, Hizbollah and other Lebanese groups have the internationally recognized right to resist the occupation. Both governments have expressed anger that the United States does not use its influence over Israel to pressure them to withdraw or at least end its shelling of civilian areas.

U.S. Urges Lebanese To Disarm Islamic Group

By SERGE SCHMEMANN

JERUSALEM, April 16 — The United States, working to broker a new cease-fire agreement in southern Lebanon, handed the Lebanese Government an initial proposal today that reportedly called on Lebanon and Syria to disarm Hezbollah guerrillas in exchange for a possible Israeli pullout from its buffer zone in nine months.

The plan met with initial skepticism from the Lebanese Prime Minister, but intensive contacts continued among Israeli, Lebanese, Syrian and American officials, along with related mediation attempts by the French and Jordanians.

There was no immediate indication when a cease-fire could be reached, but Israeli officials declared that their military operations, code-named "Grapes of Wrath," would continue unabated in parallel with the diplomatic efforts.

The sixth day of the assault was marked by ever more Israeli air and artillery assaults, halted only for a two-minute pause in the morning to mark Holocaust Memorial Day. Israeli planes rocketed the home of a Palestinian guerrilla leader in a refugee camp and a purported Hezbollah installation in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

From their side, the Shiite guerrillas continued to send volleys of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. Officials said 70 Katyushas landed inside Israel, the largest number to date.

The fight has taken about 30 Lebanese lives. No Israelis have been killed.

According to Lebanese and Israeli reports, the initial proposal, which was handed to the Lebanese Government by the American Ambassador to Beirut, Richard Jones, listed several demands that essentially reflected the Israeli position.

They included an end to Katyusha rocket attacks on northern Israel and Lebanese guarantees for the security of the region; the disarming of Hezbollah and a cessation of guerrilla attacks against Israeli soldiers inside the nine-mile "security zone" that Israel maintains inside Lebanon, and a Syrian guarantee for the agreement, along with a mechanism to enforce it.

The proposal retained for Israel the right to attack Hezbollah if the group resumed guerrilla activities. At the same time, Israel undertook to open discussions on withdrawal from the buffer zone if Lebanon managed to provide security for nine months, and to take steps toward reviving peace negotiations with Syria and Lebanon.

The proposals could not be officially confirmed. But the official Lebanese news agency reported that Lebanon's Prime Minister, Rafik al-Hariri, who was in Saudi Arabia, was skeptical about the initial offer. "Our first impression is that there is a difficulty in accepting it in its current form," he was quoted as saying.

Mr. Hariri did not specify his reservations, but it was unlikely that Syria, which has 35,000 troops in Lebanon, making it the key player in any agreement, would agree to having Hezbollah disarmed. Such a step would amount to a defeat that neither the guerrillas nor their Iranian sponsors would allow.

President Hafez al-Assad of Syria has repeatedly insisted that the Iranian-supported organization is within its rights in fighting to oust Israel from Lebanon.

After the last Israeli incursion in 1993, the unwritten cease-fire agreement barred attacks on civilian targets, but left Hezbollah free to operate inside the buffer zone — an arrangement that enabled the guerrillas to claim victory in the fighting.

This time, too, Mr. Assad would presumably insist on leaving Hezbollah free to confront the Israelis and their Lebanese Christian allies of the South Lebanese Army, at least within the nine-mile wide buffer zone.

Israeli commentators said that Israel would demand an unambiguous end to any attacks on northern Israel, and guarantees for this from Lebanon and Syria, including their participation in some formal supervisory mechanism. The Israelis were also expected to insist on the freedom to respond anywhere to an attack by Hezbollah.

The 1993 agreement was unwritten, and included Hezbollah's undertaking not to hit civilian targets, without any responsibility on Lebanon or Syria. In Israel's view, the weakness of that agreement was that Hezbollah saw itself free to attack from civilian villages, but regarded any Israeli retaliation as a pretext for shelling Israeli civilians.

"We have a clear and defined target," Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel said after meeting with Prime Minister Abdul-Karim al-Kabariti of Jordan. "There will not be firing on residents in Israel, and they shall not use civilian settlements to fire on our forces."

Israeli commentators anticipated that any agreement would also include a resumption of peace talks between Syria and Israel, which began in December but were suspended by Israel after a wave of suicide bombings six weeks ago.

Hezbollah

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Hezbollah

Middle East Quiet Could Be Temporary

U.S. Involvement Is Seen As Critical to Turning Cease-Fire Into Peace

4/28/96

By AMY DOCKSER MARCUS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

TEL AVIV—The U.S.-brokered cease-fire that ended 16 days of fighting between Israel and Shiite Muslim guerillas in Lebanon has been in place since Saturday, but on both sides of the border there is skepticism about whether it will last much past the Israeli elections scheduled for May 29.

"This agreement is going to break down eventually," one Israeli official said. "The question is how quickly?"

The answer lies in Syria's willingness to control the Hezbollah military group, which gets arms and money from Iran but answers to Syria, the main power broker in Lebanon. Middle East analysts say maintaining the cease-fire also depends on whether the U.S., which along with Syria, Lebanon, France and Israel, is participating in a monitoring committee supervising the implementation of the agreement, is ready to take a high-profile stance and prevent any disputes on the ground from escalating.

As a press conference held by Israeli military officials in Tel Aviv over the weekend demonstrated, there is ample opportunity in the agreement for such disputes to arise. The Israeli officials conceded that despite over two weeks of intense shelling of Lebanese cities that drove 400,000 civilians out of their homes, the army had failed to greatly damage either Hezbollah's firing capability or its military infrastructure. Moreover, the agreement essentially allows Hezbollah to keep attacking Israeli soldiers in the Israeli self-declared security enclave in southern Lebanon, and neither Syria nor Lebanon supports stopping those attacks.

"This is a short-term agreement. It will solve problems for maybe the next three months if we're lucky," says Fares Bouez, Lebanon's minister of foreign affairs. "But what if the resistance [Hezbollah] attacks a patrol of Israeli soldiers and kills 12 or 13 and a high-ranking officer, do you think Israel won't bomb villages around the sector? What if the resistance attacks a patrol, succeeds in killing many people, and escapes to a civilian village, do you think the Israelis will not bomb the village? What if the resistance sends a Katyusha rocket against the soldiers, do you think they'll respect the agreement? And the resistance will do this, as long as Israel remains in part of Lebanon."

Much of the success of the agreement is riding on Syria. On the face of it, Syria doesn't appear to have much incentive either to ensure peace on the Israel-Lebanon border or let Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres enjoy a quiet re-election campaign. Syria has often used Hezbollah as a way to pressure Israel in its own peace negotiations over the Golan Heights. "It's not so much that Syria has a lot to gain from this agreement," says Barry Rubin, a Middle East expert at Hebrew University. "It's that Syria has a lot to lose if the cease-fire doesn't hold."

At stake for Syria is staying on the good side of the U.S., a critical component of Syrian foreign policy. Syria also doesn't want the situation in Lebanon to deteriorate to the point that its own control there is threatened. And it has a strong interest in making sure that Hezbollah, riding a wave of popularity at home after appearing to successfully stand up to the Israelis, doesn't get too strong. "Hezbollah poses a direct and an indirect threat to Syria in the long term," says Mr. Rubin. "As an Islamic fundamentalist group, Hezbollah poses a direct threat to the secular government in Syria by encouraging Islamic radicals in Syria to rebel. It poses an indirect threat because Hezbollah's ties ultimately go to Iran, not Damascus."

But the only party with the power to force Syria to rein in Hezbollah is the U.S. Back in 1993, after a similar Israeli offensive against Hezbollah, the U.S. also brokered a ceasefire, but stayed out of the agreement's implementation. In the current agreement, says Professor Gabriel Sheffer, a U.S. relations specialist at Hebrew University, the U.S. isn't just bringing the various actors together, it's now the ultimate mediator in case anything goes wrong.

On Sunday, the U.S. and Israel signed a "statement of intent" strengthening U.S. support for Israeli efforts to develop ways to shoot down missiles and stepping up U.S. early warning to Israel when missiles are fired in the region. As part of that agreement, the defense department is providing $25 million for a joint Israeli-American project to develop an antirocket laser weapon, called the Nautilus, that would be capable of shooting down projectiles like the Katyusha rockets launched by Hezbollah in the recent conflict.

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

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Hezbollah

Teheran Says U.S. and Israel Seek to Make Iran a Scapegoat

By DOUGLAS JEHL

BEIRUT, Lebanon, May 22 — As the United States and Israel grow ever more vocal in accusing Iran of trying to disrupt the quest for Middle East peace, the Iranian Government is responding by accusing them of making Iran a scapegoat for their own failures in the region.

In remarks published today, an Iranian Vice President denounced what he called "plots engineered in the United States and Israel."

And with Israeli elections a week away, a senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official spoke in mocking terms in an interview here of efforts by Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel and the Clinton Administration to blame Iran for recent instability in the region.

"It seems that Mr. Peres needs a card, so he invents one and plays with it," said Mohammed Kazem Khansari, an Iranian Foreign Ministry official responsible for Middle East affairs.

Today, Mr. Peres said during a campaign stop near Tel Aviv that Iran was still plotting attacks on Israel in an attempt to prevent his return to office.

In a speech in Washington on Tuesday, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that there "should no longer be any doubt" that Iran "actively encourages" militant groups to attack targets in Israel.

But Iranian officials, who have long denied any link to terrorism, are portraying the Islamic militants who have carried out recent attacks against Israel as homegrown movements to which Iran provides no military support.

And in the midst of an Israeli election campaign in which issues of security have played a central role, Mr. Khansari also suggested that in lashing out against Iran, Mr. Peres was motivated largely by political desperation.

"It's a big deal when Israel fails militarily before an organization like Hezbollah," said Mr. Khansari, who has been on an extended visit to Lebanon since shortly after an American-backed cease-fire late last month brought an inconclusive end to 16 days of fighting between Israeli forces and the Hezbollah guerrillas.

"Israel has to justify its failure, so it says that Iran had a role," Mr. Khansari said. "And now people are even saying that Iran wants Mr. Peres to lose the political campaign. And Mr. Peres uses that as a card against Likud. We don't care about elections. We're not involved in this."

In an interview today in The Iran News, an English-language paper, Ataollah Mohajerani, the Iranian Vice President for legal and parliamentary affairs, accused the United States of trying "to distort Iran's image" to create divisions among the countries of the Middle East.

The United States says Iran is the main source of training and funding for Hezbollah, whose forces in southern Lebanon have waged a campaign against Israeli forces that has sometimes included rocket attacks across the border.

In his speech on Monday, Mr. Christopher said Iran provides "up to $100 million a year" to Hezbollah, far more than the several million dollars that he said Iran provides to other militant Islamic groups.

In the interview here, Mr. Khansari conceded that Iran provides financing to Hezbollah. But he insisted that the aid provided only for the organization's social welfare activities, not for weapons, and he said the extent of Iranian aid had in any case been greatly exaggerated.

Mr. Khansari, who is also a Shiite cleric, acknowledged that he had met with Hezbollah officials during his two-week visit here. But he said his main mission had been to assure Lebanese officials that Iran would provide money to help in the rebuilding of schools and hospitals damaged in the military assault last month.

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Hezbollah

Israel Says Lebanese Bomber Caused Blast in Jerusalem Hotel

By JOEL GREENBERG

JERUSALEM, May 16 — A man seriously wounded while he was handling explosives in a hotel room in East Jerusalem last month was identified today as a would-be suicide bomber for the Hezbollah, the authorities said.

Internal Security Minister Moshe Shahal said the man, identified as Hussein Mohammed Hussein Miqdad, from the Lebanese village of Faroun, "was motivated by Iranian money and Iranian officials who sent him to try and undermine the peace process and to explode in Jerusalem." But a Government official who refused to be named said the man had apparently intended to carry out a suicide bombing of an Israeli airliner.

The explosion was seen by some officials as part of a pattern of violence as Israeli elections approach, a possibility that was particularly alarming because Mr. Miqdad was able to enter the country with explosives.

"I think there is more and more evidence lately about the intensive Iranian activity against the peace process and an attempt to intervene in the Israeli elections," the director general of the Foreign Ministry, Uri Savir, told the army radio.

The police said Mr. Miqdad, who entered Israel with a forged British passport, had a clock-radio rigged as a time bomb and some two pounds of plastic explosives in his room when the blast occurred.

Hezbollah, or Party of God, which is supported by Iran, denied any links to the wounded man. But the Israeli police said he was associated with the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, Sheik Muhammed Fadlallah, and had spent time at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, before leaving for Israel.

Attacks by four suicide bombers, which killed 59 people in February and March, erased the comfortable lead in opinion polls that Prime Minister Shimon Peres held over the leader of the opposition Likud Party, Benjamin Netanyahu.

Those attacks were carried out by Palestinian militants from Hamas and Islamic Holy War, and the links to Hezbollah add another dimension to Israelis' fears of attacks being mounted around the time of the elections.

Israeli forces launched a 16-day air and artillery assault on Hezbollah guerrillas last month after they fired rockets into northern Israel.

Mr. Peres has repeatedly asserted in recent weeks that Iran is trying to organize terrorist attacks in Israel before the May 29 elections in order to topple his Government and halt Arab-Israeli peace efforts.

Newspapers have published almost daily reports of foiled or aborted attacks.

The disclosure that Mr. Miqdad, who flew to Israel from Switzerland, had smuggled explosives through airport security raised new concerns of a possible attack by Muslim militants. Security checks have been increased at Israeli airports and ports, and a ban on entry of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been tightened.

The police said that Mr. Miqdad arrived in Israel on April 4 on a Swissair flight from Zurich. After spending a few days in Tel Aviv, the police said, he moved to the Lawrence Hotel in East Jerusalem on April 9. His forged British passport, bearing the name Andrew Jonathan Charles Newman, was reportedly stolen three years ago.

On April 12 an explosion ripped through Mr. Miqdad's hotel room, blowing off his legs and one of his hands, and blinding him. He was hospitalized under tight police guard, and a court order banned publication of any details about him while the case was investigated by the police and the Shin Bet security service.

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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Hezbollah

Israelis and Hezbollah Exchange Prisoners and Bodies

By DOUGLAS JEHL

JERUSALEM, July 21 — Israel and the Iranian-backed guerrilla group Hezbollah today carried out the largest swap of prisoners and bodies since their conflict in southern Lebanon began 14 years ago.

The exchange followed three months of secret negotiations brokered by a German official, and it kindled hopes for better cooperation between Israel and the guerrillas, whose battles erupted into widespread fighting in April.

Neither Israel nor Hezbollah relinquished the prisoners most eagerly sought by the other side. But by day's end, the two sides were well on their way to completing a handover that is to grant freedom to 45 Shiite Muslims from a jail in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon and the return of more than 100 Hezbollah bodies in exchange for the remains of two Israeli soldiers last seen in 1986.

Acceptance of the terms marked an important policy decision by Israel's new Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who said he hoped that it would lead to further flexibility from Hezbollah, also known as the Party of God, and its two major sponsors, Syria and Iran.

"The return of our dead is a step in the right direction," Mr. Netanyahu said this afternoon. "I hope that we can anticipate additional steps in the near future."

The exchange, carried out via an aircraft, trucks and buses that shuttled freed prisoners and coffins across the Israeli-Lebanese frontier, was the first between the sides since 1991.

It reflected an easing of policy by Israel, which had insisted that any further swap include information about Capt. Ron Arad, a navigator in the Air Force who is the only Israeli missing in Lebanon known to have survived capture.

Israel has maintained for years that Captain Arad is being held by Iranian elements in Lebanon, but officials conceded that the accord leading to the exchange today provided them with no new information about him. Hezbollah and Iran have denied having any information about Captain Arad's whereabouts.

Among its Shiite prisoners, Israel still holds two top Hezbollah officials, Sheik Abdel Karim Obeid and Mustafa Dirani, kidnapped by its commandos as potential bargaining chips, and Mr. Netanyahu expressed hope that today's agreement might lead to a further exchange.

A similar sentiment was voiced by the German intermediary, Bernd Schmidbauer, an aide to Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Mr. Schmidbauer, who traveled to Lebanon, Syria and Iran during what he described as "very difficult" negotiations, said he was determined to pursue efforts aimed at winning the return of all prisoners and of those still missing in action.

Mr. Netanyahu's Government has also expressed interest in a limited deal to halt hostilities in southern Lebanon, the last active front in the Arab-Israeli wars.

But it is not clear that either side is willing to make the concessions needed to bring an end to the fighting in the self-declared security zone that Israel has occupied since its forces invaded Lebanon in 1982.

Hezbollah was established by Iran to help counter that Israeli invasion, and today's exchange underscored both the duration and the fury of the conflict that has followed.

The New York Times

The prisoners returned to Hezbollah had been held in Khiam.

Pvt. Yosef Fink and Pvt. Rahamim Alsheik, the two Israeli soldiers whose bodies were returned today, were among six still missing from battles in Lebanon between 1982 and 1986 at the height of fighting there. The two, then 20 years old, were ambushed in February 1986 while on a patrol in the Israeli-occupied zone, and later died in captivity.

Israel learned as a result of an earlier prisoner exchange in 1991 that both men were dead. But until this month, attempts to win the return of their bodies had repeatedly fallen way to new hostilities, including Israel's kidnapping of Mr. Dirani in 1994 and its new invasions of southern Lebanon that year and again in April in response to Hezbollah rocket attacks on towns in northern Israel.

Among others handed over by Hezbollah today were 17 members of the South Lebanon Army, which operates side by side with Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and some of whose soldiers had been held captive for years.

Some of the freed men kissed the forehead of Hezbollah's leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, before they were handed over to representatives of the International Committee for the Red Cross, who delivered them to a checkpoint in southern Lebanon leading to the Israeli-occupied zone.

Of the 45 Shiite prisoners to be freed under the accord, only 20 had been released by late evening from a prison run by the South Lebanon Army in the village of Khiam, which lies inside the Israeli-occupied zone. Those who were released, including three women, were bused northward to the village of Kafr Tibnit.

Israeli officials said that the German-brokered negotiations leading to the release began on the eve of Israel's election in late May, after Shimon Peres, then the Prime Minister, gave his approval to Chancellor Kohl, and that Mr. Netanyahu was briefed about the evolving accord shortly after his victory.

Since taking office, Mr. Netanyahu has taken a tough line toward Hezbollah, saying that his Government would "take care" of the guerrilla force "in our own way."

In his meeting with reporters this afternoon, the Prime Minister did not say today why he had not demanded that the deal include information about Captain Arad or the three other missing Israeli soldiers, who were in a tank crew battling Syrian armored forces in the Bekaa region in June 1982. Nothing has been heard of them since.

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

The Origins of Hizballah

Shimon Shapira

The Origins of Hizballah

Shimon Shapira

Parallel to the activity of Imam Musa al-Sadr in Lebanon, an Islamic Shiite trend developed there in the 1970s which maintained its apartness and did not automatically identify with the Sadr's handiwork. For the most part the leading figures of this trend were graduates of the religious academies in Najaf; others had been affiliated with the Da'wa party during their residence in Iraq, from which they were expelled following the assumption of power by the Ba'th regime in July of 1968. The Ba'th, which took a grave view of the Shiites' subversive propensities, carried out extensive operations of suppression against the academies. Their students were subjected to detention, torture, deportation and even execution. These punitive measures constituted a major setback to the Shiites' organizational efforts and generated a wave of protests in the Shiite world, principally in Lebanon. There the struggle against the Iraqi Ba'th regime was led by Sheikh Hussein Ma'tuq – the representative in Beirut of the Great Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim – together with Musa al-Sadr.

In 1970 the *Marja* (chief Shiite legal authority) Muhsin al-Hakim died. He was succeeded at the apex of the Shiite religious hierarchy in Najaf by the *Marja* Abu al-Qasim al-Kho'i. The latter, in contrast to his colleagues in Najaf, kept aloof from politics and confined his activities to matters of religion and religious law. As a result, there remained two ranking activist ayatollahs who

* Shimon Shapira specializes in the study of Shiism in Lebanon. An earlier essay, on Imam Musa al-Sadr, appeared in *The Jerusalen Quarterly* 44 (Fall 1987), pp. 121-124. Both this essay and the previous one are based on a larger study on radical Shiism in Lebanon conducted by the author at Tel Aviv University, which is to be published by the Dayan Center for ME Studies, Tel Aviv University.

[*The Jerusalem Quarterly*, Number 46, Spring 1988]

continued to teach at Najaf, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Musa Sadr's cousin), and Khomeini. Both of them, al-Sadr in particular, still had many Lebanese pupils who were influenced by the radical ideas of their master and whose doctrine they adopted.

As a result of the deportation policy launched by the Iraqi Ba'th regime against the foreign *ulama*, several dozen Lebanese clerics, who had spent their formative years in the melting-pot of Najaf – virtually all of them pupils of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr – arrived in Lebanon in the early 1970s. The most prominent among them set about founding Shiite educational institutions (*hawzat*), which were actually Shiite religious academies on the Najaf model. Two *hawzat* were established in Beirut, one in Baalbek, and two more in southern Lebanon (in Tyre and in the town of Sadikin). The idea was that these institutions would together form a radical religious infrastructure and turn out disciples of the activist school, emulating the education the founders of the new institutions had received at Najaf. Najaf in fact became the source of both inspiration and funding for the new *hawzat*.

At the same time Najaf graduates, along with other Lebanese, formed the Lebanese Islamic Da'wa Party, modelled on the Iraqi party of the same name. This organization took full advantage of Lebanon's political pluralism, operating openly, while maintaining contact and forging a mutual-aid network with the mother organization that functioned clandestinely in Iraq. The target population of the Lebanese Da'wa was the generation of young Shiites who were organized in the Lebanese Association of Muslim Students, founded by Shiite graduates of the Arab University of Beirut. Working in parallel to this association was the Amal movement, then still in its infancy.

The Lebanese Da'wa and its cadres in the students' association found their spiritual leader in the unique person of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a *mujtahid* (authority in religious law) who was a graduate of the Shiite colleges in Najaf, where he had apparently supported the Iraqi Da'wa. Fadlallah arrived in Lebanon in 1966 from Najaf, where he had been born in 1935 to a well-known Lebanese family of learned Shiites. Seven years earlier his father had taken the family to Najaf from Aynata, not far from Bint Jubeil in southern Lebanon. Muhammad Hussein's mother was the daughter of Hassan Bazzi, head of one of the most distinguished Shiite families in southern Lebanon. Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah settled in the Nab'a quarter of East Beirut, an area heavily populated by Shiites from the south and from the Beqa'. There, as the representative of his master and teacher Abu al-Qasim al-Kho'i, the supreme religious authority of the Shiite world, he strove to establish himself as a ranking *mujtahid* with an acknowledged standing of his own. In this period, which saw the impressive success of the Imam Musa al-Sadr, Fadlallah opted for a quiet mode of activity, far removed from the political realm.

His activity combined the establishment of charitable associations, educational institutions in the form of schools and clubs, and clinics and orphanages, with Shiite erudition, writing, religious instruction and teaching. Within this framework, Fadlallah established in the Nab'a quarter a welfare association which was geared to provide aid and succor, including education, to needy Shiites arriving in Beirut from the south and from the Beqa' in search of a livelihood. Under Fadlallah's patronage the association published a journal, *al-Hikma*, which to this day serves as one of the principal organs of expression of the *sayyid*, as he is called by his followers. Fadlallah taught at the Nab'a-based Islamic Shari'i Institute, which was attended by pupils from all over Lebanon who were educated in a new form of Shiism, activist in its conception. One of the institution's most outstanding students was Sheikh Raghib Harb, who pursued his studies at Najaf and would later gain renown as a leader of Hizballah in southern Lebanon.

In dozens of articles and more than twenty books Fadlallah laid the ideological basis for his revolutionary activist ideas in the new spirit of Shiism. Among the subjects he addressed was when and under what circumstances force should be used against the enemies of Islam. He also served as a kind of guide to the Shiite religious circles which found their place outside Musa al-Sadr's movement. The *sayyid* cultivated the spiritual life of these circles and also gave his patronage to the organ of the Lebanese Association of Muslim Students, *al-Muntalaq*, which quickly became the main journal for the expression of his ideas.

Thus within the Shiite community in Lebanon, alongside Musa al-Sadr's movement, a relatively small trend evolved which emphasized its Islamic Shiite roots and its affinity with the spiritual center in Najaf. At the same time, this new trend rejected the Lebanese national identity to which Sadr had vowed allegiance in his efforts to gain the authorities' legitimacy and recognition as head of the Lebanese Shiite community. Nor were the adherents of the new trend willing to accept the Christians' rule over the Muslims in Lebanon as an unassailable fact, as Sadr did, for example, when he declared publicly that the president of Lebanon must be a Christian. They also spurned the compromises which Sadr was willing to effect with the Christians, as expressed symbolically in the Imam's public appearances in churches of the 'heretics' and in the close affinity which Sadr developed for Christian ritual objects. Indeed, the leaders of the new trend, of whom the most prominent personality was Fadlallah, were not prepared to follow Musa al-Sadr's leap into the center of Lebanese politics, a move which they felt would come at the expense of their independence. Fadlallah himself rigorously avoided becoming involved in Lebanese politics or in Sadr's political activity. Although he was a member of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council established

by Sadr, incorporating all the Shiite religious figures in Lebanon, he did not associate himself with any of the rival groups which operated within that body. Not even at the height of the struggle of March 1975 against Sadr's wish to extend his term as head of the Council until the age of 65, did Fadlallah take a stand. At all events, Sadr overcame his opponents, led by a Baalbek *mufti* who headed a group of traditional Shiite clerics. Sadr removed the *mufti* from his post as deputy chairman of the Council, and appointed in his place Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din.

Sadr, heartened by the acknowledgement of his standing and the confidence placed in him through being chosen to serve for years to come as the head of the Shiite community (until 1993, in fact), now moved to unite the entire community under his leadership. Fadlallah, however, was irked by Sadr's determination to lead the Shiite community, considering himself to be the ranking personality in terms of education and erudition. Fadlallah's precise political ambitions at this stage are not known, but the fact is that in the political situation that was created, in which Sadr enjoyed the sympathy and admiration of the Shiite masses, Fadlallah remained in Sadr's shadow. In the light of this development, Fadlallah cultivated another trend, whose members were ready to acknowledge his standing, and which found partial organizational expression within the framework of the Lebanese Da'wa. Yet Fadlallah's influence reached beyond this framework, extending to the Iraqi Da'wa, which was being persecuted by the Baghdad regime. Indeed, in October of 1980 Fadlallah's connections with this movement led agents of the Iraqi Ba'th to make an attempt on his life, from which he was fortunate to emerge unscathed.

Seeing the great success enjoyed by the Amal movement's recruitment efforts within the Shiite community, the Da'wa circles began to agonize over the attitude they themselves should adopt towards Amal. One of the Da'wa group was dispatched to Najaf in order to get a ruling from Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr on this question, but the latter, apparently, offered his followers no clear cut and binding directives. Subsequently, following a visit to Lebanon by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr himself, the Lebanese Da'wa decided to infiltrate the Amal movement with the aim of exerting influence from the inside and disseminating and entrenching the ideas of Islam among its ranks. This state of affairs, in which the Da'wa maintained its separate existence alongside Amal, persisted until the Islamic revolution in Iran. Following that upheaval, and against the backdrop of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's execution in Iraq in April of 1980, the Lebanese Da'wa was dissolved, apparently at the behest of senior Iranian circles. Nevertheless, its members continued to maintain their Da'wa identity even as members of Amal.

The Islamic revolution in Iran found the Lebanese Shiite community plunged into a deep crisis, generated by the mysterious disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in late August, 1978 – a few months before the revolution. Amal thus lost its charismatic leader, the central unifying axis around whom the entire movement's leadership had coalesced. The result was that Amal was exposed to disputes and rivalries which were harmful to its operations and its image alike. Moreover, the appointment of Hussein al-Husseini as the movement's general secretary in November of 1980, and his subsequent ouster by a triumvirate led by Nabih Berri, who in April of 1980 had been named head of the movement's leadership council, was more than a mere routine change of personnel. It actually symbolized a shift in the orientation and values of the Shiite movement: the old suit was no longer suitable. No longer would there be a religious leader, an Imam garbed in a traditional robe, but a largely secular and active leadership which saw its paramount mission as promoting the interests of the Shiite community within the framework of the Lebanese state, and whose feet were firmly planted in the murky reality of Lebanese politics.

Amal's secular leaders perceived the Iranian revolution as essentially a social upheaval which had ousted an exploitative regime, and they regarded the Shiite figures who had spearheaded the revolution as purely religious authorities. It is hardly surprising, then, that the honeymoon which characterized Amal-Iranian relations in 1979-1980 was short-lived. Neither the reciprocal visits of the Amal hierarchy in Iran and of Iranian leaders to Lebanon, nor the appointments of official representatives – Musa Fakhr Ruhani as ambassador to Lebanon and *Sayyid* Ibrahim al-Amir as Amal representative in Tehran – could alter the political reality. A series of episodes which had the effect of playing up the disparities between the two sides soon generated friction and hostility. The first development was the displeasure shown by the Amal leadership at the impotence which seemed to afflict the revolutionary Iranian leadership in its attempts to obtain the release of Musa al-Sadr from his 'Libyan captivity'. Indeed, as time passed and the Iranian leadership sought allies in the Islamic world, Iranian-Libyan relations were increasingly consolidated, to the outrage of the Lebanese Shiites. An echo of this situation could be heard in the statements made by the head of the Iranian revolutionary courts, Ayatollah Khalkhali, who visited Beirut in April of 1980, and used the occasion to declare that Sadr 'was murdered in Rome by the Zionists', a pronouncement which drew furious reactions from Nabih Berri and Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din.

The ouster of key figures from the Iranian leadership, such as

Bani Sadr, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and others who had maintained friendly relations with Amal (some of them as far back as the period in which they had operated in Lebanon against the Shah's regime) only added fuel to the fire as far as Amal was concerned. Lebanon had been one of the centers of Iranian opposition activity against the Shah's regime, and senior figures such as Mahdi Bazargan, Ibrahim Yazdi, Qotbzadeh, and Mustafa Ali Chamran, had found shelter there during the 1970s. Amal had helped the operational activity of these exiles, some of whom had been involved in establishing the military force of the Lebanese Shiite movement. The most prominent of these, Mustafa Chamran, had married a ranking Amal activist – Ghada Ja'bar, and had administered the vocational school at Burj al-Shimali, near Tyre. However, Chamran devoted most of his time to the creation of Amal, serving as the liaison between the Shiite movement and the Palestinian organizations, and to overseeing the activities of a group of Iranian students who were trained by the Palestinians and sent to operate in Iran.

It was against this backdrop that the feeling grew within the Amal leadership that the Lebanese Shiite movement was losing its allies in the Iranian hierarchy. In one striking case, Mustafa Chamran himself, the first defense minister of revolutionary Iran – he had arrived in Tehran in February 1979 direct from Lebanon – disappeared in a mysterious helicopter accident. A veiled expression of this feeling was contained in a cable from Nabih Berri to Khomeini in November, 1980 following the ouster of Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh, in which Berri lauded the accomplishments of the Iranian minister, the 'great fighter', who had been dismissed. Although couched in courteous language, the cable could not conceal the displeasure felt at the removal and arrest of Qotbzadeh by the very regime in whose establishment he had been an active participant.

The Iranian perception which cast the Palestinian presence in southern Lebanon in a changed light also exacerbated the relations between Amal and Tehran. Revolutionary Iran, which saw in the Palestinian organizations the spearhead of the 'holy war' against Israel, gave them its support and encouraged them to act against the Jewish state. However, this backing angered the Amal leadership, whose movement was then engaged in a violent struggle, both in Beirut and more intensely in the south, with the Palestinians, for control of parts of these areas. Early 1980 saw an intensification of the already violent friction between the Shiites and the Palestinians following Amal's attempt to carve out an appropriate niche for itself in southern Lebanon. This move by Amal sparked sharp resistance by the Palestinians, for whom this region was a final bastion, which they were determined to retain – by force, if necessary. Aggravating the situation was the Palestinians' hard-handed and at times brutal treatment of the Shiite

population in the south, and their exploitation of the Shiites' meager economic resources. The Palestinians' violent activity against Israel, drawing Israeli counter-measures, also affected the Shiites, who found themselves bearing the burden of the suffering entailed in the Israeli-Palestinian clashes. So serious did the situation become that on the eve of the Lebanon war an Amal leader in the south, Muhammad Ghadar, declared that if the Palestinians did not abandon their war on the Shiites, Amal would open fire on Israel in order to provoke an Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon, which would deliver a military blow to the PLO.

Despite the tension between Amal and Iran, however, both sides were careful to maintain open channels of dialogue. Iran was interested in pursuing such contacts because it recognized that Amal, despite its weaknesses, was the authentic representative of the Shiite community in Lebanon, and as such constituted an important instrument for wielding influence in that country. The Amal leadership, for its part, saw in Iran a rising force which could help consolidate the strength of the Shiite community in the future. Thus the ties between the Iranian leadership and Amal persisted, largely through Da'wa members who were active in Amal, and others who were avowed followers of the Imam Khomeini, whom they regarded as both their religious and their political leader.

This situation was altered by the Lebanon war of 1982. Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon, its push northward and its siege of Beirut, led Amal to agonize over its future course of action. This development found expression in the aftermath of a proposal put forward by Lebanese President Sarkis for the creation of a National Salvation Authority, which would lead the country during the crisis. The Authority was to incorporate the representatives of the country's principal power centers, namely, the commander of the Lebanese Forces, Bashir Jumayyil, the leader of the Druze community, Walid Junblatt, and the head of the Shiites, Nabih Berri. The Iranians viewed with concern Berri's indecision about whether to join the Authority. For Tehran this body symbolized the Western takeover of Lebanon and the perpetuation of the 'Zionist occupation' of the country: Tehran therefore brought heavy pressure to bear on Berri not to affiliate himself with the new body. Berri, however, seeing in the invitation to join the Authority recognition of the rising power of the Shiite community and a propitious opportunity to effect a change in its political standing, decided to accept the offer to join. To this day the fact that he sat on the National Salvation Authority together with Bashir Jummayil is held against him in Tehran as a sin without expiation. For Iran, Berri's membership in the Authority was a crucial signpost in the shaping of Lebanese policy. Henceforth Iran would come increasingly to believe that Amal, as a secular

national movement, was incapable of advancing Iranian-Islamic interests, and that the golden opportunity the war afforded Iran to effect a breakthrough in Lebanon was fading away. It was then that the Iranians made their decision to support the creation of a Shiite Islamic movement which would provide an alternative to Amal and help inculcate the revolutionary Islamic ideology in Lebanon.

The organizational framework envisaged by Iran did not exist in Lebanon, although most of its elements were operating there discreetly in one form or another. These were for the most part Shiite religious figures who had been influenced by radical Islamic ideas, in some cases dating back to the period of their studies at Najaf, where they had been taught by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, or at the religious academies in Qom, both before and after the Islamic revolution. They took a dim view of Amal policy, and were particularly distressed at the takeover of the movement's leadership by secular elements, some of them with a left-wing orientation. For these religious figures the Iranian revolution was a model worthy of emulation in Lebanon. Thus the Iranians set about organizing them in a front-organization which would be linked to Iran and serve its policy in Lebanon.

The Hizballah

Iranian Policy in Lebanon

Iranian policy in Lebanon was grounded in Lebanon's unique political, social and economic structure, which enabled Tehran to translate its goal into effective action. That goal was to establish an Islamic movement acknowledging the political and religious leadership of the Imam Khomeini, and gearing itself to overthrow the existing Lebanese regime, replacing it with an Islamic regime on the Iranian model. The absence in Lebanon of an authoritative central government capable of ruling, combined with the intense efforts of radical Lebanese Shiites to alter the situation in the country without recourse to the existing political frameworks, enabled Iran to operate in Lebanon almost unhindered. The Lebanon war and the subsequent disruption of the delicate balance between the various Lebanese power structures only facilitated the Iranian activity. Thus it is hardly surprising that in the eyes of the former Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Musa Fakhr Ruhani, Lebanon now found itself in the same situation as Iran had found itself at the end of 1978: on the brink of an Islamic revolution.

Against this backdrop, Iran in the latter part of 1982 dispatched an advance force of Revolutionary Guards ('Pasdaran') to Lebanon in order to take part in the *jihad* against Israel – and more important, to help establish a revolutionary Islamic movement in Lebanon. Ambassador Ruhani, who was then serving in

Beirut, noted that the force, which arrived via Damascus, numbered five thousand Iranians who had come 'to assist the inhabitants of Lebanon'. Nor did Ruhani forget to emphasize that the force had been sent at the request of 'Lebanon's president, Elias Sarkis, and of the Lebanese people'. Be that as it may, after a short time the bulk of the force returned to Iran, leaving between 300-500 of their number in Baalbek. Some of these were clerics from the 'Cultural Unit' of the Revolutionary Guards, while others were military instructors and fighters who together were supposed to help form the organizational basis for the new Islamic revolutionary movement. The Lebanese clerics welcomed their Iranian 'brothers' and were sympathetic to the aid they were proffering to the local population. The Iranian contingent was supported by Iranian monetary grants which were earmarked for the rehabilitation and expansion of the religious school system in the city, the erection of religious-oriented public institutions, restoration of the health-care system, the establishment of clinics and hospitals, and aid for young Shiites enrolled in religious institutions.

It was not long before Baalbek, along with its neighboring towns and villages, assumed an Islamic-Iranian coloring. The sale of liquor was prohibited, women were compelled to dress modestly, and the city, which only recently had been a thriving center of international tourism, began to resemble Iran in every way. Huge posters of Khomeini and other Iranian leaders, which decorated its main streets, and the prominent presence of Persian-speakers, only intensified the Iranian atmosphere. The transformation of Baalbek represented the onset of the new Islamic revolutionary movement in Lebanon, which adopted the Koranic name Hizballah (meaning 'the party of God'). In this region, far from the seat of central power and its major supporters in the Christian and Muslim camps, the initial backers of Hizballah were organized, and it was from here that they fanned out to Beirut and southern Lebanon.

Hizballah: Front Organization Led by Clerics

In the introduction to his book on Hizballah's activity in the Islamic world following the Khomeini revolution,[1] Ali al-Kurani, a member of the Lebanese Da'wa who joined Hizballah, writes:

> There are those who ask whether Hizballah is actually an organization. And if the reply is that Hizballah is not an organization, they no longer bother with it, since in their view it is political organization which bears the greatest importance for Islamic activity. If the reply is that Hizballah is indeed an organization, they regard it as just one more form of organization along with the other parties and orga-

[1] *Tariqat Hizb Allah fi-l-Amal al-Islami* (Hizballah in Islamic Deed), 1986.

> nizations already extant. Their next step is to begin comparing it with organizational forms they are familiar with, and to seek out its qualities and its faults. The path of Hizballah is not that of an organization or party in the usual and conventional sense, and it does not resemble organizations in the countries of the West or the Islamic states. [At the same time] Hizballah is an organization and an apparatus adapted to what is required for Islamic deed and for the masses of its members.

Indeed, the creation of Hizballah did not resemble that of other movements and organizations in Lebanon. It started off as a small group of clerics without a distinct organizational apparatus, disciples of the radical Shiite school of thought. Led by Abbas Musawi and Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, they acknowledged the Imam Khomeini as their religious and political leader and identified with Iran's striving to make Lebanon part of the Islamic Republic. Yet within a matter of months, this small group had become a mass movement. The founders were joined by radical Shiites who broke off from Amal and other movements and who brought with them the memberships of their own organizations, such as Amal al-Islami, the Association of Muslim Ulama in Lebanon, the Lebanese Da'wa, and the Association of Muslim Students. All of these frameworks forged a coalition which banded together under the front organization of Hizballah.

The Founding Baalbek Core Group

The core group of Hizballah organized itself in Baalbek in the latter part of 1982 and first part of 1983. The founders were a group of Shiite clerics, graduates of the Najaf and Qom academies who had studied under Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and had returned to Lebanon at the end of the 1970s. Their leaders were *Sayyid* Abbas Musawi and Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli. Abbas Musawi was born in 1952 in a village not far from Baalbek, and in 1969-1970 attended the Institute for Islamic Studies at Tyre. He spent the next eight years (1970-1978) at Najaf, studying under Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. In 1978 Musawi returned to Lebanon where he took part in the founding of the religious college at Baalbek, named for the 'Hidden Imam', where he teaches. Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, born in 1948, also hails from a village near Baalbek. He spent nine years in Najaf where he, too, was a pupil of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and studied also in the religious academies in Qom. At the end of the 1970s al-Tufayli returned to Lebanon, was active in the creation of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, and then within the framework of the Association of Muslim Ulama in Lebanon. Another member of the founding group was Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek, a student in the Najaf academies, from which he was expelled during the 1970s, going on to

Baalbek, where he set up the religious academy. The religious figures in Hizballah enjoyed the close support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who established their Lebanese headquarters in Baalbek, and together they formed the first Hizballah military units in the Beqa'.

Amal al-Islami

An important element of the initial Hizballah core group in the Beqa' was the Amal al-Islami movement. This was established in the summer of 1982 following the resignation of Hussein al-Musawi, who had served as Nabih Berri's second-in-command, in the wake of Berri's decision to join the National Salvation Authority. Together with others, mostly residents of the Beqa', Musawi left the Amal center in Beirut, seized some of the movement's assets (offices and ammunition dumps) in Baalbek, and there formed the new movement.

Musawi gained encouragement and received financial and military aid from Iran, which viewed him and his newly-created small militia as an important element for the development of the radical movement in Lebanon. In short order Amal al-Islami became a logistics and operational center for the terrorist acts perpetrated by the first units of Hizballah, which Musawi joined not long after setting up Amal al-Islami. Within this framework Musawi enjoyed close cooperation from the religious figures in Hizballah, notably in the recruitment of young Shiites to his militia, and in their according of revolutionary-religious inspiration to the militia's activity.

Hussein al-Musawi, a teacher by profession, is a somewhat unusual figure in the radical Shiite movement. He spent his formative years in Lebanon, where – in contrast to the leading group in Hizballah – he received a secular education. Following the Islamic revolution in Iran, Musawi became one of Amal's liaisons with that country, paying several visits there and propounding a radical-Shiite line. Musawi ardently maintained that his movement was the authentic Amal, which was realizing in practice the Islamic vision of Musa al-Sadr, whereas Berri and his supporters in Amal had disavowed the heritage of the 'vanished Imam'. Musawi, who accepted Khomeini's teachings as a perfect doctrine, became one of the most radical spokesmen of Hizballah, as is evident from the explanation he offered of his position in January, 1984:

> We pledge our loyalty to the Imam Khomeini, politically, religiously and theologically. In accordance with Khomeini's teaching, we strive to fight all manifestations of corruption and vanity in this world, and [to combat] all the elements fighting against Muslims... Our struggle is against East and West alike, against the Soviet Union and the

United States. Our goal is to prepare the ground for the rule of the *Mahdi* on earth, the rule of truth and justice... Iran is the source of our inspiration and authority.

The Association of Muslim Ulama in Lebanon

Parallel to the growth of Hizballah in the Beqa', the first Hizballah groups in Beirut began to organize in the city's southwest, largely Shiite neighborhoods. These groups operated chiefly within the framework of existing radical-Shiite organizations, which were abetted by the Iranian embassy in Beirut. One of these was Tajammu al-Ulama al-Muslimin fi Lubnan, which was established in the wake of the Islamic revolution and operated under Iranian inspiration of an ecumenical bent. The Tajammu incorporated within it Lebanese Shiite and Sunni clerics who sought to work jointly in order to bridge the differences between the Sunna and the Shia. The Tajammu was meant to be the vanguard group which would be the institutional recipient in Lebanon of the ideas exported by the Islamic revolution – this, already in the pre-Lebanon war period. When the war broke out, and in particular during the Israeli siege of Beirut, some Tajammu members took part in military activity against the Israeli forces, while others helped cultivate the staying power and the fighting spirit of the Muslim fighters in their struggle against Israel. Organizationally, the Tajammu maintained – and still does, to some extent – action committees covering a broad range of areas, from education and philanthropy, all the way to military activity. Since early 1984 the Tajammu Information Office has published an organ called *al-Wahda al-Islamiyya*, which expresses ecumenical concepts propounded by both Shiite and Sunni clerics. Similarly, the movement's leadership comprises figures from both sects, of whom the most prominent are the Shiite Sheikh Zuheir Kanj, from the Beqa', and the Sunni Sheikh Mahir Hammud from Sidon, both of whom work in close affinity with Iran. With the extension of Hizballah operations from the Beqa' to Beirut, the members of the Tajammu joined the new movement as a single body, and they continue to maintain their separate framework within it.

The Lebanese Da'wa and the Student Association

Another important component on which Hizballah was based was the Da'wa Party, which had been established in the early 1970s as a Lebanese branch of a party bearing the same name, which operated clandestinely in Iraq. The Lebanese Da'wa served as an organizational framework for activist Shiites who were graduates of the Najaf academies and had returned to Lebanon. The organization cooperated closely with the Association of

Muslim Students, which was formed by graduates of the Arab University of Beirut who had gathered around Fadlallah, looking to him as their spiritual leader.

Following the Lebanon war, and at Iran's behest, the Da'wa members who had been operating within Amal, withdrew from the central Shiite movement – a move welcomed by Fadlallah. Perceiving Amal as secular in character, they joined the new Islamic radical movement. Together with the cadres of the students association, which, as mentioned, based itself on young Shiites who were active within university and high-school frameworks and remained unswerving followers of Fadlallah, the Da'wa group constituted a significant part of the Hizballah movement. In this way Fadlallah's adherents also bolstered the already unique standing of the *sayyid* within Hizballah.

One of the senior representatives of the Da'wa trend in Hizballah is *Sayyid* Ibrahim al-Amin, born in 1935 in a town in the Zahle district, and a graduate of the Najaf and Qom academies. In the 1970s the young sheikh, together with other Da'wa members, joined Amal, and following the Islamic revolution in Iran he was named Amal's representative in Tehran. In the wake of Nabih Berri's joining the National Salvation Authority, al-Amin left Amal and returned to Lebanon as a supporter of Khomeini. In Lebanon he worked initially in the Beqa', where he assisted in the reorganization of the Da'wa group within the Hizballah framework. He later settled permanently in Beirut, where he quickly gained prominence as the official spokesman for Hizballah – the only senior position the movement has ever made public.

Other clerics also joined Hizballah in Beirut, some of whom had held highly influential posts in radical Shiite groups. Prominent among these is Sheikh Muhammad Ismail al-Khaliq, a graduate of Najaf, from which he was expelled in the 1970s. Arriving in Beirut, Khaliq set up a religious Shiite academy (Hawzat al-Rasul al-Akram). The academy he heads has become one of the most important teaching centers of the radical-Shiite movement. In Lebanon, special significance attaches to the fact that Khaliq is the representative of the prominent Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's successor designate. This status accords Khaliq a direct link with one of the major power centers in the Iranian hierarchy, which in turn enables him to wield considerable influence within Hizballah and earns him a special place in the movement's leadership. It stands to reason that Khaliq will become even more powerful, when and if Montazeri actually succeeds Khomeini.

Working with Khaliq in Beirut as one of the founders of Hizballah was *Sayyid* Hassan Nasrallah, who was born in 1953 in southern Lebanon. A graduate of the Najaf and Qom academies, Masrallah returned to his native land upon the completion of his studies, settling in Beirut, where he is considered a leading Hizballah figure.

Also active in these developments were Shiite clerics who were connected with Iran and identified with the ideas being propounded by that country. Some were affiliated with Amal, while others bore no organizational membership. The establishment of the first Hizballah groups, Iran's call to its followers to join Hizballah, and the challenge posed by the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon, led such persons to organize themselves within a framework called the Association of the Ulama of Jabal Amil – actually a front-organization for Hizballah's consolidation in southern Lebanon. This association became the instrument through which the first resistance operations against Israel were organized. Initially these took the form of passive, non-violent resistance such as strikes and a bar on cooperation of any kind with the Israelis. Subsequently armed resistance and other forms of violent protest were employed. The various cultural centers, mosques, schools, academies, orphanages and welfare organizations which were under the supervision of Shiite clerics were enlisted in the struggle waged by the Ulama Association against Israel. It was not long before these clerics became the very backbone of Hizballah in southern Lebanon, the bearers of the banner of the armed struggle against Israel.

This struggle, along with the struggle against the foreign forces in Beirut – the US in particular – which was spurred by Shiite religious figures, played a major role in enabling the Islamic radical movement to unite around clear, well-defined objectives: a holy war to drive out the foreign forces, to be followed by the ouster of the Christian government in Lebanon and the installation of an Islamic regime. The extensive aid which arrived from Iran via Damascus in the period from 1982 to 1985 enabled Hizballah to advance on the road towards the attainment of these goals. The more achievements the movement chalked up to its credit, the more points it scored in the internal struggle it was waging within the Shiite community, especially against Amal. Growing numbers of believers among the young generation, who did not find in Amal a cogent response to their fervor and their desire to launch a *jihad* against Israel and bring about a change in the Beirut regime, left Amal and joined Hizballah. Others were persuaded to do so by means of stipends paid to them and their families. The new members of the Shiite radical movement soon found their place around a cadre of young, often charismatic, clerics, then in their thirties, who offered the new recruits a personal example in the unwavering stands they took.

Undoubtedly one of the most outstanding of the Shiite clerics who operated in southern Lebanon was Sheikh Raghib Harb, the Imam of the town of Jibshit, where he was born in 1952 and completed his elementary schooling before going on to study in

Nabatiyeh. At sixteen he was accepted to the Shari'i Institute, where one of his teachers during the several years he spent there was Fadlallah. Following the completion of his studies at the institute, Harb spent the next four years at Najaf, studying under Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and other masters. Expelled in the mid-1970s by the Iraqis, Harb returned to Beirut, where he pursued his studies at the religious academy in Burj Hamud. At the end of that decade he returned to his native town of Jibshit to serve as its Imam.

Following his return from Najaf, Harb became the leader of a group of young Shiites who felt that they had a religious mission to perform and had therefore left Amal because its secular character did not conform with their goals. The success of the Islamic revolution in Iran bolstered the belief of Harb and the members of his circle in the rightness of their chosen course. The reasoned commentary of the *marja*, in which, to all intents and purposes, he recognized Khomeini's political and religious authority, led to a tightening of Harb's relations with Iran.

The eve of the Lebanon war found Harb in Tehran, where he was attending the First World Conference of the Dispossessed, which was organized by Iran. At the conclusion of the conference he returned to Jibshit. In the spring of 1983 Sheikh Harb was arrested by the Israeli authorities on a charge of engaging in subversive activity and released a few days later. Some months later, in December of 1983, Harb was summoned to Tehran where he met with ranking members of the Iranian regime and expressed his absolute identification with Iran. Thus, in reaction to the announcement of the severance of diplomatic relations between Iran and Lebanon, which was made at about the same time as his visit to Tehran, he said, 'My home in Lebanon is the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran'. This was Harb's outlook when he returned to Jibshit to organize the armed struggle against the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon. His wife and one of his close friends would later claim that the sheikh was the chief planner of the military operations against Israel and that he even took an active part in some of the operations. Sheikh Raghib Harb was assassinated in February, 1984, a Shiite martyr, a symbol of self-sacrifice and the struggle being waged by Hizballah. He was succeeded by Abd al-Karim 'Ubeid as Imam of Jibshit.

Harb's death did not deter the Shiite clerics from continuing to play a leading role in the Islamic radical movement. The number of new recruits to the movement in southern Lebanon and Beirut alike increased steadily, and its ranks included the senior Shiite religious figures of Jabal Amil.

The departure of the Israeli and international forces from Lebanon strengthened the hand of Hizballah. The radical Shiite movement claimed the lion's share of the credit for what it perceived as

the victory of Islam over the 'Great Satan' (the US) and the 'Lesser Satan' (Israel). Thereafter, Hizballah would direct the bulk of its resources to building a new Islamic society in Lebanon. With the help of generous infusions from Iran, Hizballah invested tens of millions of dollars annually in building religious and vocational schools, hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, bakeries, and agricultural settlements in aid of the Shiite population in Lebanon, while providing scholarships for around 40,000 Shiite students at schools in Lebanon and in other countries. All these efforts aim to create a new generation of Shiites in Lebanon capable, Hizballah believes, of establishing the first 'Islamic Republic' outside of Iran.

7/15/95

Hizbullah

Israel's forgotten war in south Lebanon

BEIRUT

THE world has forgotten the vicious little war in south Lebanon between Hizbullah ("the party of God") and Israel's army plus its mercenaries, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). But vicious it is, and more than the "there go the Israelis and Lebanese banging away at each other again" that it is seen as when some incident, like those last weekend, forces it into the news.

Supposedly, the war is fought according to a tacit agreement worked out in 1993 between Syria and America, after Israeli air raids, smashing thousands of houses, had killed well over 100 Lebanese civilians and sent 300,000 fleeing north. The basic rule is that if Israeli or SLA soldiers attack people in towns or villages who are not involved in the fighting, Hizbullah will feel free to fire rockets into Israel; if not, not. In sum, soldiers are fair game, but not civilians.

The rules are obeyed up to a point. If an Israeli or, more likely, SLA soldier kills a plainly non-belligerent Lebanese or—here tacit agreement becomes disagreement—if the Israelis kill a Hizbullah official by car bomb or fire from a helicopter, Hizbullah is apt to fire Katyusha rockets into Galilee. Thus, when on July 9th an Israeli tank fired anti-personnel shells at a house in a suburb of Nabatiyeh, killing two sisters, aged 11 and 16, the guerrillas responded—unbloodily, in the event—with rockets the next day.

In that case, Yitzhak Rabin told his cabinet, there had been a mistake. The tank crew, say Israelis, indeed meant to fire, but not at the house. The Israeli prime minister has been a bit plainer in his criticism of the SLA's trigger-happy ways, which at times have brought rockets down on Israeli shelters, and occasionally heads; last month a Frenchman, working at a resort as a cook, was killed and several Israelis injured.

Uneasy northern Israelis after that incident sent their mayors to see Amiram Levin, the general in command in the area. He told them the army would soon be responding to rocket attacks in an "unusual" way. Meanwhile, Dennis Ross, America's Middle East peace envoy, has been in Damascus trying to persuade Syria to stiffen the rules by restraining Hizbullah.

Israelis dislike an arrangement that restricts their choice of reaction if their soldiers are attacked. Half a dozen have been killed in south Lebanon this year, in a soaring number of incidents, some by roadside bombs. Though Israeli or SLA fire has killed more than 100 Lebanese, Israeli defence experts say things cannot go on like this: the soldiers should either be freer, or get out.

Why are they there? Their presence dates from 1985. Israel's 1982 "Peace in Galilee" invasion of Lebanon had brought military success and diplomatic disaster. So, instead, Israel carved out and occupied a strip of southernmost Lebanon, calling it a "security zone", to protect northern Israel from infiltration (which has worked) and attack (which has not, since rockets can sail over the buffer). The zone has seen fighting ever since, its own 150,000 residents wholly insecure. Policing it was partly delegated to the SLA. Originally Christian, but now mixed Christian and Shia Muslim, this militia has no future after an Israeli withdrawal. Its interest is to keep things on the boil.

Hizbullah, formed with Iranian help in 1982, also has little future as a fighting force once the Israelis go: its military *raison d'être* is to get Israel out of the south. It now operates with Syrian help and Lebanese acquiescence; if it pursued a post-withdrawal Israel, it would have neither. So it has started to turn itself into something like a normal Islamist political party. It has eight members in Lebanon's parliament, a television station and a network of social institutions.

When might or could Israel's troops get out? On the argument, presumably, that the Syrians can do only one thing at a time, it has been assumed that Israel will not start seriously to negotiate its departure from Lebanon until the arrangements for its withdrawal from Syria's Golan Heights are complete. Certainly, the Lebanese cannot agree to anything unless Syria says so. But there is no clear reason why the two deals should not be concurrent.

The Lebanese one, in many ways, is the simpler. Israel has no right to occupied Lebanon. The relevant UN Security Council resolution, passed in 1978, says its troops (which had made incursions there even by then) must withdraw "from all Lebanese territory". Little practical claim either: no settlers, and a highly questionable gain in security. The Syrians, no doubt, like to keep Hizbullah in action as extra pressure on Israel. But if both deals were going forward together, the incentive would be to demonstrate calm, Hizbullah would be in a hurry to establish credentials as a respectable party—and Israelis in Galilee and Lebanese in Nabatiyeh might sleep in peace.

Civilian life in the insecurity zone

Lebanon

afghanistan

Home-grown terrorists may return to haunt the US

The US helped to oversee an international laboratory for Islamic extremists, Steve Rodan reports

SHEIKH Omar Abdul Rahman, who faces the death penalty after being convicted of planning the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, has many heirs, who are willing and able to continue his campaign against the West – thanks to the US and Saudi Arabia.

Current and former officials now acknowledge that the US, which has increased security at airports and other sensitive installations, fearing an attack by Rahman supporters – helped to oversee an international laboratory for Islamic extremists, where they learned weapons production, set up training camps, and had carte blanche to smuggle drugs to help pay for these activities.

Today, thousands of radical Moslems are being trained at US-established guerrilla camps on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Already, US officials have attributed several airline bombings to these Moslem fighters, who are believed to be aligned with Sheikh Hassan Turabi, the godfather of the worldwide Islamic fundamentalist movement.

The terrorist activity, called the Islamic blowback, is financed by Saudi princes as well as one of the most rapidly developing drug trades in the world, in an area known as the "Golden Crescent." US officials say the chief warlord is Gorbodin Hekmatar, once a favorite son of the CIA who turned out to be the most anti-West of the Afghan fighters.

Western diplomats say that despite warnings from many governments, the US continues to maintain a benign attitude toward the Islamic terrorist network, now based in 15 countries. This contrasts with the attitude of Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan and France, the last of which recently uncovered a cyber-terrorist network [illegible] established cells in the Middle East.

The network, conceived by the CIA and financed by Saudi Arabia began in the early 1980s, when Washington sought to build a guerrilla movement to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The rallying cry was sounded around the Arab and Moslem world to fight the godless Kremlin; training would be provided by Pakistani intelligence.

"They set up camps and called for volunteers," recalls Jack Blum, a former staffer on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.

Blum says the problem began when the war ended. The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, but the training in Pakistan continued. The graduates in sabotage, weapons and bomb assembly and guerrilla warfare practiced their new-found skills in [illegible] region.

Many joined the secessionist Moslem movement in India's Kashmir region. Others went to fight the regime of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Still others established training camps in other parts of Asia and Africa, particularly Sudan.

By the late 1980s, some of these graduates and their Islamic fundamentalist leaders were beginning to penetrate the US. Some of them entered the country on false documents, while others were given permission by the CIA.

The US has asked Pakistan to shut down the camps along its border with Afghanistan. Pakistan claims the training has ended and the recruits are gone, but US officials assert that the activity continues.

"The Pakistanis are not in control of the border areas," Blum says. "Now the camps are sustained by the drug business. The Pakistani-Afghan border is one of the most drug-infested in the world. The main drug dealers are connected to the [Pakistani] government."

Weapons are not a problem, US officials say. For one thing, large numbers of US weapons, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, were left unaccounted for in the camps.

Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, convicted of planning the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. (AP)

Blum says he was told of the Islamic blowback in 1988, in the last stages of the Afghan war. Afghan groups warned US officials that Hekmatar was stealing American weapons, given to fight the Soviets, and selling them.

The response in Washington, Blum says, was an embarrassed silence. "Everybody said, 'Shh. You can't talk about it,'" he recalls. "There was [illegible] denial."

For their part, many [illegible] officials insist that Islamic fundamentalism remains a manageable threat that does not threaten the Middle East, let alone the US. Instead, they see fundamentalism as a response to poverty.

"It is not clear that the people [illegible] fighting [illegible] are different [illegible] according to the different [illegible] of [illegible] countries," says US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau, in the latest issue of the American publication *Middle East Quarterly*. "We must deal with fundamentalist Islam in a variety of contexts..."

Privately, some US law-enforcement officials say Washington continues to play down the problem, even as it acknowledges that Islamic fundamentalism, as represented by Rahman, is threatening US interests. They point out that Pakistan has escaped US reproach for allowing the Islamic terrorists to continue training. The Saudis have easily explained away support for the volunteers as being a private and unauthorized effort to support the fundamentalist movement.

"The reluctance to block private contributions to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad," says a December 1994 report by the Congressional Research Service, "may stem from the unwillingness of the Gulf regimes to offend their wealthy and powerful constituents, or perhaps reflect their own sympathies."

The fear of some US officials is that a young boy in a Washington suburb will end up using the skills and tools he needs to wage a terrorist campaign against the West. "When you combine fundamentalist zealotry with the idea that you'll kill anyone who [illegible] anything," Blum says, "and you can put together money and training, you have something very lethal."

Hezbollah

Ex-official: Hezbollah network of operatives active in Canada

By Bill Gladstone

TORONTO (JTA) — An underground network of some 50 to 100 operatives are directly involved in Hezbollah activities in Canada, according to a former official of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

David Harris, former chief of strategic planning for the security agency, told the Toronto-based Globe and Mail newspaper Monday that Hezbollah operatives are likely raising funds, gathering intelligence and collecting weapons in Canada.

His comments come a week after the agency maintained in a court document subsequently made public that the pro-Iranian fundamentalist movement headquartered in Lebanon had established "an infrastructure" in Canada involving people who "receive and comply with direction from the Hezbollah leadership hierarchy in Lebanon."

The claim was made by the agency in a Federal Court document that provided evidence in a deportation case against Hani Abd Rahim al-Sayegh, a Saudi national who applied for refugee status upon arriving in Canada in August.

After reports late last month of Hezbollah's presence, the Canadian Jewish Congress issued a statement urging the Canadian government to take stronger action against terrorists here.

The Canadian Arab Federation, meanwhile, called upon the government to refrain from creating a climate of accusations and paranoia in the absence of concrete evidence.

Sayegh was allegedly involved in the June 25, 1996, terrorist bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 U.S. soldiers and wounded nearly 400 others. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia are seeking his extradition.

He was arrested March 18 in Ottawa.

"I think that the intelligence community of Canada has done a good job in terms of identifying this person and deterring him," said Rob Ritter, executive director of the Canada-Israel Committee, a Canadian organization that promotes relations between the two countries.

"However, we have many concerns regarding the infiltration of Hezbollah terrorists into Canada. This is not a surprise to us — we expected their existence for a long time.

"Hezbollah's networking is probably global, and Canada is probably one of many of their international addresses."

Much of the security agency's information about Hezbollah activities in Canada apparently originated with Mohammed Hussein al-Husseini, who came here as a refugee in 1991 but was later deemed a terrorist threat and deported to Lebanon.

While much of the agency's information on Husseini and Sayegh is sealed, the agency's public summary of evidence in the Sayegh case consists of hundreds of pages of documents and articles attesting to Hezbollah's presence here.

According to some media reports, Sayegh has acknowledged his association with Hezbollah operatives in Saudi Arabia.

He is being held in maximum-security detention as he awaits an April 28 deportation hearing. □

BOYCOTT REPORT

Developments and Trends Affecting the Arab Boycott and Arab Influence in the USA

A Publication of the American Jewish Congress

Congress House • 15 East 84th Street • New York, N.Y. 10028

1994

Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad

Martin Kramer (F & The State) p 539-54

Movement of Shi'ite Muslims first public appearance

1982. Ingenious forms of violence.

suicide bombing. airline hijacks. holding hostage

Never commanded means or non power to

reign power in L. Allied [illegible] half of

one sect in a small & vulnerable state

intimidated by many other sects

Reputation - mastery of violence legitimated in

name of I(slam)

Cause. Intent. Effect

why resort to violence what exactly intended to [illegible] all results

1400 years old legacy of Shi'ism (like

political power passed from family of Muhammad

in 7th century (R. Suchedina in F.O. p. 403-56

Shi'ites fell seamlessly in mountains in

South of Lebanon in plains of Bekaa

valley .. between the mountain range

(10 What should be done. Max democracy, No
Socrates depoliticment after decade
of repression.

11) Islamists were for 4 decades older
of King Hussein against radical
Palestinians and secular nationalist

12 How to deal with long I positive not
really to commit themselves to
have [illegible] democracy

13) Tweet should encourage present regime
to gradually associate moderate IS
forces with their government
Avoid electoral rupture with Wiseman
take of. democracy too fragile

15 ~~[illegible]~~ Israel for years has been
playing HAMAS against PLO

Lebanon became independent in 1946. Shiite were despised step-children by Maronite Christians & Sunni Moslems

Over 1956–1977 Shiite pop trifled to 750,000 or 30% of pop. (Have fallen to Christian emigration). Now largest confessional community. But ed not clear economic & social gap. In 1975 Lebanon civil war. Shiite creates militia known as AMAL (hope)

As result of Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1978, 250,000 refugees poured in South Beirut. Muslim now majority of people. Idea of Islamic state now promising the Islamic revolution as from in 1979

In 1982 Israel occupied Shiites South Family of God after a verse in Qur'an

In Egypt govt. distinguish well-established
Muslim Brotherhood and the I. the
associate Western tourists; governors
officers and secularist thinkers
in professional elections. The extent I
help the moderate one
7 I deep interest in international
politics. Afghanistan is viewed
as spectacular example of I ability
to win a war against Europe power
The Afghan veterans. current headed
81 Saudi Arab hostilities may I organize
against their new secular regions
9 Gulf governments still supporting some
I groups. and wealth Gulf
individuals (including members of
ruling families are helping
fund groups obstructing Gulf
governments

Iran quickly confined with a Shiites
in Gulf as big but in Lebanon

Lebanon civil war amplified effect
of Iran revolution

On the scale of [illegible] destruction. Lebanon
Shiites not surprised by Shiites anywhere else

Saudi & Kuwait deported thousands
of Shiites sympathies of Iran

Syria - a supply line

Amal [illegible] middle class Shiite
which forms defensively against H Iz hollah
Hiz hullah

First 2 searching [illegible] of H. were for
Bekaa Valley

Iran offers Shiites food, medicine
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Literal meaning of ~~[illegible]~~ JIHAD
"to strive in path of God" [illegible]
to [illegible] defense of Islam

Gods. offer concessions to reduce Islamic

~~[illegible]~~ thirst for power

and Island group allied

4 to control professional associations

also seek to create "Island areas

where good control is placed

and are I [illegible] [illegible]

public order and provide

social service

5) I hold. university campus

professional ~~[illegible]~~ associations

and inner-city neighborhood

Islamicization of [illegible]

proceeding

~~Some I group~~

Bond lump all I groups together

as monolith. Some have key. other

U [illegible]

Khomeni - "all truly Islamic is pure
all foreign is impure
+ created first Islamic fundamentalist
state

H: vision. an all-encompassing Islamic
state (not Lebanon alone)

"First root of vice is America
"cause of all our contemptibles and
sources of all malice."

Hizbullah - Sey Gen. a cleric assassinated in 1992
241 US marines killed in their barracks
H's secret brand Islamic JIHAD
"Suicide is a prohibited by Islam

IMPACT

Had planes instrumental role in driving
foreign forces out of Lebanon
Even Iran turned to cooperation with West
Relation of all western hostages - 1991 = reassessed
under way

to Iraq Iraq religious suffered for 1952
revolution.

Algeria FLN was as Islamic as
nationalistic in struggle against French
colonialism

3) 2d generation of Islamic militants
then killed, jailed or exiled by the
ore. [illegible] commands

Now. third generation of militants
well. educated cadres. since Western
education [illegible] cannot find a job
See IV victim in Iran and Sudan
and [illegible] in Algeria

4 Islamic in Egypt forced as
amendment to Egyptian constitution
declaring Shariah as main
source of legislation. Similar
Shariah imposed in Mauritania
in 1983 & Pakistan in 1988

It began to follow new strategy. now
grass roots social activism, now
willing to substitute slogan of
democracy for slogan of revolution
Islam provides long and [illegible]
political parties and revolutionary
conspiracies - began to evolve into
political party. Mediterranean Islam
began to gain social & political [illegible]
in Algeria Tunisia Egypt [illegible] &
among [illegible] - largely Sunni
[illegible] attributed to Shiites is
despotic

p 553 It [illegible] between [illegible] & [illegible]
between Shiites & Sunni
"would do words together the structure
that do [illegible] only shaken.

4 Islam fastest growing of the
real faith

5 Mass conversion seems to exist
only in Islam

6 Separation of religion from state
does not exist constitutionally
in any Arab country (Turkey
tried it with mixed results)

For Muslims the state is accepted

7 many of it serves the purpose of the
Islamic community

—

1993

Foreign Policy. Spring. Ghassan Salamé

1) Islamic activist tend to come from universities

2) Islamists represent their generation of
militants inspired by religion

Muslim Brothers founded in 1928
part of struggle against British colonialism

For Your Information

HIZBOLLAH

June 8, 1994

Hizbollah, meaning 'Party of God', is an umbrella organization of various radical Muslim Shiite groups and organizations which adhere to the ideology of the late Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. The organization was established following the 1982 Peace for Galilee War in Lebanon (and an increased Iranian presence and influence in Lebanon). The Hizbollah organization was established as an organizational body for Shiite fundamentalists, led by religious clerics, who see in the adoption of Iranian doctrine a solution to the Lebanese political malaise. This included the use of terror as a means of attaining political objectives.

Toward the end of 1982 Iran sent fighters from its 'Iranian Revolutionary Guards' in order to assist in the establishment of a revolutionary Islamic movement in Lebanon whose members would participate in the 'Jihad', Holy War, against Israel. These forces, which were located in the area of Ba'albek in the northern Beqa'a valley, bestowed on the area an Iranian-Islamic character and constituted the core of the Hizbollah organization in Lebanon.

The organization maintains a training apparatus in Lebanon throughout the villages and their surroundings, as well as outside of Lebanon. Training is aimed at building a reliable manpower source for its military forces as well as for its terror arm.

The spiritual father of the movement in Lebanon is Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah who acts as chief Mujtahid - arbiter of Islamic law - of the Shiite community in Lebanon. With the passage of time, Hizbollah has turned into an organization of secondary level groups working on the local level led by regional functionaries.

IDEOLOGY

The ideological basis of Hizbollah is Khomeinism and its principle goal is the establishment of a pan-Islamic republic headed by religious clerics.

The organization's world view was first published in its political platform in February, 1985, as follows:

* The solution to Lebanon's problems is the establishment of an Islamic republic as only this type of regime can secure justice and equality for all of Lebanon's citizen's.

Information Department
Consulate General Of Israel in New York
800 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10017

הקונסוליה הכללית של ישראל בניו־יורק

212-351-5200

* The Hizbollah organization views as an important goal the fight against 'western imperialism' and its eradication from Lebanon. The group strives for complete American and French withdrawal from Lebanon, including all their institutions.

* The conflict with Israel is viewed as a central concern. This is not only limited to the IDF presence in Lebanon. Rather, the complete destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of Islamic rule over Jerusalem is an expressed goal.

Part of this radical ideology is the group's militant approach using terror as a means of attaining its goals. Hizbollah decries the existence of Israel ('the little Satan'), viewed as foreign to the region and which constitutes a threat to Islam and Muslims. The destruction of Israel and the liberation of Jerusalem is deemed a religious obligation. The Hizbollah organization justifies the use of terror against these enemies as a weapon in the hands of the weak and oppressed against the strong aggressor. In an effort to act upon and realize the predetermined ideological lines the group's leaders actively plan and perpetrate terror attacks against IDF and SLA forces, preach religious extremism against Israel and disseminate Iranian ideology. The Hizbollah extends the conflict into Israeli territory and does not restrict its struggle to areas in Lebanon.

With the signing of the 'Taif Agreement' (1989) and the beginning of the 'Syrian arrangement in Lebanon', the Hizbollah has been forced to conform to Syrian dictates. The Syrian interest in the continuation of terrorist attacks in South Lebanon has enabled the Hizbollah to maintain its unique status in the Lebanese arena as the only major military force yet to be disarmed. The Syrians have prevented the Lebanese government from harming the military capabilities of the Hizbollah, under the pretext of opposing the Israeli occupation, while at the same time enforcing their dictates upon the organization during periods when they are interested in calming the situation in southern Lebanon (as was the case following 'Operation Accountability' in July, 1993, or the period coinciding with the Assad-Clinton meeting in January, 1994).

THE SPREAD OF HIZBOLLAH INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON

As the organizational infrastructure developed, Hizbollah, with Iranian and Syrian assistance, began to establish an extensive military network in the Ba'albek area. Its militias have since spread into the Shi'ite neighborhoods in southern and western Beirut as well as into southern Lebanon.

This network is the principle base of Hizbollah activities as well as for those of other radical Shi'ite groups. Thousands of Hizbollah activists and members are located in the Beqa'a valley, Beirut and southern Lebanon. These areas also offer a base for the recruitment of additional activists and fighters among the local Shi'ite populations.

Following the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985 the Hizbollah organization consolidated itself. The consolidation included the establishment of storage depots for weapons, recruitment of activists and fighters, and widespread aid to residents in south Lebanon, such as the donation of money, equipment, medical supplies, etc. The purpose of the aid was to gain the support of the local population in favor of the organizations' activities in the south.

ATTACKS AND TERRORISM

Using cover names such as 'Islamic Jihad', 'The Revolutionary Justice Organization' and 'The Islamic Resistance', with the blessings of its religious leaders, Hizbollah has carried out a series of high profile attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and American and Multinational Forces targets in Lebanon. Only later did their attacks become more intensive as well as demonstrating better planning, especially immediately prior to the opening of the peace process.

In 1991, the Hizbollah was responsible for 52 attacks, compared to the 19 attacks the organization carried out in 1990. In 1992, the Hizbollah launched 63 attacks and in 1993, 158 attacks, when during the course of 'Operation Accountability' they fired hundreds of Katyusha rockets into the Security Zone and Israeli territory.

ISRAEL'S 10 MOST WANTED TERRORISTS

LESLIE SUSSER

It's been a hectic summer for the two main sources of anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish terrorism: Islamic extremists and Palestinian rejectionists.

Gunmen, suicide-bombers and explosives experts have been active from London to Buenos Aires, Panama to Berlin, leaving a trail of bloodshed and fear. Many of the most serious attacks — including the July blast at the Buenos Aires Jewish community headquarters that left close to 100 people dead — were planned by Iran and carried out by pro-Iranian radicals, according to Israeli intelligence sources. But the Palestinian rejectionists have hardly been idle either — as was evidenced by the late-September reports of a planned attack on a Tel Aviv-bound El Al passenger plane in Berlin by terrorists working for Abu Nidal.

The terror threat remains undimmed even as the peace process gathers pace. President Hafiz al-Asad is clearly happy to retain the terrorist option, but he does keep an iron grip on the rejectionists he hosts in Damascus: George Habash and company have their phones tapped and their movements watched. And they know it. The same goes for Abu Nidal in Libya. Once, he virtually controlled Libyan intelligence. Today, he is a guest on sufferance, his influence and freedom of action drastically curtailed. There have even been reports that he came close to being captured and extradited to France earlier this summer — the fate that befell arch-terrorist 'Carlos,' Illich Ramirez Sanchez.

What follows are up-to-date profiles of the 10 men whom Israeli intelligence sources — inevitably insisting on anonymity — consider to be the most dangerous terrorists still confronting Israel.

Although Yasser Arafat's Fatah mainstream faction of the PLO for decades engaged in terrorism against Israel, the sources say that Arafat has honored his commitment, under

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Fadlallah: Hizballah's driving force, who personally blesses suicide bombers

PHOTOS BY SIPA, AFP & REUTER

the terms of the autonomy deal with Israel, to refrain from terror.

As for the Hamas and Islamic Jihad fundamentalist movements in Gaza and the West Bank, responsible for many of the 60-plus Israeli deaths in the year since the autonomy accords were signed, the sources note that their main ideologue, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, is held in an Israeli jail, and that no other single figure enjoys comparable status.

#1

SHEIKH MUHAMMAD HUSSEIN FADLALLAH, 59
Organization: HIZBALLAH
Place of Birth: IRAQ
Current Whereabouts: BEIRUT

A scholarly cleric who has made violence a sacred duty, Fadlallah is the driving force behind the Hizballah and its uncompromising war against Israel. Short and squat, with large owlish brown glasses and a ready smile, he could easily be mistaken for a quiet professor. But his academic works tend to carry titles like "Islam and the Logic of Force."

Even more influential than his 20 books are the fiery sermons he delivers from the pulpit of a mosque in the Bir Abid suburb of Beirut, where he lives on the fifth floor of a 10-story building swarming with Shi'ite guards carrying Russian-made assault rifles.

Several attempts have been made on his life — at least one apparently by undercover American agents, who set off a car bomb outside his apartment building in March 1985. Fadlallah was away at the time; more than 80 people died.

Although he denies the title, Fadlallah is undoubtedly the spiritual leader of the pro-Iranian Hizballah (Party of God), and it is to him that its approximately 4,000 fighters turn for guidance and swear allegiance.

Born in the village of Najaf in Iraq, he studied at the famous Shi'ite seminary there under radical fundamentalist teachers. His roots, though, are Lebanese; his family hails from the village of Aynata in southern Lebanon.

In 1966, he arrived in Beirut with a solid reputation for scholarship. After the Israeli invasion in 1982, his pulpit became a platform for attacks on foreign involvement in Lebanon. In these fierce tirades lay the ideological seeds of Hizballah, which he helped to found later that year.

It was Fadlallah who personally blessed the bombers who carried out 1983's suicide attacks on the American Embassy in Beirut (more than 60 dead), the U.S. Marine barracks (241 dead), the French military headquarters (58 dead) and an Israeli base in the port of Tyre (29 dead). And although he publicly condemned the 1980s kidnappings by Hizballah of Western hostages, in fact he inspired and knew all the operational details of the actions, and visited Teheran in 1990 to coordinate arrangements for hostage releases.

#2

IMAD MUGNIYEH, 39
Organization: HIZBALLAH
Place of Birth: BAALBEK, LEBANON
Current Whereabouts: TEHERAN

Operational mastermind of the 1980s Hizballah bombing, hijacking and kidnapping campaigns against the West, Mugniyeh now lives in Teheran, where he heads Hizballah's so-called Foreign Operations Department. In that capacity, he is suspected of having had a hand in the planning of the summer London and Buenos Aires bombings.

Short and stocky, Mugniyeh has piercing green eyes and a high-pitched, squeaky voice. Although influenced in his teens by the radical Shi'ite teaching of Ayatollah Khomeini, he joined the secular PLO's elite Force 17 in the mid-70s. There he got the thorough grounding in the techniques of terror which helped him become one of the founders and first operational commanders of the Hizballah in 1982.

Fighting as a PLO man against Israel in mid-1982, Mugniyeh was wounded in the leg; a few months later, when the PLO was expelled from Lebanon, he was encouraged by Arafat to stay and help found Hizballah. He became Sheikh Fadlallah's personal bodyguard.

When his brother-in-law and 16 other Shi'ite terrorists were captured after a bombing in Kuwait in early 1983, Mugniyeh launched a six-year wave of bombings, hijackings and kidnappings in Lebanon to try and force their release. Among the Western hostages held: Americans Terry Anderson, Thomas Sutherland, David Jacobsen and Benjamin Weir, Britons John McCarthy and Jackie Mann and numerous others including French, German and Irish nationals.

In January 1987, Mugniyeh agreed to discuss the Western hostages with Terry Waite, the Archbishop of Canterbury's special envoy, and promptly took Waite hostage too. Waite had been warned about Mugniyeh by U.S. officials — who had described him as the "world's most wanted terrorist."

In April 1988, he led the hijacking of a Kuwaiti jumbo jet and shot two passengers dead when his demands for the release of the jailed Shi'ites in Kuwait were not met. In 1990 he left Lebanon for Iran to escape Western attempts to kill him.

#3

HUSSEIN MUSAWI, 50
Organization: ISLAMIC AWAL (now part of HIZBALLAH)
Place of Birth: NABISHIT, LEBANESE BIQA VALLEY
Current Whereabouts: BIQA VALLEY

One of the few Hizballah leaders of stature who is not a cleric, Musawi, a former literature teacher who heads the violent Islamic Amal, has thousands of followers — and is believed to be responsible for countless bombings and attacks on Israeli forces in South Lebanon over the past 12 years.

He began his military career in the late 1970s, in the relatively moderate Amal militia led by Nabih Berri. But as the Amal official charged with liaison with Iran in the early 80s, he was deeply influenced by the Iranian revolutionary message.

In July 1982, a month after the Israeli invasion, he angrily broke with Berri when Amal joined the National Salvation Committee, an umbrella group of Lebanese political and military factions which he regarded as too conciliatory to the Israelis.

Musawi moved from Beirut back to the Biqa Valley where he founded Islamic Amal, later subsumed into Hizballah, preaching total commitment to the struggle against Israel and the West. In 1983, his group is believed to have supplied the suicide drivers for the spate of Beirut bombings.

Supported and funded directly by Iran, Musawi has worked closely with the nearby Iranian Embassy in Damascus, and has often been spotted driving a big black Mercedes, with the windows covered, to meet his Iranian handlers in the Syrian capital.

In one memorable display of supreme self-confidence in January 1987, he followed Mugniyeh's lead in taking Western hostages — using bona fide Lebanese police, whom he'd instructed to pretend they were giving a lesson in self-protection, to kidnap four American teachers from the American University of Beirut campus.

#4

SHEIKH SUBHI TUFEILI, 46
Organization: HIZBALLAH
Place of Birth: BRITAL, LEBANESE BIQA VALLEY
Current Whereabouts: BIQA VALLEY

Tufeili, who first made his name as the Biqa Valley's most learned cleric, became Hizballah secretary general in the mid-1980s, and as such was the paymaster of the various affiliated factions holding Western hostages.

Western intelligence services publicly fingered him as one of the planners of the recent Buenos Aires and London bombings, and Argentina initially made half-hearted efforts to have him extradited.

Succeeded as secretary general in 1989 by another Biqa-based cleric, Sheikh Abbas Musawi, Tufeili returned to the job after Musawi was assassinated in an Israeli helicopter raid in February 1992.

In 1985, Tufeili issued a political manifesto setting out Hizballah's commitment to Islamic rule in Lebanon. In it he pinpointed Hizballah's main enemies as Israel, the U.S., France and the Lebanese Christians. He contends there can be no progress towards an Islamic Lebanon until the "liberation of Palestine." Lebanon, he argues, is too small to be an Islamic republic on its own, so Israel and the U.S. have to be overcome.

#5

ABU NIDAL, 57
Organization: FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
Place of Birth: NEAR JAFFA
Current Whereabouts: TRIPOLI, LIBYA

For years, Abu Nidal was the name at the top of Israel's most wanted list. In two decades from the early 70s, his Fatah Revolutionary Council carried

out over 250 acts of terror.

Today Abu Nidal, paranoid and introverted, is hiding out somewhere in Tripoli, at the head of an organization of just over 100 men, crippled by internal fighting and constrained by his Libyan patrons, who have closed down his large training camp at Al-Hamra to the southwest. Nevertheless, he remains a danger: He has recently renewed an old working relationship with Iraq, opening an office in Baghdad. In mid-September, several men suspected of working for him were expelled from Germany for planning attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets. And later in the month, his name was linked to a foiled effort to attack an El Al passenger plane in Berlin.

Born Sabri Khalil al-Banna in 1937, the last of 12 children, he is said by some sources to have been the illegitimate child of the family's Alawite maid. His father, Haj Khalil al-Banna, was a wealthy landowner, with over 6,000 acres of orchards and orange groves around today's Ashkelon, Yavneh and Kfar Saba. The family lived in a 20-room mansion in the Ajami section of Jaffa.

In 1948, they fled first to Nablus and then to Beirut, losing their land in Israel, but retaining property in Nablus, Damascus, Marseilles and Istanbul. In the mid-50s, Abu Nidal studied engineering in Cairo but did not complete his degree. He went into business, as an electrician and building contractor in Riyadh, and later with an import-export firm in Amman.

It was in Jordan that he first came into contact with PLO fighters. Abu Iyad, then Arafat's right-hand man, took the sharp-tongued and cynical young man under his wing, and in 1971, sent him to Baghdad as the Fatah representative. But once there, Abu Nidal contrived to get Iraqi backing to establish his own clandestine force, opposed to the Arafat-Abu Iyad leadership. The final breach came in 1974, after Abu Nidal was sentenced to death in absentia for plotting to murder Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas, Arafat's deputy), already a high-ranking member of Fatah. Outraged at the death sentence, Abu Nidal vowed to kill Arafat.

In the 70s, Abu Nidal worked for the Iraqis mainly against Syria, attacking Syrian embassies in Islamabad, Rome and Ankara, and the Syrian legation in Istanbul. After suffering a heart attack in 1979, he took to spending his summers in Poland, and grew more addicted to whiskey. By 1983 Iraq, looking for Western support in its war against Iran, decided Abu Nidal had overstayed his welcome and expelled him and his organization.

Abu Nidal moved, ironically, to Damascus, setting up headquarters near the U.S. Embassy. From his new base, he launched

'Get Tough on Hizballah'

The terror threat from the Shi'ite fanatics of Hizballah is spreading worldwide, and the potential danger from Palestinian rejectionists, drawing on embittered refugees in Lebanese and Jordanian camps, can't be counted out.

So says Yigal Carmon, a former adviser on terror to prime ministers Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin, who is currently setting up a new research institute on terrorism. Interviewed at his home in Jerusalem, the bespectacled Carmon advocates that Israel take a much firmer line against terrorism in general and Hizballah in particular. "What people don't seem to understand," he stresses, "is that Hizballah is not limited to Lebanon anymore. It is an international organization with activists all over the world.

"It's hard to say whether Hizballah helped the Iranians carry out this summer's Buenos Aires and London bombings," he adds, "but it certainly has the capacity — the intelligence and the explosives."

Carmon's solution: "We must hit Hizballah hard in Lebanon, to deter it from international terror. This entails escalation by Israel. But I think the world would thank us for doing the job. The bottom line is this: What we don't do today, we'll find ourselves having to do tomorrow in much more difficult conditions."

KOL HA'IR



Carmon: 'Abu Nidal is an extreme, dedicated ideologue, committed to liberating all of Palestine'

The Jerusalem Report: Are the Palestinian rejectionists now a spent force?

Even though he's cooped up in Libya, I can't say Abu Nidal's days are over. He's a very extreme and dedicated ideologue, committed to the idea of liberating all of Palestine. Abu Abbas has widespread international relations, with connections all over Europe through Munser al-Kamar, scion of a wealthy Syrian merchant family. Ahmad Jibril is too close to the Syrians to do anything they don't approve. He still has his infrastructure, though, and if Syria wants to signal that the peace process is not moving the way it wants, it may well unleash Jibril.

What about Habash and Hawatmeh?

Habash is definitely getting weaker and losing support, partly because of the collapse of Marxist ideology. He is also plagued by an internal split, with people like Abu Ali Mustapha sitting on the PLO's executive council without Habash's approval and advocating giving peace a chance. Hawatmeh has been broken for some time, partly because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and because of the split in his organization. A splinter group under Yasser Abd-Rabbo backs Arafat on the peace process.

What about Abu Musa, who heads a pro-Syrian breakaway faction from Yasser Arafat's Fatah?

Like Ahmad Jibril, he could in time receive much support from people in the refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan, who feel that for them the agreement with Israel is a sell-out. He is not a great danger now, but he too can't be written off completely. ❑

Leslie Susser

his most brazen acts of terror, including the attempted assassination of Israel's ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, which left Argov permanently bedridden, and which triggered the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Other notorious acts in the mid-80s included the 1985 coordinated attacks on the airports of Rome and Vienna in which 14 people were killed and the 1986 Istanbul synagogue attack, in which 22 worshipers were gunned down after the door was bolted with an iron bar to prevent their escape.

Abu Nidal also embarked on a lethal campaign against PLO moderates, assassinating Sa'id Hamami, Issam Sartawi and Fahd Qawasme. He also had his own brother-in-law murdered in a squabble over family property in Amman.

In 1987 things began to go wrong. He was expelled by the Syrians, and open fighting broke out within the FRC. Hundreds of fighters were summarily executed on Nidal's orders. Abu Nidal suspected that Atef Abu Bakr, his main opponent in the internal struggle, was being run by his old PLO mentor, Abu Iyad. On January 14, 1991, just days before the outbreak of the Gulf War, Abu Iyad was assassinated in Tunis by a security guard working for Abu Nidal.

Western and Israeli attempts to catch up with Abu Nidal have always failed. He is extremely elusive, always using forged travel documents, never attending public gatherings and only rarely talking to his own people. He hands down orders in written form to no more than three close operators. He never speaks on the telephone. No one even knows for sure what he looks like. The only photo supposedly of him is at least 20 years old.



#6

AHMAD JIBRIL, 58
Organization: POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - General Command
Place of Birth: YAZUR, near TEL AVIV
Current Whereabouts: DAMASCUS

In the summer of 1988 Ahmad Jibril, the master bomber, was broke. He approached Iran after U.S. forces had mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf, killing 290 people, and offered to blow up an American commercial aircraft in revenge, for $10 million.

A few weeks later, Hafeth al-Dalkamuni, one of his chief operatives, was arrested in Frankfurt. West German police found four barometric bomb devices — designed to set off explosions at a set altitude — in Dalkamuni's hide-out. Western intelligence services believe a fifth device that the West Germans missed was used to blow up Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland on December 21, killing 270 people.

Jibril was 12 years old when his family fled Yazur in the 1948 war, first to Beirut and then to Damascus. He became an officer in the Syrian Army engineering corps, and an expert on explosives. In 1962 he founded the Palestine Liberation Front, which in 1967 became part of George Habash's Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, until 1993 a faction of the PLO. A year later, after unsuccessfully pushing for a closer liaison with Syria, he broke away from Habash to launch a ruthless terrorist campaign of his own.

In February 1970, Jibril claimed responsibility for the mid-air explosion of a Swissair plane flying to Tel Aviv, killing all 47 people aboard. With his technical bent, he had perfected the assembly of barometrically detonated bombs.

He was innovative in other ways too. In the late 1970s, he began using hang-gliders to fly terrorists across Israel's borders, avoiding border patrols and radar alike, and rubber dinghies to reach Israeli beaches: A successful infiltration by a Jibril-sponsored hang-glider pilot, who killed six Israelis at a northern army base in late 1987, is considered to have been one of the sparks that ignited the Intifada. In the late 80s, Israeli intelligence described Jibril as "no less dangerous than Abu Nidal."

Jibril is uncompromisingly opposed to the peace process. "Palestine," he says, "can only be built on the ruins of Israel. There are no short cuts."

He has always been Syria's man. In 1976, he actually fought alongside Syrian troops against fellow Palestinians in the Lebanese civil war. His hatred of Yasser Arafat is equalled only by his hatred of Israel. Throughout the 80s, his and Arafat's forces clashed openly in Lebanon. In 1988, after reconciliation between Arafat and Libyan leader Muamar Qadhafi, Libya cut off its annual $20-million stipend to Jibril. Jibril turned to Iran for support to bolster his declining Syrian funding, becoming religious and vowing to kill author Salman Rushdie for his "Satanic Verses." Says George Habash: "Jibril has no ideology, no overall picture."

Over the years, Jibril, a voracious eater, has grown fat and gray. He walks about openly in Damascus. One of his favorite haunts is the Sheraton Hotel. He has offices in Damascus and Teheran, and training camps in Syria and Lebanon. His radio station, Al-Quds, broadcasts to the territories denouncing the peace process. Jibril has warned that Arafat could be assassinated because of the PLO's peace deal with Israel. "Not that I intend to kill him," says Jibril. "But if I were him, I would be very careful."

#7

GEORGE HABASH, 68
Organization: POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
Place of Birth: LOD
Current Whereabouts: DAMASCUS

If Abu Nidal and Ahmad Jibril were the main terror protagonists of the 80s, George Habash was the supremo of the 70s. He was the first Palestinian terrorist to hijack planes (an El Al plane to Algiers in 1968), the first to bomb supermarkets (in Jerusalem in 1969), the first to recruit foreigners (in the early 1970s) and the first to shoot up passengers at an airport (at Lod in 1972). In Wadia Haddad, his tactical mastermind, he had an operational genius, and in "Capt. Kamal Rafat" — Ali Shafik Ahmad Taha — an unusually talented field officer.

But Rafat was killed when Israeli commandos stormed the Sabena Boeing 707 he had hijacked to Tel Aviv in May 1972, and Haddad split away in the mid-1970s, masterminded the Entebbe hijacking of 1976, and died of cancer in an East German sanitorium in April 1978. Habash, without them, has been a much weakened force.

Born into a well-to-do Greek Orthodox Christian family of corn merchants, he enrolled at the American University of Beirut in 1944, and qualified as a doctor in 1951. Soon after, he and student friend Haddad founded the pro-Nasserist Arab Nationalist Movement; his longstanding ideological and personal rivalry with Arafat, who was elected president of the Palestinian Students' Union in Cairo in 1952, dates back to this time. For the Marxist Habash, "liberation of Palestine" was only the first step in a wider world revolution. For Arafat, Palestine was everything.

ISRAEL SUN

Twenty-seven Israelis were killed, most of them schoolchildren, in Naif Hawatmeh's most vicious act of terrorism, at Ma'alot in northern Israel on May 15, 1974. Described by his former terrorist colleague George Habash as suffering from 'infantile leftism,' the 59-year-old Hawatmeh is nowadays in decline, with little funding, and scant support in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

On December 7, 1967, with Haddad, Jibril and Naif Hawatmeh, Habash founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which joined the PLO despite the rivalry with Arafat, and only broke away in 1993. Within months, Habash had been arrested in Damascus by the Syrians, but Haddad ambushed the convoy taking him to jail to bring off a spectacular rescue — which may have been staged after Habash cut a deal with the Syrians. Intelligence analysts note that he has been pro-Syrian ever since.

Habash was never pro-Jordanian though, and he and Hawatmeh must bear most of the blame for Black September — King Hussein's successful September 1970 campaign to drive the PLO fighters from Jordan. On September 1 that year, Hawatmeh's men tried to assassinate the king; on September 9, Habash's people hijacked three Western airliners and brought them to Dawson's Field in Zarqa, Jordan, where they blew them up three days later. On September 16, Hussein, pushed beyond endurance, moved his tanks against the PLO, killing thousands.

In 1972, Habash invited members of radical organizations from all over the world to the first "terrorist international," a conference which took place on the outskirts of the Badawi refugee camp in Lebanon in May. Habash's plan was for a partnership in terror; the Palestinians would help train foreigners, and the foreigners would help logistically or by direct participation in Palestinian actions abroad. That same month, Japanese Red Army terrorists, working for Habash, shot up a passenger terminal at Lod airport, killing 24 people and wounding 78 others.

Today Habash, 68 and unwell, needing two canes to support himself when he walks, remains bitterly opposed to any settlement with Israel. Like Jibril, he is in Damascus under tight Syrian rein. But in Lebanon, his organization boasts 800-1,000 full-time armed members, who stage infrequent attacks on Israeli forces in the security zone. In the territories, he has the backing of no more than 10 percent of the population, well behind Arafat and Hamas.

#8

NAIF HAWATMEH, 59
Organization: DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
Place of Birth: SALT, JORDAN
Current Whereabouts: DAMASCUS

Like Habash, Naif Hawatmeh is a Christian, and like Habash his organization was greatly weakened

by the blow to Marxist ideology caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. But unlike Habash, Hawatmeh has always professed himself an opponent of international terror, advocating instead a "people's war," designed to turn the Middle East into "another Vietnam." This means that he won't stage attacks overseas, but he supports killings anywhere in mandatory Palestine.

His most vicious action was the attack on the school in Ma'alot on May 15, 1974, in which 27 Israelis, mainly schoolchildren, were killed.

Today, his main bases are in the Biqa Valley — but he commands little outside support, and has little money. In the territories, most DFLP people support the breakaway FIDA wing of the movement, led by Yasser Abd-Rabbo, which backs the peace process with Israel. In early September, Hawatmeh's influence in the territories was still further weakened when a number of DFLP loyalists were arrested by the Palestinian authorities in Gaza.

Born in Salt in 1935, Hawatmeh is not strictly speaking a Palestinian. A series of bad crops forced his family off the land, and they became manual laborers. Two of his brothers had to give up school to help the family. It was partly this experience that made the young Hawatmeh such a devout Marxist.

In the 50s he joined the Arab Nationalist Movement, called for the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy, and fled to Iraq after being sentenced to death. In 1963, the pattern repeated itself. He was thrown out of Iraq for plotting to assassinate then-prime minister Abd al-Karim Kassem.

Always conspiratorial, Hawatmeh speaks in a slow whisper, almost inaudibly. In February 1969, when he broke with Habash (questioning Habash's Marxist purity), there were gun battles in the streets of Amman.

Hawatmeh has always seen the struggle against Zionism as part of a fight against reactionary Arab regimes. He has been the most outspoken advocate of a secular democratic state in Palestine instead of Israel, in which Jews would be a tolerated minority.

Alone among Palestinian rejectionist leaders, he has had contacts with the Israeli far-left and given interviews to Israeli newspapers in which he advocates a common struggle of working-class Jews and Arabs against "Zionist and imperialist forces."

Many Palestinians dismiss him as a utopian dreamer. Habash is less complimentary. He says Hawatmeh and his supporters "suffer from infantile leftism."



#9

ABU ABBAS, 53
Organization: PALESTINIAN LIBERATION FRONT
Place of Birth: SAFED
Current Whereabouts: DAMASCUS/ BAGHDAD

Muhammad Zaidan Abbas, alias Abu Abbas, is one of a younger generation of Palestinian leaders, and at one time was being groomed for great things by Yasser Arafat.

In a checkered career, the chain-smoking Abbas has shown great restlessness. In the late 60s he joined George Habash in Damascus; in the early 70s he went over to the Fatah-run Black September and in 1973 became Ahmad Jibril's spokesman, only to leave in disgust three years later when Jibril fought for the Syrians against fellow Palestinians in Lebanon.

In 1976, with Talat Yaqub, he founded the new Palestine Liberation Front, and established close ties with Iraq. Like Jibril, he used novel methods, but without the same degree of success. A hot-air balloon carrying terrorists across the border exploded in 1980, and hang-glider pilots dropped their bombs before reaching their targets and were captured by Israeli forces in 1981.

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the PLF split three ways, with the Abbas faction going to Tunis and swearing loyalty to Arafat. The PLO leader, his fortunes at a low ebb after the ignominious expulsion from Lebanon, was not slow to reward his new young cohort. Abu Abbas's budget in the 80s from the PLO alone was $100,000 a month.

In October 1985, he launched his most notorious operation — the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship, and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly wheelchair-bound American tourist. Although the affair was a PR fiasco in the West, it made Abbas something of a Palestinian hero.

His next PR fiasco, though, had serious consequences for the PLO. When (with Arafat's knowledge) he made a vain attempt to land terrorists on Israeli beaches in May 1990, with orders to kill holidaymakers and to attack the U.S. Embassy building, the U.S. broke off its recently started dialogue with the PLO, which had been based on a PLO commitment not to engage in terrorism.

Abu Abbas, although a member of the rejectionist front, retains a place on the PLO executive. He argues that he can use it to bring Arafat round to a rejectionist position. But for the time being, the effect seems to be in the opposite direction, with Abu Abbas declaring tentative support for the peace process in late August.

#10

ABU TAYEB
Organization: FATAH, FORCE 17
Place of Birth: UNKNOWN
Current Whereabouts: JORDAN

Force 17 was set up in 1968 as a Praetorian Guard to protect Fatah leaders. But the organization soon showed potential for more than internal security. Highly trained operatives stationed at PLO embassies all over the world were used to gather intelligence and to take an active part in terrorist operations.

Col. Muhammad Natur, alias Abu Tayeb, took over the organization after Ali Hassan Salameh, the "Red Prince," was assassinated in Beirut by Israeli agents in 1979 for his role in the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Under Abu Tayeb, the organization continued to recruit foreigners, to set up "safe houses" in Europe and to collect intelligence on Israel and other potential targets. A September 1985 attack on a yacht in the Cypriot port of Larnaca — in which three Israelis were killed — was carried out by a British Force 17 operative.

Abu Tayeb has compiled several tomes on terrorist methods. One is an intelligence compendium on Israel, with details of targets, transport routes, and schedules and patterns of public behavior. Another, a primer on terrorism, is now in the hands of intelligence services the world over.

Now based in Jordan, his attitude to the peace process is not clear. As a member of Fatah, he answers directly to Yasser Arafat. But he has never come to the territories, perhaps because Israel would not allow him in, and perhaps because Arafat wants him outside to maintain a potential for violence if the peace process bogs down. ❑

The Boycott Law Bulletin — February 27, 1995 Hizbollah

Egypt cuts one of few remaining links to Israel by barring Israeli paper The Jerusalem Post

CAIRO — The Egyptian government has cut yet another of the few tenuous links developed with Israel in the 16 years since the two countries signed a peace agreement. Effective Feb. 15th the *Jerusalem Post* newspaper has been banned in Cairo.

The government gave no reason for barring distribution of the Israeli newspaper. Less than 200 copies of the paper had been distributed daily in Cairo during the last year, mostly to major hotels and to some government offices.

However, the action comes in the wake of a series of anti-Israeli gestures by the Cairo government and quasi-governmental unions and trade associations. In the last six months, Israel has been barred — despite the peace treaty and Egypt's withdrawal from the boycott — from participating in international book fairs, film festivals, and other cultural events held in the Egyptian capital.

Perhaps Tied to Nuclear Dispute

Observers suggest that the action against the *Jerusalem Post* also might be the result of worsening relations between Egypt and Israel over the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Egypt is trying to force Israel into signing the treaty (which would require Israel to publicly acknowledge its nuclear arsenal), threatening to lead Arab nations in refusing to extend the treaty unless Israel signs on. The Arab states, along with other non-aligned countries, have enough votes to block renewal of the nonproliferation treaty, an event the U.S. hopes to avoid.

In any case, the barring of the Israeli newspaper is seen as yet another weakening of the never strong ties between Israel and Egypt. ❑

Frydman brothers open another front in battle against L'Oreal & Cosmair

WASHINGTON — The Frydman brothers' long-running antiboycott campaign against the French cosmetics giant L'Oreal escalated yet another notch last week when Congressman Eliot L. Engel (D-N.Y.) on Feb. 21st asked the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to determine whether the French head of L'Oreal, Andre Bettencourt, concealed his World War II collaboration with the Nazis when he filled out numerous visa applications for visits to the U.S. over the past 40 years.

Latest Echo of Boycott Suit

If the 75-year-old Bettencourt is found to have lied about his Nazi affiliations on U.S. visa applications, he could be barred from ever entering the U.S. again. One of L'Oreal's largest operating units, Cosmair, Inc., is headquartered in New York City.

In a lawsuit filed in New York Feb. 1, 1994, Jean and David Frydman, two Jewish French businessmen with ties to Israel, alleged that L'Oreal and Cosmair engineered their ouster from a L'Oreal subsidiary in order to facilitate L'Oreal's removal from the Arab blacklist in 1989.

Lingering Antiboycott Effect

Although Rep. Engel's action in seeking an OSI investigation of Bettencourt is not directly related to U.S. federal antiboycott enforcement, L'Oreal's continuing problems with the Frydman brothers was first brought to public light in the U.S. because of the boycott/antiboycott elements of the story, and it demonstrates that association with the Arab boycott still carries a powerful public relations liability — if not worse. The Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC) is said to be investigating L'Oreal and Cosmair concerning their possible complicity with the boycott. ❑

Shorts....

Islamic Bank to finance projects in non-Islamic countries — caution

RIYADH — The Islamic Development Bank, the financial arm of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has launched an ambitious program to finance projects in Islamic communities in countries that are not member states of the OIC.

The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) is funding assistance programs in four non-Islamic countries, with funds going to Moslem communities in China, Kenya, India, and Ethiopia.

Although it is not certain that the IDB funding for Moslem communities in those countries will necessarily carry boycott of Israel strings, prudent U.S. companies subject to antiboycott regulations might consider adding those countries to their lists of potential boycott request sources.

The 45-member OIC voted in 1981 to initiate a boycott of Israel. While the Islamic boycott is not widely enforced, it is now and then a source of problematic boycott-related documentation from unexpected quarters. ❑

Hezbollah leaders issue call for boycott of U.S.

BEIRUT — The Iranian-backed Hezbollah movement has called on Moslems worldwide to boycott U.S. products and companies.

Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the imam for Hezbollah, told a rally in Beirut last week that he has issued a call for the world's one billion Moslems to boycott American firms and goods.

A previous call for a boycott of all things American was issued by Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hezbollah. Both leaders were echoing still earlier demands for sanctions against the U.S. by other Hezbollah figures.

There has been no apparent effect of these demands. ❑

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
OF B'NAI B'RITH
823 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

To: ~~Will Maslow~~
3/2/95

MEMORANDUM

To: Conference of Presidents' Member Agencies

From: Kenneth Jacobson and Jeffrey P. Sinensky

Hizbollah

Date: February 16, 1995

Subject: New ADL Special Report - "The Struggle is Now Worldwide": Hizballah and Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism

The subject publication, one copy of which is attached, details the violent history of Hizballah, the Shi'ite Lebanese terror organization, against Israel, the United States and other Western countries. The report was prepared by Yehudit Barsky of the Research and Evaluation Department.

In light of last year's attacks against the Jewish communities of Argentina, Panama, and Britain, the report analyzes the ideology of the movement and the expansion of Hizballah activities from the Middle East throughout the world, including the United States. In this context, Iranian support for Hizballah, the PLO's anti-Arafat factions, and other Islamic extremist movements such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, are also examined.

In addition to providing background on Hizballah's war of attrition against Israel carried out from southern Lebanon, the report details Syria's continuing role in providing Hizballah freedom of movement in Lebanon.

Included in the report are charts of Hizballah's structure, its attacks against Israel's northern border, and a chronology of the organization's attacks against Israel, Westerners and Jews from its inception through 1994.

KJ/JPS:jg

Attachment

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Michael Kapel wrote
in Australian Mag
Review

Imad Mugniyeh

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Hizbollah

Arab Media Survey

February 26, 1995

1. PALESTINIANS

After the Palestinian Authority meeting in Gaza (25) Nabil Sha'ath suggested that if the peace talks do not advance, there may be a need to move to subjects in the final-status settlement which are preventing progress in the current talks. The Palestinian Authority awaits the visit of Secretary Christopher. Saeb Arekat said the Palestinians will send delegations of "ministerial" level to the Arab and Western countries to explain the delays in the talks with Israel. He called for parallel talks on the elections and on Israeli redeployment, saying that without this "the Gaza-Jericho agreement will disintegrate" (ME news agency, agencies, 25).

2. LEBANON

The foreign minister told Lebanon TV that Israel is escalating the situation in the south both because of internal reasons and for security and political considerations—and is not interested in negotiations. The premier, Hariri, went for consultations (24) with the Syrians. He said there is a naval blockade by Israel which has created an additional security zone to harm Lebanese sovereignty. But Israel would not succeed, and coordination with Syria will continue until the liberation of all the territories (Beirut Radio, 25). President H'rawi said separate peace agreements will not lead to a just, comprehensive peace, which cannot be reached without [restoring] South Lebanon and the Golan. Israel's intentions will be proved by implementing UN Res. 425. The labor minister, Al-Amin, said the U.S. had warned Lebanon not to turn to the UN Security Council concerning South Lebanon (the attacks and the naval blockade) because it would support Israel (Radio Nur, 25). Foreign Minister Bouez added that France also advised Lebanon not to approach the Security Council, in return for which they would make efforts with Israel.

The Hizbullah leader, Nasrallah, joined Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other Lebanese and Palestinian national Islamic groups on "World Jerusalem Day," and said the blood of victims of the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance would destroy the settlement with Israel. Hizbullah reserves the right to attack northern Israeli settlements when it deems it suitable, and not when Israel dictates the time (Radio Nur, 24). His deputy, Kassem, said it is possible to reach peace in the Middle East if Israel withdraws from all the territories without exception. "If the lands are restored, the problem will be over, and peace will prevail," he said (AFP, 24).

3. EGYPT

After meeting with Foreign Minister Peres, Egyptian Foreign Minister Moussa told a news conference (23) it was agreed to support the peace process and have many contacts and exchange opinions in the coming weeks. The relations between Egypt and Israel permit direct, candid talks, but perhaps the two countries would not agree on signing the NPT before the April renewal date, and this has to be taken into account (ME news agency, 23). The Israeli proposal

Hizbullah

4. LEBANON

The supreme Syrian-Lebanese council ended its meetings (12) and Damascus Radio said (12) the two presidents stressed the need to increase the joint activities of the two countries. Informed sources said they discussed the next steps in the peace process.

Hizbullah leader Nasrallah said (12) the Lebanese and Palestinian "resistance" is a product of Islam and will continue through tens of thousands of fighters and suicide attackers. "They are not working according to orders from Iran or Syria, but out of faith in Islam . . . We pledge to continue on the way of jihad, and the U.S. cannot do anything against this, through preparing lists of countries supporting terrorism. All of us are yearning to die as martyrs. Defining Islam as an enemy of NATO is the result of the West's fear for its interests in the Islamic world, which it divided throughout the years and into which it introduced Israel as the spearhead to control the Islamic people. The Islamic world cannot continue under the rule of the West. Iran and Syria are standing by the 'resistance' in its path of jihad" (Radio Nur, 12).

5. SYRIA

The information line (12) says the high-level Syrian-Lebanese meeting was "another component in the fortress which Israel cannot breach" in the light of her rejection of full withdrawal and preference for separate deals.

6. IRAN

On the third anniversary of the death of Abbas Mussawi, the Hizbullah leader, in an Israeli helicopter raid, the Iranian ambassador in Beirut called (12) on the Lebanese and Palestinians to fight Israel until the liberation of their lands. Hizbullah leader Nasrallah pledged the organization would continue its struggle "with backing of Iran and Syria" (Reuters, 12).

The speaker of the Iranian parliament and the foreign ministry spokesman denounced the statement by the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, that the U.S. should overthrow the regime in Iran [not by military means] and said these "foolish words arise from hatred and unbalanced thought." They also attacked Israel for expressing concern at Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation (Teheran Radio, 12).

7. QATAR

The foreign minister, Al-Thani, told Qatar TV "Israel requested the opening of an interests-office in Qatar, which is waiting for the right moment to reach a decision." An American company has been commissioned to examine the practicality of a natural gas pipeline from Qatar to Israel, but Qatar has not committed itself to any projects with Israel as long as there is no significant progress on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of peace talks (AFP, 12). Reuters reports that the Qatar foreign minister said the recent contacts with Israel were for "familiarization with the way of thought of the enemy."

8. ALGERIA

The opposition parties which signed the Rome document met (12) in Algeria and repeated their opposition at a news conference to holding presidential elections due before the end of this year. They called on the authorities to hold a "serious dialogue" (AFP, 12).

Iran:

Teheran Radio (25-26) linked the attack with the Israeli settlement policy whose continuation will renew the struggle of Islamic groups against the Zionist regime.

3. ARABS ON NPT

Egypt:

The Egyptian foreign minister, Amre Moussa, met at the Zurich airport with his Israeli counterpart and the UN secretary-general for 45 minutes. No details of their talk were announced (Reuters, 27). FM Moussa then met with the Swiss foreign minister, the NATO secretary-general, the Argentinean foreign minister and the Mexican trade and industry minister and stressed Egypt's policy for strengthening the peace process in the Middle East as a strategic concept, with the region freed from weapons of mass destruction.

Jordan:

The Jordanian ambassador to the UN, Abu-Ouda, said (24) Jordan supports efforts to get Israel to sign the NPT, and has not yet decided whether to renew it if Israel does not join. This will depend on a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers ("Jordan Times," 25).

Iran:

A foreign ministry spokesman reacted to U.S. Secretary Christopher's remarks about Iran's nuclear program and called for pressure on Israel to join the NPT (Teheran Radio, 28).

UAE:

An official source said after talks with visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary Pelletreau (27) on turning the Middle East into an atom-free zone that the UAE's stand is identical with that of the Arab League—"if Israel joins the NPT, all of us will join" (Reuters, 28).

4. LEBANON

There are conflicting reports on the status of the Lebanese-U.S. security committee due to meet in Washington on February 6. The interior minister, Al-Marrar, is reported to have said (Voice of the People Radio, 26) the former committee will be dissolved. Free Lebanon Radio (28) says there have been contacts with Washington in the past 48 hours on opening talks away from the media.

5. HIZBULLAH

The spiritual leader, Sheikh Fadlallah, said in a Friday sermon, following the U.S. decision to freeze the assets of terrorist organizations, that the U.S. has thus declared war on Islam in favor of the Jews. "We must act as Allah said—Satan [the U.S.] is your enemy, treat him like an enemy." He called on the Arab and Moslem world to boycott all American products. He claimed most of the organizations involved do not have assets in the U.S. Fadlallah said President Clinton's decision has no connection with the Beit Lid terrorist attack but was meant to gain Jewish votes and encourage Rabin. The Clinton Administration "is mostly, if not altogether, operated by Jews" (Radio Nur, AFP, 27). The Hizbullah TV, Al-Manar, said the sheikh also promised there would be many more attacks like Beit Lid. His deputy warned there are American and Zionist pressures on Lebanon in an attempt to make it surrender, with the Americans demanding the end of the "resistance" and the disarming of Hizbullah.

INSIDER middle east
FOUNDATION FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES
980 Yonge Street, Suite 401, Toronto, Ontario M4W 2J5

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 4, 1995

THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1994: THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Israelis and Arabs rode a veritable roller-coaster in 1994. The "peaks" included the peace treaty with Jordan and the cracking of the barriers to direct contacts between Israel and Arab and Moslem countries. Among the "valleys" were the continuing uncertainties in negotiations with the Palestinians, Lebanon and Syria; militant settler violence against Arabs in Hebron; and Islamist terrorism against Israeli and Jewish targets in Gaza and the West Bank, in Israel, and globally.

REAL PEACE ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER

The year's undisputed highlight was the October 26 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. While the two countries had long enjoyed informal peaceful relations, the Jordanians were always reluctant to allow the process to "go public." The bilateral relationship moved to a formal plateau in 1994, prompted by a great deal of creative diplomacy and active U.S. mediation. Despite some concern about the activities of Jordanian Islamists, officials are optimistic that bilateral cooperation will be consolidated in 1995.

THE BREAKING-DOWN OF BARRIERS

There was important progress toward normalized relations between Israel and significant segments of the Arab and Muslim worlds in 1994. Here are some of the highlights: Israel and Morocco formally established diplomatic and commercial ties; the Gulf Cooperation Council ended its compliance with the secondary and tertiary provisions of the Arab economic boycott and declared its readiness to support a future Arab League decision to terminate fully the boycott; Israel and Tunisia opened economic liaison offices; Israeli officials participated fully in the Middle East-North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca, Morocco, and they used the opportunity to confer with their counterparts from Arab countries; Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made a secret visit to Oman for consultations with Sultan Qabus bin Said. The multilateral peace talks continued to provide important opportunities for Israeli-Arab contacts. In addition, Israel's international standing was enhanced by the role it played in facilitating humanitarian relief to Rwandan refugees. In 1994, Israel enjoyed diplomatic relations with 149 of the 184 members of the United Nations. In mid-December the UN General Assembly approved by an overwhelming majority a resolution supporting the Arab-Israeli peace process. While other General Assembly statements continued to reflect the organization's traditional anti-Israel bias, the overall pattern of the UN's treatment of Israel in 1994 affirmed its steady integration into the international community.

PROGRESS WITH THE PALESTINIANS, BUT CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY

On May 4, Israel and the P.L.O. completed negotiations toward implementing the "Gaza-Jericho First" accord. In late August, agreement was reached on extending "early empowerment" to the West Bank; responsibility over education, health, tourism, welfare and taxation was subsequently transferred to the Palestinians. For their efforts, Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat were awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize.

However, this diplomatic progress was off-set by continuing difficulties. The major source of concern was Islamist terrorism which resulted in the deaths of nearly 100 Israelis in 1994. In April alone, 13 Israelis were killed in attacks in Afula, Ashdod and Hadera; Hamas claimed that the attacks were in retaliation for the deaths of 29 Palestinians in Hebron on February 25. A series of terrorist attacks in October -- including the kidnapping and murder of an IDF soldier and the bombing of a Tel Aviv bus -- left 27 Israelis dead and many others wounded. The terrorist outrages caused a steady decline in Israeli popular confidence in the Palestinian negotiations. This decline was exacerbated by Arafat's reluctance to denounce terrorism or to make serious efforts to stop Hamas from operating in Gaza. On several occasions Arafat reassured Israelis that he had chosen "the peace of the brave." But for many Israelis Arafat's credibility was diminished by his failure to comply with specific commitments (e.g., to abrogate the PNC Covenant) as well as provocative statements attributed to him and other P.L.O. leaders (e.g., Arafat's call for an Islamic *jihad* to "liberate" Jerusalem). In response to perceived attempts by the P.L.O. to create "political facts" in Jerusalem and to force an immediate showdown over the city's final status (in contravention of the DOP) the Knesset passed two resolutions reaffirming united Jerusalem's status as Israel's "sole, eternal capital" and limiting P.L.O. political activity in Jerusalem.

Hamas terrorism threatened to cause delays in implementing further stages of Palestinian autonomy. Increasingly, Israeli officials -- among them, several avowed "doves" -- acknowledged that Israel could not militarily redeploy from major Arab population centres in the West Bank (as called for in the DOP, in preparation for Palestinian elections) unless the Palestinian authorities demonstrated a greater ability to maintain order and stop terrorism, for to do so would endanger the security of settlers in Judea and Samaria. At year's end, the Cabinet reaffirmed Israel's commitment to the Palestinian track on the basis of the DOP, but emphasized that in subsequent negotiations Israel will be guided by "the lessons learned to date." Rabin and Peres reportedly offered Arafat a compromise: the IDF will undertake a phased redeployment prior to Palestinian elections but will remain in areas of potential difficulty (e.g., Hebron and Nablus, where there are sizable settler enclaves amidst large Arab populations). How Israel and the P.L.O. work through this compromise will help to define the quality of their political relations in 1995.

HIZBOLLAH TERRORISM IN LEBANON AND BEYOND

In 1994 there was a significant escalation in Hizbollah's "war of attrition" against Israeli soldiers and the pro-Israeli South Lebanon Army (SLA) patrolling the "security zone" north of the Israel-Lebanon border. In addition, Hizbollah and other Lebanese-based radical Islamist groups were implicated,

Hirchfelder

along with the government of Iran, in a series of terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in South America and England. In the most serious of the attacks, 95 people were killed when the Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires was bombed in July. The IDF launched retaliatory strikes on terrorist bases in southern Lebanon. Prime Minister Rabin called for a concerted international effort to sanction Iran for its active sponsorship of Hizbollah and other Lebanese-based terrorist groups, and he charged that by refusing to order the Lebanese army to disarm Hizbollah, Prime Minister Rafik Harari had relinquished sovereign control over southern Lebanon to the pro-Iranian terrorists. In addition, Israeli officials accused Syria of indirect complicity for the violence in southern Lebanon. As the effective military authority in Lebanon, Syria has the capacity to disarm Hizbollah and to cut-off the flow of weapons to them from Iran. By permitting Hizbollah to operate with impunity, and by continuing to give safe haven to Palestinian rejectionist factions based in the Bekaa Valley, Syrian President Hafez Assad was trying either to impose obstacles against a separate Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement or to increase the pressure on Israel in regard to negotiations over the Golan Heights. Be that as it may, a total of 21 Israeli soldiers were killed and many others were wounded in Hizbollah attacks in southern Lebanon in 1994.

WAITING FOR ASSAD

At a mid-January meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Geneva, Syrian President Assad claimed his country had made a "strategic decision" in favour of peace and desired "normal peaceful relations" with all of its neighbours. But Assad neglected to mention Israel by name and Syrian officials denied Israeli journalists access to the Assad-Clinton press conference. Clinton and Assad met again in October, this time in Damascus. Here Assad spoke specifically of Syria's desire for normal peaceful relations *with Israel*, but he disappointed U.S. and Israeli officials by refusing to publicly condemn Hamas terrorism against Israeli civilian targets. While in his October 27 address to the Knesset Clinton sought to reassure Israel of the seriousness of Assad's desire for real peace, public opinion data indicated that many Israelis continued to mistrust Syria. A potential shift in Syrian policy occurred in early December when Assad agreed to resume informal discussions with Israeli and American officials in Washington (formal talks were suspended by Syria in February). The involvement in the current talks of senior military personnel -- including the outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak, and his Syrian counterpart Hikmat Shihabi -- contributed to speculation that the negotiations had entered into a new, more serious phase. With election campaigns scheduled to begin in the United States and Israel by the fall of 1995, the next 6 to 9 months will be important in determining the status of the Syrian track.

CONTROLLED CHAOS ON THE ISRAELI DOMESTIC SCENE

As he sought to maintain the diplomatic momentum in 1994, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had to contend with a high degree of chaos and uncertainty on the domestic front. Politically, Rabin tried to shore-up a coalition government weakened by the departure of the ultra-orthodox Shas and internal disputes over issues ranging from the pace of peace negotiations and the status of Jewish settlements, to a proposed law prohibiting the importation of non-kosher meat, to the acceptability of potential new coalition partners. An attempt by Rabin to bring Shas back into the government was

blocked by a legal action launched in part by Meretz, Rabin's coalition partner. Late in the year Rabin did succeed in adding to the Cabinet 2 members of the Yi'ud faction, formerly part of Rafael Eitan's rightist Tzomet Party. However, this new configuration left Rabin three votes shy of a clear majority of 61 Knesset votes, and the government must still rely on the support of two left-wing Arab-dominated parties. Moreover, it remained to be seen if the foreign policy views of the two new cabinet members, formerly part of Rafael Eitan's rightist Tzomet Party, were compatible with those of ministers from the liberal Meretz. Rabin's difficulties were exacerbated by instability in the Israeli economy. Despite the strong performance of crucial economic indicators the Tel Aviv stock market experienced wild fluctuations and the country's rate of inflation began to rise. The Rabin government responded by introducing a controversial tax on capital gains. This move, combined with growing popular anxiety about terrorism, resulted in a noticeable shift in the domestic political balance. By year's end Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu began to move ahead of Rabin in public opinion surveys. How all of this plays out in the government's overall political calculations in the months leading up to the election campaign remains to be seen.

CANADA REMAINS ENGAGED IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Diplomatically, Canada continued in 1994 to effectively "gavel" the multilateral working group on refugees and increased its level of involvement in the working groups dealing with regional security, water and economic development. In December, Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet announced that Canada had agreed in principle to contribute to a peace-monitoring force on the Golan Heights should such be established in the context of an Israeli-Syrian peace settlement. At the same time, Canada declined an invitation from Israel and the P.L.O. to participate in a temporary peacekeeping force in Gaza. Politically, there was continued growth in the Canada-Israel bilateral relationship. At a November 23 meeting in Ottawa, Rabin and Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced the start of negotiations toward a Canada-Israel free trade zone agreement. Both sides expressed confidence that the negotiations, which formally began in Israel in December, will be completed in short order and will facilitate the lifting of the embargo on bilateral trade in weapons and dual-use components. Foreign Affairs Minister Ouellet will open a meeting of the Canada-Israel Joint Economic Committee in Jerusalem in late January. As 1994 concluded, officials from both sides were trying to develop an effective response to the growing number of Israeli citizens claiming refugee status in Canada, a phenomenon that caused difficulty in the improving bilateral relationship.

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NEAR EAST REPORT

SPECIAL ISSUE

Washington Biweekly On American Middle East Policy

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IDF Begins West Bank Redeployment

As we go to press, Israel is about to begin the process of redeployment out of West Bank cities. Following an October 15 meeting with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said the IDF pullout would begin in one week.

"Starting October 22, we will redeploy from Jenin, and continue at a rate of one city a week—except for Hebron," Peres told reporters afterwards. "I hope that a democratic Palestinian entity will be formed next to us, and that it will be a good neighbor."

AP/Wide World

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres (l) shakes hands with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat before their meeting at the Erez crossing. Israel and the PLO agreed to move up the start of the Israeli redeployment in the West Bank.

In response, Arafat thanked Peres "for his openness and frankness towards us throughout the process."

The original timetable had called for the IDF to leave Jenin by November 19. As a confidence-building measure, Israel agreed to move the date up by four weeks. Following

(continued on page 127)

U.S., Israel Press Syria To Restrain Hezbollah

In the wake of the latest attacks by Hezbollah, which killed nine Israeli soldiers since October 12, the U.S. and Israel are pressing Syria to rein in the Islamic terrorist group. The latest blow was delivered early October 15: Six IDF soldiers were killed and a seventh wounded when Hezbollah detonated a roadside bomb as an Israeli vehicle passed by. Seventy-two hours earlier, another Hezbollah ambush killed three IDF soldiers in southern Lebanon.

All nine were part of the same IDF battalion. One who died in the second attack was Capt. Yossi Ohana, 24, of Ashdod. Just two days earlier, Capt. Ohana had attended the funeral in Jerusalem for Lt. Dror Barashi, 22, of Mevasseret Zion, the unit's deputy commander. Lt. Barashi was killed in the first attack.

The Hezbollah strikes brought to 22 the number of Israelis killed in Lebanon so far this year, compared to 21 during all of 1994.

"There can be no excuse for the type of outrageous incident that occurred," State Department spokesman NICHOLAS BURNS said following the second Hezbollah ambush. "Syria, we believe, does not control Hezbollah, but Syria clearly has the capability to influence the behavior of Hezbollah....We would urge Syria to use its influence to control the violence, to end the violence, and to stabilize the situation, in order to...enhance the prospects for peace in Lebanon—as well as

(continued on page 128)

Move Embassy To Jerusalem

For 3,000 years, Jerusalem has been the sole capital of the Jewish people, the center of its religious, spiritual, cultural, and national life. It is, and forever will be, the capital of the reborn State of Israel.

For nearly five decades, however, most of the world, including the United States, has refused to acknowledge this unalterable fact. Every American administration has found it inconvenient to move the Embassy and recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Consider this: What is the only country of the 184 nations around the world with which the United States has diplomatic relations ,where we neither recognize the designated capital nor have our embassy located in that city? Israel! It is time to change that.

Earlier this year, 93 senators and over 250 members of the House sent a letter requesting that the Administration begin planning for the relocation of our Embassy to Jerusalem no later than the end of final-status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, set for May 1999. The Secretary of State never answered that letter.

In May, therefore, Senators BOB DOLE (R-KS), JON KYL (R-AZ), and DANIEL INOUYE (D-HI) introduced legislation calling for the Embassy to be opened in Jerusalem no later than May 1999, and for groundbreaking to begin for a new Embassy by the end of 1996. That legislation now has 62 co-sponsors. Some Senators expressed concern, however, that starting construction in 1996, the year that final-status negotiations are to begin, could adversely affect the peace process. The three senators, now joined by Senator DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (D-NY), reintroduced the legislation last week, deleting the 1996 groundbreaking provisions.

When asked recently about moving the U.S. Embassy, Minister of Economy Yossi Beilin, a key architect of Israel's negotiations with the Palestinians, said "the sooner, the better." Asked whether the move would hurt the peace process, Beilin responded, "Israel is the only nation in the world that doesn't have a recognized capital, and I am not prepared to accept that if Israel has a recognized capital, this will affect the negotiations."

On October 25, an event will be held in the Rotunda of the United States Capitol marking the 3,000th anniversary of King David's establishment of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. No other city on earth can claim to be the capital of the same country, inhabited by the same people who speak the same language and worship the same God as they did 3,000 years ago. It is high time the United States acknowledged Jerusalem as Israel's capital. May,1999 is just a half-century late.

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Syria...*continued*

throughout the Middle East."

Burns added that "we certainly do condemn this terrible attack....We share the grief of the Israeli people over the loss of their soldiers...We deplore the violence that continues in southern Lebanon."

The State Department spokesman also took sharp issue with arguments made by the Syrian-dominated Beirut government, which said that Hezbollah violence would only end if Israel withdrew unconditionally from southern Lebanon. "There can be no excuse for the type of outrageous incident that occurred [October 15], and the Lebanese government should not make that type of excuse," Burns said.

The Israeli Cabinet issued a statement "condemn[ing] the Government of Iran, which directly aids the Hezbollah terrorists, and denounces the Government of Syria, which—although it is capable of doing so—does not prevent, but, rather, gives backing to, the terrorist activity of this organization."

AP/Wide World

Israeli soldiers weep during the funeral of Sgt. Yotam Inbar Oct. 17. Sgt. Inbar was one of nine Israeli soldiers killed by Hezbollah terrorists in the security zone in southern Lebanon last weekend.

"Syria apparently thinks that, by encouraging terror attacks, we'll be pressured in all that relates to peace negotiations," Rabin said. "It makes a grave mistake."

Syria, however, remains defiant. In an October 16 editorial, the government-run *Al-Baath* defended Hezbollah, likening its attacks "to the method used by the French to struggle against Hitler, and employed by all Europeans to fight fascism and Nazism together." The Syrian paper added that Israel was guilty of using "Nazi practices" in Lebanon. ❑

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Benefits...*continued*

Dead Sea; and the two nations have recently concluded a memorandum of understanding encouraging joint ventures, as well as an agreement allowing Israeli firms to compete for Chinese government tenders.

•China's Deputy Prime Minister Zou Jiahua met in Israel with Prime Minister Rabin on October 4, 1994. He was the most senior Chinese official to visit Israel.

F. Improving Israel's UN Status

Israel's position at the United Nations has improved markedly in recent months:

• The Secretary General issued a statement welcoming Oslo II;

•In 1995, for the first time, the UN Security Council has condemned terrorist attacks committed against Israel by Islamic fundamentalists;

•In the last two General Assemblies, of the over thirty negative resolutions raised annually, more than twenty were either not introduced, not brought to a vote, or changed;

•An Israeli was appointed to serve as the Assistant Director of the Medical Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, becoming the highest-ranking Israeli in UN peacekeeping activities; and for the first time in the history of UN-Israeli relations, Israeli observers participated in the UN-sponsored election monitoring efforts in South Africa and in Mozambique in 1994;

•a General Assembly resolution cosponsored by 110 countries and approved by 155 countries praised the 1994 Israel-PLO accord;

•Israel's UN credentials went unchallenged in 1994 for the first time in more than a decade;

•The World Health Organization's European region agreed in September 1993 to hold the first-ever UN agency meeting in Israel;

•the UN General Assembly in December, 1993 accepted Israel as a member of the U.N. Committee on Information, the first time Israel was appointed to serve on a U.N. committee;

•the General Assembly passed a resolution in December 1994 supporting the ongoing peace process by a margin of 149-4. The resolution, sponsored by the U.S., Russia and Norway, expressed "full support for the achievements of the peace process thus far." Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Libya voted against the resolution.

G. Economic Benefits

•Tourism to Israel has risen significantly as a result of the recent breakthroughs in the peace process. In 1994 tourism increased by eight percent over 1993. The Ministry of Tourism stated that the total number of tourists for 1994 exceeded two million for the first time; 1995 may be an even bigger year for tourism. 1994 showed an increase in tourism from Eastern Europe, Asia and Egypt and a 25 percent increase in tourists arriving by land—from Egypt and Jordan.

•The peace process has paved the way for Israeli firms to penetrate new markets. About 45% of new Israeli exports are to markets that did not exist in 1991. In addition, exports to Far Eastern and Eastern European markets rose from nearly nothing to about one-fifth of Israel's total. In 1994 fully one quarter of the total 13 percent increase in Israel's exports were to Asia.

•Foreign investment in Israel have risen sharply as a result of reduced tensions in the region, lowering the security risks for investors. Banks, investment firms, and multinational corporations are currently exploring further investment opportunities in Israel. A recent Merrill Lynch report said, "The Israeli economy is poised to benefit from the trend toward peace." The IMF's March 1994 annual report states, "Israel presently enjoys...an improved geopolitical situation very different from that which had hitherto restricted market access and inhibited foreign investment."

•A leading brokerage firm, Osca Gruss and Co., stated in late 1994 that "Israel is one of the world's most exciting stock markets—not only for next year, but for the next decade.... The key is the peace process is here to stay." The firm cited the opening of giant export markets for Israeli firms in India and the Far East as one factor.

•A Goldman-Sachs report in late 1994 recommended that Standard and Poors upgrade Israel's credit rating because of "progress toward peace in the region." ❑

Hizbollah

Hizbullah -- the Party of God -- is an umbrella organization comprised of various radical fundamentalist Shi'ite groups and organizations (majmuat) that adhere to a Khomeinistic ideology. It was established following the 1982 Peace for Galilee War and the subsequent increased Iranian presence and influence in Lebanon.

Iran's penetration into Lebanon had been part of an effort by the Khomeini regime to "export" its Islamic revolution outside Iran's borders. Lebanon's large Shi'ite population became a prime target for this purpose.

From the start, the Hizbullah was established as an organizational body for the Shi'ite fundamentalists. Its leaders were religious clerics who saw the adoption of the Iranian doctrine as a solution to Lebanese political malaise. This doctrine also included using terror as a means of attaining political objectives.

Toward the end of 1982, Iran sent fighters from its "Iranian Revolutionary Guards" to Lebanon to assist in the establishment of a revolutionary Islamic movement whose members would participate in the "Jihad" -- Holy War -- against Israel. These forces, concentrated in the Ba'albek area in the northern Beqa'a valley, constituted the core of the Hizbullah in Lebanon and gave the area an Iranian-Islamic character.

The organization maintains a training apparatus throughout these villages and their surroundings, as well as outside Lebanon. Training concentrates on two goals: to build a reliable manpower source for its military and to establish terror arms.

The spiritual father of the movement in Lebanon is Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, who acts as chief Mujtahid -- aribiter of Islamic law -- of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon. He enjoys a great spiritual, ethical and religious influence over the movement; together with a Council of Shi'ite clerics and notables, he runs the activities of the organization.

With time, Hizbullah has turned into an organization of secondary-level groups working on a local level and headed by regional functionaries. These in turn operate within the general framework of the radical Shi'ites: the Leadership (Central) Council, whose members are the senior organizational leaders and receive their directives from the Iranian ambassador in Damascus, and the Regional Councils located in Beirut, the Beqa'a valley and southern Lebanon. The appointment of individuals to various organizational positions in the past few years is testimony to the growing institutionalization of the group.

The most senior and prominent leader of the organization is Said Abbas Mussawi (Abu Yassir) who serves as the general secretary of Hizbullah. Mussawi, a member of the Leadership Council, is responsible for the

military and operational wings of the organization and is the primary decision-maker.

Thirty-five year old Mussawi received his religious training in the Iranian city of Qum. He is one of the many Hizbullah leaders to have survived a November 1988 assassination attempt.

THE SPREAD OF HIZBULLAH INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON

As the organizational infrastructure developed and with Iranian and Syrian assistance, Hizbullah began to establish an extensive military network in the Ba'albek area. Its militias spread also into the Shi'ite neighborhoods in southern and western Beirut, as well as into southern Lebanon.

This network is the main base for Hizbullah activities, as well as for other radical Shi'ite groups. Thousands of Hizbullah activists and members are located in the Beqa'a valley, Beirut and southern Lebanon. The network also constitutes the principal base for the recruitment of additional activists and fighters among the local Shi'ite populations. Recruitment is based on family affinities and local loyalties.

After the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon (June 1985), the Hizbullah increased its efforts to strengthen its foothold in southern Lebanon. Activists and fighters, and stockpiles of weapons and munitions, were sent there. Moreover, with the efforts of the religious clerics and extensive Iranian financial assistance, the organization succeeded in achieving the support of the local population.

HIZBULLAH - AMAL RELATIONS

During the 1980's, due to friction over strongholds in the region, fighting broke out between members of the Amal organization and Hizbullah members. The AMAL organization, supported by the Syrians, is striving to improve its position among the Shi'ite community. Thus, in essence, both groups are fighting for control over the Shi'ite community in southern Lebanon.

In 1990, fighting resumed between the two groups in the Aklim El-Tuphach area. Hizbullah fighters captured the AMAL-held town of Jarjuah in southern Aklim el-Tuphach. AMAL efforts to recapture the town were thwarted.

Also during this period, the AMAL organization began cooperating with the FATAH militias in Lebanon; FATAH had assisted AMAL in the fierce battles and continuous exchanges of gunfire. FATAH took advantage of this cooperation to spread its forces into the area.

Since February 1991 and under the auspices of the "Second Damascus Agreement" (signed between AMAL and Hizbullah in November 1990), Hizbullah activists have returned to the villages in the south and have begun to rebuild a civilian and military infrastructure. Conflict

immediately broke out between the two groups over control and hegemony in southern Lebanon, that was punctuated by local skirmishes between activists of the two groups. Hizbullah appears to maintain the upper hand.

RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND SYRIA

Iran is the Hizbullah movement's patron state. Iran's sponsorship and support have helped the organization to establish itself and further develop. The Iranians supply Hizbullah with most of its weaponry and monetary needs, train Hizbullah fighters in Iranian training camps and give Hizbullah the political backing to counter the support AMAL recieves from Syria. The Iranian influence on Hizbullah is substantial, as demonstrated by Hizbullah's use of terror as a means of achieving political goals. It appears that Iran is behind the Hizbullah attacks on IDF and SLA forces in southern Lebanon.

For Syria, supporting Hizbullah was a means to attack, by proxy, its enemies. Even though the Syrians are AMAL's sponsor in its conflict with Hizbullah, they have no problem with sponsoring, backing and supporting both groups at the same time.

IDEOLOGY

The ideological basis of Hizbullah is Khomeinism; its principal goal is the establishment of a pan-Islamic republic headed by religious clerics.

Hizbullah's world view was first published in its political platform in February 1985:

*The solution to Lebanon's problems is the establishment of an Islamic republic, because only this type of regime can secure justice and equality for all of Lebanon's citizens.

*The Hizbullah views the fight against "western imperialism" and its eradication from Lebanon as an important goal. The group strives for complete American and French withdrawal from Lebanon including all their institutions.

*The conflict with Israel is viewed as a central concern, a concern not only limited to the IDF presence in Lebanon. Rather, the complete destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of Islamic rule over Jerusalem are expressed goals.

Part of Hizbullah's ideology is the group's militant approach: using terror as a means to attain its goals. In addition, the existence of Israel -- the "little Satan" -- is viewed as foreign to the region and a threat to Islam and to Muslims. To that end, the destruction of Israel and the liberation of Jerusalem are deemed religious obligations.

Western States, especially the United States -- the "big Satan" -- are seen as the evil forces responsible for Lebanon's tragic situation and

which attempt to oppress and subjugate the Lebanese people and undermine Islam. The Hizbullah justifies the use of terror against these enemies as the weapon of the weak and oppressed against the strong aggressor.

In order to realize its decided-upon ideological lines, Hizbullah leaders actively plan and perpetrate terror attacks against IDF and SLA forces, preach religious extremism against Israel, and encourage the dissemination of Iranian ideology. As opposed to AMAL which limits its conflict to within the confines of Lebanese territory, Hizbullah preaches the spreading of the conflict into Israel.

With its ideological outlook that stresses a spiritual and strictly religious solution, Hizbullah's ideology is attractive to the Shi'ite population, especially the younger generation, for it provides an alternative to the traditional religious and political institutions. Ideas such as "Islamic regime", with the successful Iranian example, coupled with the ability to join in the fight against the "enemies of Islam", are more enticing solutions than offered by AMAL.

With the economic crisis in Lebanon, the extensive Iranian financial aid given to Hizbullah has helped Hizbullah spread its ideological message, attract younger Shi'ite recruits, and raise the flag of Islamic radicalism.

ATTACKS AND TERRORISM

Using cover names such as "Islamic Jihad" and "The Revolultionary Justice Organization", Hizbullah has perpetrated a series of high-profile attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and American and Multinational Forces targets in Lebanon. Shi'ites hijacked airplanes -- such as their alleged 1985 hijacking of a TWA jet -- and kidnapped foreign civilians, primarily Americans and Frenchmen.

Attacks against the IDF and the SLA are carried out under cover names such as "The Islamic Resistance". Through these attacks, Hizbullah has demonstrated a proficient military and operational capability.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ATTACKS

A. SUICIDE ATTACKS

These attacks are a unique method in that they demand psychological preparation for the mission, combined with brainwashing and a great deal of fanaticism. They are carried out with an explosive device, usually electrically activated and attached to the body of the attacker.

From the beginning of the 1982 Peace for Galilee War until today, a number of suicide attacks were perpetrated by individuals driving explosive-laden vehicles. A successful attack of this kind usually results in extensive damage and numerous casualties.

B. EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

In recent times, a common terror method is the use of explosive devices, both radio triggered and conventionally triggered, aimed at travelling cars -- especially IDF and SLA-armoured vehicles. Remote control enables the attacker to choose the target and a safe location from which to attack. A successful attack can translate into heavy casualties. Hizbullah terrorists situated in mountainous areas often take advantage of their knowlege of the terrain to carefully choose sites from which to carry out these attacks.

1991 marked a switch in the number of attacks attributed to the Hizbullah in relation to those attributed to other terror groups operating in southern Lebanon. In 1991 Hizbullah became the leading perpetrator of terrorist attacks in relation to the other terror groups operating out of southern Lebanon -- surpassing the number carried out by AMAL. The spread of the Lebanese Army into the area influenced this phenomena, as some AMAL forces assimilated into the larger force.

Fifty-two attacks were attributed to Hizbullah in 1991. Eight were carried out in cooperation with other terrorist groups -- various factions of the "Palestinian Islamic Jihad", AMAL, and the Faithful Resistance. This figure marks a dramatic increase from the 19 attacks perpetrated in 1990 -- two of which were carried out in cooperation with Palestinian groups. Of particular significance, in 1991, for the first time since 1986, Hizbullah attempted to carry out an attack on Israeli territory.

During 1991, Hizbullah attacks in the security zone were characterized by:

A. A preference for attacks in the Western sector of the Security Zone;

B. The use of remote control devices or mines against IDF and SLA forces;

C. More cooperation with various factions of the "Palestinian Islamic Jihad".

MAJOR HIZBULLAH ATTACKS

18.4.83 -- Car b mb attack on the American embassy in Beirut. Sixteen killed; approximately 120 wounded.

23.10.83 -- Car bomb attack on the U.S. Marine Command in Beirut. 239 killed; some 40 wounded.

23.10.83 -- Car bomb attack on the French Multinational Forces Command in Beirut. Seventy-four killed; 15 wounded.

4.11.83 -- Car bomb attack on the IDF command in Tyre. Thirty killed; 29 wounded.

20.9.84 -- Explosive device at the U.S. embassy annex in Beirut. Twenty killed; 16 wounded.

10.3.85 -- An incendiary car bomb attack at the "Agal Fence" near Metulla. Twelve IDF soldiers killed; 20 wounded.

10.12.87 -- Attack against an IDF Dabour patrol vessel near the Adloun beach (north of Tyre). One IDF soldier killed.

19.8.88 -- An incendiary car bomb driven by a Shi'ite on a suicide mission exploded two kilometers south of the Hardulla bridge next to the Beaufort. Two IDF soldiers wounded.

19.10.88 -- Car bomb explosion at the Fatrah Bridge. Eight IDF soldiers killed; seven wounded.

29.10.91 -- Five IDF soldiers wounded by terrorist gunfire north of Biranit. The terrorists, affiliated with the Islamic Jihad organization, were on a mission to attack the northern settlement of Zarit.

29.10.91 -- Three IDF soldiers killed and another wounded in a bomb blast set off by Hizbullah terrorists as an IDF armored patrol vehicle travelled through the eastern sector of the Security Zone in southern Lebanon.

CONCLUSION

In the past year, a rejuvenation of Hizbullah elements has occurred in various south Lebanese villages. It began with the return of the activists to their homes and villages and continued with the renewal of operations in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, the re-establishment of an organized operational infrastructure enabled the resumption of terror activities. From January to March 1991, as the Lebanese Army spread into southern Lebanon, Hizbullah carried out only one of its total 52 attacks for the entire year. Later in the year, the attacks occurred more frequently and demonstrate more planning -- especially immediately prior to the opening of the peace process. In method, the organization moved toward greater use of sophisticated, remote control explosive devices. Thus far, Hizbullah terror attacks have mostly been directed against SLA targets. The few Hizbullah attempts to penetrate the Israeli border were thwarted before entering the Security Zone.

APPENDICES

A. SHEIKH FADLALLAH

Itallah Said Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah is the spiritual leader of Hizbullah. As the most prominant religious leader in Lebanon, he is very influential in the organization and its policy direction. Fifty-three year old Fadlallah was born in the Shi'ite holy city of Najif, Iraq; his family originally came from southern Lebanon. He studied in Iraq and

returned to Lebanon in 1966, where he initiated social projects in Beirut. He has given numerous interviews and has been published many times. He sat at the head of some organizations that later became a part of Hizbullah, yet has refrained from accepting any formal position in the organization.

B. SHEIKH TZAVHI TAFILI

Sheikh Tafili is a former General Secretary of Hizbullah and is a member of the Leadership Council. He often appears in public for speeches and statements. He is forty-five years old and received his training in Najif and Qum.

C. KIDNAPPINGS IN LEBANON

The Hizbullah organization and others identifying with or ideologically connected to it frequently kidnap foreign civilians under the cover name "Islamic Jihad". The organization also seized Israeli soldiers in Lebanon between 1982 and 1986.

In the past few years, more than 60 foreign citizens, mostly American and French, have been kidnapped in Lebanon. More than 35 of these kidnappings were by Hizbullah. Of those kidnapped, some died in captivity, while others managed to escape. Over the years, some of the victims have been freed within the framework of various deals. Today, Hizbullah still holds a few victims.

In recent months, a tremendous effort with the assistance of then-U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, was made to solve the problem of those still held captive in Lebanon. As of December 1991, almost all of the Western captives have been released. Information about the fate of the three IDF captives, Samir Assad, Yosef Fink and Rahamim Alsheik was received that they are no longer living. The body of Samir Assad was later returned to Israel and buried. The fate of the four remaining IDF soldiers held in Lebanon is still unknown.

Special Report





"The Struggle is Now Worldwide"

Hizballah and

Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism

January 1995

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Symbol of Hizballah

The symbol of Hizballah is represented by an image of the world with an upraised arm holding an automatic rifle. Above the rifle is the Quranic verse for which the group is named (1), and below the figure of the world is the group's name — "Hizb Allah — The Islamic Revolution of Lebanon." (2) The letter "b" (3) of the word "Hizb" (Party) (3) is fashioned in the shape of a reading stand for the Quran which rests on top of it. Growing out of the Quran is what appears to be an olive branch, which is considered to be a sacred tree in Islamic tradition. The Arabic letter "A" (4) of the word "Allah" is the arm of the figure grasping the rifle.

1 — Verse quoted from the Quran: "Lo, the Party of Allah (God), they are the victorious ones." (Surah 5, verse 56)

2 — "The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon"

3 — The Arabic letter "b" of the word "Hizb" is fashioned in the shape of a reading stand for the Quran.

4. — The Arabic letter "A" of the word "Allah" (God) is depicted as the arm of the figure grasping the automatic rifle.





"The Struggle is Now Worldwide"
Hizballah and Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism

Executive Summary

I. Hizballah is a Lebanon-based Shi'ite Lebanese Islamic extremist and terrorist organization with a 13-year history of attacks against Westerners, Israel and Jews. The organization's terror attacks and kidnappings of Westerners over the last decade specifically targetted American, French and German citizens.

II. As a *modus operandi,* Hizballah employs a plethora of aliases such as "Islamic Jihad" and "Islamic Resistance" to take responsibility for the acts of violence carried out by its operatives.

III. As a reflection of Iran's policy of "exporting the Islamic revolution," Hizballah is nurtured, financed and controlled by Iran, and is provided freedom of movement in Lebanon due to Syrian influence over that country's government. Hizballah's contacts with other Islamic extremist organizations are facilitated by Iran, which uses Hizballah as an instrument to coordinate activities and provide support for other Islamic extremist terror organizations, such as HAMAS. Under Iran's patronage, Hizballah coordinates its activities with HAMAS, which maintains its own "embassy" in Teheran. As evidence of the increasing ties between the three parties, in December 1992 Iran and Hizballah signed an official agreement of cooperation with HAMAS.

IV. Commensurate with the late Ayatollah Khomeini's philosophy, Hizballah has declared the United States to be the "Great Satan" and regards Israel as an agent of the U.S. in the region.

V. Iran assists a number of other terror organizations sympathetic to the Islamic extremist cause. These include *HAMAS - the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine*, and the *Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine*, a Palestine terror organization which shares Hizballah's pro-Khomeini views.

VI. Ideologically, Hizballah espouses the formation of a pro-Khomeini pan-Islamic government throughout the Middle East and the world.

VIL By virtue of Iran's close ties to Syria, Hizballah remains the only armed militia in Lebanon. Having been given free rein to carry out attacks against Israel, Hizballah serves Syria's interests by acting as its proxy and destabilizing the Lebanese border with Israel. Hizballah has been waging its war of attrition via southern Lebanon since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985.

VIII. More recently Hizballah has extended Iran's largesse to assist dissident factions of the PLO. Since the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993, Hizballah has forged agreements with the *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* of George Habash and the *Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine* led by Naif Hawatmah. It continues to cooperate with two other radical Palestinian terrorst organizations, namely Ahmad Jibril's *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command* and the *Abu Nidal* organization led by Sabri al-Banna.

IX. Under Iranian guidance, Hizballah has over the past three years increasingly shifted towards attacking Jewish and Israeli targets in parts of the world seemingly far removed from the Middle East. The 1994 car bomb attacks carried out in Buenos Aires and London and the threat of potential car bombings in New York and Washington, DC, demonstrates Hizballah's enhanced capabilities to carry out terror attacks with Iranian assistance. The threat of terror attacks of such magnitude are therefore no longer confined to the Middle East.

X. Due to the organization's international expansion, its fundraising activities and recruitment of operatives have spread throughout Europe, West Africa, South America and even to the United States.

XI. In light of Hizballah's renewed threats to carry out attacks against Jews and Israelis worldwide, the only deterrent will be increased international cooperation in order to counter Iran's offensive in the name of Hizballah.

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INTRODUCTION

I salute this good act, and I bow to the spirits of the martyrs.[1]

Hussein al-Musawi
Leader of Islamic Amal and later of
Hizballah, praising the bombing of the
U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon, October 1983.

We are headed for dealing with evil at the roots, and the roots are America.[2]

Open Letter from Hizballah to the Disinherited in Lebanon and the World, (Hizballah's manifesto),
February 1985.

Israel exists in fact . . . and the Devil also exists in fact. That does not mean that we must recognize its legitimacy.[3]

Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah
Spiritual Leader of Hizballah, in reaction to the
Vatican's recognition of Israel, August 1992.

The struggle against the Jewish state, in which all Muslims are engaged, is a continuation of the old struggle of the Muslims against the Jews' conspiracy against Islam.[4]

Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah
Spiritual Leader of Hizballah

Hizballah,[A] the "Party of God," is a Shi'i (Shi'ite) Islamic extremist terror organization based in Lebanon which promotes the cause of a Khomeini-style Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East. Formed in 1982 during the period of the Israeli, American and French presence in Lebanon, the group gained notoriety for its spectacular car-bombing attacks, the most notable of which was the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, in which 241 people were killed and 38 wounded.

Drawing its inspiration from the Khomeini government's policy of "exporting the Islamic revolution" around the world, Hizballah has sought to eradicate Western influence from the Middle East through acts of violence, with the ultimate goal of establishing a radical Islamic regime in Lebanon. As a complement to these local efforts, Hizballah, in concert with its patron, Iran, has also operated on a much wider scale by carrying out terrorist attacks against those whom it views as its enemies - namely, Israel and Jews, the United States and other Western countries. In this larger sphere, too, the ultimate goal is to create a radical international pan-Islamic movement that will, in the words of Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, one of the group's leaders, make Islam "prevail throughout the world."[5]

Since its founding, Hizballah has never directly assumed responsibility for its terrorist attacks. Through the use of various aliases, small factions of the group have claimed responsibility for acts of violence ranging from kidnapping to suicide car bomb attacks. Included among the aliases that have been employed by the group are: Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, the *Mujahideen* [Holy Warriors] for Freedom,[6] and the Cells of Armed Struggle.[7] Two other aliases for Hizballah's attacks in south Lebanon are the Islamic Resistance, Hizballah's self-proclaimed "military wing," and the Believers' Resistance.

The most recent bombings directed against Jews in Argentina and Panama were claimed by another small faction of the organization, which calls itself *Ansar Allah*, the "Partisans of God." *Ansar Allah* took responsibility for the July 18 and 19, 1994 bombings in a statement published in a Lebanese newspaper on July 23.

Due to the similarities of the bombings, Iran together with Hizballah are considered to be responsible for the two attacks against the Israeli Embassy and Joint Israel Appeal in London several days later. These most recent terrorist attacks, which indicate an escalation of the organization's activities worldwide, point to the need for a closer examination of Hizballah's origins, actions and stated goals.

[A] The name "Hizballah" has been variously transliterated from Arabic as "Hizbullah" and "Hezbollah." All refer to the same organization.

I. Origins and Ideology

"Lo the Party of God, They are the Victorious Ones"

The name "Hizballah" - "Party of Allah" (God) - is taken from two passages in the *Quran* (Koran) which state:

> "And whoso taketh Allah and His messenger and those who believe for friends (will know that), lo, **the party of Allah**, they are the victorious ones."
>
> (*Surah* 5, verse 56)

The second verse speaks of the reward promised to the faithful:

> Thou wilt not find folk who believe in Allah and the Last Day loving those who oppose Allah and his messenger, even though they be their fathers or their sons or their brethren or their clan. As for such, He hath written faith upon their hearts and hath strengthened them with a Spirit from Him, and He will bring them into Gardens underneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide. Allah is well-pleased with them, and they are well-pleased with Him. They are **Allah's party**. Lo! Is it not **Allah's party** who are the successful?
>
> (*Surah* 58, verse 22)

The symbol of the group is represented by a "blue and blood-red image of the world with an upraised arm holding an automatic rifle."[8] Above the rifle is the Quranic verse for which the group is named, and below the figure of the world is the group's name: "Hizb Allah - The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon." The Arabic letter "b" in the word "Hizb" (Party) is fashioned in the shape of a reading stand for the *Quran* which rests on top of it, and growing out of the *Quran* is what appears to be an olive branch, which is considered to be a blessed tree in Islamic tradition. The Arabic letter "A" of the word "Allah" (God) is the arm of the figure grasping the automatic rifle.

Hizballah was established in 1982 by Abbas Musawi and Sheikh Subhi Tufayli with the assistance of Iran.[9] A year later, the Iranians installed Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah as the

head of the organization, and Fadlallah continues to serve as the "spiritual leader[10]" of the group. Fadlallah's scholarly endeavors in Islamic extremist ideology include a work entitled *Islam and the Logic of Force.*[11]

During the 1982 Israeli incursion into Lebanon, the Iranian government, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, sent 1000 *Pasdaran* - Islamic Revolutionary Guards - to Ba'albek in the Beka'a Valley of Lebanon, which was then controlled by Syria. At that time, the Syrian government permitted the Iranians to direct the activities of their Revolutionary Guards from the Iranian Embassy in Damascus.[12]

Upon arriving in Ba'albek, the *Pasdaran* enjoyed the patronage of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, who provided the hospitality of his Imam al-Mahdi Religious Seminary. In return, the *Pasdaran* provided Sheikh Musawi and his followers with their first course in military training. According to Musawi, it was Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards' military training course which gave him a spiritual epiphany:

> When I joined the Guards and sat with the brethren in the first course they gave in the Beka'a Valley, I felt I derived an immense benefit. I felt I had truly penetrated genuine Islam.[13]

Musawi described the effect of the *Pasdaran's* training on his seminary disciples in the following manner:

> [The *Pasdaran*] made the Muslim youths love martyrdom. And so we were not surprised at all when, shortly after the arrival of the Guards, a Muslim youth in Lebanon smiled at death while carrying with him 1200 kilograms of explosives.[14]

Support for Hizballah in Lebanon is garnered through the organization's social welfare system which is used as a tool to recruit the movement's sympathizers and operatives. Throughout Lebanon, the organization operates clinics, discount grocery stores, schools, and religious seminaries for the benefit of its members, their families and their related local clans. In effect, Hizballah brought development to the most neglected areas of Lebanon, to places which either lacked infrastructure or whose infrastructure had collapsed due to the Lebanese civil war. The group therefore continues to cull its main support from the poverty-stricken southern suburbs of Beirut, a section heavily populated by Shi'a (i.e., Shi'ites), and small Shi'i villages in southern Lebanon.

Using money provided by Iran, the group provides employment opportunities and material benefits heretofore unknown in those areas, including hospitals, pharmacies, small factories, and construction projects.[15] Unrivalled in these areas by the Lebanese government, Hizballah goes one step further in supporting its followers by providing loans and basic living necessities for young couples.[16]

A hijacker from the Shi'i *Amal* movement named Fawaz Yunis, who is currently imprisoned in the United States for his role in hijacking TWA Flight 847 together with members of Hizballah, provided an interesting glimpse inside Hizballah's social welfare infrastructure. (See June 14, 1985 in Chronology for details of the hijacking.) In a conversation that he had with his friend prior to his arrest on the high seas by the FBI, he described Hizballah's social welfare efforts in the following manner:

> They've [Hizballah] opened about five pharmacies. Medicine there is sold at half price for the members of the Hizballah; both foreign and Arab-made medicines, they bought from Iran and sell it at half price. They've also opened associations, schools, and social organizations. They are doing what the Palestinians used to do, but they're stronger than the Palestinians, they're for all the people. They get involved with the people, gro-

cery stores, money exchangers, all of them from Hizballah. I swear, there are about two hundred young men inside the exchange bureau. They work by themselves, just for them. No one else except them is there.

Elaborating the extent to which Hizballah assists its supporters, Yunis went on to describe the organization's subsidization of the local population's most basic needs:

> They're doing real business. I swear, if you want to get a Mercedes car for general transportation purposes, i.e. service, they would get it for you and you can make the payments later. If you want to get married, they work to provide the girl for you, and the furniture, and they pay you for the wedding expenses and later you make payments. I swear, that's how they do things.[17]

In addition to the development schemes described above, Hizballah has also engaged in the drug trade. Throughout the Beka'a valley, members of Hizballah have openly cultivated hashish and opium, which are refined and sent on to be distributed internationally[8] through the Dahiya suburban district of Beirut.[18] For their part, the clerics of Hizballah have encouraged involvement in the drug trade because it "weakens the three great enemies of Islam" - the United States, Western Europe and Israel.[19]

"Social and Military Funds" for "Little Iran"

Included among Hizballah's "social welfare" projects is a foundation to provide for the material needs of its "martyrs," or those Hizballah operatives who have either been killed or captured, primarily in attacks against Israel. During the early 1980s, the southern Lebanese town of Ba'albek (thereafter dubbed "Little Iran") became a bulwark of Hizballah activities as the result of Iranian "investment" in the area under the guidance of Ayatollah Khomeini. A year after Hizballah's founding, an estimated $5 million each month - $60 million a year - was being "injected" as "social and military funds" for supporters of the group in the Ba'albek area.[20] At the height of its support for Hizballah over the past decade, Iran was said to be providing Hizballah with $100 million each year.[21] As a result of the Iran-Iraq War and an increase in its own domestic concerns, Iran's current subsidy to Hizballah has fallen to its original $60 million level.[22]

One of the groups which distributes Hizballah's funds is known as the "Martyrs' Foundation." In 1993 the Martyrs' Foundation was reported to have distributed $1.8 million to 1,797 families of Hizballah operatives.[23] The group also has its own media organs, including a radio station called *Voice of the Oppressed* which broadcasts from Ba'albek in southern Lebanon, and *Al-Nur*, a station which broadcasts from Beirut,[24] and a weekly newspaper entitled *Al-Ahd*, as well as other publications. Hizballah's investment in such an extensive infrastructure is geared towards its ultimate goal: the establishment of a pan-Islamic state that will eventually spread throughout the Middle East.

The activities of the party are organized by a hierarchy consisting of three area councils corresponding to the three major concentrations of the Shi'i population in Lebanon: Beirut, the Beka'a Valley, and southern Lebanon. The three councils are responsible for local activities, while the overall decision-making body of the organization, the *Shura*, or "Consultative Council" supervises the organization's operations throughout Lebanon. The *Shura* consists of 12 Hizballah leaders, the majority of whom are clergymen.[25] Due to the fact that the *Shura's* deliberations are conducted in

[8] In 1988 Lebanon was reported as being the producer of 50% of the world's hashish crop. (*Mednews*, May 16, 1988) Current figures for Lebanese hashish production are not available.

secrecy, the identities of all of its members are not known.[26]

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the *Shura* "functions as the principal governing body on day-to-day matters but actually exists to advise Iran on the unique situation of the Islamic movement in Lebanon."[27] Currently, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah serves as the organization's Secretary-General while Sheikh Fadlallah is the most prominent spokesman of the group.

During the first and second years of the organization's existence, a process of consolidation took place in which the myriad number of pro-Khomeini Shi'i organizations then existing in Lebanon joined the Hizballah. In 1983 a large number of Lebanese Shi'i organizations merged into Hizballah: the Lebanese Union of Muslim Students, the Suicide Squads of Imam Hussein led by Abdallah al-Musawi, *Al-Da'awa* - the Lebanese Da'awa[C] Party, and the *Hizb al-Amal al-Islami* - the Islamic *Amal*[D] Party headed by Hussein al-Musawi.

The largest of the factions assembled under the umbrella of Hizballah was the Islamic *Amal* Party, a more extreme offshoot of the Shi'i *Amal* Movement of Lebanon led by Nabih Birri. Five years later, another faction of Amal called the "Believers' Resistance[E]" headed by Mustafa Dirani also ceded from the *Amal* Party to join Hizballah.[28] The consolidation of these factions and up to 20 smaller ones into what became Hizballah accounts for the fractiousness that continues to exist within the group to this day.[29]

Militant Manifesto: "We Want to See Islam Prevail Throughout the World"

In February of 1985 Hizballah officially published its political manifesto entitled, "Open Letter from Hizballah to the Disinherited in Lebanon and the World."[30] The manifesto reiterates the Ayatollah Khomeini's often repeated pronouncement that America is the "Great Satan" by declaring, "We are headed for dealing with evil at the roots - and the roots are America."[31] At the ceremony celebrating the publication of the manifesto, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah paid tribute to Khomeini as the Shi'i *Faqih*, or supreme religious guide and described the Iranian revolution as the "vanguard" that "laid the foundation of a pan-Islamic state under the wise guidance of the fully qualified *Faqih*, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini." Outlining the goals of the party in an interview that took place after the ceremony, Sheikh Fadlallah explained, "We want to see Islam prevail throughout the world."[32]

Hizballah's adulation of Khomeini is reflected by the movement's designation of him as its *wali al-faqih*, or Supreme Jurisconsult in Islamic law.[33] The notion of conferring the title "Supreme Jurisconsult" on Khomeini demonstrates not only that Hizballah accords reverence to the late Ayatollah's ideas, but indicates the movement's acceptance of his pronouncements as being

---

[C] The term *da'awa* in Arabic translates as an "invitation" or "call" and bears religious overtones. The Da'awa Party, therefore, appealed to those among the Lebanese Shi'ite population who were sympathetic to the "religious call" of the Islamic revolution led by Iran.

[D] The translation of the Arabic word *amal* is "hope." The name "Islamic Hope Party" is used in an Islamic revivalist sense to refer to a communal return to Islam as the people's only hope for Divine salvation. This ideological concept is shared with the Ayatollah Khomeini's radical Islamic extremist political movement that came to power in Iran in 1979.

[E] The Believers' Resistance is believed to be the organization that held Israeli navigator Ron Arad as its hostage for at least two years. He was captured by the Hizballah-affiliated group in October 1986 at Sultan Yaqub outside of Sidon, Lebanon, and has been missing in action for more than 8 years. In August of 1991, an Islamic Amal official publicly admitted that Arad had been "sold" by the Believers' Resistance to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 1988 for "hundreds of thousands of dollars" and was subsequently transferred to Tehran. (*Ha'aretz*, August 29, 1991, translated in *Israel Line* of same date; *Forward*, May 27, 1994)

Divinely inspired. Hizballah adherence to Khomeini's ideology therefore makes the movement an instrument of Divine will. In its manifesto, Hizballah pledged its obedience to Khomeini in the following manner:

> We are sons of the nation of Hizballah, whose vanguard God made victorious in Iran, and who re-established the nucleus of a central Islamic state in the world. We abide by the orders of the sole wise and just command represented by the Supreme Jurisconsult who meets the necessary qualifications, and who is presently incarnate in the Imam and Guide, the great Ayatollah Ruhallah al-Musawi al-Khomeini, may his authority be perpetuated - enabler of the revolution of the Muslims and harbinger of their glorious renaissance.[34]

In this context, Hizballah followers display the Iranian flag and photographs of Khomeini as symbols of their international Islamic revolutionary movement and the global pan-Islamic state to come. The two symbols are employed as banners expressing obeisance to the founder of the Islamic revolution and its ultimate goals.

Employing the extremist interpretation of Shi'i Islamic theology promoted by the Ayatollah Khomeini, Hizballah's goal is the establishment of a pan-Islamic state modeled after the 1979 revolution in Iran. Paralleling the isolationism of the Iranian revolution, Hizballah provides a special prescription for Lebanon's ills. Since any compromise with the non-Muslim inhabitants of Lebanon is deemed unacceptable, the Hizballah manifesto calls for the Christians of Lebanon to convert to Islam and in that manner gain salvation:

> Oh Christians, we call you to Islam, in it you will find your safety and happiness, the rewards of this life and the Hereafter.[35]

A Call to Violence: "With the Blood of the Martyrs"

In consonance with the tone of the Hizballah manifesto, Hizballah leaders have called for acts of violence against American citizens and other Westerners. Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, one of the leaders of Hizballah, called for additional kidnappings of Americans in 1988 in an interview with the Lebanese magazine *Al-Wihdah al-Arabiya*: "If Muslims can detain the entire unjust American regime, not just one, two, or three, then they must do so, because the United States is the cause of all of our misfortunes and calamities."[36]

After Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, another Hizballah leader, Muhammad Yazbik, called for a *jihad*, or holy war, against the United States:

> "We say that America will remain the Great Satan and America should know that he who was defeated was only Saddam Hussein. No to America forever! Why are UN resolutions being carried out here [against Iraq] and not there [against Israel]? Only *jihad* and blood can rid this world of wolves and beasts ... We will stay in the front line against them."[37]

As noted, from Hizballah's viewpoint, the establishment of an Islamic state is not limited to Lebanon, but is meant to be expanded throughout the entire world. As the "vanguard" of Khomeini's Islamic revolution in Lebanon, Hizballah regards itself and those who sympathize with their movement as responsible for propagating the Islamic revolution in preparation for the final stage of the organization's international strategy.

As the Divinely guided instrument which will vanquish the forces of evil in the world (perceived as Israel, the United States, and other Western countries), Hizballah's strategy calls for the liberation of "Palestine" through unrelenting armed confrontation - *jihad* - against Israel, followed by the dismantling of Lebanon. The final stage of the process calls for all Muslims throughout the world to unite into a single Islamic nation, or, *umma*,[38] which will be ruled by Hizballah's interpretation of Islamic theocratic law, the *shari'a*.

Fueled by the perception that, as a result of the evil forces in the world, Muslims are living in a period of extreme crisis, members of the organization are enjoined to strike at the forces of evil in order to accelerate the arrival of the final stage. Thus, in the eyes of Hizballah, each of its attacks against its perceived enemies is an action to assist the Divine struggle against the Satanic forces in the world.

As Hizballah perceives it, the primary focus of this point in time is the organization's confrontation with Israel. Reflecting Hizballah's focus on Israel as the primary agent of evil in the region, Hussein al-Musawi, a leader of Hizballah expressed justification for his group's attacks on Israel in the following manner: "We are convinced that Israel is the head of the viper, and it is Israel we must strike."[39] In effect, Israel is regarded as stumbling block in the path toward the final establishment of Hizballah's pan-Islamic state. Once the Satanic "viper" is vanquished, the next stages can begin.

The final cumulative effect of Hizballah's blows against what the group perceives as the forces of evil will bring into being the establishment of a worldwide Islamic nation. The only way for this stage to come to fruition, according to Hizballah conception of it, is by waging *jihad*. Reflecting this concept, Ibrahim al-Amin, one of the movement's leaders, describes the last phase of Hizballah's struggle as "the final Middle East map" which will dismantle Lebanon in its current form and end the suffering of its Shi'i population:

> We seek Almighty God's help in drawing this map as soon as possible, with the blood of the martyrs and the strength of those who wage the *jihad*.[40]

Wide World

Beirut, Lebanon - October 27, 1983 - U.S. Marines continue to comb through the devastated remains of their Beirut headquarters which was levelled by a Hizballah suicide car bomber on October 23. On the same day the French Multinational Command was also bombed in a suicide attack. Hizballah took responsibility for the attack in the name of Islamic Jihad. 241 U.S. Marines and 74 French soldiers were killed in the explosions.

II. Striking Against the Peace Process: Hizballah's International Terror Ties

The Teheran Axis: Support for Hizballah, HAMAS, Islamic Jihad and PLO Rejectionists

Iran's sponsorship of extremist organizations which reject any compromise with Israel or the West has never been limited to Hizballah but extends to other organizations with ideologies that are sympathetic to Khomeini's notion of a Middle Eastern pan-Islamic state or simply espouse the destruction of Israel. As the result of the ongoing peace process which originated in the Madrid Conference proceedings of October 1991, Iran's clients have become more diverse as elements of various Palestinian terror factions have chosen to ally themselves with other Iranian-sponsored rejectionist organizations such as HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine and even some PLO dissident factions.

As a demonstration of the growing ties between Hizballah and HAMAS, two years ago, in October 1992, the Iranian government granted the request of HAMAS to open an "embassy" in Teheran which would maintain "contacts and coordination" with Hizballah in Teheran, the Iranian capital.[41] Musa Abu Marzuq, HAMAS's political chief, headed the delegation.[42] Two months later, in December 1992, a second HAMAS "political and military delegation" was sent to Iran, where it "concluded a number of political and military cooperation agreements with Iran and Lebanese Hizballah."[43]

Two months after Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles in Washington, DC in September 1993, Hizballah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah travelled to Damascus, Syria in order to meet with the heads of two radical Palestinian factions, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). On November 1, 1993, Nasrallah and the head of the PFLP, George Habash, announced that Hizballah and the PFLP had agreed to cooperate in order to undermine the Israeli-PLO accord. On the same day Nasrallah also announced that Hizballah and the DFLP led by Naif Hawatmah would be cooperating for the purpose of launching joint terrorist attacks against Israel from south Lebanon as well.[44]

Iran's influence has also eroded support from within the camp of Yasir Arafat's PLO loyalists. At the Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, signs of growing divisions became evi-

dent soon after the signing of the Israel-PLO accord. As a reaction to the signing of the agreement, Munir Maqdah, a former loyalist to Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO, joined forces with Iran and Hizballah.[45] In his post as the Fatah commander of the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon[46] Maqdah had occupied a key position in the PLO hierarchy. His defection to Iranian sponsorship was therefore a serious blow to Yasir Arafat's leadership.

At Ain al-Hilwah Iran was reported to have established a special foundation specifically geared for the social welfare of Palestinians named the "Martyr of Palestine." Maqdah was reported to be offering to coordinate the activities of his 1000 Fatah "fighters" with Hizballah, and, in return, he proposed that Iran pay their salaries. Praising his newly found benefactor, Maqdah stated, "In order to scuttle the Gaza-Jericho accord, pursue armed struggle and destroy Israel, our only option is to rebuild our economic, social and even military institutions. Iran is the alternative, because it raises the slogan of liberating Jerusalem, while Syria backs us politically."[47] In response, Yasir Arafat was reported to have sent a four-man committee of his own loyalists to "re-organize" Fatah activities in Ain al-Hilwah. Arafat also reportedly sent the sum of $500,000 in order to "bring payment of [his Fatah men in Lebanon] up to date."[48]

The situation in Ain al-Hilwah was further exacerbated in late November 1994 when fighting broke out between Maqdah's followers and those in the camp who were still loyal to Yasir Arafat. Four hundred Arafat loyalists attacked areas in Ain al-Hilwah that had been seized by Maqdah's followers, leaving 7 killed and 10 wounded.[49]

Hizballah's cooperation with the Abu Nidal organization, a radical Palestinian terror faction that is unaffiliated with the PLO, remains an ongoing effort. Most recently, in March of 1994, an Abu Nidal operative was reported to be teaching special courses on terrorism in the middle of the Burj al-Barajneh section of Beirut, which is heavily populated by Hizballah supporters. Dubbed the "Academy of Terrorist Sciences," the courses offered by Abu Nidal operative Ghaleb Hussein Jamal featured regular classes plus private tutoring on the execution of terrorist attacks and "applied explosive sciences" for $50 per hour of instruction.[50]

The PLO's Flirtation With Hizballah - Islamic Jihad's "Special Security Apparatus"

Ironically, the origins of Hizballah's international terror apparatus can be traced to the PLO during its years in Lebanon. Since the early 1980s, Hizballah has maintained an international operations arm called the "Special Security Apparatus" (SSA).[51] The early members of the SSA were young Lebanese Shi'is who were recruited and trained by Yasir Arafat's personal security apparatus known as Fatah's Force 17. One of the leaders of Force 17, Mahmud Natur (alias Abu Tayib) pioneered the recruiting effort among the young Lebanese Shi'is in order to find operatives who would remain loyal to him. Those young men were trained by "Fatah experts" who taught them "all there was to know about tactics, firearms, and explosives."[52]

By the late 1980s Fatah's Shi'i recruits had forsaken their ties to the PLO and directed their moral and political support toward Palestinian Islamic extremist groups such as the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine (IJLP) and HAMAS (the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine) instead. A number of members of the pro-Khomeini IJLP - a Palestinian mirror-image of the Hizballah - were originally terrorist operatives of Yasir Arafat's Fatah faction who came under the influence of the Iranian leader's ideology. The IJLP has manifested its ideological affinity to Hizballah by referring to itself at times as "Hizballah-Palestine."

The most prominent terrorist operative of Hizballah's SSA is Imad Mughniyah[F] who is considered to be responsible for planning the majority of kidnappings of Westerners in Lebanon during the 1980s. Operating most often under the alias "Islamic Jihad," Mughniyah and other members of the SSA have also been credited with the invention of the suicide car bombers that were employed with such devastating effect against American, French and Israeli posts in Lebanon in 1983. Among them were the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks outside the city, the bombing of the French Embassy in Beirut, the French military post outside that city and the bombing of the Israeli military headquarters in south Lebanon.[53] The U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut was bombed in 1984.[54] (See April 18, 1983, October 23, 1983, November 4, 1983, and December 3, 1984 in the Chronology for details.)

One of the most brutal terrorist incidents of the last decade that has been attributed to members of Hizballah's SSA was the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June of 1985. The hijacking was a joint operation which was carried out by terrorist operatives of the SSA together with members of Lebanon's Shi'i *Amal* movement led by Nabih Birri.

In the aftermath, U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was beaten and shot in the head by Hizballah's Muhammad Ali Hamadah, and 39 Americans were held as hostages in Beirut for a period of 17 days.[55] Outside of Lebanon, the SSA has carried out bombings against the U.S. and French Embassies in Kuwait,[56] and the hijacking of Kuwait Air Flight 422 to Teheran in 1988.[57] (See June 14, 1985 and April 5, 1988 in the Chronology for further information.)

The SSA maintains ties and cooperates with a number of other terror organizations. In January of 1984 Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, the Venezuelan known as "Carlos"[G] (formerly of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine but by then an independent mercenary) was reported to have set up a training base in Lebanon's Beka'a Valley in the same area as the headquarters of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Working together with Palestinian radical Abu Nidal, Sanchez was said to be training members of Hizballah's SSA and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards.[58] Reflecting the long-term relationship that he had forged with Mughniyah in 1984, a decade later Carlos again linked up with Hizballah in a different venue. Several months before his capture in August of 1994, Carlos was reported to be working together with the SSA in Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan.[59]

"Eliminate Israel From Existence and Liberate All the Territories of Usurped Palestine"

In a move designed to oppose the peace process which commenced with the October 1991 Madrid Conference, Iran hosted a parallel conference of Islamic extremist terrorist groups. Officially named the "International Conference to Support the Islamic Revolution of the People of Palestine,"[60] the purpose of the October 1991 Teheran Conference was to contrive a joint strategy among the groups to actively coordinate a unified opposition to the peace conference. Participating in the conference were representatives of Hizballah, including the group's then Secretary-General, Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi and its spiritual mentor, Sheikh Fadlallah. During the

[F] In 1992 the U.S. Justice Department indicted Mughniyah *in absentia* for his role in a number of terror attacks against American citizens, and a reward of up to $2 million was posted. In March of 1986, French officials did not respond to an American request to detain Mughniyah while he was visiting that country. (*New York Post*, November 18, 1992; *New York Times*, May 14, 1986)

[G] For more detailed information regarding Carlos's link to other international terrorist organizations, see *Bullets Are the Only Thing That Count: A Profile of Carlos The Jackal — Ilich Ramirez Sanchez*, Anti-Defamation League Research Report, 1994.

conference al-Musawi declared that Hizballah would "do everything in our power" to make the Madrid Conference fail.[61] Other participants at the conference included representatives from HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC, Abu Nidal, and Abu Musa of Fatah Uprising.[62]

Participants at the conference included, among others, representatives from "Algeria, America, Indonesia, Philippines, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Switzerland."[63] One American participant mentioned in Iranian radio coverage of the event was Muhammad al-Asi of the Islamic Education Center in Potomac, Maryland who was described as the "Friday prayer leader of Washington."[64] He addressed the Third General Session of the conference by "urg[ing] American statesmen to come to their senses and grasp the fact that the United States' security is in no way linked to the illegitimate existence of the terrorist Zionist regime on Palestinian soil."[65]

Al-Asi further "considered that the formation of a commission composed of Muslim *ulema* [clergy], scholars, and revolutionaries for issuing unified and coordinated *fatwas* [religious rulings] and for taking decision[s] concerned with the world of Islam was a necessity."[66]

Another participant at the conference was Kalim Saddiqui, the Director of the Muslim Institute in London, who described Israel as a "dagger thrust in the heart of Islamic lands,"[67] and denounced the creation of Israel as "the most arrogant step taken by the West to further its political domination of the house of Islam."[68] Saddiqui's address to the conference was further described by the Iranian News Agency as "blast[ing] arrogant powers led by the United States and the Soviet Union for trying to divert Muslim attention by insisting on negotiations with the usurpers of Palestine and *al-Quds* [i.e., Jerusalem]."[69]

The resolutions adopted by the conference called for a "war to uproot the Zionist cancer from the Holy Land, and to liberate Jerusalem,"[70] and called for the "formation of a united Islamic army to liberate *al-Quds* [Jerusalem] from the Zionist usurpers."[71]

The conference resolutions also paid tribute to "the soul of the great leader of the Islamic revolution, Imam Khomeini"[72] and "supported his initiative to declare the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan as the International *al-Quds* [Jerusalem] Day, and emphatically called on all Islamic countries to do their utmost in honoring this day, organizing ceremonies befitting this occasion and creating conducive conditions for arousing the genuine feeling of the Muslim nations towards the Palestinian cause."[73]

At the close of the Teheran Conference, the groups decided to form a "rejectionist front" called the "National Democratic and Islamic Front." Members of the Front included both Islamic extremist groups such as Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine (a Palestinian Islamic extremist organization), and HAMAS as well as radical Palestinian factions, consisting of: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Hawatmah Faction, Palestine Liberation Front of Abu Abbas, Fatah - Uprising of Abu Musa, Saiqa, Arab Liberation Front, and the Arab Popular Liberation Movement.

As an expression of its opposition to the peace process, Hizballah denounced the Madrid Conference on October 29, 1991, the day before it opened, in an announcement broadcast in southern Lebanon. The organization's *Voice of the Oppressed* stated:

> We declare to international public opinion and to the entire nation that the kind of peace Israel and the United States seek is a conspiracy against the destiny of the entire Islamic nation. **As for the peace we believe in and call for, it can only be achieved by eliminating Israel from existence and liberating all the territories of usurped Palestine.** [Emphasis added.]

The Hizballah statement concluded by "calling upon all Muslims to do their part in struggling against the Zionists until the state of absolute evil, Israel, is removed from existence."[74]

Meanwhile, on the day that the Madrid conference began, Hizballah staged a mass demonstration in the streets of Beirut. The flags of the United States and Israel were set aflame in sight of the destroyed U.S. Embassy building. The late Secretary-General of Hizballah, Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, told the assembled crowds, "This is a rally against the treacherous Madrid Conference, a meeting designed to crush Arab honor." In response, those assembled chanted, "Death to America! Death to Israel!"[75]

"The Battlegrounds of Holy War and Confrontation"

With the encouragement and support of Iran, Hizballah is believed to have established cells in many foreign countries, including the United States.[H] Indeed, upon his appointment to the post as Iran's Speaker of Parliament in 1989, Mehdi Karubi called for the "formation of Hizballah nuclei throughout the world in order to defend Muslims' rights."[76]

In spite of such declarations and the capture, trial and convictions of Hizballah terrorist operatives over the last decade, Hizballah leaders in Lebanon have denied any violent activities carried out in the name of Khomeini's Islamic Revolution.[77] Instead, the group has employed various aliases in order to deflect attention from the fact that such acts of violence are carried out by Hizballah operatives.

Using these methods, Hizballah is able to enhance its image as a shadowy organization that has ties to but not control over its most extreme elements. In the wake of such acts of terror, leaders of Hizballah such as its "spiritual mentor" Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah have expressed sympathy for the resentment felt by the hijackers and kidnappers of the movement's various factions but claim to have no power to persuade them to use a less violent means of expression. Hizballah's use of various front organizations to claim responsibility for acts of terror thus serves a twofold purpose: it enables the organization to publicly claim responsibility in the name of a fictitious group that shares Hizballah's ideology and at the same time deny any connection to appalling acts of violence.

Hizballah's choice of alias has generally depended on the area where a terror attack takes place. The names "Islamic Resistance" and the "Believers' Resistance," as indicated above, are the aliases of the organization used when attacks against Israel are launched in south Lebanon; the "Revolutionary Justice Organization," (RJO) "Islamic Jihad," and the "Organization of the Oppressed on Earth" were employed when the organization kidnapped Lebanese Jews, Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon during the 1980s.[I]

Although Hizballah's aspirations are of worldwide scope, the movement's leaders have focused their immediate attentions on the first stage of its strategy; namely, attacks against Israel. With the eclipse of Western involvement in Lebanon, Hizballah has, over the last few years, intensified its violent efforts against Israel's northern border as well as Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide.

[H] Since 1986 Hizballah was reported to have established a network of cells across West Africa among the expatriate Lebanese populations of Zaire, Senegal, Gabon and the Ivory Coast. The purpose of the organization establishing cells in West Africa, according to security officials, was to elude European security controls. (*Washington Times*, November 28, 1989)

[I] For examples of incidents claimed by each of these front organizations, see Chronology.

Hizballah's first attack against Jews outside of Israel dates back to 1985,[j] when four prominent members of the Lebanese Jewish community in Beirut were kidnapped by the "Organization of the Oppressed on Earth," a faction of the group that was reportedly trained by Iranian intelligence operatives.[78] The four were: Isaac Sasson, the Jewish community's president, Dr. Elie Hallak, a physician, Elie Srour, a member of the community's Hevra Kadisha (burial society), and Hayim Cohen Halala, who maintained the distribution of kosher meat throughout the community.[79] Six others who were kidnapped the same year included Henri Mann, Judas Beneste and his two sons, Joseph and Abraham, Isaac Tarrab, a professor of mathematics at the American University of Beirut, and Selim Jammous, the secretary of the Jewish community.[80]

The "Organization of the Oppressed on Earth" accused them of being spies for the Mossad, Israel's intelligence service, and demanded in exchange for the Jews' release that Israel release all Lebanese and Arab prisoners from Israeli jails as well as commit itself to a complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon.[81] Some time later, the bodies of Isaac Tarrab, Hayim Cohen Halala, and Abraham Beneste were dumped on the streets of Beirut. All of them bore signs of torture. Although the "Organization of the Oppressed on Earth" claimed to have executed all of the Lebanese Jews that it had kidnapped, the remains of the other victims were never found. They are all presumed to be dead.[82]

A year later, in September of 1986, Hizballah carried out a joint attack together with the Abu Nidal organization against the Neveh Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, Turkey. Two Arab terrorists entered the synagogue and locked the doors behind them with an iron bar to prevent the worshippers from escaping. They then opened fire on their captives with submachine guns. After they finished firing, the attackers poured gasoline over the bodies of the people they had just shot and started a fire. The two then blew themselves up with an explosive device. Twenty-two people were killed. Several hours later the Islamic Resistance took responsibility, saying that the attack was in revenge for an Israeli raid on the Lebanese village of Zifkin.[83]

Six years later, on March 1, 1992, a second attack was carried out against the Neveh Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul. Due to increased security, only one person, a passerby, was wounded.[84] According to a Turkish police statement, three members of the group travelled to Istanbul from Batman in order to carry out the attack. One of the group was arrested, and the Turkish authorities were said to be searching for the other two.[85] In Ankara, Turkey, seven days later, an Israeli diplomatic security officer was killed in front of the Israeli Embassy there when a bomb exploded in his car.[86] Islamic Jihad and the "Islamic Revenge Organization" both claimed responsibility.[87] Iszet Sezgin, the Turkish Interior Minister announced on March 13 that Hizballah was behind the bombings.[88] Other members of Hizballah were arrested in Turkey in connection to the bombings later the same month.[89]

Activities in America: "Long Live Islamic Revolution"

In consonance with the late Ayatollah Khomeini's pronouncements and the resolutions of the Teheran Conference, members of the Muslim Students' Association - Persian Speaking Group (MSA-PSG) have staged demonstrations commemorating the "Worldwide Day of *al-Quds*" in cities across the United States.

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[j] The first Lebanese Jew believed to have been kidnapped and murdered by Hizballah was Raul Sobhi Mizrahi, the owner of a small electrical tool shop in the Sanayah district of West Beirut. Mizrahi's body was found in July of 1984 on a deserted beach near the Beirut airport. Although a Hizballah-linked organization never took credit for his kidnapping and murder, the subsequent pattern of kidnappings and murders by the organization suggests involvement by the group. (*Jerusalem Report*, October 24, 1991)

As the largest manifestation of pro-Khomeini activity in the United States, the "Worldwide Day of *al-Quds* [Jerusalem]" demonstration takes place on the last Friday of the Muslim month of Ramadan each year. *Al-Quds*, the Arabic name for Jerusalem, represents a central goal shared by all Islamic extremist movements: the liberation of Jerusalem and all of "Palestine" from Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in its place.

Established as a political observance with religious overtones by Ayatollah Khomeini, the commemoration of the "Worldwide Day of *Al-Quds*" demonstrations are coordinated internationally by groups sympathetic to Iran's Islamic revolution, including Hizballah.

Five months after the Teheran Conference, a leaflet from the 1992 Day of *Al-Quds* demonstration in the United States contained a statement which expressed the MSA-PSG's sympathy with Hizballah by condemning the Israeli raid into Lebanon that killed Hizballah leader Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi. The group's tenth resolution stated: "We condemn the ruthless murder of the Shi'ite religious leader Sheikh Abbas Musawi."[90]

The MSA-PSG's published resolutions concluded with a statement reiterating "our unreserved support for the global Islamic Revolution,"[91] and the slogans:

LONG LIVE PALESTINE
DOWN WITH ZIONISM
LONG LIVE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION[92]

"Worldwide Day of *al-Quds*" demonstrations are held in major U.S. cities, including New York,[93] Washington, DC, Los Angeles, and Detroit, as well as in Montreal and Toronto, Canada.[94] According to the Muslim Students' Association - Persian Speaking Group of Albany, California, the main sponsor of the event, the "Worldwide Day of *al-Quds*" is an observance that was instituted by Ayatollah Khomeini for the purpose of opposing Zionism:

> In order to establish a unified front against Zionism, Imam Khomeini has declared the last Friday of the Holy Month of Ramadan to be the day of Quds, a day in which everyone is invited to proclaim international support for the Palestinian people. Join us in demonstrations held throughout the world[95] . . .

Other groups sponsoring the annual "Day of *al-Quds*" demonstration in 1992 include the "Jafaria Islamic Society," the "Islamic Institute of Southern California" and the "Lebanese Muslim Community."[96] The 1993 co-sponsors of the demonstration included: the Council for Muslim Unity, the Islamic Student Association - Persian Speaking Group, United Muslim Women [sic] Association, Muslim Group, Detroit Branch, Tawheed Association, Islamic International Development Association, United Michigan Muslim Association, Azari Student Association, Islamic Cultural Society (ISFS) [sic].[97] Expressing their support for the Islamic revolution inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini, the 1993 resolutions of the "Demonstration of the Worldwide Day of *al-Quds*" declared:

> Brothers and sisters of Islam,
>
> We are gathering here to be involved in the Palestinian struggle.
>
> 1. We consider the Zionist regime an illegitimate entity and its establishment in the heart of the Islamic lands a premeditated conspiracy by global Zionism and the arrogant powers and enemies of Islam against the Muslim nation.
>
> 3. We call on the decent Jews to come out of their fatal embrace of anti-Semitic [sic] Zionism.
>
> 10. We reiterate that Zionism is racism.[98]

The 1993 "Demonstration of the Worldwide Day of *Quds*" resolutions concluded with a statement supporting acts of violence (dubbed "military initiatives") against what are termed "Zionist usurpers" - i.e., Israel: "We endorse and support the Islamic military and political initiatives against the Zionist usurpers."[99]

In a graphic depiction of the situation in "Palestine" and in particular the groups' endorsement of "Islamic military initiatives," the flyer was illustrated with a picture of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem superimposed over a map of "Palestine" covered with barbed wire and prison bars in the shape of a six-pointed Star of David, symbolic of Israel. The corners of the star are broken and dripping with blood.

"They Are Allah's Sword and the Nation's Hope"

In addition to public manifestations expressing support for the Khomeini-inspired "Islamic revolution" in Iran and its counterpart in Lebanon, recruiting and fundraising activities on behalf of Hizballah have become evident in the U.S. in recent years. Although such support is centered in the Lebanese Shi'i community in Dearborn, Michigan, sympathy for Hizballah is manifested among a minority of the Muslim American population in the area where unsigned leaflets in English distributed along Warren Avenue "reflect the Hizballah line"[100] by praising the late Ayatollah Khomeini and condemning U.S. support for the "racist Zionists."[101] Additionally, an organization innocuously named the "Cultural Development Society" was reported by local Arab residents to be operating on behalf of Hizballah.[102]

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On Dearborn's local airwaves programs from Hizballah's *Al-Manar* Television, produced in Beirut, are re-broadcast for an American audience on Channel 23. In a 1993 program that praised Hizballah activities in Lebanon, Hizballah gunmen were shown firing automatic rifles and shelling the Israeli security zone. Accompanying the images was the announcer's voice-over which declared of the gunmen, "They are Allah's sword and the nation's hope."[103]

At the Islamic Center of America in Detroit, Islamic calendars from Hizballah's Islamic Resistance are distributed. The calendars are bound with a cover done in classical Arabic calligraphy which reads "*Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiya*" - the Islamic Resistance. The calendar states that donations raised in support of the Islamic Resistance will be used to "aid the Islamic Resistance to confront and prevail over the oppressors, to liberate the land, and secure precious freedom for the future, and for the society of resistance to overcome the challenges that it faces."[104]

Those who give donations for the "Islamic Resistance Calendar" are assured that their support for the movement shows a "strike of confidence for the struggling [Islamic] clergy and the marching of the movement in the Lebanese sphere and throughout the world as well. Peace and Allah's mercy and blessings be upon you."[105]

The Imam of the Islamic Center of America, the late Muhammad Jawad Chirri, was the author of a book entitled *The Shi'ites Under Attack*, which describes the 20th century as "a time distinguished from previous centuries by its Zionist character." Elaborating on this, he paints a picture of a wider conspiracy:

> During this century, the Zionist dream was realized through the creation of Israel . . . Israel was planted in the heart of the Islamic world. The East and the West gave their support for this location. This unanimous support was not due to the to their love of the Jews, but rather it was motivated by their prejudice against Islam and Muslims. East and West were determined to destroy the future of Islam.[106]

Chirri praised what he termed the "Lebanese Shi'ites" of Hizballah as Israel's "[n]ew enemy that was small in number but big in courage, having no arms except faith in God and love of martyrdom in the way of God,"[107] and credits them with having achieved "the first true victory against Israel . . . [and] proving that it is possible for any Arab people to defeat the Zionists if they believe in God."[108]

Israel's Border with Lebanon

III: Iran and Syria Versus Israel: The War of Attrition on Israel's Northern Border

"Relations With Israel Are Forbidden"

Since its pullback from Lebanon in 1985, Israel has maintained a security zone in southern Lebanon in order to prevent terrorist attacks against its civilians in northern Israel. The area in which the estimated 3000 operatives[109] of the Islamic Resistance, Hizballah's "military wing," carry out the majority of their attacks on Israel is thus several miles north of Israel's civilian population. The security threat of extremist organizations launching cross-border raids into Israel is thus far from over - it has merely continued under a different guise, and enjoys the patronage of the same sponsor - Syria. Syria's commonality of interest with Hizballah keeps the violence away from Syrian territory, and leaves Hizballah and Lebanon as the only parties accountable. Waging its proxy war on Israel through the suicide bombers of Hizballah, Syria is able to deny any involvement yet at the same time reap the political benefits of destabilizing Israel's northern border.

Hizballah's war of attrition with Israel has been manifested by its constant attempts to send its operatives over the Israeli border in order to carry out attacks within Israel itself. Between 1988 and 1992 Hizballah attempted 300 border incursions.[110] Twenty small groups of Hizballah operatives succeeded in crossing the Israeli security zone to the Israeli fence, but none of them was able to reach their intended targets.[111] In 1993, over the period a single year, Hizballah launched 330 attacks,[112] averaging one attack almost every day.

Headquartered in Ba'albek, the Islamic Resistance makes its presence known outside of that ancient city with a huge billboard of Ayatollah Khomeini[113] and a banner that declares, "Relations With Israel Are Forbidden."[114] Attacks carried out by Islamic Resistance that are directed against Israel include suicide bombers, the planting of explosive devices along roads patrolled by the Israel Defense Forces and the South Lebanon Army in the security zone, and long-range firing of Katyusha and, more recently, Sagger anti-tank missiles,[K] into northern Israel.

[K] Since February of 1992, the Iranians have been supplying Hizballah with more sophisticated weapons, including TOW anti-tank missiles, SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles, 122mm and 240mm rockets, mortars, and other equipment. Iranian instructors accompanied the materiel. A month later, Iranian officials were reportedly negotiating with Hizballah on the delivery of U.S. manufactured Stinger anti-aircraft missiles purportedly obtained from the Afghani *mujahideen*. (*Foreign Report*, August 20, 1992)

The fact that Hizballah is the only organization that has been given sanction by the Syria-controlled government of Lebanon to continue its violent activities provides it with a magnetism which attracts Palestinian radical groups which have been barred from carrying out terrorist attacks from southern Lebanon. One recent development is that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) led by Ahmad Jibril, which has maintained an ongoing relationship with Hizballah, began to collaborate with the Islamic Resistance in a series of joint attacks against Israel in the security zone. Despite of the two groups' long-term relationship, they had never participated in joint attacks until this year.

Attempting to avoid Syrian restrictions on Palestinian radical groups' operations in south Lebanon, the PFLP-GC worked together with Hizballah's Islamic Resistance in order to organize a joint attack against a fuel truck owned by the South Lebanese Army, the pro-Israel militia that patrols the south Lebanon security zone, on March 7, 1994. The attack, which took place near Rihane, killed 2 South Lebanon Army (SLA) soldiers and two Lebanese civilians.[115] In a subsequent Hizballah/PFLP-GC joint attack two weeks later, two Israeli soldiers were killed in an ambush while patrolling in the security zone.[116]

As a reflection of a continuing trend, Hizballah continues to assist the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine (IJLP), the Palestinian Islamic extremist group, in attacking Israeli forces in the Security Zone. In late November 1994 an Israeli convoy was attacked by mortar fire while on patrol in the Security Zone. In the ensuing clash, three IJLP operatives were killed.[117]

The Syrian Role: "Syria and Iran Have a Joint Strategy"

As an implementation of the Arab League's 1989 Taif Accord, in October of 1990 the Syrian-controlled government of Lebanon began to consolidate its power over that country's host of private militias. With its 40,000 troops[118] stationed in Lebanon, Syria implemented a five-month timetable to disarm and abolish the militias. Under the terms of the agreement, all the militias were ordered to leave Beirut beginning on November 10, 1990. The second and final stage of abolishing all of Lebanon's militias was scheduled to take place by March of 1991, when all of the militias were to be dissolved.[119] The militias were further ordered to surrender their weapons by April 30, 1991.[120]

In a last minute move, Iranian President Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani met with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad and came to an agreement which stipulated that Hizballah would continue what the group calls its "militarily operations" in southern Lebanon. The agreement enabled the organization to maintain control of the Sheikh Abdallah Barracks,[L] its southern Lebanese base, located in Ba'albek in the Beka'a Valley.[121] Several years later, in 1992, the organization moved its "military headquarters" further south. In the words of Sheikh Hussein al-Musawi, "Iran offers us material assistance, and Syria supplies the facilities that allow us to accomplish our goals."[122] The freedom of movement granted to Hizballah has given the organization the ability to remain close to the Lebanese border with Israel in order to carry out its attacks.

Iran's continued involvement in the affairs of Hizballah in Lebanon is reflected in the support that it has provided to the organization over the last decade. Expressing the intrinsic relationship between Iran and Lebanon's Shi'i population, Sheikh Fadlallah has declared that

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[L] The Lebanese Army evicted Hizballah from the Sheikh Abdallah Barracks in July of 1992, but the organization continues to maintain a presence in Ba'albek in spite of the fact that its "military base" in that city was confiscated. The American and other Western hostages were believed to have been held in cells within the Sheikh Abdallah Barracks. The cells were destroyed by Hizballah before they left. (*New York Newsday*, August 9, 1992)

"Lebanon constitutes a lung through which Iran breathes."[123] As an indication of the importance that Hizballah holds in the Iranian vision of the Middle East, the pro-Khomeini Lebanese newspaper *Al-Shira'a* described Hizballah in 1988 as operating under the "Iranian Defense Council" in Teheran led by 'Ali Khameini.[124] Iranian support for Hizballah since then has been maintained on a continuous basis, with 3000 Islamic Revolutionary Guards (*Pasdaran*) remaining in the southern Lebanese town of Ba'albek as of 1991, where they continue to assist Hizballah in its efforts to carry out attacks on Israel.

Corresponding to its perceived role as the protector of the Shi'i population of Lebanon, Iran has provided funding and other forms of assistance to Hizballah since its very inception. By 1985 the total sum of Iranian aid to Hizballah was $30 million, and two years later it had more than doubled, reaching $64 million.[125] Following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, the Iranians were reported to have increased their subsidy of Hizballah to $90 million, with an additional 2 million each month that earmarked for sympathetic "Lebanese and Palestinian radicals," including Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command[M] (PFLP-GC).[126]

A member of the *Pasdaran* (Islamic Revolutionary Guards) who accompanied Rafsanjani to Damascus explained that Assad had agreed to permit Hizballah to keep its weapons as long as Israeli forces stayed in southern Lebanon. In addition, Iran was allowed to keep its 3000 Islamic Revolutionary Guards stationed in the Beka'a Valley. The *Pasdaran* member further expressed a pledge of support to the Syrians in event of a war between Syria and Israel.[127] Several months later, other members of Hizballah related that Syrian President Assad had promised that as long as he is in power, Hizballah has nothing to fear.[128] Justifying itself as a "resistance movement" as opposed to a militia[129], Hizballah has thus remained the only legally armed militia in Lebanon.[N]

Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah has often expressed Hizballah's commonality of interest with Syria, which, although it is a secular state, is still fulfilling Hizballah's goal of opposing Israel:

> "Syria and Iran have a joint strategy based on the struggle against Israel and imperialism. We would like to reiterate that our relationship with Damascus is a strategic one based on Syria's stands, which are hostile to Zionism and US colonialism . . . We believe any differences with Syria will not affect the agreement on principles governing our relationship, because we are all interested in decisively confronting the Zionist occupation through operations carried out by the [Hizballah's] Islamic Resistance."[130]



Hizballah Attacks Against Israel's Northern Border 1991 - 1994

[M] Iran was reported to have paid Jibril's group between $1.2 and $2 million in order to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 in retaliation for the accidental downing of an Iranian Airbus by the *USS Vincennes* in July of 1988. (*Jerusalem Post*, September 21, 1989; *New York City Tribune*, November 9, 1989)

[N] The arms which belonged to Lebanon's numerous militias were disposed of in the following manner: an estimated one-third "disappeared" — the groups hid them for use in the future; one-third was sent out of Lebanon; and the last third was confiscated and given to the Lebanese army. 30,000 members of the Christian, Druze and other Shi'i (i.e., *Amal*) militias were dismissed. ("Hizballah on the Outskirts of Juniyah," *Ha'aretz*, Israeli daily, May 9, 1991)

Wide World

Buenos Aires, Argentina - July 18, 1994 - Rescue workers search for survivors trapped under the ruins of the seven-story building which housed the DAIA and AMIA Jewish communal organizations. Ninety-six people were killed and 127 were injured as the result of a massive explosion caused by a suicide car bomber who parked a delivery van in front of the building. Ansar Allah, an offshoot of Hizballah, claimed responsibility.

IV: The New Threat: Targeting of Jewish Communities Worldwide

"Until the Last Jew in the World Has Been Eliminated"

Since the Madrid Conference in 1991, Hizballah in conjunction with Iran as its patron has continued its war of attrition on Israel's northern border under the watchful eyes of Syria. While the intensity of the conflict in southern Lebanon generally remains just under the boiling point, several times over the past few years the situation has escalated to the point of a full-blown war. In such instances Hizballah has been prevented by the Syrians from further intensifying their border clashes with Israel, and has therefore sought a separate venue to pursue its war against its avowed enemy. For the past two years Iran, acting as Hizballah's protector, has internationalized the clashes between Hizballah and Israel into a shadowy war of terror against Israelis and Jewish civilians around the world, and Argentina's Jewish community has been meted out a double portion.

The most devastating attack ever carried out against an Israeli diplomatic facility was done in the name of "Islamic Jihad," the most well-known alias used by Hizballah. On March 17, 1992, a suicide bomber drove a Ford Fairlane packed with 440 pounds[131] of plastic explosives into the front of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The ensuing blast levelled half of the building and left other buildings nearby severely damaged, including a Roman Catholic church and the school adjacent to it.[132] The force of the explosion shattered the windows of other buildings within a five-block radius of the Embassy.[133] The remains of twenty-nine people[134] were recovered from the site of the blast, among them eight Israeli diplomats[135] and a Catholic priest.[136] The injured totalled 242 people,[137] including 41 children.[138]

On March 18, the Islamic Jihad took responsibility for the bombing, claiming that the explosion was in memory of Hussein, Sheik Abbas al-Musawi's son, who was killed together with his father in an Israeli attack against the Hizballah several weeks earlier. A spokesman for the Islamic Jihad in Beirut stated,

> We proudly announce that the operation . . . is one of our continuous strikes against the criminal Israeli enemy in an open war that we will not finish until Israel is wiped out of existence.[139]

The Islamic Jihad spokesman identified the suicide bomber as "Abu Yasir," an Argentinian convert to Islam[140] and went on to declare,

> We assert anew that there will not be any security for anyone as long as our security is threatened and our dear Islam in danger. We will no longer let our tyrannized people pay the price alone. We will make the aggressors pay very high prices. We will chase them wherever they are until knocking them down. Our open battle with the criminal Zionist enemy requires our continuous presence in the battlegrounds of holy war and confrontation.[141]

Two days after the blast, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the newly elected Secretary General of Hizballah who replaced Musawi, was "warmly received"[142] at the Iranian *Majlis* (Parliament) in Teheran. In the wake of the bombing, Mehdi Karubi, the Speaker of the *Majlis*, warned, "Israel will endure constant revenge strikes around the world."[143]

One week after the bombing, Islamic Jihad again took responsibility in a statement issued from Beirut which also included a videotape showing the Israeli Embassy building in Buenos Aires marked with a circle around it. The footage appeared to have been photographed from a nearby building or from the inside of a car.[144] A statement made by Islamic Jihad to the Lebanese newspaper *Al-Nahar* promised continued attacks on Israel "be there as many victims as there may,"[145] and went on further to pronounce, "The war is on until Israel ceases to exist and the last Jew in the world has been eliminated. Israel is completely evil and must be erased from the face of the Earth."[146]

Although the Argentinian authorities never arrested the perpetrators of the Israeli Embassy bombing, both Iran and Hizballah are considered responsible for what has been designated by the U.S. State Department the "deadliest act of terrorism in 1992." The State Department's 1992 annual Report on Terrorism described Iran and Hizballah's link to the incident in the following way:

> Hizballah, Iran's most important client, was responsible for the deadliest act of terrorism in 1992, the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in March . . . Indications are that Iran at least had foreknowledge of this act and was probably involved.[147]

On March 11, 1994, a week before the second anniversary of the bombing, a car-bomb attack against the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, was narrowly averted when the suicide bomber who was driving a rented truck containing the bomb abandoned it after being involved in an automobile accident "several hundred meters"[148] away from the Embassy. The body of a Thai citizen who was apparently hired by the rental company to drive the vehicle was discovered in the back of the truck, together with the bomb.[149]

Thai authorities described the bomb as being constructed of 1.4 kilograms of C-4 plastic explosives, 10 liters of nitroglycerin[150] and nearly one ton of chemical explosives.[151] The chemical explosives were similar to the ones used in the World Trade Center bombing and the foiled New York City landmarks bombing attempt: ammonium nitrate fertilizer and fuel oil.[152] Three months after the failed bombing attempt, Thai authorities issued arrest warrants for two Iranians and a third unidentified foreign suspect.[153]

"The Struggle is Now Worldwide"

Following a July 1993 series of intensified border attacks by Hizballah against northern Israeli towns and Israel's response to those attacks, the U.S. brokered an agreement between Israel and Syria regarding southern Lebanon. The agreement with Israel stipulated that Hizballah would not attack Israel's civilian population centers, and, in exchange, Israel would refrain from attacks against civilian areas in Lebanon north of the Security Zone.[154] In spite of this agreement, however, a significant escalation of Hizbailah's border war with Israel occurred in early 1994. (See Chronology for details.)

Subsequent to a wave of Hizballah Katyusha rocket attacks on Israel's Galilee region which violated the U.S.-brokered agreement, Israel Air Force planes bombed the group's training bases in the area of Jabal al-Safi in March of 1994. Hizballah operatives fired shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery at Israel Air Force planes.[155] Two months later, on May 21, Israeli forces abducted Mustafa Dirani,[o] the head of Hizballah's Believers' Resistance, in an early morning raid on his home in Qasr Naba.[156]

On May 30, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah broadcast Hizballah's threat of revenge for Dirani's abduction. He told his followers:

> [The] struggle is now worldwide and is not limited in time and space. It is wrong to debate the internal responsibility for the kidnapping. The real mission is how to retaliate.

He continued:

> [Shimon] Peres says that the Zionists' arm is long. I thought our holy fighters have already taught him whose arm is longer when they reached the Israelis in Argentina.[157]

Several weeks after Dirani's abduction, reports surfaced in Germany indicating that Hizballah was planning to attack Israeli targets in that country, and that members of the Abu Nidal organization were assisting Hizballah in that direction.[158]

The Deputy Secretary-General of Hizballah, Naim Qassem, reiterated Fadlallah's earlier statement by declaring that the "battlefield with Israel is now wide open."[159] Seeking vengeance for Dirani's abduction, Hizballah initiated a new round of Katyusha rocket attacks on the northern Galilee. Several days later, on June 2, Israeli planes raided Hizballah's newest training base at Ain Kawkab.[160] Twenty-six Hizballah recruits were reported killed, with forty-five reported as wounded.[161]

At a rally in Beirut's Shi'i populated suburbs, Hizballah's Secretary General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah vowed vengeance against Israel in the form of suicide bombers:

> "Yesterday we had tens of suicide attackers. Today we have not hundreds, but thousands." Participants at the rally chanted, "Zionists wait, wait, Hizballah are coming."[162]

In the wake of the raid, sixty rockets were fired on Israel by Hizballah.[163] As a response, Israel began to deploy tanks along its northern border.[164] Hizballah continued to fire Katyusha rockets over the border until a UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) patrol stopped them. A firefight subsequently broke out between Hizballah and the UNIFIL patrol. Two Fijian soldiers

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[o] Mustafa Dirani is believed to have been involved in a number of terrorist incidents which took place over the last decade, including the kidnapping and murder of U.S. Marines Lieutenant-Colonel William Higgins, the 1985 hijack of TWA Flight 847 to Beirut and the murder of U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem, one of the bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the kidnapping of some French and other hostages in Beirut, and the kidnapping and murders of at least ten Lebanese Jews. (*Jerusalem Report*, July 14, 1994)

from the UNIFIL patrol were wounded, and one later died. One Hizballah operative was killed. In the wake of the clash, Hizballah attacked four other UNIFIL positions, which left one more UNIFIL soldier wounded. A second Hizballah attack on a UNIFIL checkpoint manned by Fijian soldiers left one dead.[165]

As the result of the increasingly volatile situation, both Iran and Syria showed their support for Hizballah's actions against Israel's "escalating aggression."[166] At the same time, however, the two countries made an effort to avert a full-scale war in the area by reigning in Hizballah. Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akhbar Velayati told Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and his deputy, Naim Qassem, at a meeting held at the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, Syria, that the current attacks had gone too far by recommending that the organization "practice restraint."[167]

Parallelling the organization's actions of 1992, Hizballah spokesmen began to warn of the vengeance that it would take. More than a week after the attack, Hassan Huballah, a member of Hizballah's *Shura*, threatened that the "world will be astounded by the spectacular Hizballah response to Israeli aggression."[168]

"We Shall Carry On Until We Wipe Out the Zionists"

On July 18, 1994, at approximately 9:55 A.M. Buenos Aires time, Hizballah struck again. An immense explosion levelled the seven-story building that housed Argentina's two largest Jewish communal organizations - the DAIA - Delegation of Argentinian-Jewish Associations and the AMIA - the Argentinian-Jewish Mutual Association. Nearby buildings were severely damaged and cars parked on the street near the building were demolished.[169]

Ninety-six people were killed[170] and 127 people were injured[171] as the result of the explosion. A total of 450 people were reported to have been treated in area hospitals after the blast occurred.[172] Based upon evidence recovered at the site, investigators believe the blast was caused by a suicide bomber who parked a delivery van containing 350 pounds of explosives[173] in front of the building. The detonation site of the bomb produced a crater two yards wide and one yard deep where the entrance of the building had stood previously.[174] Twenty-four hours after the attack, a group identifying itself as the "Islamic Command" telephoned a Buenos Aires radio station to take responsibility.[175] A day later in Beirut, on July 20, Hizballah denied "any link to the Buenos Aires incident."[176]

Tragedy struck again twenty-four hours later, this time in Central America. On July 21 in Panama, a suicide bomber with Lebanese travel documents named Jamal Lia boarded a commuter plane en route from the Colon Free Trade Zone to Panama City. The aircraft exploded in mid-air, killing 21 people, including twelve Jews.[177] Twenty-four hours later, in Sidon, Lebanon, a group named Ansar Allah, a faction of Hizballah, took responsibility for both incidents. The group's statement declared:

> Suicide martyr squads have been formed to confront and combat Zionism everywhere. The Argentina and Panama operations are evidence of this continuing confrontation. What happened in Argentina and Panama is not going to stop. We shall carry on until we wipe out the Zionists and justice prevails throughout the entire world.[178]

Eight days after the bombings in Argentina and Panama, a car bomb exploded near the Israeli Embassy in London. A middle-aged woman described as having "Mediterranean" features[179] parked a stolen grey Audi sedan[180] at 12:10 PM. at the entrance of an apartment building next to the Embassy. She left the car moments before the bomb exploded and disappeared among the pedestrian traffic in a nearby street.[181] Fourteen people were injured.[182] After a preliminary exami-

nation of the bomb site, British police indicated that between 40 and 60 pounds of explosives were used to construct the bomb.[183]

Twelve hours later, a second car bomb exploded in London at the Joint Israel Appeal. Five people were wounded in the explosion, which took place at 12:46 A.M. The car bomb used in the attack was reported to have been constructed of an identical amount of explosives as the bomb that had exploded at the Israeli Embassy the previous day.[184] Due to the similarities of the two bombings in London, British authorities believe that the incidents are related to one another as well as to the one in Buenos Aires.[185] U.S. officials who are cooperating with Argentina, Panama, Britain and Israel in the ensuing investigations believe that Iran and Hizballah are behind these latest attacks.[186]

New York: "We're Here to Stop a Kamikaze"

On July 28, the day after the London bombings, the threat of yet another terrorist attack reached U.S. shores. Reacting to the warning of an informant which was received at 1:15 A.M., the New York Police Department tightened security at the Israeli Mission to the United Nations, its New York Consulate, and the Israeli Defense Mission. Similar measures were taken at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC.[187] According to press reports, the informant indicated that a suicide car bomb attack would take place against one of the two buildings over the next 72 hours.[188] The potential attackers were reportedly connected to either Hizballah or HAMAS.[189]

At 3:00 A.M., eight 60-ton sand-filled New York City Sanitation Department dump trucks were used to form blockades around the buildings, and later in the day the trucks were replaced with highway dividers made of concrete.[190] Both buildings were examined for explosives and dozens of police officers were sent to patrol the two locations.[191] At the Israeli Mission to the U.N., one police officer described his assignment to a reporter in stark terms: "We're here to stop a kamikaze."[192]

In addition to the sites that were specifically threatened, police protection was extended to 20 other possible targets, including institutions associated with Israel such as synagogues and Jewish organizations.[193] Responding to the Israeli government's request to tighten security for Israeli and Jewish institutions around the world, additional security measures were put in place in Britain, France and the Netherlands.[194]

Terror From the "Triangle"

Preliminary evidence from the site of the Buenos Aires bombing caused Argentina's President Carlos Menem to tell the Argentinian Jewish community on July 26 that "suspicions fall very heavily on Iran."[195] Taking into account the type and size of the bomb and its similarity to the bomb used to blow up the Israeli Embassy in 1992, Argentinian investigators together with U.S., Israeli and other South American and Western European security agencies suspect both Iran and local Hizballah operatives as being responsible for the July 18 carnage.

According to a Venezuelan intelligence report that was quoted by the newspaper *Clarin*, Iranian diplomats in Caracas have provided Hizballah cells in South America with "logistical support, arms and explosives, using the diplomatic pouch for such ends."[196] An alternative method of delivering explosives into the terrorists' hands was done via the "Shi'i communities living in the south of Brazil."[197]

The area referred to in the report is located deep inside the South American continent where the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet. Throughout the continent, the "triangle" area is known as a refuge for smugglers, since the border controls of all three countries are not strictly enforced in the area. Some 80,000 to 100,000 Lebanese live in the "triangle" area, with a large percentage of them of Shi'i.[198]

Hizballah has been reported to have established safe houses in the largest Brazilian town in the "triangle" area, Foz do Iguazu,[199] and training bases of the group are described as being located in the area between Foz do Iguazu and the Paraguayan corner of the "triangle," Ciudad del Esta.[200] Evidence from the 1992 Buenos Aires bombing investigation indicated that the truck that was used to bomb the Israeli Embassy passed through the "triangle" on its way to the Argentine capital.[201]

Although the Argentinian authorities have collected a great deal of forensic evidence from the site of the explosion, including the engine of the car that was used in the bombing as well as some physical remains of the suicide bomber, only one individual has been arrested and charged with criminal activity. That individual is described as an Argentinian mechanic who allegedly assisted the terrorists in purchasing the van that was used to blow up the Buenos Aires Jewish community center.[202] He is being charged as an accessory to the crime and is being held in custody. Although up to two dozen other individuals were questioned by the Argentinian authorities since the July 18 bombing,[203] no other arrests have been made.

Early indications of some advancement in the investigation evaporated when Argentina's Supreme Court would not permit subpoenas to be issued based on information provided by a sole informant. That individual was Manucher Moatamer, a former Iranian diplomat who defected in Venezuela. In July Moatamer had correctly warned Venezuelan authorities about the Israeli Embassy bombing in London prior to its occurrence.[204] He also indicated that several Iranian diplomats in Argentina were responsible for the bombings.[205]

Although Iran denies any involvement in the bombings, Argentinian authorities believe that Moatamer's information is "valuable."[206] Since mid-October Moatamer has been in the United States after he was issued a special entry permit which is designated as a "public interest parole" by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Moatamer's entry into the U.S. was facilitated at the request of the U.S. State Department.[207]

In spite of statements made by investigative magistrate Judge Juan Jose Galeano that his investigation had so far produced 5000 pages of information and "concrete information,"[208] no further progress seems to have been made in the case.

Meanwhile, the Argentinian Jewish community has vowed to commemorate the moment of the explosion in weekly silent demonstrations until the perpetrators are found. Each Monday morning, in a street scene reminiscent of demonstrations by the Argentinian civilian population against the "dirty war" waged by the Argentinian military government against its own people in the late 1970s, members of the Jewish community assemble at the site of the explosion. At 9:53 A.M., the moment that the explosion occurred, the participants bow their heads in a moment of silence in order to signify their frustration.

The Continuing Threat: "The Jews Will Not Be Safe"

While international investigators continue to sift through the evidence produced by the latest bombings, the threat of terrorism sponsored by Iran and carried out in the name of Hizballah is not over. Days after the November 1994 Casablanca Economic Conference in Morocco where

Arab, Israeli and Jewish businessmen met in order to advance trade between Israel and the Arab countries, Hizballah declared that it opposed the normalization of ties between Israel and the Arab countries. The terror organization further stated that it would target Jewish businessmen and tourists travelling to those countries. The Hizballah statement asserted:

> The [Islamic] nation will resist normalization and will serve blows to it. The Jews will not be safe, neither in their tourism or their trade. We warn that all this is that is going on will only lead to heating things up.[209]

A month later, on December 18, 1994, Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah made a new threat of suicide attacks against Jews worldwide:

> I say to . . . all the enemy's leaders that Islam . . . the Islam of strugglers and martyrs, is coming to you Jews, in south Lebanon, in Palestine, and all over the world. It will vanquish you.[210]

Referring to a recent flare-up of Hizballah clashes against Israel on its northern border, Nasrallah declared,

> When the Israeli funeral processions start to reach the occupied lands in Palestine, the enemy [Israel] will have to withdraw [from southern Lebanon].[211]

More recently, representatives of Hizballah have threatened Israel in the wake of a car bomb explosion in Beirut, the Lebanese capital, which killed four and wounded 11 others. A senior operative of Hizballah, Fuad Mughniyah, was one of those killed in the explosion.[212] Hizballah blamed its loss of Mughniyah on Israel, and at the site of the blast, members of Hizballah draped a black banner in English which declared "Death for Israel."[213]

Amid chants of "Death to Israel!" at Mughniyah's funeral, Hizballah Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah reiterated his previous vow that Hizballah would carry out suicide attacks on Israeli targets worldwide.[214] Mustafa Mughniyah, a cousin of the deceased Hizballah operative, declared, "They should hit deep inside Israel. Israeli civilians should be targeted as they target civilians here."[215] In response, Israel and the South Lebanon Army were put on a state of high alert.[216]

As a further indication of the direction of future international terror attacks, Iranian intelligence operatives have reportedly been testing airport security systems worldwide in order to determine their weak spots.[217] Unaccompanied pieces of luggage have been sent on international air routes for the purpose of seeing if airport security systems will detect them or permit such luggage to reach its destination. Some of the unaccompanied luggage is sent via Teheran to destinations in Europe or the United States. Other pieces of luggage are accompanied by a passenger on the first portion of a flight originating outside of Iran and abandoned for the transfer flight.[218] Unaccompanied luggage of the second type has been detected in numerous countries, including Britain, Thailand and Venezuela.[219]

Since Iranian diplomatic mail has been placed under greater scrutiny as the result of the recent attacks in Buenos Aires and London, U.S. and European intelligence agencies are concerned that Iran is either seeking alternate ways of transporting explosive materials or intends to spread the scope of its terror operations to the airlines.[220] If either one of these scenarios proves to be the case, enhanced international security coordination will be the only safeguard against such potentialities.

CONCLUSION

Taking into account Hizballah's threats and a comparison of the amount and type of explosives used in the 1992 Buenos Aires bombing, the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing was in all likelihood carried out by local Hizballah operatives with the assistance of Iran. Although Hizballah's attacks on Israel's northern border have decreased in comparison to 1993, the organization under the guidance of its patron, Iran, has increasingly engaged in attacks carried out against Jewish and Israeli targets worldwide. In light of Hizballah's most recent threats, this trend is likely to continue.

From Iran's perspective, assisting Hizballah in an act of terror for which it can deny responsibility benefits itself as well as its client. In the light of events in southern Lebanon, Iran is regarded as having helped Hizballah wreak vengeance on Israel - but without paying the price of disrupting its relationship with Syria. Additionally, Iran's denial of involvement will preserve the strong commercial relationships that it has with a number of Western European countries.

Of equal concern is the continuing role that Iran plays in nurturing and supporting a wide range of Islamic extremist groups in addition to Hizballah, particularly HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. By engaging in such support, Iran is contributing towards the destabilization of Palestinian self-rule in an effort to ensure that its clients will eventually seize control over any areas presently ruled by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Political instability and the potential seizure of the areas under PNA control by Islamic extremists and other Palestinian radicals does not bode well for future Palestinian economic development.

Although it was employed as an instrument of Iran in order to carry out the Buenos Aires attacks, Hizballah from its own perspective has "proven" that it has the ability to target both Israeli and Jewish targets in South America, Europe and possibly the United States. The fact that Hizballah has now taken credit for two attacks against the largest Jewish community in South America demonstrates that so far it can wield its weapon of terror with absolute impunity.

* * *

Chronology of Hizballah and Iranian-Sponsored Attacks

The following is a chronology of Hizballah and Iranian-sponsored terror attacks as well as significant Hizballah cross-border attacks carried out on Lebanon's border with Israel in the Israeli Security Zone.

March 15, 1983: Beirut, Lebanon - A grenade was thrown at a patrol of U.S. Marines in the Shi'i dominated southern suburbs of Beirut. Five Marines were slightly wounded in the attack.[221] Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.[222]

April 18, 1983: Beirut, Lebanon - A Hizballah suicide car bomber destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 16 people and injuring 120.[223] The entire central facade of the U-shaped building collapsed as the result of the massive explosion. Shock waves from the blast broke the windows of buildings up to 1 mile away from the Embassy. The day after the bombing Islamic Jihad took responsibility for the attack, stating, "This is part of the Iranian revolution's campaign against imperialist targets throughout the world. We shall keep striking at any imperialist presence in Lebanon, including the international force."[224]

October 23, 1983: Beirut, Lebanon - A truck driven by a Hizballah suicide bomber hit the U.S. Marines compound in Beirut, levelling the building. Within moments of the first attack, a second Hizballah suicide bomber struck at the barracks of the French Multinational Forces Command. 241 Marines and 74 French soldiers died.[225] Islamic Jihad took responsibility for both attacks.[226] American intelligence officials indicated in 1985 that members of the *Pasdaran*, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard, had helped to plan the attack.[227]

The explosion at the U.S. Marines compound "sent up a massive fireball" and completely destroyed the four story building. The bomb, which estimated to have contained 2500 pounds of TNT, left a crater 30 feet deep and 40 feet wide.[228]

At the French barracks, witnesses to the explosion stated that the second explosion lifted the building "off its foundation" and then it "collapsed like an accordion." The bomb at that site was estimated to have contained 600 pounds of TNT.[229]

November 4, 1983: Lebanon - A Hizballah suicide bomber driving a truck crashed into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) command headquarters in southern Lebanon. The bomb inside the truck was estimated to have contained between 800 to 1000 pounds of explosives. Although Israeli sentries who shot at the driver believed that they had hit him, the truck had already entered inside the compound and subsequently detonated 15 yards from the front of the building. Twenty Israelis and 32 Arab prisoners were killed,[230] and another 30 were wounded.[231]

Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack in an anonymous call placed to a Beirut news agency which declared, "We are prepared to send 2000 fighters to die in south Lebanon in order to remove the Zionist enemy from our country. We are prepared to launch operations everywhere in the world. Expect from us a big surprise in the very near future."[232]

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February 10, 1984: Beirut, Lebanon - Hizballah kidnapped Frank Reiger, an American engineering professor at the American University of Beirut.[233] He was released by a rival Shi'i militia in a raid that they carried out on the house where he was being held by his captors.[234]

March 7, 1984: Beirut, Lebanon - CNN correspondent Jeremy Levin was kidnapped by Islamic Jihad. On January 11 and 14, 1985, spokesmen for Islamic Jihad telephoned news agencies in Beirut and accused Levin, William Buckley, the Reverend Benjamin Weir and Peter Kilburn of being "CIA spies" and warned that they would be given the "punishment that they deserve."[235] (See February 14, 1985 for details on his escape from his captors.)

March 16, 1984: Beirut, Lebanon - Hizballah kidnapped William Buckley, the CIA station chief at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.[236] Buckley is believed to have died in May of 1985[237] after being brutally tortured.[238] Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for his murder on October 4, 1985.[239]

Seven years after his death, in December of 1992, the U.S. State Department took out advertisements in the Lebanese daily *Al-Hayat*. The advertisement offered a $2 million reward for information that would lead to the arrest of the terrorists who murdered Buckley, U.S. Marines Lieutenant-Colonel William Higgins and Peter Kilburn. The advertisement stated: "There's a price we pay as a result of terrorism, and there's a price we will pay to stop terrorism."[240]

May 8, 1984: Beirut, Lebanon - The Reverend Benjamin Weir of the Presbyterian Church was kidnapped by the Islamic Jihad. On January 11 and 14, 1985 spokesmen for Islamic Jihad telephoned news agencies in Beirut and accused Weir, Jeremy Levin, William Buckley, and Peter Kilburn of being "CIA spies" and warned that they would be given the "punishment that they deserve."[241] (See September 14, 1985 for details of Weir's release.)

September 20, 1984: Beirut, Lebanon - A suicide car bomber in a U.S.-manufactured station wagon with forged diplomatic license plates detonated in front of the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut. The bomb consisted of 400 pounds of TNT explosives and four Soviet Grad rockets which added to the force of the blast.[242] Part of the front of the building collapsed as the result of the attack, killing 20 and injuring 16.[243] Ninety minutes after the explosion, an anonymous caller to *Agence France Presse* claimed responsibility for the attack in the name of Islamic Jihad.

The caller stated: "The operation goes to prove that we will carry out our previous promise not to allow a single American to remain on Lebanese soil." He further warned "our Lebanese brothers and all citizens to stay away from American institutions and gathering points, especially the Embassy."[244]

December 3, 1984: Beirut, Lebanon - Peter Kilburn, a librarian at the American University of Beirut, was kidnapped by Islamic Jihad. At one point during his captivity, his kidnappers contacted American officials and demanded $3 million for his release.[245] On January 11 and 14, 1985, anonymous callers representing Islamic Jihad took credit for his kidnapping as well as those of William Buckley, the Reverend Benjamin Weir, and Jeremy Levin. They were accused of being "CIA spies" and warned that they would be given the "punishment that they deserve."[246]

On April 17, 1986, Kilburn's body was found together with the bodies of two British hostages, Phillip Padfield and John Leigh Douglas, in Lebanon's central mountain region. The Arab Revolutionary Cells took responsibility for his murder, saying that his "execution" was in revenge for the U.S. raid on Libya which had occurred three days earlier.[247]

Libyan involvement in the deaths of the three hostages was confirmed by US State Department officials who indicated that Libya had offered to buy the three hostages for $1 million each.[248] Eight months after their deaths, reports indicated that Kilburn, Douglas and Padfield were "sold" to Libyan agents two days before the U.S. raid on Libya. The three were then shot by a Libyan army officer and dumped on a roadside outside of Beirut.[249]

Six years later, in December of 1992, the U.S. State Department took out an advertisement in the Lebanese daily Al-Hayat. The advertisement offered a $2 million reward for information that would lead to the arrest of the terrorists who murdered Kilburn, U.S. Marine Colonel William Higgins and William Buckley. The advertisement stated: "There's a price we pay as a result of terrorism, and there's a price we will pay to stop terrorism."[250]

December 1984: Teheran, Iran - Kuwait Airways Flight 221 to Karachi, Pakistan, was hijacked by four Hizballah gunmen. Four passengers, including two Americans, were killed by the terrorists after a standoff lasting several days at the Teheran airport.[251]

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January 8, 1985: Beirut, Lebanon - The Reverend Lawrence Martin Jenco, head of the Catholic Relief Services office in Beirut, was kidnapped by Islamic Jihad.[252] The group took responsibility for his kidnapping on January 11 and 14, 1985 when anonymous callers representing Islamic Jihad took credit for his kidnapping as well as those of William Buckley, the Reverend Benjamin Weir, and Jeremy Levin, and Peter Kilburn. They were accused of being "CIA spies" and warned that they would be given the "punishment that they deserve."[253] (See July 26, 1986 for details of Jenco's release.)

February 14, 1985: Beka'a Valley, Lebanon - American hostage Jeremy Levin was reported to have escaped from his Hizballah captors. He appeared at a Syrian army post near Baalbek and was taken to Damascus from where he was flown to Europe.

Islamic Jihad asserted in a statement made by an anonymous caller that it had freed Levin after determining that he was not a spy.[254]

March 1, 1985: Metulla, Israel - A Hizballah booby-trapped car exploded at a border gate, killing 12 Israeli soldiers and wounding 20.[255]

March 16, 1985: Beirut, Lebanon - Terry Anderson, a correspondent for the Associated Press, was kidnapped by Islamic Jihad.[256] (See December 3, 1991 for details of his release.)

March 22, 1985: Beirut, Lebanon - Marcel Fontaine, Vice Consul of the French Embassy, and Marcel Carton, Protocol Officer, of the French Embassy in Beirut, were kidnapped. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.[257] (See May 4, 1988 for details of their release.)

April 2, 1985: Beirut, Lebanon - Hizballah is believed to be responsible for the kidnapping of four leaders of the Lebanese Jewish community.[258] They were kidnapped by the "Organization of the Oppressed on Earth," a faction of the group that was reportedly trained by Iranian intelligence operatives.[259] The four were: Isaac Sasson, the Jewish community's president, Dr. Elie Hallak, a physician, Elie Srour, a member of the community's Hevra Kadisha (burial society), and Hayim Cohen Halala, who maintained the distribution of kosher meat throughout the community.[260]

Six others who were kidnapped the same year included Henri Mann, Judas Beneste and his two sons, Joseph and Abraham, Isaac Tarrab, a professor of mathematics at the American University of Beirut, and Selim Jammous, the secretary of the Jewish community.[261]

In November of 1985, Dr. Elie Hallak was brought to examine a French hostage held by the group, Michel Seurat, who was stricken with cancer. Seurat died a month later, on December 28, 1985.[262] Jean-Paul Kauffmann, the French hostage who was the last Westerner to see Dr. Hallak

alive, believed that Hallak was killed during the last week of December 1985 because his personal effects, including his stethoscope and personal letters that he had written to his wife, were given to the other French hostages.[263] On January 18, 1986, the "execution" of Dr. Hallak was announced on Lebanese radio.[264]

May 22, 1985: Beirut, Lebanon - Two Frenchmen, Jean-Paul Kauffmann, a correspondent for the French weekly *L'Evenement du Jeudi*, and Michel Seurat, a researcher at the French Center for Studies and Research on the Contemporary Middle East in Beirut, were kidnapped. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.[265] (See May 4, 1988 for details of Kauffmann's release.)

In November of 1985, one of the Lebanese Jewish hostages, Dr. Elie Hallak, was brought to examine Michel Seurat, who was stricken with cancer. Seurat died a month later, on December 28 1985.[266] Three months later, in March of 1986, Islamic Jihad claimed that Seurat had been "executed."[267]

May 28, 1985: Beirut, Lebanon - David Jacobsen, director of the American University Hospital in Beirut was kidnapped by Islamic Jihad. On June 3, 1985, photographs of Jacobsen were distributed by Islamic Jihad to Western news agencies to prove that they were holding him.[268] (See November 2, 1986 for details concerning Jacobsen's release.)

June 9, 1985: Beirut, Lebanon - Hizballah's Islamic Jihad kidnapped Thomas Sutherland, a Scottish-American academic who was serving as the acting Dean of Agriculture at the American University of Beirut.[269] (See November 18, 1991 for details of his release.)

June 14, 1985: Athens, Greece and Beirut, Lebanon - The "Organization of the Oppressed on Earth," an alias of Hizballah,[270] claimed responsibility for the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 en route from Athens to Rome with over 100 Americans on board. The pilot was forced to fly twice between Athens and Beirut before landing at Beirut International Airport. One passenger, U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem, was beaten and murdered, and his body was thrown out of the plane onto the tarmac.[271]

Upon landing in Beirut, the majority of the passengers were released, but 41 American hostages were taken to undisclosed locations in the city. Thereafter, Lebanese Justice Minister and leader of the Shi'i *Amal* movement Nabih Birri took over the negotiations for the release of the remaining hostages, representing the Hizballah hijackers' demands as his own.[272] They were finally released in Damascus, Syria, 17 days after the hijacking of the plane on June 30. The hijackers had demanded the release of 17 Hizballah and *Al-Da'awa* terrorists being held in Kuwait and two others in Spain,[273] and the release of 766 Shi'is being held in Israel.[274] 700 Shi'i prisoners were released by Israel in the wake of the incident.[275]

In 1987, Hizballah terrorist Muhammad Ali Hamadah was tried and convicted for the hijacking of TWA flight 847 and attempting to smuggle explosives in Frankfurt, Germany.[276] He was sentenced to life imprisonment on May 16, 1989. Two German citizens were kidnapped by Hizballah on that day in an act of vengeance.[277] Also in Germany, his brother, Abbas Hamadah, was convicted of conspiracy to kidnap German citizens. He was sentenced to 13 years in prison in 1988.[278]

September 11, 1985: Beirut, Lebanon - Italian businessman Alberto Molinari was kidnapped, ostensibly by the Islamic Jihad.[279] In August of 1991 Lebanese security sources indicated that Molinari had been "mistakenly killed" not long after he was kidnapped in 1985[280] and is presumed to be dead.

September 14, 1985: Beirut, Lebanon - The Rev. Benjamin Weir was released by his Islamic Jihad captors.[281] His release was considered to be as a result of the $2 million arms-for-hostages deal orchestrated between the U.S. and Iran by then National Security Council aide Oliver North.[282]

At a September 20 press conference Weir conveyed his captors' demands regarding the release of the other hostages: the release of 17 Hizballah and *Al-Da'awa* terrorists held by Kuwait. The kidnappers threatened that if their demands were not met that they would kidnap more Americans.[283]

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1985 - 1986: Paris, France - Fifteen bombings and bombing attempts that took place in Paris over a period of nine months were attributed to a French Tunisian recruit to Hizballah named Fuad Ali Saleh. Thirteen people were killed and 250 were wounded as the result of the attacks. Eight Lebanese citizens, all of whom are believed to be members of Hizballah, allegedly assisted Saleh in his campaign of terror.[284]

Due to the fact that they had fled France, the eight Lebanese were tried *in absentia* by the French courts in 1990. According to information supplied to the French government by a former associate of Saleh, Hizballah supplied Saleh and his eight Hizballah operatives with the explosives used in the wave of bombings. French officials indicated that senior Iranian officials were implicated in the attacks.[285] At his 1990 trial, Saleh disrupted the courtroom by shouting, "My name is Death to the West!" and "War, holy war!"[286]

March 8, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - A four-man French television crew was kidnapped while filming a Hizballah rally. The Revolutionary Justice Organization, an alias of Hizballah, claimed credit.[287] (See May 4 1988 for details of their release.)

April 11, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - Brian Keenan, an Irish instructor at the American University of Beirut, was kidnapped.[288] At the time of his kidnapping, no group claimed responsibility for the act, but after four years of captivity he was released in August 1990 by Hizballah's Islamic Jihad.[289]

April 17, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - British journalist John McCarthy, a cameraman for Worldwide Television News Agency, was kidnapped by another front organization of Hizballah, the "Revolutionary Commando Cells."[290] When released by his captors more than five years after his kidnapping, McCarthy carried a letter from his Hizballah kidnappers in the name of Islamic Jihad demanding the release of Hizballah terrorists held in the West.[291] (See August 8, 1991 for details of his release.)

May 7, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - The Revolutionary Justice Organization, an alias used by Hizballah, kidnapped a retired French auto dealer, Camille Sontag. Sontag was released with another French hostage, Marcel Coudari, on November 11, 1986.[292]

July 26, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - American hostage Father Lawrence Martin Jenco was released by his Islamic Jihad captors after 17 months.[293] His release was considered to be as a result of the $2 million arms-for-hostages deal orchestrated between the U.S. and Iran by then National Security Council aide Oliver North.[294]

July 26, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - A large crowd of Muslim radicals, organized by Hizballah,

attacked the Moroccan Embassy in West Beirut to protest King Hassan II's meeting with then Israeli Prime Minister Peres.[295]

September 6, 1986: Istanbul, Turkey - Hizballah, along with the Abu Nidal terrorist group, was held responsible by Turkish authorities for a suicide attack in which two terrorists stormed the Neveh Shalom Synagogue on a Sabbath morning and killed 22 worshipers. Two young men entered the unguarded synagogue and locked the door from the inside with an iron bar to prevent their victims' escape. As soon as this was done, they immediately opened fire with submachine guns on the assembled worshippers. The two terrorists then poured gasoline on the bodies of the people they had shot and detonated an explosive device, killing themselves.[296]

September 9, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - Frank Herbert Reed, the American director of the Lebanese International School, was kidnapped by Islamic Jihad. An anonymous caller claiming to represent Islamic Jihad took responsibility for the kidnapping and characterized Reed's marriage to a Syrian, conversion to Islam and his role as an educator as being a "cover for espionage activity."[297] The caller declared, "We have uncovered Reed's game. The real Muslims have uncovered the real game, and they will punish whoever is involved."[298] (See April 30, 1990 for details of his release.)

September 12, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - Joseph James Cicippio, an American banker serving as the acting comptroller of the American University of Beirut, was kidnapped from the university's guarded campus in West Beirut. The Revolutionary Justice Organization, another alias of Hizballah, claimed responsibility.[302] (See December 3, 1991 for details of his release.)

October 16, 1986: Sultan Yaqub, Lebanon - Israeli navigator Ron Arad was reported as missing in action. He was captured by a faction of Hizballah named the Believers' Resistance and held by them until 1988. In 1988, he was reportedly "sold" to Iran for "hundreds of thousands of dollars" and was transferred there.[299]

In August 1991, an Islamic *Amal* official publicly admitted that Arad had been "sold" to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards in 1988 by a Hizballah faction named the Believers' Resistance led by Mustafa Dirani. Arad's "price" was said to be "hundreds of thousands of dollars." He was subsequently transferred to Teheran, where he is assumed to be held to this day.[300]

On April 8, 1993 an Iranian offer was reported to have been made for Arad. Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani was said to be demanding $400 million from Israel in order to gain Arad's release. That particular sum is the amount that the current Iranian government claims that Iran, under the Shah, reportedly paid Israel for the joint development of a surface-to-air missile in 1979. The money has remained in Israel since then, and the current Rafsanjani government wants the money returned in exchange for Arad.[301]

October 21, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - Edward Austin Tracy, an American book salesman, was kidnapped by the Revolutionary Justice Organization, a front organization of Hizballah. The group claimed that Tracy was a CIA spy for the Mossad.[303] (See August 11, 1991 for details concerning his release.)

November 2, 1986: Beirut, Lebanon - American hostage David Jacobsen, formerly the Director of the American University Hospital in Beirut, was freed after 17 months of captivity.[304] His release was considered to be as a result of the arms-for-hostages deal orchestrated between the U.S. and Iran by then National Security Council aide Oliver North.[305]

On October 14, 1992 Jacobsen, together with Joseph Cicippio, sued Iran for $600 million. The suit asserted that Iran directed Hizballah's kidnappings in Beirut in order to gain the release of Iranian assets held by the U.S. since 1979. The two former hostages are seeking damages for kidnapping, physical abuse, false imprisonment, inhumane medical treatment, loss of job opportunities, and pain and suffering.[306]

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January 2-7, 1987: Southern Lebanon - 13 South Lebanon Army (SLA) soldiers were killed in attacks carried out by Hizballah in the Security Zone.[307]

January 17, 1987: Beirut, Lebanon - West German businessman Rudolf Cordes was kidnapped by Hizballah in revenge for the arrest of Muhammad Ali Hamadah.[308] (See June 14, 1985 and January 27, 1988 for details regarding Hamadah; see September 12, 1988 for details of Cordes's release.)

January 20, 1987: Beirut, Lebanon - The "Holy Warriors [*Mujahideen*] for Freedom," another alias of Hizballah, kidnapped West German Alfred Schmidt from his hotel room in Beirut.[309] He was freed nine months later, in September of 1987.[310]

January 20, 1987: Beirut, Lebanon - Church of England Envoy Terry Waite disappeared while trying to negotiate the release of the Western hostages held by Hizballah's Islamic Jihad.[311] (See November 18, 1991 for details of his release.)

January 24, 1987: Beirut, Lebanon - Robert Polhill, an American lecturer at Beirut University College, was kidnapped along with Alan Steen, a communications instructor, Jesse Jonathan Turner, a professor of mathematics, and Milthileshwar Singh, an Indian with U.S. resident-alien status who taught finance[312] at the college.[313] Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine took responsibility.[314] The Organization of the Oppressed on Earth also took responsibility for the kidnappings.[315] (See October 4, 1988 for details of Singh's release; April 22, 1991 for Polhill; October 21, 1991 for Turner; and December 3, 1991 for Steen.)

February 8, 1987: Southern Lebanon - Three Israeli soldiers were wounded and five Hizballah soldiers were killed after Hizballah attacked a position held by the SLA in the Security Zone.[316]

June 17, 1987: Beirut, Lebanon - The "Organization for Defending the Free People," considered to be another alias of Hizballah, claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of Charles Glass,[317] an American freelance reporter associated with ABC News, along with two Lebanese.[318] (See August 18, 1987 for details of his release.)

July 24, 1987: Geneva, Switzerland: A Lebanese man who was trained by Hizballah appeared to have acted alone in the hijacking of a plane bound for Rome. One French passenger was killed and a steward shot before Swiss authorities stormed the plane and arrested the terrorist.[319]

August 18, 1987: Damascus, Syria - American hostage Charles Glass, a journalist affiliated with ABC News, was released after two months by his Hizballah captors.[320]

August 1987: Beirut, Lebanon - Hizballah was suspected of bombing three Saudi Arabian government buildings in Beirut.[321]

December 21, 1987: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah launched a series of attacks against the SLA in the Security Zone, resulting in the death of five Hizballah operatives and one SLA militiaman.[322]

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January 27, 1988: Beirut, Lebanon - Ralph Schray, a half-Lebanese West German citizen was abducted by four carloads of gunmen in West Beirut in connection with the Ali Abbas Hamadah trial in Dusseldorf, Germany. The Revolutionary Justice Organization, a front organization of the Hizballah, claimed responsibility. Hamadah's brother, Abd al-Hadi Hamadah, the security chief of Hizballah,[323] reportedly directed this abduction as an act of vengeance against the German government for the 1988 and 1989 trials and convictions of his two brothers.[324] (See June 15, 1985 for details.)

In March of 1988 Schray was released by Hizballah which announced his release using another alias - the "Holy Warriors [*Mujahideen*] for Freedom."[325]

February 17, 1988: Southern Lebanon - U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, the head of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon - UNIFIL) was kidnapped by Hizballah's Organization of the Oppressed on Earth.[326]

Ten months later, on December 12, 1988, the Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, a front organization of Hizballah, claimed that it would execute Colonel Higgins as a "spy" after torturing him for months.[327] The statement of the group declared that Higgins's "execution" was "in retaliation for the repeated Israeli aggression against our people in occupied Palestine and in southern and eastern Lebanon, in vengeance for the latest Israeli attack in al-Na'ameh, and in order to punish America."[328]

It is believed that Higgins was murdered by his captors in December 1988, ten months after his kidnapping and six months prior to Hizballah's second announcement of his murder on July 31, 1989.[329] (See July 31, 1989 for details of Islamic Jihad's announcement.) At that time Hizballah claimed that its "execution" of Higgins was an act of vengeance for Israel's abduction of Hizballah leader Sheikh Abd al-Karim Ubayd.[330]

In August of 1991 it was revealed that Sheikh Abd al-Karim Ubayd was responsible for Higgins's kidnapping and subsequent transfer to Beirut. Ubayd was also considered responsible for providing a safe haven for Higgins's kidnappers in his home in Jibsheet, Lebanon.[331] Ubayd has been held in Israel since July 1989.

Four years after his death, in December of 1992, the U.S. State Department took out an advertisement in the Lebanese daily *Al-Hayat*. The advertisement offered a $2 million reward for information that would lead to the arrest of the terrorists who murdered Lieutenant Colonel Higgins, William Buckley and Peter Kilburn. The advertisement stated: "There's a price we pay as a result of terrorism, and there's a price we will pay to stop terrorism."[332]

April 5, 1988: Larnaca, Cyprus - Hizballah terrorists hijacked Kuwait Airways Flight 422 and subsequently killed two Kuwaiti hostages on April 9 and April 11. On April 13, after negotiations with Cypriot and Palestine Liberation Organization officials, the terrorists released 12 hostages and on April 13 flew to Algiers.[333]

May 4, 1988: Beirut, Lebanon - French hostages Marcel Carton, Marcel Fontaine and Jean-Paul Kauffmann were freed. The French government reportedly paid a total of $28.2 million for their release. Arms and spare parts were also included as part of the deal with Iran.[334]

France also made an effort to normalize ties with Iran by repaying $330 million of a $1 billion loan that was made under the Shah's government, and forced an opponent of the Khomeini government, Masud Rajavi, to leave France.[335]

September 12, 1988: Damascus, Syria - West German hostage Rudolph Cordes was released by Hizballah's Islamic Jihad after 20 months of captivity.[336]

October 4, 1988: Damascus, Syria - Hostage Mithileshwar Singh, an Indian with U.S. resident-alien status, was released by his Hizballah captors after 20 months. The front organization "Islamic Jihad" announced his release, even though two other Hizballah front groups had taken responsibility for his kidnapping - the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine[337] and the Organization of the Oppressed on Earth.[338] (See January 24, 1987 for details.)

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May 12, 1989: Beirut, Lebanon - Jack Mann, a British citizen and Beirut resident for almost 50 years, disappeared and was believed to have been kidnapped. The "Cells of Armed Struggle," an alias of Hizballah, took responsibility.[339] (See September 24, 1991 for details of his release.)

May 16, 1989: Beirut, Lebanon - Two German relief workers, Heinrich Struebig and Thomas Kemptner, were believed to have been kidnapped by Hizballah.[340] In July of 1991, the "Holy Warriors [*Mujahideen*] of Freedom," a front group linked to Hizballah, threatened "extremely negative action" against Struebig and Kemptner if details of the prison conditions of Hizballah terrorist Muhammad Ali Hamadah and his brother Abbas Hamadah were not provided by the West German government within 48 hours.[341] (For details of their release, see June 17, 1992.)

July 31, 1989: Beirut, Lebanon - Islamic Jihad announced that it had executed U.S. Colonel William Higgins in revenge for Israel's abduction of Hizballah's Sheikh Abd al-Karim Ubayd. The organization released a videotape showing Higgins's body hanging by a rope. It is believed that Higgins died six months before, in December of 1988. (See February 17, 1988 for details of his kidnapping and murder.)

September 1989: Tunisia, Guinea, Gabon, Senegal - Over the summer months of 1989, French security officials discovered security breaches in their western African embassies in Tunisia, Guinea, Gabon, and Senegal in which Lebanese Shi'i operatives of the Hizballah were buying French passports and intelligence cables from Embassy employees.[342]

The most serious breach occurred in Senegal, when a French Consulate employee attempted to give 100 French identity cards and 60 French passports to a Hizballah cell. The breach was discovered after British officials traced a passport found with a Hizballah operative who blew himself up with a "homemade bomb" in London.[343]

November 25, 1989: Madrid and Valencia, Spain - Hizballah operatives attempted to smuggle 18 pounds of plastic explosives into Spain. The explosives, as well as two grenades and an unspecified number of detonators were hidden inside a shipment of jam imported from Lebanon that were being shipped to two of the operatives in Valencia.[344] In total, eight Hizballah operatives were arrested in a foiled plot to attack U.S. and other targets throughout Western Europe.[345] Three of those arrested were reported to have "direct links" to Hizballah. An additional two kilos of explo-

sives was discovered by Spanish police who were searching the homes of the three operatives.[346]

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February 1990: Lebanon - The Shi'i *Amal* Movement accused Hizballah of exporting foodstuffs (chocolates, sweets, ghee tins and liquor bottles) filled with explosives.[347]

March 7, 1990: Zumariya Pass, Lebanon - Hizballah assisted five Palestinian terrorists intending to attack an IDF position in the Security Zone.[348]

March 8, 1990: Hasbayah, Lebanon - Hizballah assisted Palestinian terror organizations firing rockets at an IDF patrol in the Security Zone.[349]

March 8, 1990: Southern Lebanon - An armed group of men which appeared to be Hizballah operatives, attempted to infiltrate the Security Zone. Five of the group were killed by Israeli forces.[350]

March 9, 1990: Lebanon - Hizballah attempted to assassinate a Shi'i Imam, Allamah Ahmad Zaki Tufahah.[351]

March 24, 1990: Marjayun, Lebanon - Hizballah assisted a Palestinian terror organization in placing a bomb, which was uncovered and exploded by sappers in the Security Zone.[352]

April 23, 1990: Kawkaba, Lebanon - Hizballah assisted a Palestinian terror organization in planting an explosive device against an IDF armored personnel carrier.[353]

April 26, 1990: Boroz Junction, Lebanon - Hizballah assisted a Palestinian terror organization in planting a mine in the Security Zone, which was hit by an IDF patrol.[354]

April 27, 1990: Haruf al-Bir, Lebanon - Hizballah assisted a Palestinian terror organization in firing five rockets at an IDF post in the Security Zone.[355]

April 30, 1990: Beirut, Lebanon - American hostage Frank Reed was released by the Revolutionary Justice Organization, a faction of Hizballah.[356] The "Arab Revolutionary Cells - Umar Mukhtar Forces" originally took responsibility for his kidnapping.[357] In the process of releasing Reed, the Revolutionary Justice Organization, the group which took responsibility for kidnapping and holding several other American hostages, revealed itself as being linked to Hizballah.[358]

A few weeks after his release, Reed told reporters that he had been brutally beaten by his captors. He related that he had been beaten as the result of two attempts to escape his Hizballah kidnappers. After his first attempt to escape, he stated that he was hit "more than 200 times" in the head and body. When he tried a second time, his captors jabbed him in the back with their Kalashnikov rifles "and my kidneys bled."[359] They also beat his feet with metal rods that are normally used to reinforce concrete. As the result of the beating, Reed described his feet as having been "slightly broken."[360] Thomas Sutherland, the American hostage who shared a cell with Reed, told reporters several years after both he and Reed had been freed that their captors had beaten Reed "into virtually a catatonic state."[361]

Several months after Reed was released, it was revealed that arsenic had been detected in his system shortly after he was freed. Fatima (Fifi) Reed, his wife, blamed her husband's captors for having poisoned him.[362]

In late November 1994 Reed was reportedly being treated in a psychiatric unit at the Boston Veterans' Administration Medical Center after he was arrested and charged with assault and battery against Fifi, his ex-wife.[363]

June 9, 1990: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah assisted Yasir Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO in an attack within the Security Zone. Hizballah aided the terrorists in all the stages of the attack including training and providing local guides. [364]

August 1990: Damascus, Syria - Brian Keenan, an Irish citizen held hostage since April 11, 1986, was freed by Islamic Jihad.[365]

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March 21, 1991: Southern Lebanon - Three Hizballah gunmen, attempting to infiltrate Israel, were intercepted by Israeli troops in the Security Zone.[366]

April 22, 1991: Beirut, Lebanon - American hostage Robert Polhill was released after 39 months of captivity by the "Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine" in Lebanon,[367] another alias of Hizballah. Previously Hizballah's "Islamic Jihad" had taken responsibility for his kidnapping.[368]

April 30, 1991: Lebanon - Hizballah and its allied factions were reported to be holding most of the 13 Western hostages in Lebanon.[369]

May 28, 1991: Lebanon - Hizballah claimed that it was holding two Israeli soldiers.[370]

June 1991: Southern Lebanon - A Syrian-trained Hizballah cell was caught in the western section of the Security Zone.[371]

July 3, 1991: Bayt Lif, Lebanon - Hizballah claimed in a statement that it launched a double attack on the Israeli army and the SLA in the Security Zone causing 5 deaths among SLA militiamen. It said that one of its "fighters" had detonated a powerful explosive charge as an SLA patrol drove on a road near Bayt Lif in the Security Zone's central sector. "When Israeli reinforcements arrived, another explosive went off, killing and wounding a large number of enemy soldiers," the statement concluded. It was the second such attack in three days.[372]

July 17, 1991: Southern Lebanon - Three Israeli soldiers in Lebanon were killed and four were wounded when Hizballah forces ambushed Israeli troops overnight.[373]

July 18, 1991: Beirut, Lebanon - Islamic Jihad warned the German government of "dire consequences" if any harm should come to Muhammad and Abbas Hamadah in the West German prison where they were each serving terms for acts of terror committed against German citizens.[374]

August 8, 1991: Damascus, Syria, and Beirut, Lebanon - British hostage John McCarthy was released by his Islamic Jihad captors after more than five years of captivity. A letter that McCarthy brought for U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar demanded the release of Arab prisoners held by Israel in southern Lebanon and the release of "freedom fighters" in Europe, apparently referring to Hizballah terrorists imprisoned in Germany and other countries.[375]

In Beirut, another faction of Hizballah calling itself the "Organization for the Defense of Prisoners' Rights" kidnapped French employee of the *Medecins du Monde* ("Doctors of the

World") organization, Jerome Leyraud.[376] The group accused Leyraud of being an "intelligence officer" and declared that he would be killed "the moment another hostage is released."[377]

The same group claimed responsibility for a grenade attack against the U.N. office in Beirut that was carried out on the same day. The group declared that the attack was a "warning" against the further release of any other Western hostages while Israel was still holding more than 300 Lebanese Shi'i and Palestinian prisoners.[378]

August 11, 1991: Beirut, Lebanon - Jerome Leyraud, an administrator for the humanitarian organization *Medecins du Monde* who was kidnapped on August 8, was released three days later by the "Organization for the Defense of the Prisoners' Rights," described as one of the militias "operating under the umbrella of Hizballah."[379] Leyraud's release was accomplished as the result of Iranian and Syrian pressure on Hizballah.[380]

On the same day in Damascus, American hostage Edward Austin Tracy was released by his captors after being held for almost five years of captivity.[381]

August 11, 1991: Southern Lebanon - In one week, 11 attacks were launched against Israeli and SLA units in the Security Zone.[382]

August 12, 1991: Geneva, Switzerland - A letter from the Islamic Jihad to the United Nations demanded a "comprehensive" release of "detainees" held by Israel and Western countries. The "detainees" mentioned by Islamic Jihad in its letter referred to Hizballah terrorists imprisoned in Western Europe as well as Hizballah and Palestinian operatives held by Israel, including Hizballah leader Sheikh Abd al-Karim Ubayd.[383]

Further efforts to release Western hostages by the organization were to be conditioned upon the release of Hizballah's "freedom fighters from prisons in occupied Palestine [i.e., Israel] and Europe."[384] The group justified the kidnapping of Westerners as a reaction to a plethora of Arab grievances that the U.S. and U.N. had not dealt with over the years.[385] The letter further declared, "If struggle, *jihad* and resistance against the superpowers is terrorism, we and the oppressed peoples throughout the world are proud to be terrorists."[386]

The Islamic Jihad letter concluded that due to the "Great Satan['s]" control over the U.N. the condition of the international organization was "grim." The letter suggested that the best solution would be for the U.N. Secretary General and the entire world to "adopt Islam as an ideology, a code of law and a system and to follow the teachings of the Great Imam Khomeini."[387]

May 1991 - October 1991: Southern Lebanon - Over a six-month period, 51 attacks were carried out by Hizballah against Israel from southern Lebanon.[388]

September 24, 1991: Damascus, Syria - British hostage Jack Mann was released by his Hizballah captors. Hussein al-Musawi, a leader of Hizballah, declared that "if things continued to proceed normally, an[other] American hostage will be released. Maybe within a week or less than a month."[389]

October 2, 1991: Southern Lebanon - A Hizballah terrorist was killed when the roadside bomb he was planting blew up in his hands in the Security Zone.[390]

October 8, 1991: Lebanon - Hizballah threatened Israel with a series of attacks to prevent the Madrid Middle East peace conference from taking place.[391]

October 20, 1991: Southern Lebanon - Three Israeli soldiers were killed and two were wounded when a roadside bomb, planted by Hizballah, exploded as an armored vehicle passed through the Security Zone.[392]

October 21, 1991: Beirut, Lebanon - American hostage Jesse Turner was released by his Islamic Jihad captors.[393]

October 22, 1991: Southern Lebanon - An Israeli soldier was injured in the Security Zone by an explosive device planted by Hizballah.[394]

October 29, 1991: Southern Lebanon - Three IDF soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb and five were wounded in a separate attack by members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine which carried out a joint attack with Hizballah.[395]

November 18, 1991: Beirut, Lebanon - Hostages Thomas Sutherland and Terry Waite are released by the Islamic Jihad faction of Hizballah. Sutherland had been held captive for six years and Waite had been held for five years.[396] A spokesman for Islamic Jihad stated that more Western hostages would be freed if Israel were to release "another batch of Arab prisoners," and mentioned in particular Hizballah leader Sheikh Abd al-Karim Ubayd.[397]

December 3, 1991: Damascus, Syria - American hostages Joseph Cicippio, Alan Steen and Terry Anderson were freed by their Islamic Jihad captors. A U.S. government official revealed in January of 1992 that the Iranian government had paid Hizballah nearly $1 million for the release of each hostage. During the period that they were held captive, it was also revealed that Iran paid Hizbailah directly for the "confinement and the upkeep" of the hostages' quarters. Summing up the issue as to whether Hizballah or Iran had controlled the ultimate fate of the hostages, he said, "Teheran called the shots."[398]

In exchange for the hostages, the U.S. and Iran agreed that the U.S. would give $278 million for "military claims" made by Iran. The U.S. also issued a statement declaring that Iran was not responsible for the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December of 1988.[399]

On October 14, 1992 Cicippio, together with David Jacobsen, sued Iran for $600 million. The suit asserted that Iran directed Hizballah's kidnappings in Beirut in order to gain the release of Iranian assets held by the U.S. since 1979. The two former hostages are seeking damages for kidnapping, physical abuse, false imprisonment, inhumane medical treatment, loss of job opportunities, and pain and suffering.[400]

In June of 1994, Iranian President Rafsanjani accused the U.S. of reneging on a secret agreement that Iranian assets frozen by the U.S. in 1979 would be returned to Iran in exchange for the American hostages who were held in Lebanon. Iran claims that $11 billion of its assets were frozen when the U.S. broke relations with Iran 15 years ago, but U.S. officials estimate the value of the assets to be $1 million.[401]

January-December 1991: Lebanon and Israel - Hizballah was considered responsible for at least 52 attacks against Israel during 1991.[402]

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January 8, 1992: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah claimed to have killed or injured a number of

Israeli troops and SLA forces in an ambush in the Security Zone. Israel denied any attack occurred.[403]

January 12, 1992: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah announced that they were responsible for the killing and wounding of several Israeli soldiers and SLA militiamen when a bomb exploded in the Security Zone.[404]

January 19, 1992: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah claimed responsibility for blowing up two houses in a village inside the Security Zone, killing the mayor and four other people.[405]

January 27, 1992: Southern Lebanon - Since January 1, 1992, Hizballah was involved in carrying out more than 20 attacks in the Security Zone. The types of attacks included planting mines and explosive devices and firing at Israeli troops patrolling the area.[406]

October 1991 - February 1992: Southern Lebanon: Over a period of four months, 44 attacks were carried out by Hizballah against Israel from the Security Zone area.[407]

February 1992: Southern Lebanon - An SLA soldier was killed when he tried to defuse an explosive device planted by Hizballah in the Security Zone.[408]

February 17 - 22, 1992: Northern Israel - Hizballah fired rockets on Kiryat Shmona and other northern Israeli towns close to the Lebanese border after Israeli troops killed Hizballah leader Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi. It was the first time the town had been shelled since Israel's incursion into Lebanon in 1982.[409]

March 1, 1992: Istanbul, Turkey - Three Turkish members of Hizballah were arrested in connection with throwing two hand-grenades into the Neveh Shalom synagogue. One passerby was injured in the attack.[410]

March 7, 1992: Ankara, Turkey - An Israeli diplomatic security officer at the Israeli Embassy in Ankara was killed when a bomb exploded in his car.[411] Islamic Jihad and the "Islamic Revenge Organization" took responsibility for the attack.[412] On March 13 the Turkish Interior Minister stated that the "attackers are members of the Hizballah organization."[413]

Sheikh Muhammad Yazbik, a member of the Hizballah's *Shura*, denied responsibility for the attack, saying, "Our confrontation with the Zionist entity takes place in south Lebanon and in the occupied territory. What happens abroad is not our responsibility."[414] Another leader of the organization, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah went further and denied responsibility for all of the kidnapping of Western hostages in Lebanon: "We have never been involved in hostage-taking and shall not be involved in such acts in the future . . ."[415]

March 11, 1992: Southern Lebanon - Five SLA soldiers were wounded in two separate Hizballah attacks inside the Security Zone.[416]

March 17, 1992: Buenos Aires, Argentina - In the most deadly terrorist act of 1992, a car bomb caused a massive explosion at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. The bomb levelled half of the building and left other buildings nearby severely damaged. Thirty-two people were estimated to have been killed, and 252 people were injured.[417]

On March 18, the Islamic Jihad, an alias of Hizballah, took responsibility for the bombing,

claiming that the explosion was in memory of Hussein, Sheik Abbas Musawi's son, who was killed together with his father in an Israeli attack against the Hizballah in February. A spokesman for Islamic Jihad in Beirut identified the suicide bomber as "Abu Yasir," an Argentinian convert to Islam and promised that the organization would continue its violent activities until Israel is "liquidated."[418]

The statement declared, "We assert anew that there will not be any security for anyone as long as our security is threatened and our dear Islam in danger. We will no longer let our tyrannized people pay the price alone. We will make the aggressors pay very high prices." It continued, "We will make the aggressors pay very high prices. We will chase them wherever they are until knocking them down. Our open battle with the criminal Zionist enemy requires our continuous presence in the battlegrounds of holy war and confrontation."[419] The statement also saluted "our brethren strugglers in Turkey," an apparent reference to the attacks in Turkey ten days before.[420]

Several weeks after the incident, a spokesman for Hizballah praised the bombing declaring that Argentinian President Menem had "betrayed the Arabs and sold his soul to the Jews."[421]

April 6, 1992: Southern Lebanon - A jointly-sponsored attack by Hizballah and a faction of the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine led by Fathi Shiqaqi and Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Awdah left two Israeli soldiers dead and five wounded. The three attackers were of Palestinian origin, recruited from Palestinian refugee camps and Iraq but were dressed in Hizballah fashion. Each wore a headband patterned after those of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards and the Lebanese Shi'a, and carried a miniature Quran in his pocket.[422]

May 19-20, 1992: Southern Lebanon - Israel's border with Lebanon was placed on a "high state of alert" on May 20 after Hizballah attacked an SLA post in the Security Zone leaving 5 SLA soldiers and one Hizballah terrorist dead. Several other SLA members were kidnapped. On the same day, forty mortar shells were fired at Israel by Hizballah terrorists and ten Katyusha rockets were fired into the south Lebanon security zone towards Israel. In retaliation, the IDF and SLA shelled Hizballah positions in southern Lebanon, and the Israel Air Force flew "many sorties" over the area.[423]

June 12, 1992: Southern Lebanon - Two Hizballah operatives equipped with shoulder-launched missiles, rifles and communications equipment were killed in a clash with IDF soldiers in the Security Zone. Two IDF soldiers were lightly injured.[424]

June 17, 1992: Beirut, Lebanon - German hostages Heinrich Struebig and Thomas Kemptner were released by Hizballah after three years of captivity. Abd al-Hadi Hamadah, the security chief of Hizballah, was holding them in hope of swapping them for his two brothers who are still imprisoned in Germany for their terrorist activities.[425]

The German government asserted that it had not bowed to Iran's or Hizballah's demands. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated: "There was no deal with criminal kidnappers. No conditions were accepted. Not a pfennig of ransom was paid."[426]

The German government did, however, promise to improve the two Hamadah brothers' prison conditions and move them to the same jail.[427] Germany's status as Iran's largest trading partner and its economic influence in the European Community was regarded as being the main motivation for the release of Struebig and Kemptner.[428]

June 29, 1992: Aishiyah, Lebanon - Hizballah claimed credit for a bomb attack against an Israeli convoy near the village of Aishiyah in the Security Zone that took place a day earlier. One soldier was moderately wounded, while three others sustained light injuries.[429]

July 21-23, 1992: Bayt Yahun, Lebanon: Hizballah ambushed an Israeli patrol near the village of Bayt Yahun in the Security Zone with rocket-propelled grenade launchers, light weapons and an anti-tank missile.[430] One Israeli soldier was killed and three others were wounded. An explosive device injured two other soldiers from a subsequent patrol of the same area. At the same time, three nearby SLA posts were attacked by Hizballah. Twenty-four hours later, Hizballah took responsibility for the attack.[431]

In retaliation, the IDF and SLA shelled Hizballah targets north of the security zone, reportedly injuring six Lebanese civilians. On July 22 and 23 the area was raided by Israeli Air Force jets, leaving four people killed.[432]

August 21, 1992: Beaufort, Lebanon: Near the ruins of the Crusader-built Beaufort Castle, an Israeli patrol opened fire on a group of four Hizballah operatives who were apparently on their way to carrying out a bombing attack in the area. One shot injured one of the Hizballah operatives who continued to fire on the Israelis after falling to the ground. An enormous explosion occurred when a subsequent shot detonated explosives that he was carrying in his knapsack. Nine Israeli soldiers were wounded by the ensuing blast, and the other three Hizballah operatives apparently escaped. Hizballah described the incident as a "great victory" and claimed that its operative had been sent on a suicide mission and had blown himself up near an IDF patrol, inflicting injuries on eighteen Israeli soldiers.[433]

September 21, 1992: Beaufort, Lebanon - Three Hizballah operatives were killed in a clash with IDF soldiers in the Beaufort area. One Israeli soldier received minor injuries. Hizballah announced a day later that the three were members of its organization.[434]

September 28-29, 1992: Rashaf and Brashit, Lebanon - Employing Soviet-manufactured Sagger wire-guided anti-tank missiles supplied to them by Iran,[435] hundreds of Hizballah operatives shelled over 11 SLA posts in the security zone.[436] A spokesman for the IDF Northern Command stated, "Such an attack hasn't been [seen] in years." Fifty of the Hizballah operatives attacked the SLA's main military post near the village of Rashaf. The post's commander was killed in the attack along with one other soldier. In the ensuing counterattack against Hizballah, four Hizballah operatives were killed and several others were injured. As they were retreating, one of the Hizballah operatives fired a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG) at a UNIFIL post, killing one Irish U.N. observer and wounding another. Two Lebanese civilians were also killed.[437]

During the following night (September 30), Israel retaliated by sending Cobra gunships to Dayr Qanun al-Nahr. Missiles were fired into the upper story of Sheikh Ahmad Zilzil's house, destroying that floor and wounding both a local chief of Hizballah who had been "deeply involved" in the previous day's attack together with his driver.[438]

Two days after the attack a senior official in the IDF warned that Israel would have to react to the deteriorating situation, including the deployment of a "ground offensive."[439]

October 4, 1992: Bayt Yahun, Lebanon - Hizballah operatives ambushed an SLA convoy in the northern section of the Security Zone, killing two SLA men, including the SLA's chief of security in the area, Hussein Abd al-Nahbi. Three others were lightly wounded.[440] In retaliation, the SLA fired "about 100" tank rounds.[441]

October 25, 1992: Ahmadiyah, Lebanon - In a radio broadcast, Hizballah claimed responsibility for planting a remote-controlled bomb on a road near the village of Ahmadiyah. Five Israeli soldiers were killed and five others were wounded in the explosion. The explosion occurred 500 feet

from a UNIFIL post.[442] In retaliation for the bombing, an IDF tank unit entered the Security Zone and Israel Air Force (IAF) planes bombed terrorist bases of Hizballah and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).[443]

October 27, 1992: Kiryat Shmona, Israel - One Israeli civilian was killed and three others were wounded in a Katyusha rocket attack launched by the Hizballah from Lebanon. Vadim Shuchman, a 14-year-old recent immigrant to Israel from the Soviet Union, was killed, and his father, sister and infant nephew were wounded in the attack.[444]

November 8, 1992: Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon - Members of Hizballah fired Katyusha rockets into the Security Zone and northern Israel.[445]

November 11-12, 1992: Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon - For more than two weeks, Hizballah continued to shell populated areas in northern Israel with heavy-caliber Katyusha rockets, forcing the inhabitants in the Galilee to seek refuge in bomb shelters. In the Security Zone, roadside bombs targeting Israeli troops and their allies were planted on an "almost daily basis." At the same time, the Hizballah "regularly" directed fire at the Security Zone.[446]

On November 12, the IDF and SLA began to shell certain areas of South Lebanon. According to the U.N., one UNIFIL soldier was killed and three wounded after an attack by members of Hizballah on three U.N. posts. A U.N. convoy was also attacked by Hizballah, but no injuries were reported.[447]

On the same day in Siddiqine, Lebanon, IAF planes bombed the house of a Hizballah leader from southern Lebanon who was not home at the time. Hizballah denied that the house was used for meetings of its operatives.[448]

January - December 1992: The total number of Hizballah attacks against Israel's northern border was 170.[449]

1988-1992: Lebanon and Israel - Over a period of five years, Hizballah is reported by Israeli security officials to have attempted over 300 border incursions into Israel.[450]

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January 24, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Two Hizballah gunmen were killed while planting explosive devices aimed at SLA and IDF troops inside the Security Zone.[451]

February 14, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah operatives launched an attack on Israeli forces in the Security Zone.[452]

February 17, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah operatives mounted an attack on IDF and SLA forces in the Security Zone, and then unsuccessfully attempted to overrun SLA outposts in the area.[453]

March 2, 1993: Kafr Talusa, Lebanon - An Israeli convoy on routine patrol near Kafr Talusa in the Security Zone came under attack from several missiles fired by Hizballah.[454]

April 3, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Two Hizballah operatives were intercepted and shot dead on the edge of the Security Zone. Three Israeli soldiers were injured in the clash.[455]

April 13, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah operatives killed three Israeli soldiers in a roadside ambush in the Security Zone.[456]

June 8, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Four Israeli soldiers were wounded in the Security Zone when Hizballah forces north of the zone fired an anti-tank missile at their vehicle.[457]

June 28, 1993: Kiryat Shmona, Israel - Six residents, including two young children, were wounded when rockets fired by Hizballah forces from Lebanon hit several apartment buildings.[458]

June 29, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah fired rockets against IDF and SLA targets in the Security Zone, leaving a Lebanese boy dead and two SLA soldiers and two Lebanese civilians wounded.[459]

July 9, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Three IDF soldiers were killed and five others wounded by Hizballah mortar bombs and recoilless rifle fire in the Security Zone.[460]

July 22, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah fired artillery shells at IDF and SLA posts in the Security Zone.[461]

July 31, 1993: Lebanon and Israel - U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher negotiated a limited cease fire after a string of Hizballah attacks against civilians in northern Israel and Israeli patrols in the Security Zone which killed seven Israeli soldiers. The attacks touched off an extensive Israeli response against Hizballah bases in southern Lebanon that left at least 127 dead and 496 wounded.[462]

August 16, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Slightly more than two weeks after a U.S.-brokered agreement stipulating the decrease of hostilities in the area took effect, Hizballah exchanged fire with an Israeli patrol in the Security Zone.[463]

August 19, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah killed at least eight Israeli soldiers in an ambush in the Security Zone and in a bombing that occurred after sunset. In retaliation, Israeli planes bombed two Hizballah strongholds, killing two Hizballah operatives.[464]

September 14, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah stepped up its attacks on Israeli troops in the Security Zone, wounding an Israeli officer and five SLA soldiers.[465]

November 5, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Two Israeli soldiers were wounded in attacks by Hizballah in the Security Zone.[466]

November 7, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Three SLA soldiers were wounded when Hizballah gunners fired several mortar rounds in the Security Zone.[467]

November 16, 1993: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah launched an attack to capture an SLA post in the Security Zone, taking 12 SLA soldiers prisoner. Israel retaliated by bombing Hizballah targets.[468]

December 10, 1993: Southern Lebanon - An Israeli soldier died in a missile attack launched by Hizballah in the Security Zone.[469]

January - December 1993: Southern Lebanon and Israel - The total number of Hizballah attacks in 1993 rose to 330 from 170 the previous year.[470]

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January 20, 1994: Southern Lebanon - Two days after a summit meeting between President Clinton and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, a Hizballah explosive device went off in the Security Zone, killing one Lebanese resident, and SLA posts were attacked by Hizballah.[471]

February 7, 1994: Southern Lebanon - Four Israeli soldiers were killed and five others were wounded in an ambush by Hizballah in the Security Zone. Following the assault, the IDF carried out bombing raids on Hizballah targets.[472]

March 7, 1994: Aishiyah, Lebanon - Hizballah, in a coordinated attack with Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), attacked an SLA fuel tanker in the Security Zone, killing two SLA soldiers and two civilians.[473]

March 21, 1994: Aishiyah, Lebanon - Hizballah gunmen, in a coordinated attack with the PFLP-GC, ambushed and killed two Israeli soldiers in the Security Zone. An officer with the SLA was killed by a Hizballah booby trap in a separate incident.[474]

April 15, 1994: Israel - Hizballah fired three rockets into northern Israel. This was the third time that Hizballah violated the agreement negotiated by the U.S. in July 1993.[475]

June 2, 1994: Israel - Hizballah fired sixty rockets[476] into northern Israel after an Israeli raid on a Hizballah training camp.[477]

June 3, 1994: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah forces fired on members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, killing one soldier from Fiji and wounding three others. Within a few days of the incident, Hizballah killed another Fijian U.N. soldier.[478]

June 4, 1994: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah gunmen attacked an armored patrol of the SLA in the Security Zone. The SLA patrol returned the fire and killed three members of Hizballah.[479]

June 20, 1994: Southern Lebanon - Three IDF soldiers were killed and three others wounded when Hizballah gunmen ambushed an army convoy in the Security Zone.[480]

July 4, 1994: Southern Lebanon - An IDF soldier was killed in a Hizballah attack in the Security Zone.[481]

July 18, 1994: Buenos Aires, Argentina - A suicide car bomber parked a delivery van in front of the seven-story Jewish community center building in Buenos Aires and detonated 350 pounds of explosives.[482] An immense explosion levelled the building which had housed Argentina's two largest Jewish communal organizations - the DAIA - Delegation of Argentine-Jewish Associations and the AMIA - the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association. Nearby buildings were severely damaged and cars parked on the street near the building were demolished.[483] The explosion killed at least 96 people[484] and 127 people were injured.[485] A combined total of 450 people were treated in area hospitals after the blast occurred.[486]

Twenty-four hours after the attack, a group identifying itself as the "Islamic Command" tele-

phoned a Buenos Aires radio station to take responsibility for the bombing.[487] In Lebanon two days after the blast, an offshoot group of Hizballah, Ansar Allah, also claimed responsibility.[488]

July 19, 1994: Panama City, Panama - A suicide bomber with Lebanese travel documents named Jamal Lia boarded a commuter plane en route from the Colon Free Trade Zone to Panama City.[489] The aircraft exploded in mid-air, killing 21 people, including twelve Jews.[490] Twenty-four hours later, in Sidon, Lebanon, a group named Ansar Allah, a faction of Hizballah, took responsibility for the bombing.

Ansar Allah's statement declared: "Suicide martyr squads have been formed to confront and combat Zionism everywhere. The Argentina and Panama operations are evidence of this continuing confrontation. What happened in Argentina and Panama is not going to stop. We shall carry on until we wipe out the Zionists and justice prevails throughout the entire world."[491]

July 25, 1994: Southern Lebanon - Hizballah claimed responsibility for an ambush that killed an Israeli soldier and wounded 12 others in the Security Zone. The attack was declared to be Hizballah's response to Jordan's and Israel's pledge to sign a peace treaty.[492]

July 26-27, 1994: London, England - At 12:10 P.M. a car bomb exploded in front of the Israeli Embassy in London. A middle-aged woman described as having "Mediterranean" features[493] parked a stolen grey Audi sedan[494] at the entrance of an apartment building next to the Embassy. Moments before the bomb exploded she disappeared among the pedestrian traffic in a nearby street.[495] Fourteen people were injured.[496] After a preliminary examination of the bomb site, British police indicated that between 40 and 60 pounds of explosives were used to construct the bomb.[497]

At 12:46 A.M., slightly more than twelve hours later, a second car bomb exploded at the Joint Israel Appeal. Five people were wounded in the blast.[498] The car bomb used in the attack was reported to have been constructed of an identical amount of explosives as the bomb that had exploded at the Israeli Embassy the previous day.[499] Due to the similarities of the two bombings in London, British authorities believe that the incidents are related to one another as well as to the one in Buenos Aires.[500] U.S. officials who are cooperating with Argentina, Panama, Britain and Israel in the ensuing investigations believe that Iran and Hizballah are behind these four attacks.[501]

July 28, 1994: New York and Washington, DC, United States - Reacting to the warning of an informant that a potential suicide bomb attack was to occur within 72 hours,[502] the New York Police Department tightened security at the Israeli Mission to the United Nations, its New York Consulate, and the Israeli Defense Mission. Similar measures were taken at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC.[503] The potential attackers were reportedly linked to either Hizballah or HAMAS.[504]

Eight 60-ton sand-filled New York City Sanitation Department dump trucks were used to form blockades around the buildings, and later in the day the trucks were replaced with highway dividers made of concrete.[505] Both buildings were examined for explosives and dozens of police officers were sent to patrol the two locations.[506]

In addition to the sites that were specifically threatened, police protection was extended to 20 other possible targets, including institutions associated with Israel such as synagogues and Jewish organizations.[507] Responding to the Israeli government's request to tighten security for Israeli and Jewish institutions around the world, additional security measures were put in place in Britain, France and the Netherlands.[508]

August 6, 1994: Southern Lebanon - Two Israeli soldiers were killed and three wounded when Hizballah operatives ambushed an Israeli patrol in the Security Zone.[509]

October 30, 1994: Dabshah, Aishiyah, Nabatiyah, and Kafr Ruman, Lebanon - In the Security Zone, Hizballah operatives attacked the Israeli post of Dabshah and claimed to have overrun it. In the ensuing firefight, one Israeli soldier was killed and two were wounded. Lebanese security sources in the area claimed that one Lebanese civilian was killed and 13 others were wounded. Several hours later, members of Hizballah fired an RPG at an Israeli patrol in Aishiyah. In retaliation, the IDF shelled Nabatiyah and Kafr Ruman, and the IAF staged mock air raids. In the shelling one civilian was killed and three others were wounded. A Hizballah operative was also wounded.[510]

Marjayun and Taybah, Lebanon - Later the same day, Hizballah fired Katyusha rockets at two villages held by the South Lebanon Army, Marjayun and Taybah. Three civilians were reported killed and one militiaman was wounded.[511]

November 28, 1994: Southern Lebanon: An Israeli convoy was attacked by mortar fire in the Security Zone by the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine in cooperation with Hizballah. In the clash that followed, three operatives from the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation for Palestine (IJLP), the Palestinian Islamic extremist group, were killed. A Hizballah statement subsequent to the attack declared that the three were IJLP operatives.[512]

December 6, 1994: Southern Lebanon - A roadside bomb killed one Israeli soldier and wounded a second soldier moderately in the western sector of the Security Zone. Hizballah claimed responsibility for the attack.[513] Israeli forces and the South Lebanon Army fired artillery at Hizballah positions in the area in response.[514]

December 11, 1994: Marjayun, Lebanon - One Israeli soldier was killed and seven were wounded in an ambush carried out by Hizballah against Israeli forces in the Security Zone.[515] Four Hizballah operatives were killed in the clash that ensued.[516]

December 19, 1994: Kafr Talusa and Teeri, Lebanon - Two Israeli soldiers were killed and four others were wounded in Hizballah attacks in the security zone. In one attack, Hizballah operatives fired Katyusha rockets at an IDF post near Kafr Talusa, killing one Israeli soldier. Hizballah took credit for the attack.[517]

In the second incident, Hizballah operatives fired Sagger anti-tank missiles at an IDF patrol in Teeri, located in the security zone's western sector. One Israeli soldier was killed and two Hizballah operatives were also killed in the clash.[518] The "Palestinian Islamic Revolutionary Army," a group apparently linked to the Popular front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command,[519] took joint credit with Hizballah for the attack.[520]

December 23, 1994: Dabsha and Suwaydah, Lebanon - Nearly 48 hours after a car bomb exploded in the Sfeir district of Beirut killing Fuad Mughniyah, a senior Hizballah operative and three others, Hizballah operatives in southern Lebanon attacked two Israeli outposts in the northern sector of the Security Zone.[521] Two Israeli soldiers were killed, and seven others were wounded. In a retaliatory raid, Israel Air Force jets fired rockets at Hizballah bases in Melita and Jabal al-Rafiya.[522] Lebanese security sources claimed that two Lebanese policemen were killed in their jeep several miles north of the Security Zone as the result of the raid.[523]

Hizballah announced that the attacks against Dabsha and Suwaydah were in revenge for the murder of Fuad Mughniyah, for which it blamed Israel. Responsibility for the attacks was claimed in the name of the Islamic Resistance, and were characterized as the "the Islamic Resistance's response to the Sfeir massacre."[524]

Appendix A

Anti-Defamation League Counterterrorism Action Agenda

1. **Create a new Federal Anti-Terrorism Statute.**

   There is currently no comprehensive Federal anti-terrorism statute. Since terrorist attacks, by their nature, affect U.S. national interests, American law should provide for broad Federal jurisdiction - with substantial criminal penalties - for terrorist acts committed in the United States.

2. **Deny terrorists and their supporters access to the United States.**

   - Visas should be presumptively denied for terrorists and their supporters who come here to raise money.

   - Improve interagency communication to ensure that the most current comprehensive intelligence information gets to consular officials who make visa decisions abroad.

   - Streamline deportation proceedings for alien terrorists and more effectively screen political asylum requests, consistent with appropriate constitutional safeguards.

3. **Expand and toughen prohibitions on providing material support for terrorism and terrorist organizations, such as training, weapons, safehouses, fundraising and financial services.**

4. **Examine the use of the RICO statute for fighting terrorism.**

   - Terrorists are criminals and their activities should be regarded as ongoing criminal enterprises.

5. **Enhance administrative response of federal agencies.**

   - Preserve an independent State Department Counterterrorism Office with an Ambassadorial-rank Coordinator with direct access to the Secretary of State.

   - Increase funds for counterterrorism research and development.

   - Improve interagency coordination and establish a central repository for terrorist threat information.

   - Facilitate information networking and expand analytical resources, such as translators.

6. **Increase pressure on U.S. allies to make counterterrorism efforts a priority and to develop a coordinated strategy.**

   - Counterterrorism should be an ongoing agenda item at every multilateral diplomatic forum and high-level bilaterals.

   - NATO/G-7 allies should decline from rescheduling requests from state sponsors of terrorism.

   - The United States and its allies should oppose aid by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to terrorist countries. Make them choose: terrorism or access to development funds.

   - Establish an international counterterrorism rewards program to encourage intelligence gathering leading to prosecution for terrorist crimes.

7. **Increase the diplomatic, military, and economic costs for U.S.-identified state sponsors of terrorism.**

   - Restrict technology transfers to state sponsors and third countries that support them.

   - Expand commercial sanctions, including export credits, and restrictions on imports and landing rights.

8. **Amend the Foreign Service Immunities Act to provide explicit jurisdiction for lawsuits against countries that support or condone terrorism, torture, or genocide.**

9. **Raise public awareness.**

   Terrorism should be a continuing priority for the 104th Congress, not just an episodic concern.

Appendix B

Chart of Hizballah's Structure



Appendix C

List of Hizballah Front Organizations

Islamic Jihad

Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine

Islamic Resistance

Islamic Revenge Organization

Islamic Command

Revolutionary Justice Organization

Organization of the Oppressed on Earth

Organization for Defending Free People

Organization for the Defense of Prisoners' Rights

Arab Revolutionary Cells

Arab Revolutionary Cells - Umar Mukhtar Forces

Revolutionary Command Cells

Mujahideen [Holy Warriors] of Freedom

Ansar Allah

Appendix D

Terror Incidents Perpetrated by Hizballah

Listed by Front Organization

Note: Front organizations used to claim responsibility for cross-border attacks against Israel are not included. Dates refer to entries in the Chronology.

Islamic Jihad

March 15, 1983
April 18, 1983
October 23, 1983
November 4, 1983
March 7, 1984
March 16, 1984
May 8, 1984
December 3, 1984
January 8, 1985
March 16, 1985
March 22, 1985
May 22, 1985
May 28, 1985
September 14, 1985
April 11, 1986
July 26, 1986
January 20, 1987
September 12, 1988
October 4, 1988
July 31, 1989
August 1990
April 22, 1991
July 18, 1991
August 8, 1991
August 12, 1991
October 21, 1991
November 18, 1991
December 4, 1991
March 7, 1992
March 17, 1992

Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine

January 24, 1987
April 22, 1991

Islamic Revenge Organization

March 7, 1992

Islamic Command

July 18, 1994

Revolutionary Justice Organization

March 8, 1986

May 7, 1986
September 12, 1986
October 21, 1986
January 27, 1988
April 30, 1990

Organization of the Oppressed on Earth

April 2, 1985
June 14, 1985
January 24, 1987
February 17, 1988
October 4, 1988
December 12, 1988

Organization for Defending Free People

July 17, 1987

Organization for the Defense of Prisoners' Rights

August 8, 1991

August 11, 1991

Arab Revolutionary Cells

April 17, 1986

Arab Revolutionary Cells - Umar Mukhtar Forces

April 30, 1990

Mujahideen [Holy Warriors] of Freedom

May 16, 1989

Ansar Allah

July 18, 1994

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Lebanon

In 1948. 200,000
Palestinians fled into
Lebanon

NEAR EAST REPORT

Washington Biweekly On American Middle East Policy Vol. XXXIX, No.27, December 4, 1995

Hezbollah Rockets Galilee; Peace Process Goes Forward

In the wake of new Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel, the Clinton Administration is pressuring Syria to curb the group's operations in Lebanon.

Hezbollah fired more than two dozen Katyusha rockets into northern Israel early November 28. The rockets landed in the border town of Kiryat Shemona, and a number of other locations in the Galilee, smashing into homes, damaging cars, toppling power lines, and forcing tens of thousands of Israelis to take refuge in bomb shelters. In Kiryat Shemona—where the rockets began to fall as children were going to school—classes were cancelled.



AP/Wide World

Israelis survey damage to a home after it was hit by a Katyusha rocket Nov. 28. It was the most damaging Hezbollah attack on Israel since June.

In all, eight Israelis received minor injuries from shrapnel, while dozens of people were treated for shock. Israel responded with air and artillery raids on Hezbollah bases. Prime Minister Shimon Peres warned Syria that the attacks must stop.

"We have warned the Syr-

(Continued on page 146)

UN: Iraqi Biological Weapons And Ballistic Missile Development Programs Continue

UN inspectors have found more evidence that Iraq continues to lie about its ongoing efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction, and that its weapons programs have made much more progress than previously thought. According to the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which is charged with dismantling these weapons, Saddam Hussein had deployed biological arms at the start of the 1991 Gulf war. Iraq may still retain some of them.

"It is...reasonable to assume that, given that biological weapons were considered [to be] strategic weapons and were actually deployed, detailed thought must have been given to the doctrine of operational use for these weapons of mass destruction." UNSCOM Executive Chairman ROLF EKEUS says in a new report to the UN Security Council. "In spite of the substantial new disclosures made by Iraq since mid-August, the Commission does not believe that Iraq has given a full and correct account of its biological weapons program....The documentation [obtained thus far] appears to represent a fraction of all the documents generated under the program."

Iraqi officials stated that authority to launch biological and chemical warheads "was predelegated [to field commanders] in the event that Baghdad was hit by nuclear weapons during the Gulf War." But among the Iraqi documents recently turned over to UNSCOM

(Continued on page 147)

Sanctions Are Taking Heavy Toll On Iran

Recent reports suggest that Iran's military buildup is being seriously undermined by U.S. economic sanctions, and that the prospect of strengthened, more comprehensive sanctions is making multinational oil companies think twice about dealing with Tehran. President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani himself has acknowledged that existing U.S. sanctions have "caused difficulties" for Iran.

"Iran's deepening economic woes and a strict Western embargo on arms sales to Tehran...have forced the country to scale back sharply its military procurement plans, with the result that Iran poses much less of a conventional threat to its neighbors," the *Washington Post's* R. Jeffrey Smith reported (Nov. 20). Financial and technical problems have also limited purchases and deployment of weapons such as Kilo-class submarines from Russia and Rodong ballistic missiles from North Korea.

There are also reports that the French oil company Total's prospective deal with Iran is in serious difficulty, and may never be consummated. American pressure has reportedly made contracts for the sale of gas from the new fields Total wants to develop extremely difficult for it to obtain. International oil sources told the Paris-based Arabic daily *al-Watan al-Arabi* (Oct. 6)that Total is becoming nervous about the prospect of toughened U.S. sanctions, which would take away its American market and make the technology required for the Iran project much more expensive.

Iran's hopes of getting a $7 billion infusion of Western investment in its declining oil industry also seem illusory. Sources revealed that as few as 40 companies actually attended the Oil and Gas Investment Conference held in Tehran November 11-14. (Iran's Oil Minister had announced several weeks earlier that as many as 160 foreign companies had registered to attend.)

Of those firms that showed up, many were not represented by senior executives, but by lower-ranking officials. Iran reportedly sent many domestic companies to the conference to fill empty seats. Major oil companies have apparently become quite sensitive about being publicly associated with Iran.

All of this indicates that efforts by the Clinton Administration and Congress to tighten the screws on Iran are proving successful. More significantly, it suggests that Tehran would be much more vulnerable than previously thought to strengthened, more comprehensive U.S. sanctions.

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NEW YORK NY 10028-0458

Peres...*continued*

placed upon me by the President of Israel. I ask that the Knesset express confidence in the government, as follows [in Hebrew alphabetical order]:

Shimon Peres - Prime Minister and Minister of Defense

Shulamit Aloni - Minister of Communications and Minister of Science and the Arts
Yossi Beilin - Minister; he will be a minister in the Prime Minister's Office
Binyamin Ben-Eliezer - Minister of Housing and Construction
Uzi Baram - Minister of Tourism
Ehud Barak - Minister of Foreign Affairs
Micha Harish - Minister of Trade and Industry
David Libai - Minister of Justice
Ora Namir - Minister of Labor and Social Affairs
Efraim Sneh - Minister of Health
Rabbi Yehuda Amital - Minister
Yair Tsaban - Minister of Immigrant Absorption
Yaacov Tsur - Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development
Yisrael Kessar - Minister of Transport
Amnon Rubinstein - Minister of Education, Culture and Sports
Haim Ramon - Minister of the Interior
Gonen Segev - Minister of Energy and Infrastructure
Avraham Shohat - Minister of Finance
Moshe Shahal - Minister of Internal Security
Shimon Shetreet - Minister of Religious Affairs
Yossi Sarid - Minister of the Environment. ❑

Hezbollah...*continued*

be reached within months on a "full peace" in return for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. Barak described al-Sharaa's response as "positive."

"The non-polemical tone of al-Sharaa's reply to Barak's appeal for renewing a search for peace was viewed by Israelis as a heartening preliminary reaction," the *New York Times* observed (Nov. 28). The constructive public tone of the conference was welcomed by the foreign ministers of France and Spain, who called it a striking example of the "spirit of Barcelona."

Below are some of the key points of the **Barcelona Declaration:**

The final version contains language in which participants agree to "settle their disputes by peaceful means," and "call upon all participants to renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant."

Also, signatories agreed "to promote regional security by acting in favor of nuclear, chemical and biological nonproliferation," including "regional arrangements such as weapons-free zones, including their verification regimes, as well as...fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation conventions. The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction...and their delivery systems."

The countries also agreed to "strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combatting terrorism."

The anti-terrorism language was sharply contested by Syria. Damascus delayed the signing of the accord for hours, in an attempt to ensure that none of the wording would undermine the "right" of Hezbollah and other terrorist groups to attack Israel.

After the agreement was signed, Syrian officials tried to suggest that a provision referring to the rights of all peoples to "self-determination" legitimized Hezbollah attacks A Syrian diplomat claimed that inclusion of the "self-determination" language constituted a Syrian and Lebanese victory over Israel (Reuter, Nov. 29). The government organ *al-Baath* (Nov. 29) asserted that the Barcelona Declaration recognized Arab rights "to resist the aggressor [Israel]."

The parties agreed that, over the next 15 years, they will work to establish a new free-trade area—to "progressively liberalize...trade in agricultural products," and to eliminate "tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products."Also, "trade and services...will be progressively liberalized." ❑

Iraq...*continued*

Iraq had a far more advanced ballistic missile-production capability than previously believed. **Ekeus stated that Baghdad may have under-reported the number of Scuds deployed during the Gulf war and may thus be hiding a number of home-built systems somewhere in the country.**

Since post-Gulf war UN resolutions do not bar Iraqi "research activities," **Baghdad has been able to continue efforts to develop even more capable long-range ballistic missiles with ranges of 3,000 kilometers (roughly 1,800 miles), capable of reaching all of the Middle East and Western Europe.** While such weapons have not been built yet, Iraq has covertly purchased—through middlemen and front companies—missile production technologies and equipment to continue its Scud programs. Ekeus said Iraq's new disclosures included data on "indigenous production of Scud-type missile engines—assembled from both imported and locally produced parts—and the testing of such engines." ❑

—Joel Himelfarb/Charles Perkins

Perkins is AIPAC's Senior Military Analyst.

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As reviewed in *Near East Report*, Nov. 20

Correction

In our Nov.6 issue, we neglected to identify Senator **Alfonse D'Amato** (R-NY) as a co-sponsor of the Jerusalem Embassy Act within the breakdown of the votes.

We regret the error.

Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad

Martin Kramer (F & Stab) pp 539 - 556

First public appearance 1982

Never commanded means or manpower to seize power in Lebanon

1400 year legacy of Shi'ism

Assassinate Major Cont. Tel Aviv

L. independent in 1946 - a state thus governed by & for Maronites & Sunnis

Large Christian emigration has increased Shiite %

Shiites the poorest of the Lebanese

Lebanese Civil war of 1975 - militia known as AMAL created

Shiites became refugee fight of Palestinians against Maronites / Israel. Flocked to South Beirut. 250,000 refugees squeezed slides

Shiites claims after ~~1970~~ Iran 1979 grew stronger. Ideal of ~~Shiit~~ Shiites still seemed more real

1982 Israel occupation of South

Lebanese Shiites found hands with 1000 ~~Islamic~~ Iranian Revolutionary guards who had come to Lebanon to fight enemies of Islam

Created – fortress ringed by anti-aircraft
emplacement in Bekka valley
Hizbullah – marriage of Lebanon Shiite
& Islamic Iran. Iran's greatest
impact in Lebanon, ~~and reach further~~
and Westward & reach outpost of
Shiite world

Collapse of ~~state~~ in a country without a
functioning state. a capital city
without services

Syria allowed supply line from Iran to
run thru Syria to Lebanon
Shiites in Bekaa prosperous as a result
of illicit drug trafficking .. which thrives
in central authority
H. offered fund. loans – medical & ever
jobs to impoverished Shiites

Great return to Islam led by Komeini
K created first Islamic fundamental state
Good Islamic state in entire Arab world
world of real mercy Lebanon

H: First root of vice is America
K is repeatedly shown that
America is the cause of all of
our colossal
H. a moment [illegible] spent this
[illegible]. After 21st Sept
Bombing of 1983 & 1984 - destroyed
arms enemy & killed
3 Martyrs 241 Marines in their [illegible]
US & [illegible] ran away
Bombing of [illegible] in 1986
forced France to [illegible] they
will arm.
America [illegible] Hi [illegible] in 1985 to
free Lebanon [illegible] held [illegible]
Hi Jackers killed passenger in [illegible]
hijacking
Rogers of abduction of foreign [illegible]

H also a political movement

202.639.5240
Michael Lewis

H: reassessed release of nearly
all of western hostages

H began to turn to politics
to evolve slowly into a political
party.

Mediterranean Islam began to
gain social & political [illegible]
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia
all largely Sunni

"Stalled but still [illegible] Islamic Iran"

Annual million created in 1975 after
outbreaks of civil war in Lebanon

H began to evolve slowly into a political
party.

H: [illegible] Israel military [illegible] in South
Lebanon. Dec 11.94

Consulate June 8

H.. umbrella group of various radical
Shiite group
adhere to Ideology of Khomeini
H established in 1982 Lebanon
In 1982 Iran ~~Ag~~ sent fighters
to L. to help established revolutionary
Shiite movement
Spiritual leader Sheikh M.H. Fadlallah
chief architect of Islamic law
Goal - from Islamic republican leader
[illegible] clerics
~~[illegible]~~ Destruction of Israel deemed
a religious obligation - terror
justification
H now conform to Syria decisions
Syria provided Lebanon govt for
discussing H.. only military for
not yet discussing
Military network in Bir'al-Abd Ali.
Network is presently home of H
for 1991 H. 52 attacks
1990 15
1992 158
Israel [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

H. last Nov. any Jews
discussion since today
and could will been
target of attack

Had talked to Alexander K

bombs we carried out 1993
received attack on American
Embassy in Beirut (60 dead)
US Marine Barracks 241 dead
French military headquarters 58 dead
(December that

that only the militant revolutionary
in Midland [illegible] frequently [illegible] the
~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] the [illegible]
as part of the [illegible]

p 74 Abou Halima [illegible]
religious fanaticism [illegible]
[illegible] of violence [illegible] they
considered [illegible]

(77) Nicette of labeling [illegible] evidence
intent, motive - background

2nd [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] expansion
[illegible]

78 [illegible] Voinder ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] [illegible]
6 (S) claim

90. 13 (S) [illegible]

93 Nosair & Bomb Jeopardy
convicted in [illegible] court! Federal
charges [illegible]

Hezbollah

portionality?

BARAK: Look, unfortunately we cannot fully prevent tragic mishaps. But we are not launching a campaign against the civilians in Lebanon. It's hard to say right now, with the dead bodies of these innocent victims in front of you, but our forces made an extreme effort to avoid civilian loss of life.

INT: How could your intelligence not know there were refugees at the UN base, when that was pretty common knowledge?

BARAK: I believe they are concentrating quite naturally on following the Hezbollah on one hand and identifying to what extent there are still civilians in the villages. It was the spokeswoman of the UN who told all of us that in the minutes before the artillery shells fell, Hezbollah fired Katyushas and mortars against our forces. Of course, I'm not trying to justify (hitting the UN camp). No one intended to inflict that type of tragic event. It's an unfortunate mishap that should be and will be investigated.

INT: What assurances are there that it won't happen again?

BARAK: There was no foolproof guarantee against any civilian loss of life once the operation continued, just as there is no full guarantee against major loss of life to Israeli citizens. (But Israeli commanders have) repeated the orders and made it clear that under no circumstances would anyone be allowed to shoot in the vicinity not only of UN installations but of a hospital or school or any other installation, as long as it is populated.

INT: What about President Clinton's call for an immediate cease-fire?

BARAK: We were ready to stop the operation after (the first) 24 hours provided it would lead to an end to the Katyushas and allow us to operate against Hezbollah in the security zone within the framework of improved understandings, compared to the July 1993 understandings.

INT: What improvements?

BARAK: First, that no Katyushas will be shot at the Galilee, nor will civilian areas in Lebanon be attacked. Second, we should have the right to respond to sources of fire in self-defense, if we are shot at intentionally from within a village. The third has to do with hostile activities coming from within the villages, such as preparing and controlling operations. That should be treated by the Lebanese armed forces or police.

INT: Some say that because of Kana, Israel will get a less favourable agreement than it would have otherwise.

BARAK: It's clear that it makes the situation more complicated. But I still think the objectives are reasonable, sensible, achievable and justifiable.

INT: Are you ready to resume suspended peace negotiations with Syria?

BARAK: We have a strong strategic interest in achieving peace with Syria, so we're interested in the talks. But the details and timing might depend on the Syrian response to the present crisis. □

Howard Backs Durable Peace

By Norman Abjorensen
Australia/Israel Review

WHILE deploring the human suffering in Lebanon from Israel's shelling attacks, Prime Minister John Howard has seized on the issue of Lebanon's sovereignty as a key element in any durable settlement.

Mr. Howard's statement signalled that the Government was looking beyond immediate events to the larger picture in the region and the sources of disruption to the peace process.

"All Australians have been appalled by the tragic events in northern Israel and Lebanon in the past two weeks," Mr. Howard said.

"The Australian Government strongly supports the call for a ceasefire by [United States] President [Bill] Clinton, which has come in the wake of the displacement of many thousands of families in both countries, and immense human suffering, including the terrible loss of life at Kana."

Israeli shells mistakenly destroyed the United Nations base at Kana in southern Lebanon, killing about 100 Lebanese refugees, instead of Islamic Hezbollah strongholds from where rockets had been launched at sites in northern Israel.

"In the past two weeks we have seen attempts to destroy the progress that has been made towards peace between Israel and its neighbours in the Middle East.

"Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel have aimed at wrecking the mutual confidence and trust which is necessary for a lasting settlement.

"These attempts must not succeed. The violence must end," Mr. Howard said. He said the Government welcomed efforts by the US, France and others to construct a ceasefire and a settlement in southern Lebanon.

However, any durable settlement needed to reflect some key elements: Israel's security had to be ensured, the sovereignty of both Israel and Lebanon had to be respected, and any settlement had to engage Syria "which bears some responsibility to help end Hezbollah attacks against Israel".

A settlement must provide the Lebanese Government with the opportunity to negotiate for all of Lebanon, the Prime Minister said.

It would also need to include implementation of the UN Security Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, but also including "credible guarantees" for the security of Israel's northern border.

Hezbollah is maintained by Syria and funded by Iran.

Meanwhile, an Arabic newsagency in Australia has accused the Western news media of being blind to Israel's actions in southern Lebanon.

The editor-in-chief of *Al-Moharer* news service, Fouad Elhage, said that in the media Hezbollah appeared to "attack the Zionist entity for no particular reason, [but] in fact wants to liberate their occupied lands".

"Iraq was forced to withdraw from Kuwait, so why is not the Israeli terrorist regime forced to withdraw from southern Lebanon?" he asked.

"This is a clear double standard, clearly apparent to anyone not blinded by Zionist propaganda," Mr. Elhage said. □

A History of Hezbollah Terrorist Attacks

In 1994, a total of 187 attacks against Israeli troops and positions by Hezbollah were recorded. There were 119 instances of artillery fire, 31 detonations of explosive devices and 2 frontal assaults on IDF positions.

In 1995, Hezbollah committed a total of 344 attacks against Israeli troops and positions. There were 270 instances of artillery fire, 31 detonations of explosive charges and 2 frontal assaults on Israel Defense Force positions.

The year 1996 began in a similar fashion:

February 28 - Attempt by Hezbollah terrorist to infiltrate northern Israel utilizing ultra-light aircraft.

March 4 - Detonation of explosive charge near Kibbutz Manara, in northern Israel. 4 Israeli soldiers killed, 9 wounded.

March 10 - Detonation of explosive charge in Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon, killing 1 Israeli soldier.

March 14 - Ambush of Israeli Defense Force convoy on the Reihan - Aeyesha road. 8 IDF soldiers wounded.

March 20 - Suicide bomber detonates explosive charge in front of an IDF convoy.

March 30 - 2 Katyusha salvos were fired at the Galilee. One Israeli civilian was wounded.

April 9 - 2 Katyusha salvos were fired at the Galilee. 36 Israeli civilians were wounded.

April 10 - Hezbollah mortar fire killed one Israeli soldier and wounded 2 others. □

Priorities of the Search for Peace

By Dore Gold
Jerusalem Post

HENRY Kissinger opens his first book on international politics with the observation: "Those ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least in search of peace. Those whose quest for it seems unending appear least able to achieve tranquillity." Kissinger was writing about European politics. But his analysis could easily be applied to Israel's situation.

Why has the Labor government, after all its conciliatory policies toward Syria, had to initiate two major military operations in Lebanon? When addressing the Lebanon problem, Prime Minister Peres prefers to stress the role of Iran (over which he has no control) rather than that of Syria (with which he has been negotiating). Yet Syria is the critical factor controlling the situation on the ground today.

If Syria wanted to curb Hezbollah but Iran wanted to continue attacking Israel, Hezbollah's attacks would end. Indeed, Syria has overseen the disarming of every Lebanese militia with the exception of Hezbollah. And if Iran wanted to curb Hezbollah but Syria wanted the attacks to continue, the attacks would continue.

For Syria, Hezbollah terrorism has one central purpose.

Since Damascus has no real military option on the Golan Heights, the main instrument for forcing a political settlement on Israel, on Syrian terms, is terrorism against Israeli soldiers in the security zone and against Israeli civilians in the north. The critical error Israel has made in negotiating with Syria has been its accepting the rules of the game President Assad has established for negotiations: that terrorism is a legitimate instrument of diplomacy for winning Israeli concessions.

Even today Syria's preference is to restore the Operation Accountability understandings that only temporarily limited terrorism to the security zone, but did not rule it out entirely.

There are two basic options in this situation. First, the Peres government can say that the problem of Hezbollah will only be solved in the long term in the context of a larger political settlement with Syria. In other words, Israel hands over the Golan and obtains from Syria both a formal peace and, hopefully, an end to Hezbollah terrorism. According to this scenario, peace is the objective, and security a possible by-product.

Would this work? For Assad, terrorism would still remain in principle a legitimate means of obtaining Syrian diplomatic goals.

With Turkey, the Syrian leader uses PKK terrorism to obtain more water from the Euphrates River. Turkey and Syria have diplomatic relations and a November 1993 agreement against terrorism. Syria simply violates its agreements, while Turkey continues to fight Kurdish terrorists from northern Syria.

Assad also uses terrorism against Jordan. In 1994- 95, there were 164 infiltration attempts from Syrian territory across the Jordanian border.

Syria and Jordan also have diplomatic relations. They have formal peace but it is peace without security. After making peace with Israel, why shouldn't Assad resume terrorism by proxy to obtain more water from the Banyas River or from Lake Kinneret? After all, the quality of any peace between Israel and the Arab states surely cannot be superior to the peace that exists among the Arab states themselves.

Syria will permit Hezbollah to rebuild its infrastructure in Lebanon. And should the negotiations deadlock on the question of normalization or Israeli early-warning stations, Katyushas will again fly into Kiryat Shmona.

A better option would be based on a policy that would first insist on changing Assad's rules. Israel must reject the idea that Hezbollah terrorism is a legitimate part of the negotiating process. Instead, Assad must be given a clear choice: If he wants good relations with the West, his terrorism must be halted; if he wants to maintain the terrorism option, he risks facing the same fate as Iran and other rogue states containment, and even economic sanctions. Unless Syria is reformed before the peace process advances, any understandings reached at the end of Operation Grapes of Wrath will fall apart. Syria will permit Hezbollah to rebuild its infrastructure in Lebanon. And should the negotiations deadlock on the question of normalization or Israeli early-warning stations, Katyushas will again fly into Kiryat Shmona.

To obtain this change regarding Syria, Israel needn't go to war with Assad; it needs to use its international diplomatic influence correctly. Israel's most stable peace relationships with Egypt and Jordan were not negotiated while Israelis were under fire or facing a terrorist threat. Terrorism was not part of the negotiations. Terrorism cannot be part of the Syrian-Israeli peace process either.

Kissinger's warning needs to be seriously considered: "Whenever peace... has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member. Whenever the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised, even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable."

Dore Gold is director of the US Foreign and Defense Policy Project. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. □

Middle East Hourglass

February 21, 1996: Earthquake measuring 5.4 on Richter scale jolts Israel from Tel Aviv to Eilat.
23/2: Prime Minister Shimon Peres lifts security closure on Palestinian Authority controlled areas.
25/2: Arab suicide bombers kill 25 in Jerusalem and Ashkelon.
26/2: Arab terrorist drives into crowd at Jerusalem bus-stop, kills Jewish woman.
29/2: Hamas claims responsibility for Jerusalem and Ashkelon attacks; offers Israel ceasefire .
March 1: Terror attack planned against Gaza Jewish community foiled by IDF.
3/3: 19 murdered by Hamas terrorist in Jerusalem bus bombing.
4/3: Hamas bomber kills 12 in Tel Aviv. Four Israeli soldiers die in Hezbollah attack in Lebanon.
5/3: Israel Defense Force (IDF) seals hundreds of Palestinian villages, suspends preparations for withdrawal from Hebron, scheduled for March 28.
7/3: Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu beats Peres in polls for first time since Rabin's death.
9/3: Arafat and US deputy CIA chief meet in Gaza.
9/3: US calls on Syria to attend anti-terrorism Summit of Peacemakers, in Sinai on March 13.
10/3: IDF soldier killed by Hezbollah.
11/3: Hezbollah confirms it is funded by Iran.
12/3: Nationalist parties Likud, Tsomet and David Levy's Gesher form joint election list.
13/3: 29 world leaders meet in Sinai to push peace process ahead and back Peres.
13/3: Fierce fighting erupts in South Lebanon after Hezbollah bombards IDF and South Lebanon Army.
14/3: IDF arrests members of terror group near Hebron, foiling imminent suicide attack.
14/3: Visiting US President Bill Clinton pledges $100 million in extra anti-terror aid to Israel.
19/3: Report that Israeli government has presented plan to share Jerusalem with PLO.
20/3: Hezbollah suicide bomber kills Israeli soldier in Lebanon, wounds five others.
21/3: Likud Parliamentarian Benny Begin asserts that PLO and Hamas have terror agreement.
22/3: US says Damascus must curb Hezbollah attacks before Israeli-Syria talks resume.
24/3: Israel says closure of territories will remain until terror threat ends.
25/3: Report of Libya building chemical weapons plant inside mountain.
27/3: Yigal Amir found guilty of murder of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; jailed for life. □

SPECIAL ISSUE

NEAR EAST REPORT

Washington Biweekly On American Middle East Policy

Vol. XL, No. 11, May 20, 1996

Hezbollah Stages New Attacks On IDF

Despite the understandings which ended Israel's "Operation Grapes of Wrath," Hezbollah continues to attack IDF troops in the security zone. On May 12, Hezbollah gunmen shelled several IDF units, wounding five Israeli soldiers.

The Shiite terrorist group also continues to target the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a militia aligned with Israel. An SLA soldier was killed in a May 10 ambush, when Hezbollah operatives detonated a roadside bomb by remote control. Hours later, Hezbollah fired at SLA positions in the eastern part of the security zone. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for those attacks, as well as a roadside bomb blast a day earlier, which wounded two SLA soldiers, one of them seriously. In response, IDF and SLA troops returned fire against Hezbollah positions, and the Israel Air Force (IAF) bombed terorist bases north of the security zone, including the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley. On May 14, an IDF patrol shot and killed a suspected Hezbollah terrorist in the security zone.

These attacks followed an abortive roadside bomb attack one week earlier, and at least two other ambushes since the ceasefire understandings which ended Operation Grapes of Wrath late last month. IDF sources have said that the attacks should not come as a surprise: Since the ceasefire began, Hezbollah operatives, who had fled to Beirut, have been returning to southern Lebanon.

"The attacks are seen as a clear statement of intent by Hezbollah...to resume activities against the IDF and SLA targets in the zone," the *Jerusalem Post* observed (Jan. 12). "Ac-

(Continued on page 50)

Iran, Hezbollah Bolstering Lebanon's Terrorist Infrastructure

As Hezbollah once again steps up its attacks against the IDF, State Department officials have confirmed a report in the *Washington Times* (May 14), which said the Shi'ite terror group is receiving increased financial assistance and weapons shipments from Iran.

In a separate development, U.S. officials said they intended to complain to Damascus about continued arms shipments to Hezbollah, which are being channelled through Syria.

State Department spokesman NICHOLAS BURNS said May 14 that the Iranians have been using various routes—including Syria—to transfer the weaponry to Iran.

"We have complained consistently over the past several weeks about this," Burns said.

Middle East sources say that Iran, with Syrian help, supplied as many as 900 Russian-made Katyusha rockets to Hezbollah during last month's clashes with Israel.

"Since then, there have been more arms deliveries that have been monitored in the past two weeks," veteran security analyst Kenneth Timmerman told *Washington Times* correspondent Martin Sieff (May 14).

Several days earlier, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri met in Beirut with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati. Velayati pledged to help Lebanon rebuild infrastruc-

(Continued on page 52)

Vital Iran-Libya Legislation

The House is poised to consider tough legislation imposing economic sanctions on foreign companies developing the energy sectors of Iran and Libya. Similar legislation has passed the Senate. This legislation is a vital part of America's efforts to curb both countries' support for international terrorism and their pursuit of mass destruction weapons.

The President and the Secretary of State have identified Iran as the leading sponsor of international terrorism. It supports Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad—radical Islamic groups responsible for the recent terrorist outrages in Israel. Iran is also actively seeking nuclear weapons. The CIA says it could have them in five years.

Imagine the implications for the U.S. and Israel of a nuclear-armed Iran, sitting astride the Persian Gulf oil shipping lanes. Imagine what Iran might do to assist international terrorists if it possessed nuclear-armed missiles that could hit Israel or other targets.

Libya, identified by the UN as responsible for the PanAm 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, is now building the world's largest underground chemical weapons complex, according to Defense Secretary WILLIAM PERRY. Qaddafi refuses to hand over those responsible for Pan Am 103, despite UN sanctions.

The U.S. has a total trade ban with both countries. Unfortunately, other nations—including our closest allies—continue to trade with both. Just as they did ten years ago with Iraq, they tell our diplomats that "business is business."

Both countries are dependent on their oil and gas industries to finance their support of international terrorism and pursuit of mass destruction weapons. Over ninety percent of Iran's hard currency, for example, comes from its oil sector. Yet its fields are aging, suffering from years of neglect. Only massive investment will stop a precipitous drop in its oil exports.

The "Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act" would deter foreign companies because of the possibility of U.S. sanctions. To those who say that sanctions don't work, consider this: The mere threat of this bill becoming law has already stopped over $8 billion in foreign investment in Iran in the past seven months.

Congress now has the chance to enact tough, meaningful legislation. Any substantial weakening of the bill would be taken by Iran and Libya—and their leading trading partners—as a lack of resolve on America's part. The sanctions must be real, be tightly drawn, and bite if they are to have deterrent effect.

The stakes are too high for anything less.

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Dow: Political, Ideological Diversity Are AIPAC Strengths

Below are excerpts from AIPAC President Melvin Dow's April 28 address to AIPAC's Annual Policy Conference:

Most people would not have foreseen AIPAC's accomplishments over the past year. First, after AIPAC had worked harmoniously and productively with the Democratic majority in Congress for 40 years, the Republican majority took control in 1995. In addition, the 104th Congress contained 86 freshmen House members, with whom AIPAC had no previous working relationships.

Richard Sobell

AIPAC President Melvin Dow addresses the AIPAC Policy Conference.

One might have thought that efforts to balance the budget would have endangered foreign aid appropriations for Israel in FY1996. However, contrary to such expectations, the $3 billion in all-grant, earmarked aid; plus $80 million dollars for refugee settlement; plus early disbursal and other provisions, passed the House and Senate with record favorable votes.

Also, one might have thought that the same budgetary pressures would have adversely affected joint U.S.-Israel weapons development programs, such as the Arrow missile, Boost Phase Intercept, and the Nautilus Laser. But this was not the case. Those programs, and many others, were funded by the FY1996 Defense Appropriations Act.

It has been conventional wisdom that, as instruments of foreign policy, economic sanctions simply don't work. But contrary to this conventional wisdom, **the Iran Oil Sanctions Act has already had a significant effect—even before becoming law**. (The bill has passed the Senate, but companion legislation has not yet been voted on by the House.)

The fact that the bill that is pending has already created major instability with Iran's currency, the *riyal*. It has also dissuaded various companies from going forward with proposed oil and gas development projects.

(Continued on page 48)

HEARD ON THE HILL:

Sher Testifies In Behalf of Aid to Israel

AIPAC Executive Director Neal Sher testified before the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee in support of continued assistance to Israel. Sher told panel Chairman SONNY CALLAHAN (R-AL): "While I fully understand and appreciate the budgetary pressures under which you and other Appropriations Subcommittee chairmen are operating, I strongly believe this aid to Israel is vitally important to U.S. national security interests....At less than 3 percent of the costs of stationing and supporting U.S. troops in key areas of the world, aid to Israel helps protect vital American interests in the Middle East," including stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, containing radicalism, curtailing international terrorism, and promoting the Arab-Israeli peace process.

"I urge you and the members of the Subcommittee to continue the leadership you have demonstrated in supporting Mideast assistance—particularly aid to Israel—as the United States takes on this historic task in this vital region," Sher concluded, adding that sustaining aid to Israel sends a powerful message about the unshakable U.S.-Israel relationship.

REP. NITA LOWEY (D-NY) said aid to Israel "sends an important message to all parties in the current peace negotiations about the U.S. commitment to Israeli security and peace in the Middle East. Any action by this Congress which could be viewed as diminishing our traditional support would undercut the very things we wish to occur."

House, Senate Budget Committees Set Funding Levels for International Programs

The Budget committees passed their respective versions of the FY1997 budget resolu-

(Continued on page 48)

Berger, Perle Debate Missile Defense

AIPAC Policy Conference attendees were treated to a robust debate over American defense policy at an April 29 luncheon. President Clinton's Deputy National Security Advisor, SAMUEL BERGER, squared off with American Enterprise Institute scholar Richard Perle.

Perle criticized the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, saying it prohibits the United States from having "a serious ballistic missile defense program."

Perle said current U.S. policy is that "we will accept restrictions on theater defense—the kind that might be deployed in the defense of Israel...in order to make those theater defenses consistent with a notion of the ABM Treaty."

Perle said the ABM treaty would undercut the Aegis cruiser program, under which ballistic missiles could be placed on naval vessels. He said that, if the U.S. went forward with the Aegis program "in the mistaken belief that it must be made consistent with the ABM treaty," the Aegis would be unable to defend Israel or Italy.

"In other words, the coverage of the missile shrinks from thousands of miles to tens of miles," Perle said. "It is time to recognize that it is vital to our security and the security of our friends and allies, that we make the most effective use we can of our technology, and that we not tie our hand...because of a treaty that was signed a quarter of a century ago, that is no longer relevant to our security."

Berger responded that the Clinton Administration is "pursuing very vigorously, with increased funding over levels when we arrived. A range of theater missile defenses in an intensified air missile defense program...is moving forward in research and development at a very rapid pace."

Berger added that the U.S. continues to spend "hundreds of millions of dollars on a national missile defense system. It is in the research and development stage." He added that the Administration believed it was not necessary to agree now "to deploy something into the next century....Let's see what the strategic threat looks like at that time."

Berger said the Administration wants to "move forward robustly with theater defenses, without abrogating the ABM treaty."

Inouye: Israel's Critical Defense Needs

Sen. DANIEL INOUYE (D-HI), who also appeared on the panel with Perle and Berger, spoke bluntly about the defense costs Israel

(Continued on page 49)

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I Thought that these articles are Hizballah might be of interest - David

HIZBALLAH

STATE OF ISRAEL

Press bulletin

Jerusalem, 12 April 1996

#21 HIZBALLAH BACKGROUND
/96.04.12 (Communicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

The Hizballah is an umbrella organization of various radical Shi'ite groups and organizations which adhere to a Khomeinistic ideology. The organization was established following the 1982 "Peace for Galilee" war in Lebanon (and an increased Iranian presence and influence in Lebanon). The Hizballah organization was established as an organizational body for Shi'ite fundamentalists. Led by religious clerics, who see in the adoption of Iranian doctrine a solution to the Lebanese political malaise. This included the use of terror as a means of attaining political objectives.

Toward the end of 1982 Iran sent fighters from its "Iranian Revolutionary Guards" in order to assist in the establishment of a revolutionary Islamic movement in Lebanon whose members would participate in the 'Jihad', holy war against Israel. These forces, which were located in the area of Ba'albek in the northern Beqa'a Valley, bestowed on the area an Iranian-Islamic character and constituted the core of the Hizballah organization in Lebanon.

The organization maintains a training apparatus in Lebanon throughout the villages and their surroundings, as well as outside of Lebanon. Training is aimed at building a reliable manpower source for its military forces as well as for its terror arm.

The spiritual father of the movement in Lebanon is Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah who acts as chief Mujtahid - arbiter of Islamic law of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon. With the passage of time, Hizballah has turned into an organization of secondary level groups working on the local level led by regional functionaries.

The current secretary general of Hizballah is Hassan Nasrallah. At the start of the 1980's he was responsible for the Beka'a area on behalf of the Amal movement. He left the organization in 1982 and affiliated with Hizballah, taking with him many of his followers. Following the death of Abbas Musawi, he was unanimously elected as his successor as commander of operations.

Hizballah, taking with him many of his followers. Following the death of Abbas Musawi, he was unanimously elected as his successor as commander of operations.

IDEOLOGY

The ideological basis for Khomeinism and its principle goal is the establishment of the a pan-Islamic republic headed by religious clerics.

The organization's world view was first published in its political platform in February 1985. As follows:

* The solution to Lebanon's problem's is the establishment of an Islamic republic as only this type of regime can secure justice and equality for all of Lebanon's citizens.

* The Hizballah organization views as an important goal the fight against 'Western Imperialism' and its eradication from Lebanon. The group strives for complete American and French withdrawal from Lebanon, including all their institutions.

* The conflict with Israel is viewed as a central concern. This is not only limited to the IDF presence in Lebanon. Rather, the complete destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of Islamic rule over Jerusalem is an expressed goal.

Part of this radical ideology is the group's militant approach using terror as a means of attaining its goals. Hizballah decries the existence of Israel ('The Little Satan'), viewed as foreign to the region and which constitutes a threat to Islam and Muslims. The destruction of Israel and the liberation of Jerusalem is deemed a religious obligation. The Hizballah organization justifies the use of terror against these enemies as a weapon in the hands of the weak against a strong aggressor. In an effort to act upon and realize the predetermined ideological lines the group's leaders actively plan and perpetuate terror attacks against IDF and SLA forces, preach religious extremism against Israel and disseminate Iranian ideology. The Hizballah extends the conflict into Israeli territory and does not restrict its struggle to areas in Lebanon.

With the signing of the "Ta'if Agreement" (1989) and the beginnings of the Syrian agreement in Lebanon, the Hizballah has been forced to conform to Syrian dictates. The Syrian interest in the continuation of terrorist attacks in south Lebanon has enabled the Hizballah to maintain its unique status in the Lebanese arena as the only major military force yet to be disarmed. The Syrians have prevented the Lebanese government from harming the military capabilities of the Hizballah under the pretext of opposing the Israeli occupation, while at the same time enforcing their dictates upon the organization during periods when they are interested in calming the situation in southern Lebanon (as was the case following "Operation Accountability" in July 1993 or the period coinciding with the Assad-Clinton meeting in January 1994).

THE SPREAD OF HIZBALLAH INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON

THE SPREAD OF HIZBALLAH INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON

As the organizational infrastructure developed, Hizballah, with Iranian and Syrian assistance, began to establish an extensive military network in the Ba'albek area. Its militias have since spread into the Sh'ite neighborhoods in southern and western Beirut as well as into southern Lebanon.

This network is the principle base of Hizballah activities as well as for those of other radical Shi'ite groups, thousands of Hizballah activists and members are located in the Beqa'a Valley, Beirut and southern Lebanon. These areas also offer a base for recruitment of additional activists and fighters among the local Shi'ite populations.

Following the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985 the Hizballah organization consolidated itself. The consolidation included the establishment of storage depots for weapons, recruitment of activists and fighters, and widespread aid to residents in S.Lebanon, such as the donation of money, equipment, medical supplies, etc. The purpose of the aid was to gain the support of the local population for the organization's activities in the south.

.../3

HIZBALLAH/3

ATTACKS AND TERRORISM

Using cover names such as 'Islamic Jihad', 'The Revolutionary Justice Organization' and 'The Islamic Resistance'. With the blessings of its religious leaders Hizballah has carried out a series of high profile attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and American and multinational forces targets in Lebanon. Only later did their attacks become more intensive as well as demonstrating better planning, especially immediately prior to the opening of the peace process.

In 1991, the Hizballah was responsible for 52 attacks, as compared to 19 attacks the organization carried out in 1990. In 1992 the Hizballah launched 63 attacks and in 1993, 158 attacks. When during the course of "Operation Accountability" they fired hundreds of Katyusha rockets into the security zone and Israeli territory.

In 1994 a total of 187 attacks against Israeli troops and positions by Hizballah were recorded. There were 110 instances of artillery fire [illegible]

In 1994 a total of 187 attacks against Israeli troops and positions by Hizballah were recorded. There were 119 instances of artillery fire. 31 detonations of explosive charges and 2 frontal assaults on IDF positions.

In 1995 a total of 344 attacks against Israeli troops and positions by Hizballah were recorded. There were 270 instances of artillery fire, 64 detonations of explosive charges and 2 frontal assaults on IDF positions.

IRAN AND HIZBALLAH

Since Khoemeni's rise to power in 1979, Iran has maintained aspirations to lead the radical Islamic Camp and continues to deepen its ties to extremist states and terrorist groups through the Middle East -- Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, Iran has engaged in a public relations campaign aimed at convincing the West, as well as its neighboring Gulf states of its benign intentions and fitness to be fully integrated into the community of nations.

The one realm where Iran has made no attempt to disguise its ideological fervor is with regard to its implacable hatred of Israel. Iran remains committed to the proposition that Israel has no right to exist and that its destruction is a desideratum.

It comes as no surprise, then, that one of Iran's major policy goals is the wrecking of the Middle East peace process. An Arab world, which is overwhelmingly Moslem, at peace with Israel contradicts an essential pillar of Iranian ideology. To this end, Iran has fomented terrorism, either in the West Bank and Gaza or on Israel's Northern border, in an attempt to bring about the collapse of the peace process.

Iran views Hizballah as its spearhead in the battle against Israel. Hizballah terrorists are almost in constant combat against IDF troops. The geographic location of Lebanon, coupled with its political situation easily enables Iran to ship weaponry, with Syrian acquiescence, to Hizballah units operating on Israel's border. In January 1996, three Iranian trucks loaded with arms were intercepted by Turkish authorities on their way to Lebanon via Turkey and Syria.

Iran was instrumental in the founding of Hizballah and continues to fund its operations at a level of approximately $70 million per year. Moreover, Hizballah terrorist are trained at Iranian military installations and close contact with the Hizballah hierarchy is maintained by Teheran through its embassy in Beirut.

.../4

HIZBALLAH/4

APPENDIX -- MAJOR HIZBALLAH TERRORIST ACTIVITY SINCE DECEMBER 1995

6 December 1995: Clash between IDF and Hizballah terrorists in the central region of the Security Zone. 1 IDF soldier killed and 3 wounded.

29 December 1996: 2 Katyusha rockets were fired at Northern Israel. 1 Civilian was wounded and 4 other civilians were treated for shock.

28 February 1996: Attempt by terrorist to infiltrate Northern Israel utilizing an ultra-lite aircraft.

4 March 1996: Detonation of explosive charge near Kibbutz Manara. 4 IDF soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded.

10 March 1996: Detonation of explosive charge in Southern Lebanon. 1 IDF soldier killed.

14 March 1996: Ambush of IDF convoy on the Reihan-Aiyeshia road. 8 IDF soldiers were wounded.

20 March 1996: Suicide bomber detonates explosive charge in front of an IDF convoy. 1 soldier killed and 1 civilian was wounded.

30 March 1996: 2 Katyusha salvos were fired at the Galilee. 1 civilian was wounded.

9 April 1996: 2 Katyusha salvos were fired at the Galilee. 36 civilians were wounded.

10 April 1996: 1 IDF soldier was killed and 2 were wounded by Hizballah mortar fire.

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STATE OF ISRAEL

Press bulletin

Jerusalem, 11 April 1996

#21 THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND NORTHERN ISRAEL
/96.04.11 (Background Information Communicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

1. The recent upsurge in terrorist activities on the part of Hizballah must be viewed against the backdrop of the current peace process. Two camps have emerged in the Middle East. One comprised of those who seek a peaceful resolution to decades of conflict and another, inspired by Iran, which seeks to perpetuate war and strife. Hizballah functions as a proxy for Iran, which seeks to wreck the egotiations between Israel and its neighbors.

"Hizballah receives financial aid from Iran and Iranian revolutionary guards are in Lebanon." (Hizballah Vice Chairman Naeem Kassem. March 19, 1996 - Phalange Radio).

"There is no point in denying that we receive financial and political aid from Iran." (Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nassrallah, March 11, 1996, Al-Wassat).

2. Current IDF operations are defensive and aimed at protecting Israel's northern population centers, which have, in recent days, been subjected to repeated katyusha rocket attacks. Moreover, these actions have come after numerous provocations by Hizballah. Since February 1, 1996, seven IDF soldiers have been killed and twenty-nine wounded in Hizballah attacks in the security zone. Israel has maintained self restraint in the hope that diplomatic activity could dissuade Hizballah from continuing its attacks.

Israel has, through the good offices of the United States requested on numerous occasions that Syria use its influence to restrain Hizballah. In spite of those efforts, Israel's northern population centers have continued to suffer attacks at the hands of the Iranian backed Hizballah.

Just a few weeks ago a summit conference was held at Sharm el-Sheikh which brought together 29 heads of government, among them 13 Arab representatives, in an effort to combat terrorism. Israel's actions in Lebanon should be seen, though not exclusively, within the context of the global fight against terrorism.

3. Israel will not allow its civilian population centers to be held hostage by Hizballah. Israeli civilians will not be forced to seek cover in bomb shelters while "business as usual" goes on in Lebanon.

4. The government of Lebanon, which has been derelict in discharging its responsibility for restraining Hizballah and for preventing the use of its territory as a base for terrorism and violence against Israel, must bear responsibility for the fate of its citizens and must take up its international legal responsibilities to prevent such terrorism and violence.

5. Syria, which controls large portions of territory in Lebanon has the ability to restrain Hizballah and Israel expects it to do so.

6. The goals of Hizballah go beyond the issues of southern Lebanon.

Background/2

Hizballah Vice Chairman Naeem Kassem has stated:

"We oppose and will continue to oppose the Zionist entity....Israel has no reason to exist and the solution must be the return of all the Jews to their countries of origin." (March 16, 1996)

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STATE OF ISRAEL

Press bulletin

Jerusalem, 21 April 1996

#21 ISRAELI VICTIMS OF HIZBALLAH ATTACKS SINCE THE END OF "OPERATION ACCOUNTABILITY" (31 JULY 1993)
/96.04.21 (Communicated by IDF Spokesman)

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:

From 31 July 1993 until "Operation Grapes of Wrath" (11 April 1996):

83 wounded and 2 killed

During the current "Grapes of Wrath" Operation:

25 civilians were wounded (as of 18 April 1996, 17:00 hours)

ISRAELI MILITARY CASUALTIES:

From 31 July 93 - 11 April 96 -- 58 soldiers killed.

67 wounded (entire year 1993)
80 wounded (entire year 1994)
85 wounded (entire year 1995)
29 wounded (until 11 April 1996)

NUMBER OF KATYUSHAS FIRED INTO ISRAEL FROM 31 JULY 1993 - 11 APRIL 1996:

1994 93 Katyushas
1995 121 Katyushas
1996 68 (until "Operation Grapes of Wrath" 11 April)
1996 +300 (12 April to 18 April 17:00 hours)

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11:15 hours

JERUSALEM REPORT, MARCH 21, 1996 P. 29

Hizballah: 13 Principles of Warfare

UNDER THE COMMAND OF A man unknown in the West, a man who stays out of the limelight yet arouses awe among his subordinates, the Hizballah movement has developed a list of 13 essential principles of warfare, employed by those who attack the security zone. Following is the doctrine of the man known as "Haj Halil" — the head of operations, who has sworn "to pave South Lebanon with the skulls of Israeli soldiers."

1. Avoid the strong, attack the weak — attack and withdraw!
2. Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy casualties!
3. Strike only when success is assured!
4. Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you've failed!
5. Don't get into a set-piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the enemy can drive home his advantage!
6. Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the enemy's weak points!
7. Keep moving, avoid formation of a front line!
8. Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear!
9. The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories!
10. Keep up the morale of the fighters, avoid notions of the enemy's superiority!
11. The media has innumerable guns, whose hits are like bullets. Use them in the battle!
12. The population is a treasure — nurture it!
13. Hurt the enemy, and then stop before he abandons restraint!

Some of the mujahedin who had to leave Bosnia following the Dayton agreement were tranferred by Iran to Lebanon and are now being indoctrinated with these concepts of modern guerrilla warfare. ❐

E.Y.

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South Lebanese woman lives in fear of Hizbullah, Syrians

Mar. 24, 1996
p. 2

The IDF's presence in the security zone and the safety of soldiers there is dependent to a great extent on the goodwill of local residents – based on the harmonious relations that have been painstakingly established over the years. A woman resident of the zone describes the present situation: the atmosphere among the local population, their hopes and fears at such a sensitive time in the turbulent region

DAVID RUDGE

THERE was a time when the young Lebanese woman would have been proud to have her name appear in an Israeli newspaper. Now she is scared to be identified as being associated with the state that Hizbullah and its Iranian mentors have termed "The Zionist Enemy," "the Cancer of the Middle East," or "the Little Devil of the Big Satan of America."

She still works in Israel, as she has done for several years. She enjoys her work, and that she is able to help support her family, which lives in a Moslem village inside the security zone.

She views Israelis, especially her employers and those with whom she comes in contact, as friends. She is frightened of Hizbullah and the Syrians, who she says rule the roost in the rest of Lebanon, and is intimidated by the forces they represent.

The young woman, whose condition for the interview was not to print her name or age, the name of her village or the place in which she works, is afraid of what the future holds. She is not alone.

According to her own testimony, the vast majority of the nearly 200,000 residents of the security zone, if not all, share the same concern.

Their fears have been exacerbated by incessant Hizbullah attacks on the South Lebanese Army, the unremitting psychological warfare of the extremist Shi'ite organization, and recent legal measures taken by the Syrian-backed government of Lebanon against SLA soldiers and their commanders.

"For families who have a soldier in the SLA it is very difficult. When their son goes out on duty – it might be for a few days, a week, or a fortnight – they don't know if he is going to come back safely," said the woman.

"All the relatives and neighbors come round and everybody kisses him, and when the explosions and booms are heard close or far away, everybody prays for him. When he comes home, there's a party," she said.

"I can't understand it. Moslems from Hizbullah are coming to kill other Moslems. If they only had a bit of common sense they would know that it is wrong, and if there were no attacks there would be peace and quiet.

"That is what we want. Quiet and peace. Since I was born, I have never known a period of real peace and quiet – only war, battles, death and destruction and people afraid of one another."

According to the woman, the situation has worsened in the past few months. Hizbullah has escalated its attacks, and has also been infiltrating the zone and recruiting collaborators among some residents of the zone.

"We have heard, at least that's my understanding, that people from Hizbullah have come to the homes of some people and offered them money in return for information or for keeping somebody hidden in their home.

"This is something new and it's not very good. Somebody is getting a hundred dollars or more so that he will live, but somebody else will die. What kind of situation is that?

"It wasn't like that before, but now people are worried. They are afraid of what might happen to them now and in the future.

"There is a woman, for instance, whom I know, who used to work at a factory in Israel. She was sick and went to a Beirut for treatment. There she was interrogated by people from Hizbullah.

"They didn't want her to be treated at first because she was on the list of people who work in Israel. She told them she that if she didn't work in Israel she would die of starvation because there is nowhere else to earn money to live.

"Eventually, she was treated but she was also warned not to go back to work in Israel because if she did they would get her. Now she sits at home, afraid to go to Beirut and afraid to work in Israel.

"We have also heard about other people who have run into similar problems, not just with the Hizbullah but with the Syrians who are in control in Beirut. I don't know what they want from us.

"We want peace, but we also want guaranteed security in the event of peace. We are scared, all of us: those who serve in the SLA, those who work in Israel, business people, and even truck drivers who bring things back and forth.

"We don't know what will happen to us if Israel withdraws in the event of peace. We want to be sure that Hizbullah and the Syrians won't come here and take revenge on us," she added.

JP.
Sunday April 28, 1996

Operation Grapes of Wrath

P. 1

- 127 residents of the North were injured by Katyushas, 3 moderately or seriously.
- 170-200 Lebanese citizens were killed.
- More than 50 Hizbullah members were killed.
- 10 Syrian and Lebanese soldiers were killed.
- More than 1,400 homes were damaged in the Galilee, 1,200 of them in Kiryat Shmona.
- Hizbullah fired more than 700 Katyushas.
- The IDF fired more than 18,000 shells and the IAF flew more than 1,600 missions.
- Estimated cost of operation – NIS 300 million
- Estimated damage by Katyushas – NIS 100 million

Jerusalem Post Staff

Text of cease-fire understanding

P. 2

Following is the text of the "understanding" reached on Friday for the cease-fire in Lebanon:

The United States understands that after discussions with the governments of Israel and Lebanon, and in consultation with Syria, Lebanon and Israel will ensure the following:

1) Armed groups in Lebanon will not carry out attacks by Katyusha rockets or by any kind of weapon into Israel.

2) Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire any kind of weapon at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon.

3) Beyond this, the two parties commit to ensuring that under no circumstances will civilians be the target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks.

4) Without violating this understanding, nothing herein shall preclude any party from exercising the right of self-defense.

A Monitoring Group is established consisting of the United States, France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Its task will be to monitor the application of the understanding stated above. Complaints will be submitted to the Monitoring Group.

In the event of a claimed violation of the understanding, the party submitting the complaint will do so within 24 hours. Procedures for dealing with the complaints will be set by the Monitoring Group.

The United States will also organize a Consultative Group, to consist of France, the European Union, Russia and other interested parties, for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction needs of Lebanon.

It is recognized that the understanding to bring the current crisis between Lebanon and Israel to an end cannot substitute for a permanent solution. The United States understands the importance of achieving a comprehensive peace in the region.

Toward this end, the United States proposes the resumption of negotiations between Syria and Israel and between Lebanon and Israel at a time to be agreed upon, with the objective of reaching comprehensive peace.

The United States understands that it is desirable that these negotiations be conducted in a climate of stability and tranquility.

This understanding will be announced simultaneously at 1800 hours, April 26, 1996, in all countries concerned.

The time set for implementation is 0400 hours, April 27, 1996.

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JP Apr. 28 1996 pp 1 & 3

Ya'alon: IDF never intended to disarm Hizbullah

Operation Grapes of Wrath ends in written accord

ARIEH O'SULLIVAN, DAVID RUDGE and news agencies

UNDER the new agreement reached Friday, the IDF will be able to hit back at Hizbullah in south Lebanon even if the terrorists take shelter in villages there, Chief of the General Staff Lt-Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak said last night.

Military Intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. Moshe Ya'alon said Hizbullah survived Operation Grapes of Wrath with its weapons intact and that it had never been the IDF's intention to disarm it.

The understanding announced Friday by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Prime Minister Shimon Peres ended the 17-day Operation Grapes of Wrath. A monitoring group made up of the United States, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and France will supervise the agreement. (Text of agreement, Page 2).

Shahak stressed in a news conference in Tel Aviv last night that the agreement was not a total cease-fire, as Hizbullah can still attack the IDF, or a peace agreement, but that it would bring peace and quiet to northern Israel "for a long time."

"Hizbullah understands that the price it had to pay for the way it behaved is very great," Shahak said, adding this understanding could only be judged over time.

"I hope and believe that Hizbullah got up this morning and checked the damage it suffered and saw that it caused itself and its surroundings very great harm," Shahak said. "I presume that it understands that the price it will pay should it decide to fire Katyushas will be at least the price it paid this time."

Shahak said he believed life in the northern Galilee would quickly return to normal.

Ya'alon told reporters that Hizbullah can continue to carry out attacks in the security zone after the operation and after the agreement. "It can continue to fire mortars and Sagger rockets on our positions, shoot anti-aircraft fire on our planes, [and use] suicide bombers and car bombs. We did not harm this capability of theirs and we did not intend to do so. But it has to think very hard before it violates the agreement when it comes to shooting Katyushas and firing on civilians," Ya'alon said.

Ya'alon said he believed Hizbullah would try to violate the agreement, but that the Syrian and Lebanese governments, as well as the IDF's deterrence, would prevent this.

Maj.-Gen. Eitan Ben-Eliyahu, assistant head of IDF Operations, and soon to be OC Air Force, said the agreement was "reasonable, because the residents of Israel and of south Lebanon are no longer a target. They are not part of the war."

Ben-Eliyahu said the Hizbullah now knew what the price was for violating the understandings of the 1993 Operation Accountability and that the new understandings were "much better."

Ben-Eliyahu said the IDF caused extensive damage to Hizbullah's infrastructure, including their communications and ammunition dumps.

"The only price we paid was

(Continued on Page 3)

(Continued from Page 1)

that it took a long time. I think 17 days is too long. I wish we could have come to the agreement after two days," Ben-Eliyahu said.

Shahak defended the officers' expressed satisfaction with the agreement, in light of criticism from the political opposition, saying it was the IDF's obligation to give its opinion regarding the security of the Galilee.

Peres said yesterday that the cease-fire reached in Lebanon opens "a completely new chapter" in the Middle East.

"It's the first time that we have Syrians and the Lebanese government as partners," Peres said in French after meeting with French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette, who took part in the truce talks.

"All of us seek tranquillity, security for everyone, and it's perhaps a prelude for a permanent peace," he said.

Christopher told a joint news conference with Peres that the cease-fire would take effect from 4 a.m. yesterday, and that both sides had agreed not to target civilians.

"After seven days of shuttling in the region I am very pleased to announce that we have reached an agreement on a new set of understandings to end the current crisis," Christopher said.

"Carrying out of these understandings will end the Katyusha attacks and protect citizens, civilians in both Israel and Lebanon allowing them finally to return to their homes and leave the air raid shelters," Christopher said.

He said the written agreement was an improvement over the 1993 oral understandings reached after Operation Accountability.

"As such they should prove more enduring and less susceptible to misinterpretation," he said.

Lebanon and Syria have agreed to ensure the success of the cease-fire. Syria, with 35,000 troops in Lebanon, is viewed as key to reining in Hizbullah.

Christopher said Hizbullah would not launch attacks from "civilian populated areas" in south Lebanon. It was not immediately clear what this meant since the Hizbullah gunmen live or move among the local Shi'ite Moslem residents of south Lebanon.

"We have achieved the goal of our mission which was to achieve an agreement that will save lives and end the suffering of people on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border. These understandings take us well beyond the oral understanding that I negotiated in July 1993," Christopher said.

Peres said there were no secret clauses to the agreement but he revealed the existence of unpublished understandings.

"There are no secret agreements, there are certain understandings and they will be published at a certain point later on. Every agreement will be put before the Knesset," Peres said.

In a radio interview hours after the guns fell silent across south Lebanon, Peres rejected opposition charges that Operation Grapes of Wrath had achieved nothing at the cost of more than 200 Lebanese lives, mostly civilians.

"This is an agreement of the first magnitude," Peres said, adding that it "to a great extent exceeds our expectations."

Peres said Syria could be trusted to keep its word on agreements "nearly religiously."

"Since Israel signed a cease-fire agreement with Syria in 1974 over the Golan Heights, not one Katyusha rocket or bullet has been fired there," he told Army Radio.

Peres praised Shahak for the "successful end" of Operation Grapes of Wrath.

"I want to express personally, and in the name of the government of Israel and the entire nation, the deep appreciation of the IDF and to you personally for the remarkable achievements we reached during the days of the operation," Peres said in a statement released by the Defense Ministry.

The cease-fire drew sharp criticism over the weekend from the Likud and the rest of the opposition. The government was accused of having caved in, of having failed to improve on the unsatisfactory 1993 understandings, of having in effect given the green light for assaults on the IDF and of having bolstered the Syrian position instead of undercutting it.

Cross-border fighting continued until the last minute before the agreement came into effect.

Just five minutes before the deadline, Hizbullah fired two final salvoes at the Galilee Panhandle. One of the rockets scored a direct hit on an apartment building in Kiryat Shmona.

NEAR EAST REPORT

Washington Biweekly On American Middle East Policy

Vol. XL, No. 9, April 22, 1996

Hezbollah Attacks Trigger New Round Of Fighting

The IDF continues with its military campaign to press Syria and Lebanon to rein in Hezbollah. As we went to press, Israel was continuing to target Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist bases throughout Lebanon.

For most Israelis, Hezbollah's April 9 Katyusha rocket barrage, which wounded 36 civilians in northern Israel—most of them in the border town of Kiryat Shemona—was the final straw.



AP/Wide World

Smoke billows from a car which suffered a direct Katyusha rocket hit in the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shemona April 12.

Israel Television showed film of a home in Kiryat Shemona that took a direct hit from one of the rockets, which landed in Israel around 7:15 a.m. Inside, a mattress was shown covered with blood. One Israeli civilian described seeing a Katyusha explode near a city bus. Other rockets damaged apartment buildings and cars, and started numerous fires. The most seriously injured was a women who suffered shrapnel wounds in the hip (JTA, Apr. 10).

Still other rockets landed near the coastal resort of Nahariya.

(Continued on page 34)

Hezbollah: Sworn Enemy of Israel and America

The animus towards Israel harbored by the Lebanese radical Islamic group Hezbollah is motivated not by the defensive Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, but by Israel's very existence. Hezbollah has consistently advocated Israel's destruction. Its vice chairman, Naeem Kassem, stated March 16: "We oppose, and will continue to oppose, the Zionist entity....Israel has no reason to exist, and the solution must be the return of all the Jews to their countries of origin." Hezbollah general secretary Sheik Hassan Nasrallah refers to northern Israel as "Northern Palestine" (*New York Times*, April 12). Hezbollah's former general secretary Sheik Subhi al-Tufayli declared, "We shall forever reject Israel's existence....resistance will go on even after Israel's withdrawal....Our goal is to destroy the Zionist entity, and in the near future there won't be a single Jew or Zionist left in Palestine" (AFP, Dec. 9, 1994).

Hezbollah's hatred of Israel has persisted since its founding in 1982. In 1985, Hezbollah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, declared: Israel cannot be viewed "as a state with the right to security and peace just like any other state....We cannot see Israel as a legal presence. [The Jews should] leave Palestine which was usurped by them." The now-deceased Hezbollah general secretary, Abbas Musawi, termed Israel "the cancer of the Middle East," and declared that "in the future, we will wipe out every trace of Israel in Palestine....Our slogan is the liquidation of Israel."

(Continued on page 35)

Hezbollah Must Be Curbed

As we go to press, fierce fighting continues in Lebanon. Hezbollah Katyusha rockets are pouring on northern Israel at an unprecedented rate, while Israeli aircraft and artillery are pounding Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. Playing an highly constructive role, the U.S. has begun mediating among the parties in an effort to achieve a cease-fire.

Clearly, going back to business as usual in southern Lebanon is not an option. Hezbollah routinely and flagrantly violated the 1993 understanding, which barred Katyusha attacks into Israel. It used suicide bombers against Israeli personnel, and it arrogantly warned Israeli residents of Kiryat Shemona to move into air-raid shelters. As President Clinton stated April 17, "Clearly the truce was violated by Hezbollah violating the agreement that had previously been brokered, and raining the Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. That was what provoked this." No responsible government can tolerate such a situation.

Lebanese officials claim that the problem will be solved if Israel eliminates the security zone in southern Lebanon. They argue that Hezbollah merely wants to remove the Israelis from the zone, and that once they are gone, Hezbollah will stop its attacks and transform itself into a peaceful political party. Nothing could be further from reality.

As documented in the accompanying stories, Hezbollah leaders have consistently made clear that they are opposed to Israel's very existence, not just to the security zone. Furthermore, Hezbollah is not a free agent. It is controlled by two powerful countries—Iran and Syria; both want continued Hezbollah attacks on Israel regardless of the security zone.

Iran, which has openly called for the destruction of Israel and the termination of the peace process, has publicly praised Hezbollah's Katyusha attacks. Tehran would doubtless continue to recruit, train, equip, and goad Hezbollah terrorists into further attacks even if the security zone were to go.

Syria—without whose support Hezbollah cannot function—has used Hezbollah terrorism as an instrument for improving Damascus' bargaining position in negotiations with Israel. The elimination of the security zone would not alter Syria's interest in continued attacks into Israel.

Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated that Jerusalem has no territorial demands on Lebanon, and that it needs the security zone only as a barrier against cross-border terrorist attacks. A cease-fire can quickly be achieved if Hezbollah is made to stop its attacks—once and for all.

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INSIDE

- Ron Brown: 1941-1996
- Senate Passes Counterterrorism Legislation

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Attacks...*continued*

Many residents of northern Israel have packed their bags and headed south. Nearly half the residents of Kiryat Shemona have been evacuated; those remaining spend much of their time in underground bomb shelters. The April 9 attacks were at least the sixth time since December that Hezbollah fired Katyushas into northern Israel.

Since January 1995, Hezbollah has carried out well over 700 attacks on IDF and SLA forces in the southern part of Lebanon. These attacks have included anti-tank fire; artillery bombardments; mines; explosives; and suicide attacks. This adds up to "almost two such actions daily, for more than 14 months, in which 64 IDF and SLA soldiers were killed, and some 200 wounded," *Ha'aretz* columnist Joel Marcus noted (Mar. 19).

In recent weeks, the Iranian-backed terrorist group has become more brazen in its efforts to target Israeli soldiers and civilians. In a February 28 incident, the IDF killed a Hezbollah terrorist who attempted to parachute into northern Israel. Since March 5, at least seven Israeli soldiers have been killed and 19 others wounded in Hezbollah bombings and mortar attacks.

During the recent spate of suicide bombings inside Israel—which killed 59 Israelis and wounded more than 200—Hezbollah gloated about these crimes, saying they showed that Palestinians would never give up the fight to destroy the Jewish State. Israel, Hezbollah declared March 3, "only understands the language of murder."

Hezbollah's Sinister Challenge

Just hours after a March 30 Katyusha barrage into Kiryat Shemona and the Galilee, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, openly taunted Israelis.

In a television interview, Nasrallah recommended that Israelis remain in the bunkers another 72 hours, lest they be hurt by another Katyusha barrage. "If a single incident spurred Israel into sending helicopter gunships to Beirut, it was the mortifying advice broadcast to Israelis last month" by Nasrallah, the *Washington Post* reported (Apr. 12).

On April 11, Israel launched an offensive of its own, targeting Hezbollah bases throughout Lebanon. This included air strikes against Hezbollah's operational headquarters—located in the southern suburbs of Beirut. According to the IDF, this building serves as a planning and coordination office for attacks on northern Israel, and on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

"It should be noted that, during the IAF attacks on the operations center, special ordnance was used, enabling direct hits on a target, in order to prevent civilian casualties," an IDF communique stated. "The location of the Hezbollah operations center testifies to the fact that Hezbollah exploits civilians as a...human shield for its operations."

Before targeting terrorist bases, Israel repeatedly urges civilians living nearby to evacuate. Hezbollah, meanwhile, has continued firing Katyushas into the Galilee.

"The fire, in many instances, comes from inside the villages. They keep the rockets inside houses, take them out and fire, then return to the house. We saw them fire from a school, and other public buildings," the IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Amnon Shahak, told reporters. "We won't let Hezbollah hide among civilians, or use the residents of South Lebanon as a shield."

In an effort to press Syria to move against Hezbollah, Israel targeted Baalbek—located in the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon. Foreign Minister Ehud Barak stated that IAF air strikes in Baalbek were particularly important, because Syria maintains a large military presence there.

"We will stop at nothing to make [Hezbollah] stop their aggression against our North," Government Press Office spokesman Uri Dromi said April 11. "Our aim is to reverse the situation, and put Hezbollah on the run. We want to drive home the message to the Lebanese—and whoever helps Hezbollah—that going on with this will be very costly and very painful." ❑

Hezbollah: U.S., Israel Could Be Suicide Bombing Targets

Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said the group's response to Israeli "aggression" would not occur in "northern Palestine." He warned ominously that Hezbollah would respond "elsewhere...We will set the time and place, and both will astonish Peres." (*Mideast Mirror*, Apr. 12)

In the wake of Israel's offensive against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, the terrorist group is threatening a new wave of suicide attacks against American and Israeli targets. In Beirut, an April 15 broadcast on a Hezbollah television station showed nearly 70 camouflaged men who had been "sworn in" as suicide bombers. Their "commander" was shown ceremonially inserting fuses into explosive packs, which had been tied to their bodies.

"We swear by the blood and severed bodies of our children, and the struggle of our detainees, that we will respond to the call, and will detonate our bodies and shake the ground under the feet of our enemies: America and Israel," the suicide bombers declared (Reuter, Apr. 15). ❑

Ron Brown: 1941-1996

"I am committed, as are most Americans, to the vision of our country's relationship with Israel which is rooted in history, rooted in shared values, and rooted in a strategic alliance with a strong democratic ally." These are the words of the late Secretary of Commerce RON BROWN at the AIPAC Policy Conference in 1992. When Secretary Brown's plane crashed in Croatia in early April, the pro-Israel community lost one of its staunchest allies in Washington.

Ron Brown's commitment to Israel went well beyond words and platitudes. He had a long record of achievement that made a real difference in the U.S.-Israel alliance. As Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Brown was instrumental in ensuring a strong pro-Israel platform in 1992 and was an early supporter of absorption loan guarantees for Israel.

As Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown became founding co-chair of the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission in 1993 and helped forge new joint ventures between U.S. and Israeli companies because he saw the benefits to both countries of increased business cooperation. A staunch opponent of the Arab economic boycott against Israel, Brown convened a 1994 meeting of trade ministers from Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, which issued the so-called "Taba Declaration" to increase economic cooperation and end all barriers to trade, including the Arab boycott. He also organized and led the American delegations to the Casablanca Conference in 1994 and the Amman Conference in 1995 to promote economic cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa. Brown brought hundreds of American business people to the region, because he saw economic prosperity as an essential building block of peace.

Brown travelled to Israel seven times, including once with the American Israel Education Foundation in 1990. He was the last senior American official to have met with the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, just a few days before his assassination.

Steve Grossman, Chairman of the Board of AIPAC and a close friend, described Brown as having a "gut-level bond between the United States and the people of Israel." Grossman added: "It is not enough to say that he will be missed".

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HEARD ON THE HILL

Senate Passes Counterterrorism Legislation 91-8

The Senate passed the Conference Report on counterterrorism legislation after House and Senate conferees agreed to restore provisions similar to those that were removed by the House last month. The amendments agreed upon will allow the government to designate foreign groups as terrorist organizations, freeze their assets in the U.S., and stop their fundraising here. Foreign members of designated foreign terrorist organizations may be barred from entering the country, and the U.S. government will be able to seek in court the deportation of foreigners based on evidence linking them to terrorist activities. As we go to press, the bill is expected to be on the floor of the House by April 19, the first anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing.

Congress Presses Arafat To Control Terrorism, Amend Covenant

Two letters have been sent to Yasir Arafat, pressing him to take visible steps against terrorists and to amend the Palestinian Covenant. With 59 Israeli lives erased by last month's series of bombing, 109 members of the House sent a letter demanding that Arafat take stronger measures against terrorists. Authored by Rep. Ben Gilman (R-NY), chairman of the House International Relations Committee, the letter reminds Arafat that the Oslo II accords and the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) require him to assist Israel in the apprehension, prosecution, and imprisonment of terrorists: "The benefits of relations between the United States and the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, including U.S. assistance, are contingent upon the PLO complying with its signed commitments with Israel."

Reps. Jim Saxton (R-NJ) and Eliot Engel (D-NY) sent Arafat another letter, expressing disappointment with Arafat's response to a February House letter calling on him to take visible steps to amend the Covenant. Saxton and Engel reminded Arafat that no aid will be available to the Palestinian Authority if the Covenant is not amended by May 7.

In the letter, the lawmakers told Arafat, "the replacement of your outdated, belligerent Charter...with language recognizing the right of Israel and innocent Israelis to live in peace and security, could help restore a sense of momentum toward peace, and would be an essential indication of your intention to comply with the commitments specified in the Israel-Palestinian agreements." ❑

AIPAC to "Webcast" Policy Conference '96; Launches On-line Advocacy Day

If you can't be in Washington in person for AIPAC's 37th Annual Policy conference, you can still have a virtual seat in the front row.

Using cutting edge Israeli technology produced by VDOnet Corp., AIPAC will video "webcast" conference plenaries, enabling AIPAC's message to reach a global audience from Alabama to Zimbabwe.

Those with a 28.8 modem and an Internet connection on their computer can download free software and pull up a chair to view the "webcast" live on their desktop or watch it days later.

"This is the first major political conference to use this technology," said Roger Schneider of Traveller Information Services, a multimedia company which helped to coordinate the video broadcast. Schneider added the company will be using the technology to webcast other political conventions in the coming months. "AIPAC is a pioneer in this arena," he said.

Web users with a 14.4 modem can also listen to the Sunday evening "Salute to the Peacemakers" program on real-time audio produced by Progressive Networks, a Seattle-based company.

On-line activists will be able to join in Monday morning's "Town Hall meeting with Architects of the Peace Process" by e-mailing their questions during or before the program starts to AIPAC's Web Site, the CyberCenter for pro-Israel activism at **http://www.aipac.org.**

Activists with an Internet connection are also encouraged to participate in the Tuesday, April 30th "On-line Pro-Israel Advocacy Day." Click on AIPAC's CyberCenter to learn about the key issues more than one thousand pro-Israel activists will be taking to Capital Hill. Then, click on your state in the clickable U.S. map, and up come the e-mail addresses of your Congressional delegation. Click again to send your message of support for U.S. Israel relations right from our Web Site.

Creative use of new media technologies can revolutionize grassroots pro-Israel activism. Our community stands to gain a great deal from this exciting medium.

For more information, click on AIPAC's web site. ❑

—Toby Dershowitz, Jeff Palker

Dershowitz and Palker coordinate AIPAC's new media technology program.

Hezbollah...*continued*

Israel's current actions in Lebanon are a response to repeated Hezbollah attacks against Israeli personnel, which, since March 5, resulted in seven Israelis killed and many wounded, and by Hezbollah's Katyusha attacks into northern Israel. Hezbollah also has launched terrorist attacks against Israeli diplomatic—and Jewish cultural—targets far from the Middle East, and it is again threatening to do so. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992. Hezbollah is almost universally believed responsible for the July 1994 destruction of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires in which nearly 100 people were killed.

Hezbollah's anti-Zionism is paralleled by its fervent anti-Westernism, with a special animosity towards the U.S.—"the Great Satan." As the State Department's latest report on terrorism noted, Hezbollah is "known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks."

Indeed, many Americans have been murdered by Hezbollah—mostly in suicide bombings. 49 were killed in the April 1983 suicide car bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut; and 241 were slaughtered in the October 1983 suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Other Hezbollah crimes included the March 1984 kidnapping and torturing to death in 1985 of CIA Beirut station chief William Buckley; the June 1985 murder of U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem aboard a TWA flight hijacked to Beirut; and the February 1988 kidnapping and subsequent murder of Marine colonel William Higgins, who was serving in Lebanon with the UN.

The State Department notes that "elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of most, if not all, U.S. and other Western hostages in Lebanon." It further notes that Hezbollah "continues to issue public threats against American interests," and that "American diplomatic missions and personnel remain at risk." Hezbollah was one of a dozen Middle East terrorist organizations whose assets were frozen last year by Presidential executive order.

Characterizing Hezbollah as "Iran's closest client," the State Department reports that it "receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic and organizational aid." Hezbollah has acknowledged its relationship to Iran.As Nasrallah declared last month: "There is no point in denying that we receive financial and political aid from Iran" (*Al-Wasat*, March 11).

Even as it acts as a proxy of Iran, Hezbollah also serves as a *de facto* instrument of Syria against Israel. By not halting the supply of Iranian armaments to Hezbollah and by not clamping down on Hezbollah attacks, Syria, at the very minimum, enables Hezbollah to attacks on Israel. ❑

—Michael Lewis

Lewis is AIPAC's Director of Policy Analysis

A Ron Brown Legacy: The Science and Technology Commission

Israel's value to the U.S. as both a democracy and as a strategic asset are well-known. But few in America, until recently, have thought of Israel as a strategic opportunity for Americans in the economic arena. Israel has many advantages that are getting increasing attention from both the U.S. Government and American business.

Lee Stalsworth

Ron Brown (l), then-chairman of the Democratic National Committee, at AIPAC's 1992 policy conference (with then-chairman of the Republican National Committee Richard Bond).

First of all, Israel is too small to compete with the U.S. worldwide, unlike large economic rivals like Japan and Germany. Yet, Israel possesses one of the most dynamic environments for scientific and technological research and development in the world today. Israelis are very proficient at developing innovative products, but are generally less effective at manufacturing and marketing, compared to their American counterparts. Hence, the partnership of American production efficiency and marketing know-how with Israeli research and development is natural and mutually-beneficial.

These realities were behind the announcement by President Clinton and the late Prime Minister Rabin of the establishment of the U.S. and Israeli Science and Technology Commission on March 15, 1993. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, until his death, was the co-chair along with Micha Harish, Israel's Minister of Industry and Trade. With his typical enthusiasm, Brown saw the Commission as an opportunity to expand America's technological base through cooperation with Israel, while, at the same time, promoting economic growth and peace in the Middle East.

Upon signing, in January 1994, the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding to create the Commission, Brown stated: "The economic opportunities for growth offered by the ending of the Cold War and the new peace in the Middle East are vital to U.S. regional and global security interests." The Department of Commerce coordinates the U.S. Government effort, which has also involved the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Defense, Health and Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The Commission is advised by a distinguished high-level advisory panel drawn from the business, scientific, and educational communities in both the U.S. and Israel.

On a tiny budget (each government has committed $5 million per year for three years), the Commission's achievements have been impressive. The Commission awards grants to high-tech joint ventures between American and Israeli companies, on a competitive basis, involving both U.S. and Israeli Government and private-sector judges. Awards are made on a cost-sharing basis, with the private sector paying at least one-half of the cost.

The joint projects awarded thus far include:

•development of a new compact nuclear imaging camera to create images of major organs and detect diseases, such as cancer;

•research on developing a high-efficiency, modular solar power generation system, to be commercially ready by 1998-1999;

•development of new products and technologies for efficient year-round production of farmed seafood (aquaculture);

•development of a high-performance, compact and low-cost ultrasound system;

•development and commercialization of technology for ceramic-metal bonding to improve the performance of engines used in the automotive, aerospace, and industrial sectors;

•design and development of a seawater desalination technology that can be used worldwide.

Perhaps more important than the direct grants are the Commission's efforts to promote economic and technological collaboration between the two countries. Several working groups are charged with identifying and removing existing regulatory impediments to collaboration.

The most promising area is food and drug-testing standardization. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is working with Israeli health ministry personnel to inform Israeli pharmaceutical companies about FDA rules and regulations.

Other Commission activities include:

•harmonizing standards in food, cosmetics, energy, and the environment to facilitate cooperation and trade;

•showcasing to U.S. companies technologies developed by the Israeli defense industry that have commercial applications;

•organizing coperative projects in new information technology, telemedicine, and biomedicine;

•establishing a World Wide Web site (located at www.usistc.org), which interlinks business and technology information available to both U.S. and Israeli companies.

For further information on the Commission, contact Lee E. Bailey, the executive director in the United States, at 202-482-6264.

—Steven L. Spiegel

Dr. Spiegel is a political science professor at UCLA and head research consultant for the Center for Policy Options at the University of Judaism in Los Angeles. His latest book is World Politics In A New Era *(Harcourt, Brace College Publishers, 1995).*

Russia Says It Will Continue Nuclear Collaboration With Iran

Russia—which plays host to President Clinton and other world leaders at a conference on nuclear safety later this month—says it will continue supporting Iran's nuclear program.

"Russia will keep working under the contract to build a power station in Bushehr, in spite of criticism coming from the United States," First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets said April 10.

Soskovets (who made his remarks at a Moscow meeting with Iranian Ambassador Mehdi Safari) said Moscow is also prepared to sign contracts to build planes in Iran, and to provide Tehran with oil drilling and refinery equipment (Reuter, Apr. 10). ❑

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Pp 90-11.

Hizballah in Lebanon

Summary

Emerged in 1983
Power in Shiite community in L.
By 1990, gained control of [illegible] of Shiite concentration
Increasing inability of Iran to support H.
H. future is in jeopardy

Emerged in 1983 with a whirlwind of attack against Israeli targets. I left Lebanon since 1982

~~Emerged~~

I provided support in establishing & maintaining the organization - it's good a republic in L like that in Iran
Its Secy General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah admitted. He [illegible] with Iran (He stated every party in L has [illegible] other countries.
At end of 1980 gained control of [illegible] of West Beirut & large sections of South L.
Challenges: Taif agreement which led to end of civil war & new Maronite Sunni order with Syrian backing
Shiite community excluded from new order altho it constitutes a majority in L
Second challenge in Peace Process
Third: Iran increasing political & economic difficulties contained its ability to handle H.
H ready to abandon ideological goals & now pressurizing to postpone their implementation
H Took part in L's parliamentary elections in 1992
Seeking to expand into social & economic sphere

which H initially rejected outright

Grudging readiness to accept a possible Syrian
& Israel Lebanon peace deal

Can H purely change course
Wd hear the difference with AMAL is
rival for contested Shi'i community
Israel regard H as a terrorist organization/
its future is in jeopardy
De facto deal with Israel to avoid
civilian target

Military wing of H responsible for bombing of
Wilbur Embassy in Beirut (1983) & Marine
Headquarters 6 mos later in Oct 83
in Nov 83 Israel Army Headquarters
in Tyre bombed. 29 soldiers
killed. In Sept ~~85~~ 85 Israel
withdrew to its 'Security Zone' in
South Lebanon
L's Shi'ite community remains there
into a radical aggressive factor

Iran responsible as inspiration & real mentor
for Shi'ites religious leader
Iran hears H's primary backer
financial, militarily politically
about 1500 Iran Revolutionary Guard
stationed in Bigar Valley since 1982
arms & economic aid = tens of millions of
dollars annually
Also made possible H's expansion in
health, education & welfare
Also provided by Iran political [illegible]

War of June 1982 - Fall of PLO & ex

(Israel allied itself with Maronites)

% of total population of Shiite surveyed for
19% in 1950 to 30% in early 70
Shiite clerical leader Musa Sadr

Shiite community lacked a foreign patron
& also a military to protect it
Musa Sadr founded Amal movement
as a military force
Sadr ~~[illegible]~~ disappeared in Libya
& replaced as Amal leader by
Nabih Barri

[H. goal to establish Islamic regime as
Iranian model
Cornerstone of effort to destroy Israel

Spiritual leader Muhammad Fadlallah
is the spiritual leader & inspiration
[illegible] advisory council of religious rogers
H. protected an overtly [illegible] & [illegible] political
operated a TV and radio station
operated in Biqua Beirut & South Lebanon

Shiite along a small minority among a
[illegible] Sunni population
Syria mostly Sunni
99 H. does not employ [illegible] suffer
[illegible] Shiite communities

By 1990 [illegible] control of West Beirut [illegible]
imported Sunni centre [illegible] [illegible]
Biqa valley and [illegible]

Syr hab Amal
Hez " H.
Majority of communal suffer Amal &
the world Up

TAIF agreement Oct 1989 - marked end
of Civil war & new Lebanon order
under Syrian patronage
replacing National Covenant of 1943
Taif agreement is nothing but a Maronite
Sunni contract enabling the
notable families of each to maintain
their control over state & society

During war years Shiite communal agreement
in Tarif & Co. constituting 30%
of population. Maronite &
Sunni left without extent
support or protection. Sunni do
not even have a militia

Taif agreement annual continuation of
Maronite Sunni authority
agreed Maronite Pres. Sunni PM &
Claim of Parliament & Shiite
Taif resuscitated the Lebanese govt
giving Amal a clear advantage
Hizb. widely believed to be responsible for
assassination of pro elect Rene Mu'a w. and
in Can not explain in 1989

Hadi, pro-Syrian law ~~for~~ welcome Syrian suffer
S. Lan no interest in underminding
Clamor to region & bolt

In Sept 93 [illegible] [illegible] Wet Beer

against Oslo agreement [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
Sept 13 [illegible]

1994 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
of H
Fad [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In [illegible] 95 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] H [illegible] [illegible]
In Oct 95 [illegible] [illegible] Hiraoui [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Oct 1998
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

163 H [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

H & [illegible] [illegible] Nasrallah
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
H & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] H [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Since 1997
H [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

p 10

Today Amal [illegible] H. [illegible]
Lebanon Strike
H Sen Gen Abbas Musawi
& Shaik Fadhallah [illegible]
[illegible] Amal &
Hasan Nasrallah

Lebanon [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
against Hezbollah [illegible]

p 105

H owes its [illegible] to its violence

In Feb 92. Israel killed Abbas Musawi. H
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in Bekaa
Acre

Deal worked out with [illegible] for Syria (US)
H would refrain for [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~
against Northern settlement of Israel
& Is. would not take [illegible] action
against [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In Jan 94. H [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] MA & Israel [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]
But two [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] in April 96 [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] W
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
Israel [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

93-905 F

CRS Report for Congress

Hizballah: A Radical Militia in Lebanon

Kenneth Katzman
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

October 7, 1993

Congressional Research Service • The Library of Congress

HIZBALLAH: A RADICAL MILITIA IN LEBANON

SUMMARY

The Hizballah organization in Lebanon remains a highly ideological militia, committed publicly to the destruction of Israel, to an end to the Arab-Israeli peace talks, and to the establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon as part of a broader Islamic state. It has been attacking Israeli positions in southern Lebanon, in an effort to derail the Arab-Israeli peace process under way since October 1991. In addition to opposing a peace on ideological grounds, Hizballah probably believes that a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon and Syria would lead to Hizballah's disarmament. (Hizballah remains the only major militia in Lebanon that has not been disarmed as part of the 1989 Ta'if Accords on political reform in Lebanon.) Although it has not resumed the kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings against the United States and its European allies that characterized its early years, Hizballah is building a stronger network outside Lebanon. It claimed responsibility for bombing the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, in retaliation for Israel's assassination of Hizballah's leader during an Israeli offensive in February 1992.

Some analysts believe that Hizballah's agenda may be shifting as Hizballah realizes it lacks the military or political ability to prevent an Arab-Israeli peace that might lead to its own disarmament. These analysts point to signs that Hizballah wants to play a bigger role in Lebanon's legitimate political process. Most notably, it participated in August/September 1992 parliamentary elections and now, along with its Sunni fundamentalist allies, forms the biggest single bloc in the 128 seat parliament. By participating in the political process, therefore, Hizballah may be seeking to preserve a long term role for itself in Lebanon, even if this comes at the expense of implementing its maximalist ideology, i.e., the destruction of Israel and the purging of Western influence in the Middle East. Most observers believe Hizballah will continue to act against an agreement between Israel and Lebanon and Syria, however.

For support, Hizballah continues to look primarily to Iran, from which it receives arms, funds, and training. The ideology of Iran's revolution infuses the statements of leading Hizballah clerics, many of whom studied under Ayatollah Khomeini. However, some point to strains between Hizballah and Iran, particularly over the level of Iranian financial support to Hizballah. Syria, which has been informally allied with Iran since 1982, seeks leverage over Israel and allows Hizballah to operate in areas that Syria controls with its 40,000 troops in Lebanon. Syria also permits Iranian weapons shipments to reach Hizballah through Syrian and Syrian-controlled territory. Syria, however, has generally supported the rival Amal organization (the more moderate Shia group in Lebanon) and has often acted to rein in Hizballah in order to prevent a breakdown of the Middle East peace process and avoid direct conflict with Israel. Syria also has a secular government that is concerned about the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism such as that espoused by Hizballah.

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HIZBALLAH: A RADICAL MILITIA IN LEBANON

INTRODUCTION

Hizballah is a political movement, as well as a militia, composed of Lebanese Shia Arabs. It is the activities of Hizballah's militia that have earned Hizballah the label of terrorist organization by the State Department. In its annual report on international terrorism for 1992, the State Department describes Hizballah as a "radical Shia Muslim group formed in Lebanon, dedicated to the creation of an Iranian style Islamic republic in Lebanon and removal of all non-Islamic influences from [the] area. [It is] strongly anti-West and anti-Israel [and] closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran." [1] The report says Hizballah is "known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the U.S. Embassy annex in September 1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of most, if not all, U.S. and other Western hostages in Lebanon. Islamic Jihad [another name used by Hizballah elements] publicly claimed responsibility for the car-bombing of Israel's Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992." [2] There was widespread agreement among analysts that Hizballah provoked a series of clashes with Israeli forces in southern Lebanon in July 1993 that escalated into the most massive Israeli retaliation since the Israeli incursion into that country against Palestinian guerrillas in 1982. Hizballah (Arabic for "The Party of God") reportedly has several thousand fighters and numerous other supporters among Lebanon's Shia community, which constitutes about 38% of Lebanon's population. Hizballah elements sometimes act under a variety of names, possibly corresponding to different cells or clans within the organization, including: Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. Hizballah's military operations are carried out under the name Islamic Resistance.

Some observers believe Hizballah is shifting from its stated goal of the destruction of Israel and the elimination of Western influence from the Middle East, perhaps realizing that such goals are not achievable. For example, since the release of all American hostages from Lebanon in December 1991, Hizballah has not conducted any similar attacks against the United States or its European allies. Moreover, it is now participating in the legitimate political process in Lebanon; it won eight seats in Lebanon's 128 seat parliament in August/September 1992 elections. Hizballah may be seeking to play a larger role in Lebanese politics

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[1] U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992. April 1993. p. 38.

[2] Ibid.

to compensate for what Hizballah may see as likely further limitations on its regional influence in a future peace agreement between Israel and Syria and Lebanon.

FORMATION, ORGANIZATION, AND GOALS

FORMATION

A number of factors accounted for Hizballah's emergence as a movement in 1982. Lebanon's Shia Muslims - who comprise Hizballah - have been underrepresented in the Lebanese power structure and, possibly as a consequence, economically downtrodden. These conditions have created Shia resentment, particularly of the economically and politically dominant Christian community. In addition, the civil war that began in 1975 and pitted virtually all of Lebanon's factions against each other at one time or another left the Lebanese government with very little authority.[3] Power was primarily in the hands of militias linked to the factions that split Lebanon along ethnic, religious, familial, and regional lines, creating a fertile ground for Hizballah's formation.

The proximate event in Hizballah's formation was the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, a response to attacks on northern Israel by Palestinian fighters. The invasion provoked Iran, with Syrian approval, to send a contingent of about 1,000 Revolutionary Guards to Baalbek in eastern Lebanon, ostensibly to combat the Israelis.[4] However, instead of fighting Israeli forces about 35 miles south of their position, the Guards began propagating Iran's Islamic revolution among the Shia community and began running social welfare programs, schools, and hospitals.[5] Gradually, the Guards and hardline Iranian clerics promoted the coalescence in the Baalbek region of local Shia clerics and non-clerical militants who, by late 1982, were referring to themselves as Hizballah, the Arabic word for Party of God. Each cleric who joined Hizballah brought large parts of his

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[3] For further discussion of Lebanon's political crisis, see: U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Lebanon: The Current Crisis, by Clyde Mark. CRS Issue Brief 89118, updated regularly.

[4] The Guard contingent in Lebanon subsequently grew to about 3,000 by the mid to late 1980s, but apparently shrank to about 1,000 after the release of remaining U.S. hostages from Lebanon in December 1991. There was speculation that many of them had been sent to Sudan, where a buildup of Revolutionary Guards reportedly has been underway since 1991. When the remaining hostages were released, there also was a debate in the Iranian leadership about whether or not to withdraw the Guards from Lebanon but the Guard resisted and has remained. See: Katzman, Kenneth. The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. p. 97.

[5] An account of the infiltration of the Revolutionary Guard into the Baalbek area is provided in Wright, Robin. Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam. New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1985. p. 80-82.

congregation into Hizballah's militia; significant numbers of additional recruits were attracted by Hizballah propaganda, sermons, and seminars.[6] It offered to these recruits a vision of an Islamic Lebanon within a broader Islamic revolution, catering to the economically deprived.

The emotional and ideological ties between Iran and Hizballah run deep. Many of the clerics that formed Hizballah had studied under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when he was in exile in Najaf, Iraq, in the 1970s, or his associate Muhammad Baqr Al Sadr, who was executed by Saddam Husayn's regime in 1980. (Khomeini began teaching in Najaf, which is sacred to Shias worldwide, when the Shah of Iran exiled him from Iran in 1963.) Hizballah cleric Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah helped found the Da'wa (Islamic Call), a forerunner of Hizballah, when he was a student of Muhammad Baqr Al Sadr in Najaf, Iraq in the 1960s. Fadlallah brought the Da'wa to Lebanon in the mid 1960s. [7] It is this mentor-student relationship -- a crucial element in the Shia clerical hierarchy --that, in large part, forms the emotional bond between Iran and Hizballah. However, there are occasional strains between Iran and Hizballah over specific tactics and Iranian financial support, as well as cultural differences between Arab Hizballah and Persian Iran.

Some analysts, however, believe the Iranian role in forming Hizballah has been overstated in most writings on Hizballah, and that the structure of the organization was already present even before the Israeli invasion. They trace growing Islamic awareness among Lebanese Shias to such movements as Sayyid the "Movement of the Disinherited," and its military offshoot, Amal (hope) founded by Sayyid Musa Sadr in 1975. The organization now has a clandestine presence in Iraq and possibly some of the Persian Gulf monarchies. In addition, prior to its invasion of Lebanon, Israel had established contact with Shia leaders in southern Lebanon in an attempt to create an anti-Palestinian ally there. Many of these Shias turned on Israel after its invasion and later joined Hizballah.

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[6] For a further discussion of the factions that comprise Hizballah, see: Shapira, Shimon. The Origins of Hizballah. Jerusalem Quarterly, Spring 1988.

[7] Marlowe, Lara. Cleric Who Holds the Reins of Power. Financial Times, August 31, 1991. p. 14. Hizballah in Lebanon apparently retained connections to Da'wa branches in the Persian Gulf states, which are still active, particularly in southern Iraq. During the time of the holding of Western hostages by Hizballah in Lebanon, a consistent demand of the hostage holders was the release of 17 Da'wa prisoners held in Kuwait. The Da'wa prisoners were held for the bombing on December 12, 1983, of six foreign and Kuwaiti installations, including the U.S. Embassy compound, in Kuwait. At least one of the Da'wa prisoners was reportedly related or linked to Imad Mughniyah, identified alternately as chief of the hostage holders, the head of Islamic Jihad, or chief of security for Hizballah.

ORGANIZATION AND ARMAMENT

Many analysts have described the organizational structure of Hizballah -- both its political and military wings -- as fluid and flexible. Hizballah's organization has traditionally been based on the personal authority and following of its clerical leaders and its militia commanders, linked by a common ideology and background. In addition, clans and families have dominated large factions within Hizballah. In the late 1980s, however, Hizballah attempted to become more centralized and structured. It formed an overarching 12 person consultative council and three regional councils corresponding to its areas of greatest influence in Lebanon: the Bekaa Valley (the base of most of Hizballah's senior clerics), the southern suburbs of Beirut (to which many Shias migrated during the 1975-90 civil war), and the traditional Shia villages in southern Lebanon. Decisions of the 12 person consultative council are implemented by a Political Bureau, which is chosen by an electoral body of delegates that meets in a congress about every four years. Hizballah also established a screening system for its militia recruits, probably to prevent penetration by Israeli, Syrian, and Lebanese government agents.[8] According to its current chief, Hasan Nasrallah, its decisions are by a majority vote of the recognized leaders of Hizballah, but on major decisions, Hizballah leaders usually try to achieve a consensus. Some observers believe that, in hesitating to discuss organization, Hizballah is trying to mask a high degree of factionalization.

Hizballah's military wing operates under the name Islamic Resistance. The State Department's 1992 report on international terrorism lists Hizballah's "strength" at several thousand. Hizballah sources assert that the organization has about 5,000 - 10,000 fighters.[9] Hizballah fighters tend to operate in small units in order to avoid becoming a concentrated target to its enemies. Hizballah's main military bases are in the Bekaa Valley, where they are protected by Syrian air cover, and its forces in southern Lebanon are widely dispersed in small groups that use information and support from the local Shia population.[10]

Hizballah is predominantly a light force. It is equipped primarily with small arms, such as automatic rifles, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and Katyusha rockets, which it occasionally has fired on towns in northern Israel. U.S. officials

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[8] Kramer, Martin. The Moral Logic of Hizballah. International Security Studies Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Working Paper No. 84. Washington, D.C., November 1987.

[9] Ladki, Nadim. Die Hard Hizballah Guerrillas Torment Israel. Reuters, August 19, 1993.

[10] Vendetta, With Missiles. The Economist. Volume 323, May 30, 1992. p. 43-44. The dispersal of Hizballah's forces in southern Lebanon is unlike the concentrated force deployments characteristic of the Palestinian guerrillas that, prior to 1982, used southern Lebanon as a base to attack Israel. According to U.S. counterterrorism officials, Hizballah's dispersed deployments in the south have made difficult targets for Israeli aircraft during Israeli-Hizballah conflict.

say it does not have truck mounted multiple launch systems for the Katyushas, however. Hizballah guerrillas are sometimes shown on television conducting military parades in Beirut, which often include tanks and armored personnel carriers that may have been captured from the Lebanese army or purchased from Palestinian guerrillas or other sources. Hizballah has also frequently used remotely detonated bombs against Israeli or South Lebanese Army (SLA, a pro-Israeli militia led by Brigadier General Antoine Lahad) patrols in Israel's "security zone" in southern Lebanon. According to State Department counterterrorism officials, Hizballah also has short-range anti-tank weapons but apparently not wire-guided systems such as the Sagger. However, an Israeli general said that anti-Israeli forces in southern Lebanon had used the Sagger against Israel following clashes in late July 1993.[11] In addition, there have been reports that Iran, with Syrian complicity, delivered anti-tank rockets, possibly Saggers, to Hizballah immediately preceding its July 1993 clashes with Israel.[12] U.S. officials add that there is an assumption that Hizballah also has some Russian-made shoulder held anti-aircraft missiles such as the SAM-7, but there is no record of Hizballah shooting down Israeli aircraft. Hizballah is not known to possess such sophisticated weapons as Stinger anti-aircraft missile launchers, but its patron, Iran, is believed to possess some and is reportedly attempting to acquire additional Stingers in Afghanistan.[13] Some U.S. officials believe the Iranian supply is limited and it would not be willing to turn any over to Hizballah.

IDEOLOGY AND GOALS

Hizballah's ideology, motivation, and goals, are best understood from the statements of its clerical leaders. These include its current chief, Hasan Nasrallah, as well as Shaykh Subhi Tufayli and Mohammad Husayn Fadlallah. (Fadlallah aspires to broad influence as a Shia spiritual leader and has consistently rejected characterizations of him as the senior cleric of Hizballah or spiritual mentor of the organization.) However, there are many divisions and differences of opinion among top Hizballah leaders, and Hizballah's intentions are therefore best judged by ideas expressed widely among Hizballah's factions.

Virtually all of Hizballah's leaders view Lebanon as an artificial creation of the West; they want to see it become a purely Islamic republic within a greater

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[11] Rudge, David and Raine Marcus. Nine Soldiers Killed by Hizballah Bombs in S. Lebanon. Jerusalem Post International Edition, week ending August 28, 1993. p. 1.

[12] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights. U.S. Security Policy Vis-a-Vis Rogue Regimes. Hearing, 103rd Congress, 1st Session. Federal News Service, July 28, 1993; Congressional Record, daily edition. July 28, 1993. p. E 1912.

[13] Weiner, Tim. U.S. Will Try to Buy Antiaircraft Missiles Back From Afghans. New York Times, July 24, 1993. p. A1.

Islamic state that would encompass the whole region, including Israel. Even though the creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon was not included in Hizballah's manifesto, [14] Hizballah leaders see the creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon as a step in promoting the formation of a greater Islamic state, not as a final goal. They argue that Lebanon is too small and politically and militarily weak to form an Islamic republic that could stand by itself. Hizballah rejected the provisions for political reform contained in the 1989 Taif Accords, primarily because the Accords included a commitment to disarmament of Lebanon's militias, of which Hizballah is one, and did not contain what it considered sufficient political concessions to the Shia community.[15] Hizballah supported the Accords' references to U.N. Security Council Resolution 425, of March 19, 1978, which called for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. (About 1,000 Israeli troops, in cooperation with the 2,000 - 3,000 man SLA, have maintained a 5 to 10 mile deep and about 50 miles long "security zone" along the Lebanese-Israeli border since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 -- see map.)

Others believe Hizballah's goals are more limited and that it would abandon its operations against Israel in exchange for a larger role in the Lebanese political system. Analysts who take this view contend that Hizballah realizes that it cannot prevent a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon and Syria if those parties decide on such a step. Furthermore, such an agreement might result in Hizballah's disarmament and a permanent loss of standing if Hizballah does not cultivate an alternate source of influence in Lebanon. For evidence, these analysts point to its decision in 1992 to participate in parliamentary elections in September of that year. Others see no contradiction in these differing analyses, rather, that gaining a greater share of power might represent an interim step toward Hizballah's formation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon and a purge of Western influence from the region.

HIZBALLAH'S ACTIVITIES

Hizballah's activities appear to flow directly from its ideology. Hizballah's operations against Israeli forces in the security zone follow from Hizballah's vision of a broad Islamic state, its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, a desire

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[14] Text of an Open Letter Presented by Hizballah to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World. Pamphlet issued in Beirut, February 16, 1985. p. 6.; Kramer, Martin. Hezbollah's Vision. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Paper No. 16, 1989. p. 51. This open letter is commonly referred to as Hizballah's manifesto or charter.

[15] The Taif Accords refers to an agreement on a possible solution to Lebanon's civil war, reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia. The process began in September 1989 in Taif and was formally approved by deputies of Lebanon's National Assembly on November 5, 1989. For further discussion of the Taif Accords and their provisions, see: U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Lebanon: The Current Crisis, by Clyde Mark. CRS Issue Brief 89118, updated regularly.

to avenge Israeli attacks on Lebanese Shias (including those living within Israel's security zone), and a belief that Israel usurped Islamic lands (those formerly constituting Palestine). Its actions against the United States, including the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks and Embassy annex and the holding of American hostages, appear to have been motivated by Hizballah's belief that the United States is an implacable enemy of Islam. Hizballah viewed the U.S. contribution of 2,000 Marines to a MultiNational Force (MNF) in Lebanon (1982-84) as an effort to prevent the formation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Its competition with other Shia groups in Lebanon -- as well as its social services network and more recent participation in elections -- is based on its commitment to the formation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Hizballah's growing role in the legitimate political process in Lebanon could also be read as an effort to preserve a role for itself in the event there is a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon and Syria. Such an agreement would almost certainly provide, at least implicitly, for the disarmament of Hizballah's militia.

WITHIN LEBANON

Struggles With Other Shia Groups

Hizballah has faced significant obstacles in its drive to make Lebanon an Islamic republic. After rapid growth in size and influence during the early 1980s, later in that decade Hizballah became embroiled in a violent political struggle for supremacy among Lebanese Shias. Its adversary in that struggle was the secular Amal (hope) militia, which has enjoyed the strong backing of Syria and is better armed than Hizballah.[16] Hizballah's revolutionary and Islamic ideology enabled it to siphon many recruits and some leaders from the more pragmatic Amal, which has been less willing to fight Israel in southern Lebanon. For example, Husayn Musawi, the leader of the Islamic Amal faction of Hizballah, broke away from Amal in favor of Hizballah in 1983, when Amal decided to enter the Lebanese government.[17] The tensions between Hizballah and Amal manifested as violent clashes during 1988-90, in which Amal defeated Hizballah in Amal's traditional stronghold in southern Lebanon but Hizballah wrested from Amal control of the largely Shia southern suburbs of Beirut. Amal reportedly initiated the fighting in 1988 in an effort to solidify its base in Lebanon's Shia

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[16] From the time of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979 until Hizballah's formation in 1982, Amal enjoyed the support of Iran, which was looking to promote its revolution to Lebanese Shias. Iran backed away from Amal when Hizballah, which was more in line with Iran's ideology, was formed.

[17] Amal, which has suspended its militia activities in accordance with post-Taif reconciliation, is led by Nabih Berri, who now serves as Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament.

community in advance of anticipated 1988 elections (not held).[18] Hizballah was allowed to return to southern Lebanon under an Iranian-brokered ceasefire of January 30, 1989. There have been some clashes between the two forces since that time, primarily in early 1990 and again in April 1990, but Amal and Hizballah began cooperating in June 1992 to contest Lebanese parliamentary elections.

Social Services

As noted above, Hizballah expanded rapidly in the early 1980s by maximizing its use of social service networks, performing functions and services that the Lebanese Government, because of the civil war and financial constraints, could not. Its strong social services network could allow Hizballah to remain popular among Lebanese Shias even if Hizballah's militia is disarmed in connection with a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. In Beirut's southern suburbs and other Hizballah strongholds, Hizballah has provided clean water, hospitals, and subsidized medical clinics. It also runs schools reportedly staffed by well qualified teachers, sells food at discount supermarkets, and rebuilds damaged homes for poor Lebanese. [19] During a snowstorm in the winter of 1991-1992, Hizballah organized teams of relief workers to open roads and distribute food and other provisions to villages cut off in the storm.[20] Hizballah also has a reconstruction arm, the Holy Struggle for Reconstruction, that financed repairs of over 1,000 homes in south Lebanon following an Israeli offensive into two Shia areas north of the security zone villages in February 1992.[21] Travelers report that many Hizballah establishments are emblazoned with images of the Iranian flag or the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Moreover, Hizballah activists often have tried, sometimes through violence, to interfere with other businesses it considers "un-Islamic." However, they note that Hizballah is less strict in its enforcement of Islamic values in areas under its control than was the case a few years ago. Lebanese officials say that, as it rebuilds Lebanon, the Lebanese government hopes to take over the performance of traditional governmental functions from Hizballah. Hizballah's social services network has helped it attract recruits and take away

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[18] Many analysts believed that Amal's patron, Syria, encouraged Amal to clash with Hizballah in an effort to limit Hizballah's influence in Lebanon. Syria is a secular state that, to some degree, fears the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and Syria has generally tried to prevent other powers from exercising major influence in Lebanon. However, Syria has tolerated Hizballah's presence in areas of Lebanon that are under Syrian control (such as the Bekaa Valley) in order to maintain good relations with Iran and to gain leverage vis-a-vis Israel.

[19] Brooks, Geraldine. Changing Image: Radical Islamic Groups in Lebanon Tone Down Anti-Western Fervor. Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1991. p. A1.

[20] Trendle, Giles. Lebanon: The Grass Roots of Success. The Middle East, February 1993. p. 12.

[21] Ibid.

support from its chief rival for Shia loyalties, Amal, which is not financially supported by Iran.

Elections/Political Process

From the time of its formation until shortly before August/September 1992 parliamentary elections, Hizballah had opposed any involvement in the legitimate political process in Lebanon. However, in early 1992 -- perhaps realizing that its maximalist goals could not be achieved -- it decided to participate in the August/September 1992 elections. This decision prompted some observers to argue that Hizballah was becoming a more traditional political movement. Acknowledging that the decision was a departure for Hizballah, its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, explained the goals of that decision as: stiffening political and moral support in Lebanon for Hizballah's "resistance" against Israel; ending Lebanon's participation in the U.S. sponsored Middle East peace talks (begun October 30, 1991) and voting down any agreement under those talks that might require parliamentary approval; overturning what Nasrallah describes as political domination by Lebanon's Maronite Christians and the confessional basis of the Lebanese political system, more broadly; and promoting laws that better serve the lower classes. [22] There was some indication of dissent within Hizballah in the decision to participate; a Hizballah leader, Subhi Tufayli (formerly its Secretary General) reportedly believed that contesting the elections would represent a diminution of Hizballah's revolutionary zeal. The Lebanese press reported that Tufayli's position had support among rank and file Hizballah members. [23]

In the elections, Hizballah concentrated on winning seats in its three major strongholds, forming a common slate with its erstwhile rival, Amal, in southern Lebanon under a "Liberation List." Hizballah won heavily in the Baalbek region of the Bekaa Valley. Out of 128 seats up for election, Hizballah won eight seats outright and its Sunni Muslim fundamentalist allies won four others, giving Hizballah the largest single bloc in the new parliament. Some analysts attributed Hizballah's strong showing to a boycott of the elections by most Maronite Christians, who argued elections could not be fair because Syria maintained a presence in Beirut. Others believe its social services have made Hizballah genuinely popular among Lebanese Shias. Some believe Hizballah did commit some election fraud, although few believe the alleged fraud was so widespread to have drastically affected Hizballah's vote. According to its current leader, Hasan Nasrallah, Hizballah's support comes mainly from younger Lebanese Shias.

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[22] Nasrallah Views Hizballah's Political Activity. Tehran Keyhan in Persian. October 27, 1992. p. 16. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS NES 92 217, November 9, 1992. p. 42.

[23] Hizballah Faces Divisions Over Iranian Policies. Beirut Al Shira', January 4, 1993 in FBIS, January 5, 1993. p. 34.

Hizballah therefore wants to lower the voting age in Lebanon from 21 to 18 years of age.[24]

Following the elections, Hizballah continued to assert that it is an opposition element. Its spokesmen declared that Hizballah would not accept any positions in the Lebanese government but indicated it would coordinate and cooperate with Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Hizballah said it would allow its four Sunni fundamentalist allies in the Chamber of Deputies (parliament) to participate in the government. Lebanese officials note that Hizballah deputies in parliament have followed parliamentary procedure and have not been disruptive, but they continue to assert the stated goals of destroying Israel and creating an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Hizballah deputies have become focused to some degree on local issues, such as services and infrastructure, however. Some observers add that because Hizballah is based on ideology, Hizballah deputies in parliament are less willing to engage in corrupt practices that have allegedly tainted members of Lebanon's traditional power blocs.

AGAINST ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Hizballah's opposition to the State of Israel is based on Hizballah's belief that Israel is "the American spearhead in our Islamic world," as well as its desire to retaliate for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its belief that Israel should not control any of the land or Muslim holy sites in what formerly was Palestine.[25] Statements by Hizballah leaders indicate their belief that Israel's actions, including the invasion of Lebanon, are decided in Washington and that the only way to purge U.S. influence from the region is to destroy Israel. Hizballah's rejection of Israel -- as well as fear of its own disarmament -- also forms the basis of its opposition to any Arab-Israeli peace settlement, including the September 13, 1993 Israel-PLO agreement on Palestinian autonomy. On that day, Hizballah participated in a public demonstration in Beirut against the agreement; six of its fighters were killed by Lebanese soldiers who were attempting to suppress the demonstration. Hizballah deputies in parliament have demanded an investigation of the Lebanese army's handling of the demonstration and punishment of those officials and army officers responsible.

To express its opposition to Israel's existence, Hizballah has forged growing ties to radical Palestinian groups opposed to the peace process and it has undertaken its own military operations against Israeli forces and their allies in southern Lebanon.

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[24] Nasrallah on Hizballah's Political Profile, Israeli Prisoners. Tehran Resalat in Persian, October 13, 1992 in FBIS-NES-92-209, October 28, 1992. p. 38.

[25] Text of an Open Letter Presented by Hizballah to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World.

Alliances With Radical Palestinian Groups

The Palestinian uprising on the West Bank and Gaza strip, which began in late 1987, created an opportunity for Hizballah to develop *de facto* alliances with like-minded Palestinian groups. Hizballah and the radical Palestinian groups have been united by their opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process that presumably would result in a territorial compromise with Israel. Hizballah held conferences and rallies in Lebanon in support of the uprising, and it built ties to a Palestinian Islamic group called Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which originated among militant Palestinian fundamentalists in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s (Islamic Jihad is one of the names used by Hizballah activists in terrorist operations).[26] The uprising also helped spawn another militant Palestinian Islamic group, Hamas, to which Hizballah and Iran are also reported to have developed strong ties.[27] Hamas was an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and has become the major rival to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) among Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas rejects the Arab-Israeli peace talks. Hizballah also has expanded its ties to a secular Palestinian radical group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC), headed by Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian army. Fighters from the PFLP-GC and other radical Palestinian groups fought alongside Hizballah in the July 1993 clashes with Israel in southern Lebanon. Hizballah and representatives of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP-GC expressed rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process at a conference hosted by Iran, held on the eve of the October 30, 1991 Madrid Middle East peace conference. Hizballah also has called on radical Palestinian groups to aggressively oppose the Israel-PLO agreement.

Operations Against Israeli Forces

Hizballah's operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon during the Israeli occupation were widely believed to have contributed to Israel's decision in early 1985 to withdraw from Lebanon and to accelerate the withdrawal once it had begun. Hizballah, as well as Amal, conducted car, truck, and remote detonation bombings against Israeli forces during their occupation of parts of Lebanon (1982-85), killing many Israeli soldiers.[28] Hizballah, as well as other Lebanese and Palestinians, continued to attack Israeli forces in the southern "security zone" after Israel withdrew in 1985 from all areas north of the zone. The security zone is inhabited largely by Lebanese Shias. As Hizballah became more organized and well trained in the post withdrawal period, its attacks on the SLA increasingly took on a more conventional form, and the use of suicide attacks decreased.

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[26] Kramer, Martin. Hezbollah's Vision of the West. p. 59.

[27] U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Hamas: The Organization, Goals, and Tactics of a Militant Palestinian Organization, by James Wootten. CRS Report No. 93-511F, revised and updated August 19, 1993.

[28] Wright, Robin. Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Militant Islam. p. 228.

The latest phase of operations against Israel appears to have begun following the start of Middle East peace talks in October 1991, and appears to be intended to derail the peace process. (Lebanon is a participant in these talks, as is Israel.) On February 16, 1992, an Israeli helicopter attack on Hizballah positions resulted in the death of Hizballah leader Abbas Musawi and members of his family. (Israel did not deny that the attack on Musawi was premeditated.) Hizballah retaliated for the attack on March 17, 1992 by planting a bomb at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and wounding 242.[29] Hizballah claimed responsibility for the attack under the name Islamic Jihad.

The July 1993 Clashes

The most violent round of clashes since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon took place in July, 1993 after Hizballah attacks against Israeli and SLA forces in the security zone killed six Israeli soldiers within two weeks in mid July. (Hizballah attacks killed 3 Israeli soldiers on July 8 and another on July 22; its *de facto* ally the PFLP-GC killed two Israeli soldiers on July 8.) The Hizballah attacks occurred shortly before U.S. Secretary of State Christopher was to visit the Middle East in an effort to organize an eleventh round in the Middle East peace talks.[30] In response to the Hizballah attacks, Israel, on July 25, launched a series of large scale air, naval, and artillery attacks on Hizballah and PFLP-GC positions in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, termed "Operation Accountability." Three Syrian soldiers were killed in the course of the attacks in the Bekaa, but Syria did not retaliate against Israel directly. As the Israeli offensive began, Hizballah also launched Katyusha rockets on towns in northern Israel, such as Qiryat Shemona, and Israel subsequently began striking Hizballah positions in civilian areas in southern Lebanon in an effort to pressure Syria and Lebanon to curb Hizballah by creating a flood of about 300,000 refugees. (Hizballah has often established positions in civilian areas in an effort to discourage retaliation.) The Israeli artillery barrage killed about 120 and wounded about 500 Lebanese; two Israeli civilians and one soldier were killed; and 25 Israeli civilians and 9 soldiers were wounded during the operations.[31]

The Israeli strikes on civilian areas may have contributed to a decision by the United States to mediate a ceasefire. Some analysts believe the strikes on civilian areas may have increased popular support for Hizballah in southern

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[29] U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992. p. 22. The State Department report adds that Iran "at least had foreknowledge of this act and was probably involved."

[30] The flareup appeared to temporarily threaten the peace talks but did not derail them; and an eleventh round began on August 31, 1993. However, according to press accounts, the fighting caused Secretary of State Christopher to abbreviate a diplomatic trip to Asia in order to deal with defusing the confrontations.

[31] Figures for Israeli casualties provided by the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C. Figures for Hizballah and PFLP-GC casualties are not known. The Israeli civilians were killed by the Katyusha rocket attacks on northern Israel.

Lebanon. U.S. mediation largely ended the fighting by July 31 (a few days before Secretary of State Christopher's arrival in the region); Hizballah reportedly pledged not to attack Israeli towns but did not agree to discontinue operations against Israel and the SLA in the security zone.[32] On August 19, however, Hizballah detonated three remote control bombs in the security zone, resulting in the death of nine Israeli soldiers. Probably to avoid another prolonged round of fighting that could derail the Arab-Israeli peace process and/or its private negotiations with the PLO, Israeli retaliation was limited. Sporadic, small clashes have continued since then, but Hizballah has not fired any rockets on northern Israel.

Following the ceasefire, about 300 Lebanese troops moved into southern Lebanon, presumably to rein in Hizballah attacks on Israel. Lebanon reportedly wanted to deploy more than the largely symbolic 300 troops but Damascus reportedly pressured Beirut to scale back the deployment. Syria was said to fear that the Lebanese deployment could lead to fighting between Lebanese soldiers and Hizballah, legitimize Israeli demands for security guarantees with Lebanon and, possibly, lead the United Nations to conclude that its peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon was no longer necessary.[33] The Lebanese government, reportedly at the behest of Syria, said its troops would not attempt to disarm Hizballah or take over its positions. The United Nations allowed the Lebanese army to deploy in southern Lebanon alongside units of the 5,900 man U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a peacekeeping force.[34] (UNIFIL, which is to maintain strict neutrality among warring parties, had previously opposed maintaining joint checkpoints with the Lebanese army in southern Lebanese villages.)

The U.S.-Brokered Ceasefire

In mediating the ceasefire, U.S. Secretary of State Christopher apparently worked primarily with Syria, which regards Hizballah as an instrument with which to pressure Israel. However, Syria has been known to restrain Hizballah to avoid clashing with Israel directly. According to U.S. officials, there was no U.S. contact, direct or indirect, with Iran in arranging the ceasefire. However, according to some U.S. officials and foreign diplomats, once Syria had decided to try to wind down the clashes, it apparently asked Iranian leaders to restrain and discontinue arming their client, Hizballah, and Iranian Foreign Minister

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[32] Some Hizballah leaders later said Hizballah had not agreed not to attack northern Israel, and that the ceasefire represented only an "understanding," not an agreement.

[33] Lebanese Leaders in Talks With Syria's Assad. Reuters, August 16, 1993.

[34] Lebanese Army to Deploy Up to "Security Zone" Alongside UNIFIL. Mideast Mirror, August 2, 1993. p. 13.

Velayati visited Damascus to help work out the ceasefire arrangements.[35] The Administration, as well as Israel, praised Syria for helping arrange the ceasefire.[36] No information has appeared to confirm speculation that the United States reached any understandings with Syria -- such as a promise to remove it from the "terrorism list" -- in exchange for its help in brokering a ceasefire.[37]

TERRORISM/EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES

Many of Hizballah's activities since the early 1980s fit any reasonable definition of terrorism. However, it should be noted that there have been no hostage takings or hijackings against the United States and its European allies over the past two years.[38] [39] In June 1992, Hizballah released two German hostages -- Heinrich Struebig and Thomas Kemptner, who were captured on May

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[35] Haeri, Safa. Iran's "Positive Attitude." Middle East International, August 6, 1993. p. 6.

[36] Holmes, Steven. Peres Praises Syrian Leader for Role in Ceasefire. New York Times, August 4, 1993. p. A7.

[37] Zak, Moshe. Lebanon: A Chance to Move Ahead. Jerusalem Post International Edition, August 14, 1993. p. 6.

[38] Specific acts of Hizballah terrorism against the United States and its allies, from the formation of Hizballah until the release of remaining U.S. hostages from Lebanon in December 1991, are covered in U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Lebanon: U.S. Hostages, An Overview and Chronology, February 10, 1984 - December 27, 1991, by Clyde Mark. CRS Report No. 92-398F, April 7, 1992.

[39] The foreign assistance appropriations act for FY 1991 (P.L. 101-513), signed November 5, 1990, attempted to help the U.S. victims of Hizballah terrorism, the former U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Section 599C of that act provided life and health insurance to the hostages and their families, as well as a salary at the GS-9, Step 1 level ($24,705 in 1990) during the period of their captivity, provided the hostages were not paid a salary by another employer during their captivity. The act appropriated $10 million for this purpose.

16, 1989. [40] Aside from six missing Israeli servicemen,[41] the two were the last remaining Western hostages known held.

Even though Hizballah has released all Western hostages it once held and has not seized any additional hostages, in early 1993, senior U.S. intelligence officials told journalists that they still regard Hizballah as "the most aggressive and lethal sponsor of terrorism in the world." [42] They were probably referring to the buildup of Hizballah's presence worldwide. Hizballah's ability to conduct the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires demonstrates a presence in South America, far from Lebanon. The State Department listed Sudan's harboring of Hizballah -- as well as several other groups -- as a reason for placing Sudan on the "terrorism list" on August 18, 1993.[43] On July 12, 1993, a State Department spokesman warned travelers to the former Yugoslavia that Hizballah elements, as well as Iranian Revolutionary Guards, were present there, and that both organizations had clear terrorist capabilities.[44] There have also been allegations that Hizballah is building a network of support in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and has established at least one cell in

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[40] There were reports that Hizballah released the two Germans in exchange for the promised release of two Hizballah terrorists imprisoned in Germany -- Abbas and Mohammed Ali Hammadi. Mohammed Ali was imprisoned for his role in the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985, in which U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was killed; Abbas was arrested on charges of conspiring to kidnap Germans in Beirut. The alleged kidnapper of the two German hostages was Abdul Hadi Hammadi, brother of the two Hammadis and reportedly a key Hizballah commander, who had captured the Germans in order to exchange them for his brothers. Germany denied it would release the two as part of an exchange but it did release Abbas Hammadi in July 1993, short of his full sentence.

[41] According to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., six Israeli soldiers are still held by Hizballah or its allies. Pilot Ron Arad, captured in 1986, is believed still alive and held by Iran's Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon; two other Israeli servicemen are believed dead; and the fate of three others is not known. There is continued speculation that Israel, Hizballah, and Iran have been indirectly discussing a possible exchange of the Israelis, especially Arad, for Shaykh Abd al-Qarim Ubayd, a Hizballah cleric seized by Israel on July 28, 1989. According to press reports, Israel also holds about 350 Shia prisoners who also could be part of an exchange.

[42] Jehl, Douglas. Iran-Backed Terrorists Are Growing More Aggressive, U.S. Warns. New York Times, March 18, 1993. p. A8; Smith, R. Jeffrey. Experts: Islamic Extremists Pose and Aggressive Threat. Washington Post, March 17, 1993. p. A25.

[43] State Department Regular Briefing. Federal News Service. August 18, 1993.

[44] U.S. Warns Against Revolutionary Guards in Former Yugoslavia. Deutsche Press Agency, July 12, 1993.

Canada.[45] If the allegations are true, a Hizballah network in these countries is probably for the primary purpose of raising money for its operations in the Middle East.[46]

OUTSIDE SUPPORT

SYRIA

While Syrian toleration of Hizballah is widely recognized, there are some differences of opinion among analysts about the degree of its support for the organization. There is widespread agreement among analysts and U.S. officials that Syria exercises some influence on Hizballah and that Syria sometimes encourages Hizballah's aggressive actions. For example, Syria permits Hizballah to operate in areas under Syrian control, such as the Bekaa Valley and it allows Iran to use Syrian territory and facilities, such as Damascus airport, to provide arms to Hizballah. Some believe that Syrian encouragement for Hizballah operations against Israel is part of Syria's effort to force Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and to exercise leverage over Israel in the Middle East peace process. Analysts argue that, if it wanted to, Syria, which maintains about 35,000 troops in Lebanon could help the Lebanese Armed Forces disarm Hizballah at any time and as provided for in the Ta'if Accords.

Others emphasize instances in which Syria has tried to restrain Hizballah. For instance, Syria backed the Amal militia during the Amal-Hizballah clashes of the late 1980s and it made efforts in 1991 to persuade Hizballah to release remaining U.S. hostages. Those subscribing to this view believe Syria tolerates Hizballah to preserve Syria's close relations with Iran, from which it gets some free oil and cooperation on missile production and acquisition. In testimony before the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 27, 1993, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East Edward Djerejian provided some support for both views. He acknowledged that Syria can influence the Iranian resupply of Hizballah but stated that Hizballah acts "rather autonomously" in southern Lebanon where there are no Syrian troops.[47]

This nature of Syria's relationship with Hizballah has often led to controversy. For example, on July 27, 1993, a few days into the major Hizballah-

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[45] Jehl. Douglas. Iran-Backed Terrorists Are Growing More Aggressive, U.S. Warns.

[46] Emerson, Steven. The Great Satan Wins One. Wall Street Journal, June 25, 1993, reprinted in Congressional Record, daily edition. June 29, 1993, p. E 1663, [remarks by Representative Gerald Solomon]

[47] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Developments in the Middle East. Hearing, 103rd Congress, 1st Session. Federal News Service, July 27, 1993.

Israel clashes in July, President Clinton said that Syria had exercised "commendable restraint" during the clashes. He was apparently referring to Syria's refusal to engage Israeli forces in retaliation for the deaths of Syrian soldiers resulting from the Israeli attacks. The President's remarks caused criticism from some Members of Congress, including Representatives Swett, Levy, and Schumer, who argued that Syria supported the Hizballah attacks against Israel, even if it did not enter the battles itself.[48]

IRAN

There is widespread agreement among analysts that Iran is Hizballah's major backer. The Administration blamed Iran for instigating the July 1993 clashes through its relationship with Hizballah, in an effort to sabotage the Middle East peace process.[49] As noted above, Iranian clerics and Revolutionary Guards played a key role in creating Hizballah in 1982. Like Hizballah, Iran has consistently called for Israel's destruction, an end to Middle East peace talks, and the purging of Western influence from the region. Hizballah supports the doctrine of clerical rule (velayat-e-faqih, rule by the supreme Islamic jurisprudent) that was first espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini and forms the basis of Iran's revolutionary regime. Hizballah leaders consistently emphasize that Hizballah is a part of the Islamic revolution that achieved power in Iran.

In spite of recent cutbacks in Iranian aid to Hizballah, Iran reportedly still provides about $60 million annually to underwrite Hizballah activities, and it arms and trains Hizballah through its Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebanon. (According to Lebanese officials, Iranian aid to Hizballah had been as high as $300 million per year.) According to the U.S. Government, in 1992 Iran was the ninth largest arms exporter to the Third World with about $200 million in arms exports; a sizeable part of this figure undoubtedly consisted of arms transfers to Hizballah, and possibly Afghanistan and Sudan.[50] A State Department official adds that Hizballah may also purchase some weapons in the free wheeling market for arms in Lebanon. Iran also reportedly helps fund and administer Hizballah's social services network in Lebanon.

However, some believe that there are potential strains in the Iran-Hizballah relationship and that Iran's influence on Hizballah has waned in recent years. First, there are cultural differences in that Iranians are Persians and Hizballah members, although Shias, are Arabs. Iran's President Rafsanjani has been trying

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[48] See Congressional Record, daily edition. July 28, 1993, p. E 1912; and July 30, 1993. p. H5531, H5533.

[49] White House Blames Iran for Mideast Crisis. Reuters, July 27, 1993.

[50] U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1985-1992, by Richart Grimmett. CRS Report No. 93-656F, July 19, 1993. p. 56. The figures for arms transfer values are rounded to the nearest $100 million.

to improve Iran's relations with the West and some feel that he sees Hizballah as an obstacle to that process. For evidence of some strain, observers point to an Iranian refusal to provide significant additional funds to Hizballah for repair of damage to its infrastructure in south Lebanon following the July 1993 clashes, as well as other cutbacks that began in late 1992.[51] Iranian leaders reportedly told Hizballah to raise the funds privately,[52] probably by seeking donations from hardliner-dominated Iranian foundations. Some interpreted the rebuff as an indication that Iran wants Hizballah to be more self-sufficient financially, given a serious shortage of funds in Iran itself. In addition, Iran no longer deals exclusively with Hizballah in Lebanon, an Iranian policy shift that has angered Hizballah somewhat. Iran has recently begun normal state-to-state relations with Lebanon, including a January 1993 visit of Lebanon's Foreign Minister Faris Buways to Tehran. Iran has also upgraded its Charge d'Affaires in Beirut to the rank of Ambassador.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Many observers believe that Hizballah poses several risks to the United States. Its operations in southern Lebanon, to some degree, threaten the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace process. However, major progress between Israel and the Palestinians -- including the September 13, 1993 Israel-PLO agreement -- has occurred after the July 1993 clashes. Some believe that the actions of Hizballah and its radical Palestinian allies have backfired in that these actions helped persuade Israel to reach accommodation with the PLO, which appears moderate by comparison. However, future Hizballah attacks in southern Lebanon could bring Israeli and Syrian forces into conflict, a possibility that will increase if the Syrian or Israeli leadership is seeking an opportunity to slow progress in the talks.

Hizballah's relative autonomy also threatens the reconstruction of Lebanon's political and economic system, a goal the United States supports. Any disarmament of Hizballah would almost certainly need Syrian approval, since the Lebanese armed forces are considered too weak and vulnerable to fragmentation to accomplish that task themselves. If Hizballah resists a Syrian-Lebanese attempt to disarm it, the organization could trigger a new round of fighting inside Lebanon, possibly including Hizballah suicide or other attacks against Syrian troops in Lebanon. Moreover, a Syrian attempt to help Lebanon disarm Hizballah could seriously strain Syria's relationship with Iran, which strongly opposes disarming Hizballah.

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[51] Hizballah Faces Division Over Iranian Policies. Beirut Al Shira', January 4, 1993 in FBIS-NES-93-002, January 5, 1993. p. 34. Some Hizballah leaders believe Iran has cut back its aid because it wants Hizballah to achieve self-sufficiency through its own businesses.

[52] Mideast Mirror. August 12, 1993. p. 19.

Some posit a scenario in which Hizballah willingly agrees to disarmament and instead focuses on gaining in Lebanon's legitimate political process. Those who take this view point to Hizballah's growing involvement in the legitimate political process in Lebanon. According to this view, Hizballah, while not abandoning efforts to disrupt the peace process, realizes it is not capable of obstructing a peace agreement between Israel and Syria and Lebanon if those parties reach a compromise that is in their interests. Hizballah's increasing focus on the political process may be intended to preserve a role for itself in the event of a peace agreement that will almost certainly, at least implicitly, provide for its disarmament.

Although Hizballah has not committed acts of terrorism against the United States in Lebanon since the release of remaining hostages, U.S. officials nonetheless are concerned about Hizballah's growing worldwide presence. Hizballah could potentially use its growing presence abroad to retaliate against the United States or its allies if, for example, the United States helps Lebanon disarm it or in opposition to the Israeli-PLO or future accords. Others believe Hizballah, in establishing its worldwide network, is following the wishes of Iran, from which Hizballah wants continued financial and political support for its efforts in Lebanon.

U.S. Policy

The United States clearly wants Hizballah's military and external activities curbed and its influence in Lebanon limited. According to State Department officials, with certain possible exceptions, the United States has no contacts with Hizballah, nor are official contacts contemplated.[53] Hizballah is officially considered a terrorist group by the State Department, as noted in its annual report to Congress on international terrorism. However, the United States did not oppose Hizballah's entry into the legitimate political process in Lebanon in its participation in the August/September 1992 parliamentary elections, largely because the Lebanese government legally recognized Hizballah as a political party in advance of the elections.

The United States supports all aspects of the Ta'if Accords, which present a blueprint for the political reconstruction of Lebanon but also call for the disarming of militias, including Hizballah. The United States also believes that a successful conclusion to Middle East peace talks, which presumably would result in an Israeli and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, would remove the potential for confrontation between Israel and Hizballah and facilitate Hizballah's disarmament. In March 1993, Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian said that, as of December 1992, the Lebanese army had begun to extend its authority in the southern suburbs of Beirut and had retaken control of some of those areas,

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[53] U.S. officials noted in August 1993 that there may be some operational contact with Hizballah regarding the security of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. They note that similar arrangements have been made in the past with such groups as the PLO, in order to ensure the security of the Embassy and U.S. personnel.

presumably from Hizballah.[54] State Department officials say they favor the continuing extension of Lebanese military authority into southern Lebanon and they are pressing for the complete disarming of Hizballah with their Lebanese and Syrian counterparts. Lebanon, however, says it will not try to disarm Hizballah as long as Israel maintains its security zone in southern Lebanon. The United States also is urging Syria not to allow resupply of Hizballah through territory under Syrian control. Because of the continuing poor relations between the United States and Iran, the United States has little leverage with which to persuade Tehran to end support for Hizballah.

Economic Aid

To strengthen Lebanon's government and military, and presumably their ability to rein in or marginalize Hizballah, the Bush Administration requested $4 million in Development Assistance (DA) and $5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for FY 1993. Congress earmarked $10 million in aid to Lebanon for FY 1993 in the foreign operations act for the fiscal year (H.R. 5368, P.L. 102-391). Of that amount, $4 million was in ESF, about 95% of which is provided to private volunteer organizations working in Lebanon. (There are no Agency for International Development (AID) personnel in Beirut, due to security concerns.) For FY 1993, a total of $11.1 million in ESF and DA was provided, which included amounts carried over from prior year accounts. For FY 1994, the Clinton Administration requested $10 million in DA and ESF. There is no earmark for Lebanon in the FY 1994 foreign operations law (P.L. 103-87).

Military Aid

The United States also sees military aid as a means to strengthen Lebanon's central government against Hizballah. the United States has resumed providing International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance, the primary stated purpose of which is to make Lebanese Armed Forces personnel in the program well disposed towards the United States and its values. After consultation with Congress, the IMET program for Lebanon was resumed in March 1993 (FY 1993) after a suspension since January 1991. The suspension had been at the request of the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had asserted that Syria maintains control of Lebanon and that the IMET program would therefore benefit Syria. The program provided about $600,000 for FY 1993 to train 33 Lebanese officers, and the Administration is planning a $400,000 program for FY 1994.

In addition, since July 1992, the United States has sold Lebanon about $1.4 million (as of June 1993) in excess non-lethal defense articles, including uniforms, helmets, and trucks to help bolster the Lebanese army. The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently processing another $3.6 million in non-lethal excess

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[54] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Developments in the Middle East: March 1993. Hearing, 103rd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, G.P.O., March 9, 1993. p. 38-39.

defense article cases. The United States had discontinued sales of lethal equipment in 1985 for fear the equipment would not remain under central government control. On July 19, 1993, as tensions between Israel and Hizballah were escalating, the United States modified its policy somewhat by approving the commercial sale of $500,000 worth of spare parts for lethal items (track shoes for M113 tanks). Following the July clashes, in which the Lebanese army deployed to areas near Hizballah positions, the Secretary of State approved aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). According to a State Department fact sheet, the Department has briefed Congress on plans to allow the LAF to buy limited amounts of U.S. lethal equipment with $500 million Lebanon received from other Arab states and international lending institutions following the July clashes. The fact sheet adds that DoD is working to identify used armored personnel carriers, requested by the LAF, that could be sold to Lebanon. DoD also has provided humanitarian equipment, including an $11 million 750-bed field hospital that arrived in Lebanon in September 1993.

Other Measures and Options

State Department officials say there is currently no U.S. antiterrorism assistance program (Chapter 8 of Part 2 of the Foreign Assistance Act) for Lebanon, probably because of the poor security conditions in Lebanon. That program is intended to enhance the ability of recipient country law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in the types of activities (bombings, kidnapping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking) in which Hizballah has engaged in the recent past.

Should Hizballah resume terrorist activities against the United States and the West, an additional option likely to be considered is military retaliation. This option reportedly was considered during the period of incarceration of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon but never exercised. The primary drawback at that time, was the possibility of revenge by the kidnappers against the U.S. captives. Targets under discussion during that time included Iranian Revolutionary Guard garrisons and training bases for Hizballah, including the Zabadani base in western Syria and the Shaykh Abdullah Barracks in the Bekaa Valley. (The Lebanese armed forces took over the Shaykh Abdullah Barracks in July 1992, apparently with Syrian approval.)[55]

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[55] Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992. p. 19.


LEBANON
National Capital
Province Capital
City
Approximate limits of Israeli "security zone"
Syria
Al Hamidiyah
Tall Kalakh
Al Qubayyat
Halba
Al Qusayr
Al Mina
Tripoli
Ash Shamal
Al Himil
Al Qa
Shikka
Amyun
Al Bairun
Baharri
Duma
Al Biqa
Jubayl
Jabal Lubnan
Mediterranean Sea
Balabakk
(Bekka Valley)
Juniyah
Beirut
Bkfayya
Bayrut
B'abda
Beirut International Airport
Zahlah
Riyaq
Alayh
Shtawrah
Al Qutayfah
Ad Damur
Bayt ad Din
Al Biqa'
Syria
Barja
Jubb Jannin
Dimas
Sidon
Jazzin
Al Qirawn
Duma
Rashayya
Damascus
Az Zahrani
As Sarafand
Qatana
An Nabatiyah at Tahta
Marjiyun
Tyre
Al Janub
Banyas
UNDOF Zone
Qiryat Shemona
Bint Jubayl
An Naqurah
Rumaysh
Al Qunaytirah
As Sanamayn
Golan Heights
Israel
Gadar
Nahariyya
As Surah as Sughra
The Golan Heights is Israeli occupied. The permanent status of this territory is yet to be determined.
UNDOF - United Nations Disengagment Observer Force.

CHAPTER
22

Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad

Martin Kramer

Of the many fundamentalisms that have emerged within Islam during recent years, perhaps none has had so profound an impact on the human imagination as Hizbullah—"the Party of God." This movement of Lebanese Shi'ite Muslims gained both fame and infamy within months of its first public appearance in 1982, by its resort to ingenious forms of violence. Hizbullah's progression from suicide bombings to airliner hijackings to hostage holding made it an obsession of the media and the nemesis of governments.

For a time, Hizbullah seemed invincible, dealing blow after blow to the "enemies of Islam" and creating islands of autonomous fundamentalism in Lebanon. Hizbullah held the attention of the world. Armies of journalists besieged the press secretaries of Hizbullah's leaders. Satellites crisscrossed the blackness of outer space above Hizbullah's bases, searching for the tracks of its adherents. Diplomats and mediators shuttled around the globe, seeking deals that would check or conciliate Hizbullah. More than any other fundamentalist movement in recent history, Hizbullah evoked the memory of the medieval Assassins, who had been feared in the West and Islam for their marriage of fierce militancy with destructive deeds. Like the Assassins, Hizbullah gave rise to an immense lore, and much confusion.

That Hizbullah owed its impact to its violence is beyond any doubt. Although it grew into a social movement, it never commanded the means or manpower necessary to seize power in Lebanon. Hizbullah's appeal remained limited to perhaps half of one sect, in a small and vulnerable state inhabited by many other sects. As for resources, Hizbullah disposed of an estimated annual budget of less than half that of the University of Chicago. The movement owed its reputation almost solely to its mastery of violence—a violence legitimated in the name of Islam. This legitimation may be fairly described as Hizbullah's most original contribution to modern Islamic

fundamentalism. Hizbullah's vision of an Islamic state and society was derivative, but its methods for inspiring and rationalizing violence displayed a touch of genius.

This violence is subject to interpretation from any number of analytical and disciplinary vantage points, but any approach must necessarily settle on the core issues of cause, intent, and effect. Why and in what circumstances did the adherents of Hizbullah resort to force? What did they intend to achieve by their acts? What were the effects of their violence? These are large questions, and the evidence is scattered at best. The purpose here is not to provide confident answers but to chart the islands of existing knowledge where answers might be found. The point is to better understand the unique predicament of Hizbullah—unique even within contemporary Islam. Nevertheless, the experience of Hizbullah may illuminate the passage of other fundamentalist movements into violence, a passage for which there are examples in every great tradition.

Shi'ite Fundamentalism in the Lebanese Context

Hizbullah's militance must first be set in context. But which context? There is the 1,400-year legacy of Shi'ism, a legacy of martyrdom and suffering, resting on an ancient grievance: the belief that Islamic history was derailed when political power passed out of the hands of the family of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. In the subsequent course of history, Shi'ism has sometimes erupted as a form of protest against the existing order in Islam; at other times it has retreated into an otherworldly preoccupation with messianic redemption. This inner tension in Shi'ism, and Lebanon's place in it, was explored in an earlier study in this series. The themes addressed there, especially the crisis that confronts all contemporary Shi'ism, are the necessary prelude to any appreciation of Hizbullah.[1]

Here it is more appropriate to dwell on the narrow but rich Lebanese context of Hizbullah. Many works of reportage and scholarship now attest to the power of modern grievance among Lebanon's Shi'ite Muslims. Their pattern of settlement reflected a history of persecution, from which they had found refuge in redoubts along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. The Shi'ites felt secure and free in the mountains of what is now the south of Lebanon and the plains of the Bekaa Valley, tucked between two high ranges. But when the impact of the West struck Lebanon in modern times, the isolated Shi'ites felt it last, and they were slow to modernize. When Lebanon became independent in 1946, the Shi'ites became the despised stepchildren of a state governed by (and for) Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims.[2]

The Shi'ites have been rushing breathlessly to catch up ever since. Demographically, they soon surpassed every other sect. In the thirty-five years between 1921 and 1956, the Shi'ite population had risen from 100,000 to 250,000, but its percentage of Lebanon's total population remained steady at about 19 percent. Yet, in the twenty years between 1956 and 1975, the Shi'ite population tripled, from 250,000 to 750,00, bringing the Shi'ites to about 30 percent of the total population.[3] The larger size of the Shi'ite families, coupled with Christian emigration, had produced a dra-

matic rise in the Shi'ite proportion of Lebanon's population. The Shi'ites had become Lebanon's largest single confessional community, surpassing the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims.

But the Shi'ites could not close the social and economic gap. Some did shake the legacy of poverty and ignorance, and forced open Beirut's worlds of commerce, administration, and education. But many more flocked from their villages to the great Lebanese capital to sweep the streets and hawk on corners. The angriest of the Shi'ites joined the revolutionary movements that swept Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s, especially those founded and led by Palestinians, who were even angrier. Other Shi'ites who still held out hope for reform created their own communal movement to promote their interests, under the leadership of a progressive cleric and middle-class professionals. After the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, this movement created a militia known as Amal ("Hope"), which adopted a largely defensive posture in the fighting.[4]

But geography trapped the Shi'ites in the withering crossfire of the shootout that pitted the Palestinian organizations in Lebanon against the Maronite-led Lebanese Forces and Israel. Hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites became refugees, first from Maronite-Palestinian fighting in 1976, then as the result of the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1978. A quarter of a million refugees poured into the squalid southern suburbs of Beirut, which they transformed into a massive village, reeking of garbage and open sewage.[5] By 1982, the storehouse of Shi'ite grievance had filled to overflowing and Amal could scarcely manage it.

For some years before 1982, a few voices, mostly of Shi'ite clerics, had raised a slogan very different from Amal's call for reform. These voices pronounced the death of Lebanese confessionalism and urged the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic state. Not only did they demand rule by Muslims, who now constituted a majority of the Lebanese, but they claimed that only an Islamic government could restore peace and independence to Lebanon.[6] Few persons in the jaundiced world of Lebanese politics took this promise of an Islamic utopia seriously, even within the Shi'ite community. But after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979—a revolution that swept a white-bearded Shi'ite cleric to power on a tide of revolutionary rage—the idea of an Islamic state suddenly seemed real to many Shi'ites, and even urgent. The events of 1982, including the Israeli occupation of the Shi'ite south, the massacre of Palestinians by Maronite militiamen in league with Israel, and the deployment of American and French troops near the Shi'ite slums of Beirut, convinced many Shi'ites that they stood to become the victims of history once again.

As the vise closed ever tighter, the Shi'ite community finally cracked. A faction of Amal bolted, and the defectors left in the hundreds for the Bekaa Valley. They were accompanied by several fervent young Shi'ite clerics, whose minds burned with visions of a Lebanon purified by Islamic revolution. There the Lebanese Shi'ites joined hands with a contingent of a thousand Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who had come to do battle with the "enemies of Islam" now assembled in Lebanon and to spread the revolutionary message of the Imam Khomeini. Together they seized a Lebanese army barracks on a hill in the Bekaa Valley and transformed it into a formidable

fortress, ringed by antiaircraft emplacements and bristling with antennae. This base, and several smaller installations in its vicinity, would become the nucleus of an autonomous zone, governed by the precepts of Islam. The new formation took the name of Hizbullah—the "Party of God"—after a verse in the Qur'an (V, 56): "Lo! the Party of God, they are the victorious."[7]

Hizbullah thus issued from a marriage of Lebanese Shi'ites and Islamic Iran, and grew to become the most influential Shi'ite fundamentalist movement outside Iran. Here lies a paradox. Iran's Islamic Revolution first targeted the Shi'ite populations of the countries immediately adjacent to Iran or across the Persian Gulf: Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Some of these states had large Shi'ite populations that were in ready reach. Yet Iran's revolution ultimately had its greatest impact in Lebanon, the most westward and remote outpost of the Shi'ite world, and home to only 2 or 3 percent of the world's Shi'ites outside Iran. Despite the distance from Iran, Lebanon seemed to magnify the signal of Iran's revolution many times over, generating a Shi'ite fundamentalism that marched stridently to Iran's cadence. (Lebanon also produced the only Sunni fundamentalist movement that unashamedly embraced Iran as its model, the Tawhid movement in Tripoli.)

The paradox had a ready explanation: Lebanon's civil war amplified the effect of Iran's revolution. The collapse of the state and the resulting violence had taken a tremendous toll on Shi'ite society, producing demographic, social, and economic dislocations that dwarfed the simple discrimination suffered by Shi'ites elsewhere. Many hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites had been made into destitute refugees, in a country without a functioning state, in a capital city without operational municipalities and services. On the scale of human distress, Lebanon's Shi'ites could not be surpassed by Shi'ites elsewhere, and their hopelessness made them the most receptive of all Shi'ites to the siren calls that issued from Iran.

Just as important, the gate to Lebanon lay wide open. Iraq and the Arab Gulf states, while closer to the torch lit by Khomeini, also had the will and means to extinguish local sparks of sympathy with Iran's revolution. Iraq went to war to do so; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait launched cold wars against Iran, which included the arrest and deportation of thousands of Iran's Shi'ite sympathizers. But in Lebanon, there was no one to arrest or deport those sympathizers, or even to keep Iran's zealots from entering Lebanon in force to join hands with their Shi'ite admirers. "The biggest obstacle to starting Islamic movements in the world is the people's attachment to governments," declared Islamic Iran's first ambassador to Lebanon. "But since the republic of Lebanon does not have much power, there is no serious obstacle in the way of the people of Lebanon."[8] Syria, which exercised a statelike authority in parts of Lebanon, was willing to accept any help against the hostile foreign forces entrenched in its Lebanese backyard: Syria allowed a supply line of support to run from Iran through Syria to Lebanon's Shi'ites. The absence of effective government, and the ease of Iranian access to Lebanon, created hothouse conditions for the rise of Iranian-inspired fundamentalist movements in Lebanon, a situation unique in the Middle East.

The Partisans of God

Those Lebanese Shi'ites who rallied around the banner of Islam in the summer of 1982 came from many different walks of life, but they all bore a double grievance. Not only did they feel threatened by outside enemies—the "satans" against whom Khomeini railed—but also they seethed with resentment against the Amal movement and its allies in the Shi'ite clerical establishment.

At the forefront of the new movement were young clerics, all drawn from the same narrow age group. They shared the stigma of inadequate preparation for their chosen profession. The fault was not theirs. Like their elders, they had gone to the Shi'ite shrine cities in Iraq to acquire the best credentials at the best theological academies. But in the 1970s the Iraqi security authorities decided to expel most foreign Shi'ite students, and several hundred returned to Lebanon empty-handed. The Shi'ite clerical establishment then spurned them, and they became a disgruntled mass, uncertain of their allegiance. When Iran's emissaries arrived in the Bekaa Valley in 1982 and issued the clarion call to make a revolution, these young clerics rushed to pledge their loyalty to Khomeini and assume positions of leadership in Hizbullah.

Iran's emissaries also reached out to the great Shi'ite clans of the Bekaa Valley. The Bekaa Shi'ites had long felt themselves excluded from the higher echelons of Amal, which drew its leaders from the south of Lebanon. Yet the Shi'ites of the Bekaa had recently enjoyed an unprecedented prosperity, the result of a trade in illicit drugs that had flourished since the collapse of central authority. They now sought a vehicle to legitimize their new status and found it in Hizbullah, which accorded them a disproportionate place in its leadership and turned a blind eye to the original source of their wealth. The first two incumbents of the office of secretary-general, Hizbullah's highest office, were clerics who hailed from the Bekaa Valley: Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli and Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi.

Hizbullah also fed upon another grievance against Amal. Many young Shi'ites had joined Palestinian organizations during the 1970s, usually to escape poverty. When Israel forced the Palestinian organizations out of Lebanon in 1982, these Shi'ites lost their paymasters. In a blunder Amal would come to regret, it failed to make room for these Shi'ite orphans of the Palestinian revolution, scorning them for their service in a cause that had brought misery to South Lebanon. But Iran's emissaries held no grudge against them. Indeed, many of these same Iranians had been trained in Palestinian camps before the Islamic Revolution and they saw Palestinian service as a commendable credential. They now offered the unwanted Shi'ite militiamen jobs, weapons, and a sense of divine purpose. These Shi'ites joined enthusiastically and rose quickly through the ranks. The brilliant commander of the Islamic Jihad, Hizbullah's clandestine branch, would be a graduate of long Palestinian service: 'Imad Mughniyya.

Iran's emissaries even recruited successfully from within Amal. The established Shi'ite militia had grown brittle over the years, and some of its junior commanders concluded they had no prospects for advancement. When Iran offered Amal's malcon-

tents some of the most senior command positions in the new movement, they jumped at the opportunity. Hizbullah even incorporated a faction called Islamic Amal, comprising disaffected Amal veterans and led by Husayn al-Musawi.

Finally, Hizbullah won followers among the many tens of thousands of Shi'ites who had no stake in existing communal institutions. Many were impoverished refugees from the south who had crowded into the southern suburbs of Beirut. They had suffered terribly, and they regarded Amal and the Shi'ite clerical establishment as ineffectual defenders of the Shi'ite interest. Iran's emissaries moved quickly to offer food, jobs, loans, medicine, and other services to the teeming masses of impoverished Shi'ites in Beirut's slums. In return, they gave Hizbullah their loyalty. The senior cleric often named as the spiritual mentor of Hizbullah, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, personified their grievance. His native town in the south of Lebanon abutted Israel and had often been emptied by fighting. He relocated to a Shi'ite slum in East Beirut, but lost his first pulpit in Maronite-Palestinian fighting in 1976 and arrived as a refugee to Beirut's southern suburbs. There, like other refugees, he began anew, without the help of the Shi'ite establishment. The mosque he built and guided would become the hub of Hizbullah in the city.[9]

From this account, it is clear that Hizbullah met some very mundane needs among its adherents. Yet it also made some very severe demands. The most fundamental of these demands was the obligation to "strive in the path of God." This is the literal meaning of jihad, interpreted in Shi'ism as a willingness to sacrifice in defense of Islam. Hizbullah's strength resided in its ability to harnass a hundred grievances to one sublime purpose and to persuade its downtrodden adherents of their own hidden strength—the strength of sacrifice.

To Right a World

One compelling idea forged a movement from these fragments of broken humanity, from the diverse grievances of thousands. It resided in a holistic vision that ingeniously transformed every kind of despair, injustice, and suffering into the product of one great crink in the world. Muslims had abandoned Islam. Seduced by the falsehoods of others, they had cast aside the only known certainty in this world: the divine revelation of the Prophet Muhammad. The more they doubted this revelation, the further they fell from grace. Now they had lost all power to defend themselves, and their enemies preyed on their wealth, territory, and lives. Only by returning to Islam could Muslims right the world and set human history on the course intended by God.

The great return to Islam was already under way, led by the Imam Khomeini. By his appearance, he had begun to banish the darkness that enveloped the believers. Beneath his evocation of Shi'ite symbolism, his message had a dualistic simplicity: all that was truly Islamic was pure; all that was demonstrably foreign was impure. If the pure did not root out the impure, then the impure would prevail. The message touched a deep chord in Iranian culture, amplifying more prosaic grievances. Ultimately Khomeini succeeded in turning the Iranian people into a caldron of righteous-

ness. He promised to overturn the faithless regime of the shah, purge society of hypocrites and corrupters, and cut the tentacles of the foreign powers that gripped Iran's destiny. He kept his word. The shah fell, the accused hypocrites faced imprisonment or execution, and every trace of American influence vanished. Khomeini had created the first Islamic fundamentalist state.

Lebanon's Shi'ites watched his performance with amazement. Some began to believe that his medicine could cure Lebanon as well. Hadn't Lebanon's Muslims been corrupted by foreign ways? Didn't foreign powers control the destiny of the country? Hizbullah ultimately rested on an analogy between Lebanon and Iran—an analogy that defied vast disparities in the size and populations of the two countries, and in their geostrategic positions and resources. In the eyes of some, Lebanon now appeared to be some remote extension of Iran, linked by a shared fealty to one man. Hizbullah's program, conveyed in its "open letter" of February 1985, declared that the movement "abides by the orders of the sole wise and just command represented by the supreme jurisconsult who meets the necessary qualifications, and who is presently incarnate in the Imam and guide, the Great Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musawi al-Khomeini."[10] Khomeini became the only source of legitimate authority, and by their allegiance to him the Shi'ites of Hizbullah ceased to be Lebanese. "Some say we are Muslim Lebanese," noted Husayn al-Musawi. "No! We are Muslims of the world, and we have close links with other Muslims of the world."[11] "We do not work or think within the borders of Lebanon," declared Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, "this little geometric box, which is one of the legacies of imperialism. Rather, we seek to defend Muslims throughout the world."[12]

Hizbullah's vision was as grand as Lebanon was small. Its goals exceeded even the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic state. The establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon "is not our demand," said Husayn al-Musawi. The aim was not Islam in one country but the creation of an "all-encompassing Islamic state" which would absorb Lebanon.[13] An almost apocalyptic messianism animated this vision of a sweeping triumph of Islam. Islamic revolution had first occurred in Iran, but it was not Iranian. As one of Hizbullah's leading clerics declared: "The divine state of justice realized on part of this earth will not remain confined within its geographic borders and is the dawn that will lead to the appearance of the Mahdi, who will create the state of Islam on earth."[14] This evocation of the Mahdi, the messianic figure in Islamic eschatology, suggested that the world had entered upon the last days and that redemption might be imminent.

In this vision, Hizbullah had the heroic role of purifying a province of Islam. "We are proceeding toward a battle with vice at its very roots," declared Hizbullah's manifesto. "And the first root of vice is America." The manifesto announced that "the Imam Khomeini, our leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is the cause of all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. . . . We will turn Lebanon into a graveyard for American schemes."[15] Once the Americans were ousted, their agents would fall as well. "We will bring down the Maronite regime just as we brought down the shah in Iran," promised the chief of staff of the Revolutionary Guards to his Lebanese listeners—although he could only address them in Persian.[16] And Hizbullah was fi-

nally charged with the most daunting task of all: driving Israel from Lebanon and then from existence. Israel was the "cancer of the Middle East," said Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi. "In the future, we will wipe out every trace of Israel in Palestine."[17]

This grandiose vision served the deepest needs of the most alienated of Lebanon's Shi'ites. Through their membership in Hizbullah, the clerics, commanders, and common followers of the movement could escape narrow allegiances and embrace a vast cause that transcended the boundaries of family, clan, sect, and state. Through an affiliation with Hizbullah, the individual ceased to be Lebanese, Shi'ite, Arab—a member of a disadvantaged sect in a small war-torn state populated by many different sects. Through the agency of Hizbullah, the poor village boy or slum-dweller became a true Muslim, a member of a religious-political community spanning three continents, and a soldier in a world movement led by the Imam Khomeini for redressing the imbalance between Islam and infidelity. This was a mission above human history, a task of eschatological significance. A sense of divine purpose accounted for Hizbullah's appeal and eased its resort to violence, not only in Lebanon but throughout the world.

But to remake the world, the adherents of Hizbullah first had to remake themselves. The adherents of Hizbullah had to undergo a spiritual transformation if they were to muster the inner strength necessary for sacrifice—the kind of sacrifice without which the weak could not overcome the strong. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards brought with them to Lebanon the fire that had made the revolution in Iran. Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi, Hizbullah's secretary-general from 1991 until his assassination by Israel in 1992, was a cleric who had passed some time in higher theological studies in Najaf. He also took the first training course offered by the Revolutionary Guards in 1982. Of the two experiences, his training with the Guards had the greater impact:

> I recall one of the sights I can never forget. We were awakened at night by the weeping of the brethren Guards during the night prayer. Is this not the greatest school from which one can graduate? I also recall when one of the brethren Guards gave a weapons lesson. Suddenly, after he had given all the explanations, he put the weapon aside and swore an oath saying: "All I have explained to you will not help you; only God can help you." He began to talk about belief and reliance on God. . . . When I joined the Guards and sat with the brethren in the first course they gave in the Bekaa Valley, I felt I derived immense benefit. I felt I had truly penetrated genuine Islam. If this is how I felt, as someone at an advanced level of schooling, then how must the other youths have felt who filled the ranks of the Guards?[18]

Fadlallah called this transformation the "rebellion against fear." The great powers inspired fear among the oppressed, who had no more than "children's toys" to mount their opposition. But by conquering their own fear, through acceptance of the virtue of martyrdom, the oppressed could evoke alarm and fear among their oppressors.[19] In a short span of time, the first adherents of Hizbullah had overcome that fear. "The school of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard made the Muslim youths love martyrdom," said 'Abbas al-Musawi. "We were not surprised at all when, shortly after the

arrival of the Guards, a Muslim youth in Lebanon smiled at death while carrying with him 1,200 kilograms of explosives."[20]

The Revolutionary Guards passed the torch to Hizbullah's clerics. Their new role found symbolic representation in the arming of clerics at Hizbullah's rallies. They would stand in a row at the head of marches, awkwardly gripping AK-47s and M-16s, occasionally wearing the added accessory of an ammunition belt. They delivered funeral orations over dead fighters while brandishing rifles. In fact, clerics were not expected to bear arms in combat; the clips in the paraded weapons were probably empty. But the bearing of arms constituted a visual allusion to the preaching of the clerics. It reminded witnesses not that clerics sometimes took up arms but that they guided those who did.

Violence and Virtue

The blinding light of Lebanese Shi'ite anger, focused through the lens of Iran's Islamic zeal, set a fire. To understand the impact of that violence, it must first be characterized. A day-by-day chronology of the violence employed by Hizbullah during its first decade would be long indeed—too long to bear repetition.[21] But most of it fell into these four categories:

1. Campaigns meant to rid the Shi'ite regions of Lebanon of all foreign presence. Assassinations of individual foreigners later escalated into massive bombings, some of them done by "self-martyrs," which destroyed the American embassy and its annex in two separate attacks in 1983 and 1984; the barracks of American and French peacekeeping troops in two famous attacks on the same morning in 1983; and command facilities of Israeli forces in the occupied south in 1982 and 1983. Hundreds of foreigners died on Lebanese soil in these bombings, the most successful of which killed 241 U.S. Marines in their barracks. These operations, combined with other, lesser actions, forced American and French forces into a full retreat from Lebanon. As one Hizbullah leader put it, they "hurriedly ran away from three Muslims who loved martyrdom."[22] This violence also pushed Israeli forces back to a narrow "security zone" in the south.[23] "The Israeli soldier who could not be defeated was now killed, with an explosive charge here and a bullet there," said Fadlallah. "People were suddenly filled with power, and that power could be employed in new ways. . . . it deployed a small force and a war of nerves, which the enemy could not confront with its tanks and airplanes."[24] Hizbullah continued to launch frequent attacks against Israeli forces and their Lebanese ally, the South Lebanon Army, in the "security zone." "Our goal is not the liquidation of [South Lebanon Army commander] Antoine Lahad in the border zone," said Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi. "Our slogan is the liquidation of Israel."[25]

2. Operations intended to lend support to the efforts of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Before Hizbullah's emergence, its Shi'ite fundamentalist precursors launched a violent campaign against Iraqi targets in Lebanon, culminating in the destruction of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in a 1981 bombing. The campaign later spread to Kuwait,

where Hizbullah's Islamic Jihad bombed the American and French embassies and other targets in 1983, in an effort to compel Kuwait to abandon its support of Iraq. This violence peaked in a series of paralyzing terror bombings in Paris in 1986 meant to force France to abandon its policy of supplying Iraq with arms. The cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in 1988 brought this campaign to an end.

3. Operations meant to free members and affiliates of Hizbullah who had been captured by enemy governments in the Middle East and Europe. These operations included the hijacking of an American airliner in 1985 to secure the freedom of Lebanese Shi'ites held by Israel, and two hijackings of Kuwaiti airliners in 1984 and 1988 to win freedom for Lebanese Shi'ites held by Kuwait for the bombings there. The hijackers killed passengers in each of these hijackings, to demonstrate their resolve. In addition, Islamic Jihad and other groups affiliated with Hizbullah abducted dozens of foreigners in Lebanon, mostly American, French, British, and German citizens, for the same purpose. Some of these foreigners would later be traded for American arms needed by Iran in the Gulf War, but the motive for the wave of abductions remained the release of Hizbullah's imprisoned fighters elsewhere. The longest-held hostage spent over six years in captivity. Most of the hostages were freed; a few died in captivity.

4. Battles waged against the rival movements over control of neighborhoods in Beirut and villages in the south. In 1986, Hizbullah clashed repeatedly with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party over control of routes leading from the Bekaa Valley to the south. And beginning in 1988, occasional skirmishes with Amal escalated into war. Several thousand Shi'ites, many of them noncombatants, died in this intra-Shi'ite fighting, which persisted despite numerous cease-fire initiatives. In the course of the battles, Hizbullah perpetrated several atrocities and assassinated two prominent leaders of Amal. Hizbullah usually enjoyed the upper hand in fighting, but it was denied the fruits of victory by Syrian intervention. The fighting ended in late 1990 with a cease-fire mediated by Syria and Iran.

In what way did this violence reflect its origins in a fundamentalist movement? Violence in Lebanon did not constitute a deviation. Indeed, it had become the norm. Long before the appearance of Hizbullah, Lebanon had become a land in which guns spoke louder than words. To do battle was not a matter of choice but of survival. And in some respects, this violence followed well-worn paths in Lebanon—paths blazed first by the Palestinians in the early 1970s and followed by various militias in the late 1970s. The commanders of Hizbullah were veterans of either Palestinian service or the Amal militia, and they often took pages from both books.

Nor could the "self-martyrdom operations," which Hizbullah pioneered, qualify as a strictly fundamentalist mode of operation. Groups in Lebanon that were not fundamentalist, religious, or Shi'ite quickly imitated this method. In terms of the number of casualties inflicted by such operations, Hizbullah undoubtedly deserved place of primacy. Hizbullah employed the method first and enjoyed the advantage of surprise. But in terms of the number of operations—and the number of "self-martyrs"—pride of place went to the imitators: the secular, nationalist organizations that operated in Lebanon under Syrian auspices. A study that summarized the major

round of "self-martyrdom operations" from their inception in 1983 through the end of 1986 found that Shi'ite organizations perpetrated only seven of the thirty-one attacks. Pro-Syrian organizations carried out twenty-two attacks, most notably by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (ten attacks) and the Ba'th Party (seven attacks). (These operations were all directed against Israel and the South Lebanon Army.)[26]

It was also obvious that Hizbullah's collective choices regarding the extent and intensity of its violence had a clear political rationale. Hizbullah was also a political movement and indeed saw politics as an inseparable part of religion. When it employed violence, it did so for political and not ritualistic purposes—to bring it closer to power. In making its choices, Hizbullah weighed benefits against costs. Violence drove enemies into retreat and created a zone of autonomous action for Hizbullah. But it simultaneously invited punitive retaliation and at times created political complications for Iran. Fadlallah fairly described the guiding principle of Hizbullah: " I believe that in all cases violence is like a surgical operation that the doctor should only resort to after he has exhausted all other methods."[27]

But the calculus of politics is not driven by a universal logic. It is conditioned by cultural values. Hizbullah did not simply seek power; it sought power in order to implement Islamic law. That goal had to be pursued within the law of Islam, as understood by its interpreters among the clerics. "The Muslim fighter needed answers to many questions," said Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim 'Ubayd, a Hizbullah cleric who would be made famous after his abduction by Israel in 1989. "Is resistance to the occupation obligatory on religious grounds? What about the question of self-martyrdom? The law has an answer to these examples, which therefore are not political questions so much as legal questions, and here lies the role of the cleric." Only he could provide answers; without his essential contribution, there could be no legitimate violence, since "these questions cannot be answered by the military commander, especially for the believing fighter, who must turn to a cleric who is enthusiastic, responsive, and committed to resistance."[28]

On the one hand, submission to Islamic law freed Hizbullah from non-Islamic moral constraints. Hizbullah felt no need to justify its acts by other codes. Its struggle was a jihad, a form of sacred warfare regulated solely by Islamic law (hence the choice of Islamic Jihad as the name for Hizbullah's clandestine branch). It made no difference to Hizbullah's adherents that jihad remained associated with fanaticism in the historical consciousness of the West. They did not seek the favor of world public opinion and addressed their justifications solely to Muslim believers.

On the other hand, jihad had its requirements. The Islamic law of war is the codification of a moral sensibility. While it is open to interpretation, it is not infinitely elastic. Some of its provisions compel violence—acts of punishment or resistance. But other provisions forbid violence against persons afforded protection by law. The believing public had to be persuaded that Hizbullah's actions were not criminal but "in the nature of a jihad, launched by the oppressed against the oppressors."[29] The clerics, as interpreters of law, constantly subjected Hizbullah's selection of targets and techniques to the judgment of this law.

In doing so, they forced Hizbullah to resist two powerful temptations of its Leba-

nese environment. First, Hizbullah sometimes threatened to deteriorate into one more sectarian militia devoted to battling other sectarian militias. "Parties and movements and organizations begin as great ideas," warned Fadlallah, "and turn into narrow interests. Religion starts as a message from God and struggle, and turns into the interests of individuals and another kind of tribalism."[30] That deterioration had to be fought. The clerics never ceased to remind the movement of its divine mission and to urge the expansion of the jihad to confront the "global infidelity" of foreigners. Second, Hizbullah occasionally seemed poised to imitate the sectarian militias, by employing wholly indiscriminate violence. The clerics never ceased to insist that the jihad not harm innocents. To be worthy of Islam, the struggle had to be global in conception but discriminating in execution.

In retrospect, some of Hizbullah's acts of violence met these demanding criteria, some did not. It soon became clear that in the real world, violence could rarely be pure. A few acts approximated the ideal, such as the earliest bombings by "self-martyrs" against foreign forces in Lebanon. These targeted armed, foreign intruders and so constituted legitimate jihad in the defense of Islam. And the use of "self-martyrs" assured that these attacks achieved pinpoint precision—an unusual technique for Beirut, where exploding cars usually killed indiscriminately.

Yet even here, a problem of Islamic law arose, since some innocents did die in these attacks: the "self-martyrs" themselves. Suicide is prohibited by Islam, and the question of whether their deaths did or did not constitute suicide tugged at the consciences of Hizbullah's clerics. As long as the attacks succeeded so dramatically, the clerics suppressed all doubt. But the question resurfaced when subsequent attacks began to produce lower yields in enemy casualties. "The self-martyring operation is not permitted unless it can convulse the enemy," said Fadlallah. "The believer cannot blow himself up unless the results will equal or exceed the [loss of the] soul of the believer. Self-martyring operations are not fatal accidents but legal obligations governed by rules, and the believers cannot transgress the rules of God."[31] The clerics ultimately banned such operations, and they gradually ended.

Other acts generated even more controversy. Abductions of innocent foreigners divided Hizbullah's clerics. Some came out clearly against the practice, which they criticized as a violation of Islamic law. Other clerics justified the hostage-holding as an unfortunate but necessary evil. But even these showed some hesitation, so that the hostage-holders often had to provide their own justifications, communicated through hand-scrawled missives to the press. Ultimately, the debate over the Islamic legality of hostage-holding did not produce a repentant release of hostages. They were usually freed when it served Iran's purposes, in moves governed by the ethic of the marketplace rather than Islamic law. But the debate did put the perpetrators of these acts in the moral docket, before the only constituency that mattered: believers in the primacy of Islamic law. And it is possible that hostage-holding would have been practiced even more extensively had this debate never taken place, although no one can say this for certain.[32]

Finally, some acts could not be defended from the point of view of Islamic law. True, France supplied Iraq with the weapons that killed Iran's faithful in the Gulf

war. Striking at French interests would show the solidarity of true believers. But the bombings that shook Paris in 1986, and which killed at random in shops and trains, represented acts of sheer terror that Hizbullah's clerics could never have defended. And so the Lebanese Shi'ite plotters, who came from within Hizbullah, took care not to claim the bombings for Islam and even enticed a hapless Tunisian recruit to plant the bombs. Both distancing measures reflected a certain knowledge that the bombings constituted terror by *any* definition, Western or Islamic. Perhaps for this reason, the Paris bombings remained an isolated instance, although Hizbullah possessed the capability to launch similar campaigns abroad and was reported ready to do so on many occasions.

Hizbullah's war with Amal also caused deep anguish among the clerics, for it involved the killing of Shi'ites by Shi'ites. Of course it could be rationalized: Amal had conspired with the enemies of Islam, within Lebanon and abroad. It denied the global leadership of Islamic Iran and protected Israel by barring Hizbullah's way to the south. Yet Hizbullah's clerics were not completely persuaded that these deeds justified killing, and they persisted in calling the struggle a "dissension," a *fitna,* rather than a sacred war, a jihad. This did not stem the fighting. But if Amal had to be fought, then it had to be fought quickly and in a spirit of regret. At one point, at the height of the fighting, the clerics could no longer look away, for fighters in the field had taken to mutilating corpses in Lebanese fashion—a method used to inspire terror in the enemy. The men of religion issued a religious edict against the practice.

In the end, Hizbullah's violence could not help but demonstrate the movement's contradictory character. Hizbullah was Islamic by day, Lebanese by night. What seemed right in the mosques did not always work in the alleys. Hizbullah's clerics had to know when to avert their eyes from the compromises between the ideal and the real. Was this hypocrisy? There were some principles, even of Islam, that the poor could not afford. And if the poor did not have smart bombs, then who would deny them the blunt weapons at hand? "The oppressed nations do not have the technology and destructive weapons America and Europe have," said Fadlallah:

> They must thus fight with special means of their own. . . . [We] recognize the right of nations to use every unconventional method to fight these aggressor nations, and do not regard what oppressed Muslims of the world do with primitive and unconventional means to confront aggressor powers as terrorism. We view this as religiously lawful warfare against the world's imperialist and domineering powers.[33]

But even Fadlallah drew a line: sacred ends could not be achieved *only* by profane means. There always had to be some aspects of Hizbullah's struggle that approached the exacting standards of the law. And usually there were. At one moment, a guard might beat a hapless foreign hostage to discourage thoughts of escape. But that could be rationalized if, at the same moment, a fighter of the jihad prepared himself to court death by assaulting an Israeli army patrol. "There is evil in everything good and something good in every evil," reasoned Fadlallah.[34] Even a fundamentalist movement pre-

occupied with purity had to acknowledge its own impurities—and strive to cleanse itself, even as it cleansed the world around it.

The Impact of Hizbullah

During the decade between 1982 and 1992, Hizbullah's violence made an indelible impression on the world and its name passed into common parlance. Yet Hizbullah's vision of a new age receded from grasp. By the end of the decade, the triumph of Islam in Lebanon, the further spread of Iran's revolution, and the liberation of Jerusalem all seemed more remote than ever. Lebanon inched toward a Syrian-guaranteed peace based on (revised) confessionalism—a reform, not a revolution. Islamic Iran, still smarting from wounds sustained in a failed war with Iraq, turned toward domestic reconstruction. And Arab states, Lebanon among them, sat down with Israel in direct talks to discuss a possible peace. Had Hizbullah chased the horizon?

No one could say for certain, but none could deny that Hizbullah had become one of the realities of Lebanon and the region. Hizbullah did not have the means to turn the world upside-down, but it had fought and bought its way into the hearts of perhaps as many as half of Lebanon's politically active Shi'ites. Hizbullah had played an instrumental role in driving foreign forces out of Lebanon and continued a tireless campaign against Israel in the south. It had rendered some service to Islamic Iran by its abductions of foreigners and had also secured the release of many of its own imprisoned members. It had defeated its Shi'ite rivals in one confrontation after another, earning the respect of friends and the fear of enemies. And above all, it had initiated a return to Islam—a gradual process of inner transformation whose results no one could predict.

Still, the world had changed in profound ways while Hizbullah made itself secure. Old ideologies broke under the weight of economics, old conflicts moved toward resolution. Even Islamic Iran turned a corner, moving from confrontation to cooperation with the West. Fadlallah helped his listeners accept the fact. "Like all revolutions, including the French Revolution, the Islamic Revolution did not have a realistic line at first," he said. "At that time it served to create a state, it produced a mobilization, a new religious way of thinking and living, with the aim of winning Muslim autonomy and independence from the superpowers." But "the new phase which should now be reached is the normalization of relations with the rest of the world."[35] To speak of the Islamic Revolution like any other revolution, to speak of accepting the world as it is—at first these ideas found little echo among Hizbullah's other clerics. But soon they also would concede that Hizbullah, too, would have to turn a corner. The release of nearly all the Western hostages in 1991 indicated that the reassessment was under way.

Fadlallah had warned against the limits of violence. The Palestinians in the 1970s had also stunned the world with their violence—and still had nothing to show for it. To avoid such an impasse, Hizbullah would have to move to a new phase: the struggle

for ideas. This would be a different kind of jihad, requiring perseverance and patience; for Hizbullah had taken only a first step: "We work to arrive at a result from within the objective and actual circumstances, some of which we ourselves must work to create, while others we must await with the passage of time. We see that these conditions do not exist in the Lebanese reality at the present stage and in the immediate stages to follow—this, despite the spread of the Islamic spirit which transformed Islam into a pressure force on political reality."[36]

Hizbullah began to fashion a new strategy for this jihad over hearts and minds. At home in Lebanon, it would become more committed to grass-roots social activism and more willing to substitute the slogan of democracy for the slogan of revolution. Elsewhere in the region, Islamic movements bid for power as political parties, not as revolutionary conspiracies, and they enjoyed remarkable success. Might this not work in Lebanon? After all, Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims constituted a clear majority in the country. Hizbullah began to demand a general referendum on the question of an Islamic state. In an ironic twist, Hizbullah cast itself as a champion of democracy; the "Party of God" began to evolve slowly into a political party, a *hizb,* whose clerics spoke more like candidates.

Hizbullah also transformed its own vision of its regional role. During the 1980s, the movement had looked east toward Islamic Iran, anticipating a victory against Iraq and the creation of an "all-encompassing Islamic state." That dream had been shattered, but another arose to replace it. Hizbullah's leaders noticed how Mediterranean Islam began to gain social and political momentum in the 1980s—in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and among the Palestinians. Islamic movements in these countries also sought the transformation of secular state and society into Islamic state and society. Mediterranean Islamic activism is largely Sunni, as are the great majority of Muslims in the Mediterranean basin. But its attitude to Shi'ism was usually dispassionate, and it now contained pockets of open sympathy for Iran's revolution as a genuine expression of Islam, from Tunisia's "Renaissance" Islamic party to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Hizbullah sat astride a point where two powerful winds of Islamic reassertion converged—one from the west, the other from the east. And it soon established itself as the mediating bridge between Mediterranean Islam—the Islam of the Algerian Islamists and the Palestinian Jihad groups—and the stalled but still potent Islam of Iran. In short, Hizbullah sought to play the classic Lebanese role of middleman—to stay afloat by mediating the contact between two parts of the Muslim world separated by language, culture, and space. This kind of mediation is precisely the Lebanese art, and it is the way Lebanon has found its place and livelihood in the world. Hizbullah bid to become the bridge between Shi'ism and Sunnism, Iran and the Arabs, the Gulf and the Mediterranean.

Were Hizbullah to become such a bridge, its role would change profoundly. The fighting vanguards of Islamic revolution would become the talking mediators of ideas. Lebanon would cease to be the ground of contention; instead, Hizbullah would assist the struggle of others, by becoming a regional amplifier of Islamic Iran's message.

It now remained to be seen whether Hizbullah would prove as adept in persuasion as in coercion, whether its words would topple the structures that its bombs had only shaken.

Notes

1. See Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, "Activist Shi'ism in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 403–56 (includes select bibliography).

2. Many aspects of the history of the Shi'ites in what is now modern Lebanon remain obscure. For general appreciations, see Mounzer Jaber, "Pouvoir et société au Jabal Amel de 1749 à 1920 dans la conscience des chroniques chiites et dans un essai d'interprétation," thèse 3e cycle, Paris IV, 1978; Monika Pohl-Schöberlein, *Die schiitische Gemeinschaft des Südlibanon (Gabal 'Amil) innerhalb des libanesischen konfessionellen Systems* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1986); and Ghaleb el Turk, "The South," in Halim Said Abulzzedin, ed., *Lebanon and Its Provinces: A Study by the Governors of the Five Provinces* (Beirut: Khayat, 1963), pp. 49–71.

3. On the voluntary movement of Shi'ites to Beirut before the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, see Salim Nasr, "La transition des chiites vers Beyrouth: Mutations sociales et mobilisation communitaire à la veille de 1975," in CERMOC, *Mouvements communautaires et espaces urbains au Machreq* (Beyrouth: Editions du CERMOC, 1985), pp. 87–116.

4. For the history of the Shi'ite awakening in Lebanon, see Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); and Andreas Rieck, *Die Schiiten und der Kampf um den Libanon: Politische Chronik, 1958–1988* (Mitteilungen des Deutschen Orient-Instituts, 33) (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1989). Article-length studies that consider important aspects of the awakening include Thom Sicking and Shereen Khairallah, "The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for Radical Change in a Traditional Way," *CEMAM Reports,* no. 2: *Vision and Revision in Arab Society, 1974* (Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1975), pp. 97–130; Talal Jaber, "Le discours shi'ite sur le pouvoir," *Peuples Méditerranéens* (Paris), no. 20 (July–September 1982), pp. 75–92; Salim Nasr, "Mobilisation communautaire et symbolique religieuse: L'imam Sadr et les chi'ites du Liban (1970–1975)," in Olivier Carré and Paul Dumont, eds., *Radicalismes Islamiques,* vol. 1: *Iran, Liban, Turquie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985), pp. 119–58; Elisabeth Picard, "De la 'communauté-classe' à la Résistance 'Nationale.' Pour une analyse du rôle des Chi'ites dans le système politique libanais (1970–1985)," *Revue française de science politique* (Paris) 35, no. 6 (December 1985): 999–1027; and Shimon Shapira, "The *Imam* Musa al-Sadr: Father of the Shiite Resurgence in Lebanon," *Jerusalem Quarterly,* no. 44 (Fall 1987): 121–44.

5. On the forced movement of Shi'ite refugees to West Beirut and the southern suburbs after 1975, see Salim Nasr, "Beyrouth et le conflit libanais: Restructuration de l'espace urbain," in J. Metral and G. Mutin, eds., *Politiques urbaines dans le Monde Arabe* (Lyons, 1984), pp. 287–305.

6. On the emergence of this trend, see Chibli Mallat, *Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1988).

7. On the emergence of Hizbullah and the role of Iran, see these studies by Martin Kramer: *Hezbollah's Vision of the West.* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper no. 16, October 1989); "The Moral Logic of Hizballah," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies,*

States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 131–57; "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah," in David Menashri, ed., *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 105–30; "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon," in Mark Juergensmeyer, ed., *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 30–47; and my annual essays for the *Middle East Contemporary Survey,* commencing with volume 8 (1983–84). See also R. K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 175–95; Yves Gonzales-Quijano, "Les interprétations d'un rite: Célébrations de la 'Achoura au Liban," *Maghreb-Machrek* (Paris), no. 115 (January–March 1987): 5–28; Shimon Shapira, "The Origins of Hizballah," *Jerusalem Quarterly,* no. 46 (Spring 1988): 115–30; Andreas Rieck, "Abschied vom 'Revolutionsexport'? Expansion und Rückgang des iranischen Einflusses im Libanon, 1979–1989," *Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung* (Cologne) 20, no. 2 (1990): 81–104; and Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection," in John L. Esposito, ed., *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), pp. 116–37.

8. Interview with Hojjat al-lslam Fakhr Rouhani, *Ettcla'at* (Tehran), 9 January 1984.

9. On Fadlallah, see Martin Kramer, "Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah," *Orient* 26, no. 2 (June 1985): 147–49. Some of Fadlallah's theoretical writings, mostly from the 1970s, have been examined by Olivier Carré, "Quelques mots-clefs de Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah," *Revue française de science politique* (Paris) 37, no. 4 (August 1987): 478–501; and "La 'révolution islamique' selon Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh," *Orient* (Opladen, West Germany) 29, no. 1 (March 1988): 68–84. Both have been reprinted in Olivier Carré, *L'Utopie islamique dans l'Orient arabe* (Paris: Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1991).

10. "Nass al-risala al-maftuha allati wajjahaha Hizbullah ila al-mustad'afin fi Lubnan wal- 'alam" ("Open Letter from Hizbullah to the Disinherited in Lebanon and the World") (Beirut), 16 February 1985, p. 6.

11. Interview with Husayn al-Musawi, *Kayhan* (Tehran), 27 July 1986.

12. Speech by Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, *Al-'Ahd* (Beirut), 10 April 1987. *Al-'Ahd* is the weekly newspaper of Hizbullah.

13. Interview with Husayn al-Musawi, *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan* (Beirut: Dar al-Shira', 1984), pp. 226–27.

14. Speech by Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, *Al-'Ahd,* 7 February 1986.

15. *Nass al-risala al-maftuha,* pp. 9, 17.

16. Speech by the chief of staff of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, delivered in the Imam Ali Mosque in Baalbek, *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 9 February 1988.

17. Interview with Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi, *La revue du Liban* (Beirut), 27 July 1985.

18. Interview with Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi, *Al-'Ahd,* 16 October 1987.

19. Interview with Fadlallah, *Al-Nahar al-'arabi wal-duwali,* 21 July 1986.

20. Interview with Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi, *Al-'Ahd,* 16 October 1987.

21. For chronologies of Hizbullah's campaign, see the section "Shiite Terrorism" in the annual *Middle East Military Balance,* published by the Jaffee Center at Tel Aviv University, and also the U.S. Department of State's annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism.* For a comprehensive account of Hizbullah's hostage-holding, see Maskit Burgin et al., *Foreign Hostages in Lebanon* (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Memorandum no. 25; Tel Aviv, August 1988). Hizbullah's violence is also described in a number of accounts by journalists from the Western countries targeted by Hizbullah's violence. From the American vantage point, see Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); John Wolcott and David C. Martin, *Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War against Terrorism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988); and Larry Pintak, *Beirut Outtakes: A TV Correspondent's Portrait of America's Encounter with*

Terror (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988). From the French vantage point, see Xavier Raufer, *La Nébuleuse: Le terrorisme du Moyen-Orient* (Paris: Fayard, 1987); Yves Loiseau, *Le grand troc: Le labyrinthe des otages français au Liban* (Paris: Hachette, 1988); and Gilles Delafon, *Beyrouth: Les soldats de l'Islam* (Paris: Stock, 1989). There are already many published firsthand accounts by former hostages.

22. Interview with Sadiq al-Musawi, *Al-Nahar al-'arabi wal-duwali,* 28 July 1986.

23. See W. A. Terrill, "Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite War," *Conflict Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (1987): 22–35.

24. Al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadallah, *Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi al-Janub wal- Biqa' al-Gharbi wa-Rashayya: Tatallu'at wa-afaq* (Beirut, 1984), p. 11.

25. Speech by Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi, *Al-Safir* (Beirut), 23 September 1986.

26. Ariel Merari, "The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East," in Walter Reich, ed., *The Origins of Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 204–5. These proportions are brought home vividly in the collection of obituaries reproduced in a Syrian-sponsored publication, *Al-'Amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya: Watha'iq wa-suwar* (The self-martyring operations: documents and photographs) (Damascus, 1985). While the volume covers all operations by all groups, it is clearly intended to emphasize Syrian preeminence in the employment of this technique, and opens with excerpts from remarks by Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad.

27. Interview with Fadlallah, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), 15 October 1984.

28. Interview with Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim 'Ubayd, *Al-Safir,* 28 July 1986.

29. Interview with Husayn al-Musawi, *Kayhan,* 29 July 1986.

30. Friday sermon by Fadlallah, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), 27 July 1985.

31. Speech by Fadlallah, *Al-Nahar,* 14 May 1985.

32. For the debate in Hizbullah over hostage-holding, see Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizballah," pp. 149–56.

33. Interview with Fadlallah, *Kayhan,* 14 November 1985.

34. Fadlallah Friday sermon, *Al-'Ahd,* 5 December 1985.

35. Interview with Fadlallah, *La Repubblica* (Rome), 28 August 1989.

36. Interview with Fadlallah, *Al-Shira'* (Beirut), 18 March 1985.

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